ORDER
1. An officer of the respondent Vijaya Bank is before this Court aggrieved by the orders made by the Appellate Authority dated 17-9-1991 in confirming the orders made by the Disciplinary Authority dated 27-12-1990. By the said order the Disciplinary Authority imposed certain punishments as provided under C and D Regulations of the Bank.
2. Briefly the background facts are:
While working as Branch Manager of the respondent-Bank, petitioner was served with a charge memo dated 6-2-1989. In that it was alleged that while working as an officer at various branches of the Bank in Bangalore, as a Branch Manager in Keshavapura Branch, Hobli and at West Maredpally Branch, Secunderabad between the period 15-4-1980 and 24-2-1987, petitioner had committed grave official misconduct and failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant, inasmuch as, he had amassed wealth disproportionate to all his known sources of income by corrupt and or by illegal means to the tune of Rs. 2,03,323.14/-. According to the respondent-Bank these omissions and commissions would constitute acts of misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 3(1) read with Regulation 24 of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1981. In the charge memo itself, it was communicated to thepetitioner to offer his explanation since the respondent-Bank intends to hold an enquiry.
3. By reply dated 11-3-1989, petitioner had denied the allegations made in the charge memo and in fact had explained the charges. The Disciplinary Authority not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner in his reply dated 11-3-1989, had appointed an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the allegations made in the charge memo. The Enquiry Officer after holding an enquiry as required under the regulations of the respondent-Bank and in accordance with the principles of natural justice had proceeded to give his findings on the charges alleged against the petitioner in the charge memo. According to the Enquiry Officer, petitioner is not guilty of the charges alleged against him in the charge memo. The Enquiry Officer thereafter had submitted his report, findings thereof and the records of the proceedings to the Disciplinary Authority as required under C and D Regulations of the respondent-Bank. The Disciplinary Authority with the available evidence on record, disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proceeds to hold that the delinquent official is guilty of the charges alleged in the memo. Having come to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges, proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 27-12-1990. In that, the Disciplinary Authority has imposed following punishments:
'Reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of two stages with immediate effect i.e., the basis pay of Mr. Manohar Pakkala is reduced from Rs. 3,780/- to Rs. 3,540/- in the middle management grade Scale-II with immediate effect'.
4. The appeal preferred by the petitioner did not meet with success. The Appellate Authority by his order dated 17-9-1991 was pleased to confirm the orders made by the Disciplinary Authority dated 27-12-1990. It is these orders which have brought the petitioner before this Court being aggrieved by the same.
5. Sri. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner raised the following two issues for consideration of this Court in support of the reliefs sought in this writ petition. They are:
(I) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, a notice to the delinquent is a must and otherwise the entire proceedings would be opposed to the principles of natural justice. In support of this contention, learned Counsel relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of K. Ashoka v Vijaya Bank and Another.
(II) The findings of the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority are wholly perverse and basing on such findings, the Disciplinary Authority could not have imposed the punishments as has been done by him by his order dated 27-12-1990.
6. Smt. Tapsi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank sought to justify the impugned orders made by the Bank authorities.
7. Insofar as the 1st issue is concerned in my view it is no more a debatable issue in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India, Bhopal v S.S. Koshal. In the aforesaid decision a specific issue was raised before the Court. The issue was whether failure to give fresh notice to the delinquent when the Appellate Authority (Disciplinary Authority) disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on some of the charges would it vitiate the entire enquiry proceedings. The Supreme Court considering the issue urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant before them was pleased to state as under:
'So far as the second ground is concerned, we are unable to see any substance in it. No such fresh opportunity is contemplated by the regulations nor can such a requirement be deduced from the principles of natural justice. It may be remembered that the Enquiry Officer's report is not binding upon the Disciplinary Authority and that it is open to the Disciplinary Authority to come to its own conclusion on the charges. It is not in the nature of an appeal from the Enquiry Officer to the Disciplinary Authority. It is one and the same proceeding. It is open to a Disciplinary Authority to hold the inquiry himself. It is equally open to him to appoint an Enquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry and place the entire record before him with or without his findings. But in either case the final decision is to be taken by him on the basis of the material adduced. This also appears to be the view taken by one of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.) as a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahendra Kumar v Union of India. The second contention accordingly stands rejected'.
8. In my view, in view of the categorical observations made by the Supreme Court that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, a fresh notice to the delinquent is not required, therefore, I am unable to accept the 1st contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. However learned Counsel strongly relies upon the observations made by this Court in the case of K. Ashoka, supra.
9. Before I advert to the observations made by this Court in Ashoka's case, supra, I intend to add, normally the Courts ought to follow its previous decisions of the learned Single Judge, but such a rule is not a rule of law but a matter of practice. Interest of justice does not prescribe strict adherence to the above rule. There is also another view which is to the effect that the Judicial decorum and certainty of law require a Single Judge to follow the decision of another Single Judge if the facts are same or similar. However, if the facts of the case are dissimilar or distinct, the principles of law enunciated in the preceding case cannot be made applicable in a later case. For the purpose of this case, I intend to follow the earlier thinking.
10. In Ashoka's case, supra, domestic enquiry proceedings had been initiated by the respondent Vijaya Bank to inquire into certain acts of misconduct said to have been committed by delinquent officer. After an inquiry, the Enquiry Officer was of the view that the delinquent is not guilty of the charges alleged in the charge memo. The findings of the Enquiry Officer was not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and had passed an order to reopen the entire enquiry proceedings by remitting the matter to the Enquiry Officer for a de novo enquiry. It was at that stage, delinquent officer had approached this Court inter alia questioning the legality or otherwise of the orders made by the Disciplinary Authority dated 28-1-1991.
11. What was canvassed by learned Counsel for petitioner therein was that the order made by the Disciplinary Authority is wholly illegal and invalid since the Disciplinary Authority before passing the impugned order had not issued fresh notice and had not afforded an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In support of that contention, the learned Counsel had relied upon the observations made by Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v B. Karunakar and Ram Kishan v Union of India and Others and also the dicta of this Court in Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation v Vittaldas.
12. Per contra learned Counsel Sri. M. Subba Rao for respondents contends that whenever Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, he need not issue a fresh notice and can come to his own conclusion on the evidence available on record. In support of that contention the learned Counsel had mainly relied on the observations made by Supreme Court in Koshal's case, supra.
13. The Court after taking into consideration the fact situation, the date of the enquiry report and the orders passed by Disciplinary Authority was pleased to decide the one and the only issue viz., whether the Disciplinary Authority was required to hear the delinquent before rejecting the report of the Enquiry Officer while answering the question raised by the parties to the lis, was pleased to hold that a fresh notice is absolute to the delinquent by the Disciplinary Authority before rejecting the report of the Enquiry Officer regarding the finding that the charges levelled against the petitioner was not proved. The Court while rejecting the contention of the learned Counsel for respondent and while observing that the decision of the Apex Court would not apply to the fact situation was pleased to observe:
'The law laid down in the Karunakar's case, supra, makes it clear that in respect of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer subsequent to 20-10-1990, the delinquent official is entitled for the copy of the report and he should be given an opportunity to explain the finding in the report. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioner (respondent) cannot get anyassistance from the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India, supra, as the principle laid down in the said case will not apply to the facts of the present case as the report was given by the Enquiry Officer after 20-10-1990'.
and then holds that the delinquent official is entitled for an opportunity before the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in favour of the delinquent official mainly relying upon the observations made by Supreme Court in Ram Kishan's case, supra, and the view of this Court in Karnataka Agro Industries case, supra.
14. In Ramkishan's case, supra, the Supreme Court was not considering the question whether Disciplinary Authority was obliged to issue a notice to the delinquent official whenever he disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer which is favourable to the delinquent. In the said case the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority should contain reasons or not.
15. The Disciplinary Authority in the aforesaid decision had disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and after disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and before coming to a conclusion, whether the delinquent official is guilty of the charges alleged against him, had issued a show cause notice to the delinquent official but in the notice the Disciplinary Authority had not indicated the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority proposes to disagree with the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. In a case of that nature, the Supreme Court was of the view that.-
'The next question is whether the show-cause notice is valid in law. It is true, as rightly contended by the Counsel for the appellant, that the show cause notice does not indicate the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority proposed to disagree with the conclusions reached by the Inquiry Officer. The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the Disciplinary Authority persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the Inquiry Officer for the reasons given in the inquiry report or he may offer additional reasons in support of the finding by the Inquiry Officer.
In that situation, unless the Disciplinary Authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on Inquiry Officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the Disciplinary Authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the Inquiry Officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final orders some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions' reached by the Disciplinary Authority cannot cure the defect. But on the facts in this case, theonly charge which was found to have been accepted is that the appellant had used abusive language on the superior authority. Since the Disciplinary Authority has said that it has agreed partly to that charge the provisional conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority in that behalf even in the show cause notice cannot be said to be vague. Therefore, we do not find any justification to hold that the show cause notice is vitiated by an error of law, on the facts in this case.
16. In the case of Karnataka Agro Industries, supra, a Bench of this Court was of the view that the Disciplinary Authority is entitled to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer but however the requirement is that the delinquent should be issued with a notice and should afford him an opportunity of hearing. The observation made by Bench of this Court was much earlier to the law declared by Supreme Court in Koshal's case, supra.
17. In view of the law laid down by Supreme Court in Koshal's case, supra, I respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the learned Judge for the reasons, that the learned Judge while coming to the conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority whenever disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, should issue a show cause notice and should afford an opportunity of hearing had followed the observations of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan's case, supra. In my view the facts situation in that case was totally different. The learned Judge refers to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Koshal's case, supra, but does not follow the ratio decidendi in the said case only for the reason that the enquiry report in the said case had been submitted to the Disciplinary Authority earlier to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v Mohammed Ramzan Khan. In my view Koshal's case, supra, answers the issue whether a show cause notice is a must to the delinquent if the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Court is of the view that the Disciplinary Authority can come to his own conclusion on the evidence available on record. That apart a reading of the provisions in Vijaya Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 shows that the Enquiry Officer has to submit his report and the findings to the Disciplinary Authority. If the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings it can impose any punishment as provided in the Regulations. However, if the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the report and the findings of the Enquiry Officer on any article of charge or on all the charges, it is under an obligation to record its reasons for disagreement and record its own finding on such charges and impose such penalty as it considers appropriate in its opinion irrespective of the report and the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The language employed in the sub-regulation does not give any indication that whenever Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it should give notice to the delinquent officer before recording its own finding. In view of the clear language employed in the sub-regulation it is difficult to accept thecontention of the learned Counsel. In view of the above, the first contention of the learned Counsel, has no merit and accordingly it is rejected.
18. Insofar as the 2nd contention of the learned Counsel is concerned, in my view the judicial review of this Court in a domestic enquiry proceedings is limited. The Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v Union of India and Others, was pleased to observe as under:
Para 12: Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges on a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact of conclusion. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as denied therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the Disciplinary Authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal, in its power of judicial review does not act as Appellate Authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the Disciplinary Authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case'.
19. In the instant case, the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and on the evidence available on records comes to the conclusion that the delinquent official is guilty of the charges alleged against him in the charge memo. While doing so, the Disciplinary Authority had taken into consideration the evidence of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 who are examined by the delinquent on his behalf and also the evidence of M.W. 1 who was examined by the Management to prove the charges against the petitioner. After analysing the evidence of all these three witnesses, comes to the conclusion that there is some evidence against the petitioner and that evidence would implicate that the petitioner is guilty of the charges alleged against him in the charge memo.
20. Having come to that conclusion, the Disciplinary Authority proceeds to give his findings and has imposed certain punishments. In my view it is difficult to accept the assertion of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority is perverse for the simple reason that the Disciplinary Authority has come to the conclusion on some evidence available on record. Since I have negatived both the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any good grounds to interfere with the impugned orders made by the respondent-authorities. Accordingly, petition deserves to be dismissed and it is dismissed. Rule discharged. In the facts and circumstances of this case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.