Venkatesh, J.
1. The appellant Abdul Khader has preferred this appeal against the order dated 31-10-1985 of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 10090 of 1984.
2. In the petition filed by him under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, Abdul Khader had challenged the order dated 21-51984 of the Land Tribunal, Sedam, Gulbarga District (No. REV/LRY/74-75/392) declaring him as a surplus holder and directing him to surrender 32 acres, 37 guntas of land. The Tribunal had passed that order under S. 67 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. (the Act) on a declaration made by Abdul. Khader before it in form No. 11, under S. 66 of the Act.
3. Petitioner Abdul Khader's case before the learned single Judge was that he was not a surplus holder, was not liable to surrender any extent of land and that the Tribunal had committed an error in declaring him as such.
4. In the declaration he had filed in the Tribunal, the petitioner had stated 'the lands declared by him are joint family lands which are shared by himself, his wife, two major sons and 4 unmarried daughters'.
It is not in dispute that the lands held by the declarant were 'D' class lands. It is also not in dispute that the total extent was 140 acres, 37 guntas.
5. The Tribunal holding an enquiry on this declaration came to the conclusion that the petitioner and his wife and children constitute a joint family; that the lands in question were held by that family; that the petitioner and one of his sons were majors and therefore the family was entitled to retain two ceiling areas, in all, measuring 108 acres; and that it was liable to surrender the remaining extent of 32 acres, 37 guntas.
6. Petitioner's contention in the writ petition before the learned single Judge was that the Tribunal had committed an error in treating his second son as a minor and in holding that his family was a surplus holder. His case was that that son who had been treated as a minor as on 1-3-1974 by the Tribunal had in fact attained majority by that date; that he had proof to show this fact and that even otherwise, since, admittedly, that boy had attained majority as on the date when the Tribunal passed the impugned order (21-5-1984) the Tribunal ought to have held that he too was entitled to retain a ceiling area and taking that view of the matter it should have held that his family was entitled to retain three ceiling areas amounting 162 acres and therefore the family was not a surplus holder and was not liable to surrender any land at all.
7. The learned single Judge by the impugned order, though has partly allowed the writ petition permitting the declarant to retain 20 more acres of land, however directed him to surrender 12 acres, 21 guntas and declined to concede the petitioner's claim that his family was entitled to retain one more ceiling area. In the course of his order, the learned Judge observed that the two previous decisions of this Court in Nagappa Channappa v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 1 Kant U 420: (AIR 1979 NOC 175 Kant) and Revanna Siddappa Hadri v. Asstt. Commr. Indi, (1977) 2 Kant U 187: (AIR 1977 NOC 338 Kant) are no longer good law.
8. Since certain observations made by the learned Judge in the course of his order are of general importance, we requested some of the members of the Bar to assist the Court in deciding the case. Accordingly, Sriyuths : A R. Janardhana, Shivaraj Patil, T. S. Ramchandra, advcoates, argued as Amidus Curiae and Sri V. T. Raya Reddy, Advocate, as Intervenor. We have heard all of them and also learned counsel Sri. Appa Rao, for the appellant and Sri. Chanden Gouder, learned High Court Government pleader.
9. The first question that arises for consideration in this appeal is 'With reference to what date the extent of the holding of the declarant (the person or the family as the case may be) has to be determined by the Tribunal.'
10. In Nagappa's case (1979) 1 Kant LJ 420: (AIR 1979 NOC 175 Kant) a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that the date on which the Tribunal finally takes a decision in the matter under S. 67 can be the date with reference to which the extent of the ceiling area of the family could be determined. The learned single Judge has observed that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhikoba Shankar v. Mohan Lal Punchand, : [1982]3SCR218 , Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, : [1972]1SCR48 , and The State of Maharashtra v. Annapurna Bai, (AIR 1985 SC 1403), the decision of this Court in Nagappa's case is no longer good law.
11. We are inclined to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge. As observed in Bhikoba's case, the Act has to be construed in accordance with its scheme and object. Chapter IV of the Act containing as it does Ss. 63 to 79 provides for creping on land holdings. S. 63 in its present form is a provision that has been substituted by the Amendment Act in place of former S. 63. To a certain extent this provision further reduces the ceiling area fixing it either for a person or a family at 10 units. The Section declares that 16no person who is not a member of a family or who has no family and no family shall except as otherwise provided in this Act, be entitled to hold, whether as land owner, landlord or tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another, land in excess of the ceiling area'. (See sub-section (1) of S. 63). That is the mandate of the law. It declares in unequivocal terms that no person or family in Karnataka State should hold agricultural land in excess of 10 units which is the ceiling area. Since this provision has been brought on the Statute book with effect from 1-3-1974 we have to understand that with effect from that date, its mandate is required to be obeyed and the object of the law should be given effect to from that date.
Section 66 which provides for the filing of the declaration of holdings and S. 67 which says as to how the enquiring authority (the Tribunal) shall have to work out the ceiling area in a given case do support the above conclusion. The aforesaid provisions contain procedure ' e and guidelines in the matter of filing declaration and in determining the ceiling area in a given case. Since none can hold land in excess of the ceiling area with effect from the date on which S. 63 came into force, the statutory authority in giving effect to the mandate of the law, cannot proceed from any other date. The enquiry of the authority is required to find out the extent of land held by the declarant as on 1-3-1974.
12. In Raghunath Laxman Wani's case the Supreme Court considered a similar question under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. Section 3 there under provided that 'on the commencement of this Act there shall be in posed to the extent, and in the manner hereinafter provided a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land throughout the State.' Section 4 of that Act prohibited a person from holding land in excess of the ceiling area, and S. 5 and other related provisions provided for the determination of the ceiling area. The Supreme Court after examining the scope of these provisions observed: 'ceiling area has to be determined with reference to the appointed day'. It was further observed that 'the policy of the Act appears to be that on and after the appointed day, no person in the State should be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area as determined in the Act' and it was also observed that 'the argument that every addition or reduction of the number of the members of the family requires predetermination of the ceiling area of such a family would mean an almost perpetual fixation and recitation of the ceiling area.' Similar are the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra v. Annapurna Bai, (AIR 1985 SC 1403).
13. The scheme of our Act is not quite different. The relevant provisions are also not dissimilar. If the relevant provisions of our Act are read in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, the conclusion that we have reached would be inescapable. In the circumstances, we agree that the decision of this Court in Nagappa Channappa, (1979) 1 Kant LJ 420: (AIR 1979 NOC 175 Kant) can no longer be held to be good law.
14. In the course of his order, at Para 18 the learned single Judge says that a major son who is not a declarant himself cannot request the Tribunal to permit him to retain a ceiling area for himself. The learned Judge appears to be of the view that sub-section (4) of S. 63 does not confer on him any such right at all.
15. It seems to us that the view taken by the learned Judge may not be correct. It may be noted that it is not the filing of the declaration under S. 66(l) of the Act alone that confers jurisdiction or enables the Tribunal to determine the ceiling area. Subsection (2) of S. 66 confers power on the Tahsildar to call upon any person to furnish to him a declaration as to the lands held by him. And besides this, in the declaration filed in form No. 11 in a given case, if there is a statement that the lands are held by a joint family; that that joint family consists of the number of persons mentioned therein and if the Tribunal finds, on enquiry, that the lands are held by that joint family and that that joint family consisted at the relevant time some major male members, the Tribunal can certainly take notice of that fact and allow the family in the case of each major member a ceiling area or an extent equivalent to that major male member's share. It may thus work out the extent of land that the family could, hold. Sub-section (4) of Sec. 63 read with $. 66 clearly provides for this.
16. The ceiling area has to be determined either with reference to a person or with reference to a 'family' as defined in the Act. Therefore, the possibility of a 'joint family' as defined in the Act also holding lands, as such joint family, is not ruled out by the Act. This is clear by sub-section (4) of Sec. 63 itself. An unmarried major member of a 'joint family' would be, under the Act, a person and not a family as defined in the Act. Subsection (4) says that in calculating the extent of land held by such a person, who is also a member of a joint family, the share that such person may have in the lands held by the 'joint family' shall also have to be taken into consideration. Now, the 'joint family' as defined in the Act is not confined to one or the other communities. It applies to all communities including Muslims. Under sub-; section (17) of S. 2 of the Act 'joint family' means in the case of persons governed by Hindu law an undivided Hindu family and in the case of others, a group or unit the members of which are by custom joint in estate or residence. It is relevant to note that, Mohammedan Law does not recognize a joint family like an Undivided Hindu Coparcener. The agrarian relations Acts throughout the country, therefore, wanted to have a uniform definition applicable to all sections of the people. It is with that end in view this new term 'joint family' has been coined and introduced in the various agrarian relations Acts. The law recognizes and rightly so, the members of a family of Muslims or Christians together holding property. To treat them on par with Undivided Hindu Families this entity 'joint family' has been brought about in the Act. The possibility of a Muslim family as such family holding agricultural lands is recognized by the Act. Joint possession of properties by the members of a family governed by Mohammedan Law is also envisaged by that law under certain circumstances. The following observations of the learned Authors of Mullah's Principles of Mohammedan Law, Eighteenth Edition, page 50 may be noted:
'However, if a custom of the family establishing joint holding as is common among Hindus is proved, it will be given effect. Additions to the joint estate by the managing member of a Mohammedan family will be presumed to have been made from the joint estate and will be for the benefit of all the members. But acquisition of property not attributable to the family assets will not be for the family.
However, if all the members of the family live in commensality and are in joint possession of family properties, it will be for the person claiming property as his own to show that the source of the property was his own. Mohammed Ibrahim v. Mohammad Abubakker, AIR 1976 Mad 84'.
17. In the instant case, on fact the Tribunal has held that as declared by the declarant the lands had in fact been held by the joint family consisting of the declarant, his wife, their sons and daughters. Therefore, it had permitted a ceiling area each in the case of the declarant and his first son since, according to the Tribunal, he had attained majority by 1-3-1974. We are not in a position to say that that finding is either incorrect or not based on facts.
18. Though the question as to whether a minor son separated from the family at a partition that had taken place prior to 1-31974 could still be treated as a member of the family as on 1-3-1974 had not directly come up for consideration in this case, the learned single Judge, however, has incidentally gone into that question and observed that the decision of this Court in Revanna Siddappa's case, (1977) 2 Kant U 187: (AIR 1977 NOC 338 Kant) is no longer good law in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in (i) State of Maharashtra v. Vyasendra, : [1983]3SCR1 : (ii) Begullabapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : [1983]3SCR701 ; (iii) Ramendrasingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, : [1984]2SCR451 and (1v) Vengdasalam Pillai v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, : [1985]2SCR925 .
19. It is therefore necessary to examine the correctness or the legality of the observations made by the learned Judge. As a preliminary to the consideration of this aspect of the matter, we may note that though the agrarian relations Acts brought about in several States during 60s and 70s have some common features, they do differ on the question of the ceiling limits prescribed, the rate of compensation payable, exemptions on agricultural holdings and the like. It was bound to be so for reasons both historic and geographic. Unlike in the case of trade, commerce and industry, which are a modern phenomenon, land relations have evolved through history in different ways in different regions. Fertility of the soil and also pressure on land, irrigation facilities, patterns of cultivation, nature of holdings, etc., widely differ from State to State.
20. In vyasendra, : [1983]3SCR1 the Supreme Court was dealing with a case arising under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 196 1. The question that had arisen therein was as to whether the land held by the wife as her separate property or stridhana property should be treated as land held by what was known in that law as the 'Family Unit'. The Court held that that share of the wife also should be included. In that Act Explanation to sub-section (1) of S. 4 defines what constitutes the' family unit'. A person, his spouse and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters do constitute
'family unit'. But sub-section (1) of S. 4 itself has made it absolutely clear that the lands held by such members 'whether jointly or separately' should be deemed to have been ME by the family unit. We do not find this term 'whether jointly or separately' in the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act.
21. In Bapi Raju's case, : [1983]3SCR701 it was the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 that had come up for consideration. The question was as to whether the land standing separately in the name of a minor son should be taken as the land held by the 'family unit' of which that minor son was a member. Placing reliance on Vyasendra's case, : [1983]3SCR1 referred to above, the Supreme Court held that that land also should be treated as land held by the family unit under the Andhra Pradesh Act. A reading of Andhra Pradesh Act shows that under S. 7 of that Act even partitions taking place after a certain date had been treated as null and void which in fact is not the case under the Karnataka Act. In Ramondrasingh's case, : [1984]2SCR451 the court was considering the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, relying on Bapi Raju's case and taking into consideration the special features of the Madhya Pradesh Act the Court has held that minor son cannot claim separate ceiling area independently.
22. The Court has held in Vengdasalam Pillai's case, : [1985]2SCR925 that the separate properties of minor sons as well as of the wife obtained by them on partition before the appointed day were required to be included in the holding of the family under the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation on Ceiling on Land) Act. It is relevant to note that under sub-section (4) of S. 4 of the Pondicherry Act it is specifically made clear that 'in calculating the extent of land held by any person, any land which was transferred by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned by that person after the appointed day but before the commencement of this Act, shall be taken into account as if such land had not bee transferred or partition as the case may be'. We do not find such a provision in the Karnataka Act.
23. In Revanna's case (1977) 2 Kant LJ 187 : (AIR 1977 NOC 338 Kant) while construing the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act and in particular S. 63 thereof which provides for fixation of the ceiling area, a learned single Judge of this Court has held that 'land transferred on partition is not included in the deemed transfer of land laid down in explanation to S. 63(10)' and has further held that 'the authority should calculate the ceiling area of the land, after taking into consideration the partition and the extent of land that fell to the sharers'. The learned Judge also observed that where there was a partition between a Hindu father and his minor son, that share of the minor son should not be treated as land held by the family. Undoubtedly, the partition referred to by the learned single Judge was the partition that had taken place prior to 1-3-1974, the date on which the Karnataka Amendment Act came into force and not partitions that had taken place subsequently. We are, therefore, not inclined to hold that the view taken in Revanna's case is not correct. Regard being had to the express provisions in our Act, the decision therein appears to be correct.
24. There is another aspect of the matter. This decision was rendered on 22-4-1977, about 9 years ago. The appeals then preferred by the State against that decision W. As. 419 and 420 of 1977 were dismissed on the question of delay. Against the aforesaid decision, the State preferred petitions for Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court in Nos. 507 and 508 of 1979. The same were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 6-4-1979.
The Courts and the Tribunals have hitherto followed that decision. The parties have generally adjusted their rights and arranged their affairs in accordance with that decision. Possibly in several cases lands which were subject matter of such declarations may have changed hands and in some cases, there may be improvements with considerable investments. It is also possible that third parties may have purchased such lands. When such is the case, we feel that matters settled over these years should not be disturbed. In this context, it will be useful to take note of the following observations of the Supreme Court in Gajanan v. Seth Brindaban, : [1971]1SCR657 . At Para 13 the Court observed thus :
'There is also another aspect which may, legitimately be kept in view. People in arranging their affairs are entitled to rely on a decision of the highest court which appears to have prevailed for considerable length of time and it would require some exceptional reasons to justify its reversal when such reversal is likely to create serious embarrassment for those who had acted on the faith of what seemed to be the settled law. Where the meaning of a Statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretations than one, and one view accepted by the highest court has stood for a long period during which many transactions such as dealings in property and making of contracts have taken place on the faith of that interpretation the court would ordinarily be reluctant to put upon it a different interpretation which would materially affect those transactions.'
Further, the observations of the Supreme Court in Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tewari, : [1973]2SCR835 , may also be noted (page 294):
'........In the matter of the interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view would not only introduce an element of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which might have been entered into on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decision can be aptly invoked in such a situation. As observed by Lord Evershed M.R. in the case of Brownsea Haven Properties Ltd. v. Poole Corp., (1958) Ch 574 there is well established authority for the view that a decision of long standing on the basis of which many persons will in the course of time have arranged their affairs should not lightly be disturbed by a superior court not strictly bound itself by the decision.'
We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no reason to reconsider the decision of this Court in Revanna's ease, (1977) 2 Kant U 187: (AIR 1977 NOC 338 Kant) much less to declare that decision as no longer good law.
25. For reasons stated, we allow this appeal and setting aside the order of the learned single Judge, allow the writ petition, make the rule issued absolute and quash the impugned order of the Land Tribunal and remit the matter involved therein with a direction to it to hold an enquiry and find out as to whether the second son of the declarant had attained majority as on 1-3-1974 and dispose of the declaration made by the appellant petitioner in the light of the observations made in this judgment.
Parties to bear their own costs.
26. Appeal allowed.