ORDER
Rajendra Babu, J.
1. This appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, questioning the correctness of an order made in Writ Petition No. 38181/92 on 6th August. 1993. By the said order, the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition questioning the correctness of the conditions imposed for grant of a permit, however modifying the said order to certain extent in regard to the age of vehicle that could be covered by a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 thereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. The appellant applied for gram of a stage carriage permit. The R.T.A., Manga-lore, granted permit subject to certain conditions including that the petitioner shall produce the documents of 1985 or later model vehicle within 30 days from the date of receipt of the proceedings. The matter was carried in appeal to the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal contending that the condition imposed in regard to the age of the vehicle was illegal. The appeal was allowed and the resolution of the R.T.A. was modified to the effect that the appellant shall be granted permit in respect of a 1983 model vehicle subject to the condition of replacing the said vehicle by a less than 10 years old vehicle as and when the vehicle covered by the permit becomes 10 years old from the date of initial registration which shall be a condition of the permit. Correct ness of this order was called in question in the question in the writ petition.
3. The learned single Judge took the view that under Section 72(2) of the Act, R.T.A, can grant a permit for a stage carriage of a 'specified description' and the expression 'specified description' would include the year of manufacture also and to reach this conclusion relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in : [1980]2SCR1024 (Subhash Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and several other decisions. The learned single Judge rejected the contention of the petitioner that Section 59 of the Act militates against imposing conditions under Section 72(2) of the Act so as to prescribe the age limit in regard to the vehicles to be covered by permits. Being of the view that Section 59 provides that the Central Government may, having regard to the public safety, convenience and objects of the Act, specify the life of a motor vehicle reckoned from the date of its manufacture, after the expiry of which the motor vehicle shall not be deemed to comply with the requirements of the Act held that the purpose of Section 59 is to fix the life of a vehicle for the purpose of issues of certificate of registration; while Section 72 is in relation to grant of permits, in respect of different kinds of vehicles including a stage carriage.
4. Before us two questions are raised for consideration:
(1) Whether the authorities acting under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 have the power to prescribe a particular model or age of a vehicle to be used as a stage carriage service under a permit in the absence of a Notification being issued by the Central Government in exercise of the power under Section 59 of the Act?
(2) Whether the learned single Judge was justified in departing from the earlier view in this regard?
5. On the first question, it is submitted that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the '1939 Act') there was no provision similar to Section 59 of the Act and under Section 24(4) of the 1939 Act the power to fix the period for validity of certificate was mentioned and it would be period of 15 years from the date of issue of certificate and the same could also be renewed. However, under Section 59 of the Act, it is the Central Government which has been empowered to fix the age limits for different classes of vehicles. It is urged that the learned single Judge did not take into consideration that a certificate of registration issued under Section 46 of the Act would be effective throughout India and the same is not required to be registered in any other State. Under Section 56 of the Act, a transport vehicle which is covered by the fitness certificate is deemed to be validly registered. Under Section 59 thereof, Central Government is empowered to prescribe the Rules as to the effectiveness of such certificate and under Section 59, the authorities under the Act are empowered to cancel the certificate of fitness if it does not comply with the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Under Section 59 of the Act, the Central Government has framed Rule_62 which specifies the validity of the Fitness Certificate in respect of new vehicles for 2 years; in respect of vehicles which complete 10 years from the date of registration for one year and the renewal of a fitness certificate for another 6 months after completion of 10 years from the date of original registration. It is submitted that from the above provisions, it is the Central Government that is empowered to prescribe the age of various vehicles and therefore the transport authorities constituted under the Act cannot act in conflict with Section 59 of the Act. The decisions rendered prior to the Act coming into force cannot be applied at all as under the earlier Motor Vehicles Act provisions akin to Section 59 of the Act were not available. No reliance on the decision in Subhash Chandra's case can be placed at all inasmuch as in the said decision the Supreme Court was concerned with a case arising from Uttar Pradesh where a Rule had been framed by that State as to the age of the vehicle in relation to omnibus and the vires of the said Rule had been questioned and the said Rule was held to be within the competence of the State Government.
6. The basic contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the authorities acting under the Act cannot impose a condition as to the age of vehicle which is covered by a permit. Under the Scheme of the Act, requirement in regard to registration of a motor vehicle is covered by Chapter-IV of the Act; while Chapter V deals with the control of transport vehicles. A 'Transport vehicle' is defined under Section 2(47) as a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle. Public service means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxi-cab, a motor cab, contract carnage and stage carriage. A goods carnage means a motor vehicle construed or adapted for use solely for the carriage of goods. An educational institution bus is an omnibus which is owned by such institution and used for the purpose of transporting students or staff of such institution. A 'Private service vehicle' means a motor vehicle which is construed or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver for the purpose of carrying persons for, or in connection with, trade or business otherwise than for hire or reward. A 'motor vehicle' gives a very wide definition of any vehicle which is mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads, i.e., every kind of motor vehicle is covered. Therefore, while Chapter IV relates to control of motor vehicles by registration and condition thereto. Chapter V relates only to transport vehicles. Under the Act at Chapter IV Section 59 occurs which empowers the Central Government to fix the age limit of a motor vehicle. That has relevance only in regard to issue of certificate of fitness and section 56 which provides for certificate of fitness is subject to Section 59 of the Act. Section 72 of the Act empowers the R.T. A. to grant permit for a stage carriage of a 'specified description', subject to certain conditions which may be prescribed under the Rules. While granting registration what is primarily to be looked at is the road worthiness or fitness of the vehicle so as not to affect public safety and convenience. However, while granting permits for a transport vehicle the authority may also take into consideration the safety and convenience of passengers who travel in such vehicle apart from road worthiness and depending upon the nature of the permit that is granted by the authority concerned, a condition in this regard could be imposed by the said authority. Thus, the provisions of Section 59 and Section 72 operate in two different fields and the authorities acting under both the provisions can impose conditions relevant thereto including as to date of manufacture of the same.
7. The Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra's case has made certain general observations in the matter of prescribing such conditions. The Supreme Court notices that the imposition of a condition would assure a comparative safety and older the mode! less the chances of such safely and every new model would incorporate new devices to reduce danger and provide comfort and a new model assures of less failures and breakages and less susceptible to wear and tear adding to the fatigue of the travelling public. Therefore, in considering whether a particular vehicle of a 'specified description' atone should be used could be taken note of by the authorities concerned in granting the permit.
8. The learned single Judge while disposing of W.P. No. 11832/91 took the view that the R.T.A. being only a statutory authority cannot go beyond the provisions of the , Act and the Rules framed thereunder to insist upon fulfilment of such conditions for grant of the permit. When such age qualification had not been prescribed under Section 59 of the Act, it was not open to the Authority concerned to impose such condition. With respect, we cannot subscribe to this view because even in the absence of Rules, if conditions could be prescribed in the permit and such conditions are reasonable and such power to impose conditions is traceable to the provisions of the Act itself, it cannot be said that such power is exercised by the authority beyond its powers. The expression 'Specified Description' used in Section 72(2) of the Act is similar to such expression used in Section 48(3) of the 1939 Act and that expression had been explained in several decisions. Specified description of a stage carriage is not confined to its class or make, but it also includes the year of manufacture. In Subhash Chandra's case, the Supreme Court clearly spelt out that the expression 'Specific Description' would include the year of make and the particulars of the model as part of the description.
9. In this view, when the Act itself empowers the authority concerned to prescribe the model of the vehicle or the year of the make as covered by description of the vehicle, it cannot be said that the authority was acting ultra vires the provision of the Act or the Rules in imposing such condition. Indeed, neither the decision in Subhash Chandra's case was brought to the notice of this Court in the earlier decision nor the effect of Section 72(2) of the Act adverted to. In that view of the matter, the decision in Writ Petition No. 11832 of 1991 and other decisions following the same are not in order. Therefore, we overrule those two decisions and agree with the conclusion of the learned single Judge.
10. In the circumstances, we do not think the second question raised by the learned Counsel as to the propriety of the learned single Judge in not referring the matter to a Division Bench and deciding the matter himself really would matter. However, we may state that when the decision is based on a decision of the Supreme Court and to which no reference is made in the earlier decision or when the earlier decision did not take note of the provisions of law noticed in the decision under appeal we find no impropriety on thepart of the learned Judge.
11. Thus, the appellant having failed on all submissions advanced before us, this appeal is dismissed.
12. Appeal dismissed.