ORDER
1. This appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 arises from the judgment and award dated 12-7-1994 whereby the Tribunal has awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,800 with cost and interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of petition till the date of realisation payable by the respondents 1 to 3 jointly and severally. Respondent 3 before the Claims Tribunal is the appellant in this present appeal.
2. On behalf of the appellant only one and one contention has been raised that the learned Tribunal has erred in fastening the liability on the Insurance Company with reference to the death caused in the accident particularly when the deceased person was a passenger in the jeep covered by the 'Act policy'. Learned Counsel contended that the Tribunal erred in not seeing the insurance covered jeep bearing No. MGR 7095 only for 3rd party risk, i.e., the 'Act policy' which covers only liability for third party and it does not cover the liability of the occupants in the jeep.
3. We have applied our mind to the above contention raised on behalf of the appellant. It will be appropriate to refer and quote Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, as quoted hereinafter:
'Section 147. Requirements of polices and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:
Provided that a policy shall not be required-
(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of or bodily injury to, any such employee-
(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or
(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or
(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or
(ii) to cover any contractual liability.
Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place'.
4. The contention, as has been advanced in this case, was earlier raised before one of us in the case of National Insurance Company Limited, Bangalore v Smt. Rasheeda and Another. Later on it appears such a question and contention appears to have arisen in the case of New India Assurance Company, Bangalore v Satpal Singh and Others , in which such a contention has been rejected by their Lordships in the Supreme Court. It will be appropriate at this juncture to quote relevant passage from the following two decisions:
(i) National Insurance Company Limited's case, supra - This Court after referring to provisions of Section 95 of old Motor Vehicles Act and Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and to the decision of Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Others v M/s. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Company Private Limited and Another, and the observation made in para 8 thereof, observed, as under:
'A reading of sub-section (1) per se shows that statutory requirements of policy and the limits of liability. Firstly, we have to make out a distinction in sub-clauses (1)(i) and (1)(ii) of Section 147, so far as the death or bodily injury to any person in public service vehicle is concerned. Clause II has provided separately, so far as the liability arising from death or bodily injury to 'Any person' caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place is concerned. It has been mentioned and provided under Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The expression used as 'Any person' is of wide connotation and includes in itself and within the framework of expression Third party' used in it is included any person other than the insurer and the insured. It may include in itself a traveller, in a private vehicle. It may also include in itself the person who is a pedestrian and has died or has been injured by the use of private vehicle on the road. It may also include as a case of pedestrian injured or a pedestrian who has died on account of injury caused to him by the use of a vehicle may be a public service vehicle or private vehicle. But so far as the passengers in public service are concerned there category has been mentioned separately. The distinction in the use of two expressions in the two clauses per se reveal that any person may include a traveller in a private vehicle. The learned Counsel contended that it does not include in itself a traveller in private vehicle. I am unable to accept this contention. The private vehicle is also required to be properly insured. The object behind the provision requiring compulsory insurance is to protect the members of community travelling in vehicles or using roads from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicle or roads and to make realisation of compensation a reality in terms of money to the injured, as well as to the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased who die on account of motor accident. If two interpretations are possible it has been held that interpretation beneficial to the subject, i.e., injured or heirs of deceased and the one which promotes object and purpose of the Act is to be adopted. The object of such provision has been very well explained and indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Skandia Insurance Company Limited v Kokilaben Chandravadhan'
This Court further observes in para 10 as hereinafter:
'A perusal of these observations per se reveals that in order to reject the plea raised therein that the expression third party is wide enough to cover all persons except, person and the insurer, the basis provided has been by the proviso Clause (ii) to Section 95(1) of the Act of 1939. No doubt under Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 proviso clearly says that policy is not required to cover the liability in respect of death or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises, subject to the exception which is indicated and provided by the expression 'except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of contract of employment'. The Section 95 of the Act of 1939 very clearly provides by virtue of proviso clause (ii) inserted therein, with exception to the passengers for hire or reward taken in the vehicles in which passengers are taken for hire or reward or who are taken by reason of contract, Insurance Policy will not be required to cover the risk of any persons travelling in the vehicle who are not carried for hire or reward. This clause (ii) to the proviso to Section 95 of old Act has been omitted from the new Act. The legislature has completely omitted to enact this clause in proviso to Section 147(1), when it enacted Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is to be assumed and presumed that Legislature when enacting the new Act and when enacting Section 147, knowingly changed the tenor of language and omitted proviso two to Section 95 of Act of 1939 and did not incorporate that in Section 147 of Act of 1988. It intended to provide something different and modified from the scheme of Section 95 of old Act under Section 147, to that extent.
It is well-settled principles of law that if under subsequent Act, the legislature changes the tenor of language, omits certain provisions from being incorporated which existed at the time of enactment of new Act replacing old Act and the subject-matter, the intention emerging therefrom, i.e., the change has got to be given effect to. The effect of change of languages is revelation of legislative intent that expression 'Any person' and the third party used in the Act will also include any person even travelling in the vehicle without paying any hire etc. If the legislature would not have different intents to enacting Section 147 of Act of 1988 than revealed by Section 95 of old Act, it would have incorporated in extenso Section 95 of the Act of 1939 in the Act of 1988 as it did exist in Act of 1939. The Parliament would not have omitted clause (ii) to proviso to Section 95(1) when it enacted Section 147. Therefore, in my opinion the expression 'Third party' or 'Any person' used in Section 147 of Act of 1988 includes in itself even a person travelling in a private car. When I so opine, I find support from the Single Judge decision of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of National Insurance Company v Faqir Chandra, as well as the decision of this Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited v P.V. Lakshmanan and Another, and the decision of this Court in the case of Shantabai and Others v Shekappa and Others. Thus considered in my opinion the appeal has got no merits and I do find that the' Tribunal has not committed any error of law or jurisdiction in holding that Insurance Company is liable to pay that amount as the liability of the Insurance Company, runs with the liability of the owner of the vehicle and so liability fastened under Section 140 will also be covered by the policy'.
That almost same view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Bangalore v Minaxi and Others, after having followed the decision in National Insurance Company's case, referred to above. Further Amrit Lal Sood v Smt. Kaushalya Devi Thapar, has interpreted 'any person', to mean every person including the occupant-of car travelling therein, as the gratuitous passenger.
5. In the case of New India Assurance Company, supra, their Lordships referred to various provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and thereafter observed, at page 237 as under:
'8. Proviso to Section 147(1) of the new Act shows that it is a recast provision by placing the erstwhile clause (iii) as the present clause (ii). In other words, clause (ii) of the proviso in Section 95(1) of the old Act is totally non-existent in the proviso to Section 147(1) of the new Act.
9. Under Section 147 of the new Act, the policy must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily (injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle) or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicles caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place.
10. The proviso to the said sub-section is not relevant here as it pertains to death or bodily injury to the employee mentioned therein. Sub-section (2) provides that a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely.-
(i) save as provided in clause (b) the amount of liability incurred;
(ii) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand:
Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such policy whichever is earlier.
Hence, under sub-section (2), there is no upper limitation for the insurer regarding the amount of compensation awarded in respect of death or bodily injury of a victim of the accident. It is, therefore, apparent that the limit contained in the old Act has been removed and the policy should insure the liability incurred and cover injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle. The Legislature has also taken care even the policies which were in force on the date of commencement of the Act by specifically providing that any policy of insurance containing any limit regarding insurer's liability shall continue to be effective for a period of four months from commencement of the Act or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. This means, after the said period of four months a new Act is required to be obtained.
11. The result is that under the new Act an insurance policy covering third party risk is not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle is of any type or class. Hence the decisions rendered under the old Act vis-a-vis gratuitous passengers are of no avail while considering the liability of the insurance company in respect of any accident which occurred or would occur after the new Act came into force'.
This decision of the Supreme Court really in no doubt appears to lay down the law on the same lines, as has been laid down in National Insurance Company's case, supra.
6. In view of the principle, as laid down by the above decisions of this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in our opinion there is no force in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant and the above contention of appellant's Counsel is rejected.
The appeal is dismissed, as is devoid of merit and the judgment and the Award of the Tribunal is maintained. The amount which has been deposited in this Court may be transferred to the Tribunal for being disbursed in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal itself.