ORDER
S.P. Kukday, J.
1. In this petition, the petitioners have impugned order dated 3rd December, 1997 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, dismissing the application for discharge.
2. Briefly stated, relevant facts are that Madhukar, Nanasaheb, Avinash, Ravindra and Bharat (since deceased) are real brothers. They were living with mother Dhudkabai at Chalisgaon. Eldest brother Madhukar is a teacher at Bhadgaon. Nanasaheb is also a teacher at Bhadgaon. The petitioner No. 1 Avinash is an Engineer and had taken up a job with 'Al Ain', in United Arab Emirates, from 1976. He purchased a plot at Sane Guruji Nagar in the year 1978. He got married in the year 1981. His wife was shuttling between the two countries namely, UAE and India. She used to be with her husband for some time and for some time she used to be at chalisgaon. Younger brother Ravindra, is a tailor, and has a tailoring shop at Chalisgaon. Youngest brother Bharat (since deceased) was running a grocery shop at Sane Guruji Nagar. He got married on 8th March, 1988. Petitioner No. 1 was blessed with a triplet. All the three children were brought up at UAE. In the year 1992, he decided to construct a House on the plot which was purchased earlier. He trusted Bharat, therefore, responsibility of looking after the construction was entrusted to Bharat. The petitioner No. 1 had an account with the Bank of Maharashtra at Chalisgaon and State Bank of India at Chalisgaon and Aurangabad. To facilitate purchases and payment for construction materials, Madhukar (Petitioner No. l) used to send duly signed cheques. By using these cheques, Bharat used to withdraw money from the accounts of Madhukar as and when required for the construction work. In addition, Madhukar was maintaining direct contact with Engineer Ashok Punshi who was supervising the construction work. Construction of the building was completed within three years. The building was baptized as 'NISAS' named after three children of Madhukar. The children were taking education in a school at Pachgani. After house warming ceremony, petitioner No. 2 shifted to the house and was ordinarily living there. Madhukar had purchased a Maruti van and had kept it at Chalisgaon. The vehicle being Registration No. MH-20E 384 used to be given on hire. There was some dispute in respect of expenditure for construction of the building as well as income from Taxi business.
3. Petitioners 3, 4, and 5 used express doubts that Bharat had misappropriated amount of Rs. 7 lakhs from construction funds and has also taken commission from Taxi business. Bharat, being a sensitive individual, could not bear the agony of these allegations and made an effort to commit suicide in the month of May, 1995. However, due to timely treatment, the catastrophe was averted. However, the dispute continued. Petitioner No. 1 came to Bombay on 10th December 1995 he was received by his brother-in-law, Arun and wife Rekha (petitioner No. 2), at Bombay, Arun had some business at Bombay. He, therefore, stayed there; whereas petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 came to Chalisgaon in their Maruti van. They reached Chalisgaon at about 10.00 p.m. As it was late in the night everybody relaxed.
4. On his return, petitioner No. 1 asked him to hand over ornaments which were kept in the locker hired in the name of Bharat, in Bank of Maharashtra. Bharat, however, did not oblige. This led to a quarrel. On the next day, at about the same time, there was again a quarrel over this dispute. Nanasaheb, Ravindra, complainant Alka, her co-sister Anjanabai and mother Dhudkabai were present. In their presence, petitioner No. 1 demanded ornaments. As Bharat did not show his willingness to do so, petitioners No. 1 rushed at him. He, thereafter threatened Police action and asked petitioner No. 2 to go to Police Station with her father and bring Police Officer. Nanasaheb and Ravindra entreated petitioner No. 1 and 2 not to do so. However both of them did not accede to these entreaties.
5. The Petitioner No. 2 took her father with her and went to Chalisgaon Police Station. She contacted PSI Kshirsagar, who advised them to lodge a formal report but agreed to accompany them to the house. On the way, petitioner No. 2, got sick. She was, therefore, dropped at the house of neighbourer Kumawat. After leaving them at the house of Kumawat PSI Kshirsagar came to NISAS Building in the Police vehicle. After getting down he made enquiries with Dhudkabai who informed that Bharat has already left the house. In the meanwhile, condition of petitioner No. 2 started deteriorating, therefore, PSI Kshirsagar took petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to the Hospital. After advising petitioner No. 1 to lodge report at Police Station, PSI Kshirsagar, left the Hospital.
6. After leaving the house, Bharat went to Aurangabad and lodged himself in Room No. 20 of 'Shangrila' Lodge which is in front of the ST stand. At about 3.20 a.m. he wrote s suicidal note blaming petitioners 1 to 5 for the torture during the course of preceding years. He also alleged that petitioner No. 1 is engaged in Hawala business at Mumbai and that both petitioners 1 and 2 have several passports. After blaming petitioners for his death, Bharat committed suicide by hanging himself. His dead body was discovered at about 11.15 a.m. on 15-12-1995. On receipt of the intimation regarding the occurrence, AD No: 94/1995 came to be registered at Kranti Chowk Police Station, Aurangabad. At the time of Panchnama of the inquest and the scene of occurrence, suicide note was found, therefore, offence punishable Under Section 306 came to be registered against petitioners 1 to 5.
7. During pendency of prosecution, petitioners 1 to 5 filed an application Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for discharge on 24-8-1996. By his order dated 3-12-1997, learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, rejected the application. This order is impugned in the present petition.
8. Shri V.R. Manohar, learned senior counsel for petitioners 1 to 5, has argued the matter elaborately. For elucidating the principles applicable at the stage of framing of the charge, learned Senior Counsel has made a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104 in the matter of Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration. According to learned Senior counsel, framing of charge in the absence of cogent material, is an exercise in futility as is pointed out by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Satish Mehra's case.
9. Dealing with the aspect of existence of prima facie case, learned senior counsel referred to Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, with which petitioners are charged. According to learned Counsel 'instigation' is an integral part of this section. Prosecution has to show that petitioners instigated deceased Bharat to commit suicide. It is contended that, in the cases Involving abatement by instigation, it has to be shown that element of mens rea exists and the intention of the accused was to induce suicide. According to learned senior counsel even if threats given by the accused are the motive for commission of suicide, if it is not shown that the accused intended that deceased should commit suicide, the accused cannot be indicted for offence of abatement punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the rlling of the M.P. High Court reported in in the matter of Deepak v. State of M.P. : ruling of the Supreme Curt reported in : 2002CriLJ2796 , Sanju v. State of M.P. and the ruling of Supreme Court reported in 2005 (2) Scale 452 in AIR 2005 SC 1775 the matter of Netai Dutta v. State of West Bengal. Learned Senior counsel submits that even if the allegations found in the statement of witnesses are taken as they are, at the highest it can be said that in view of the threats to approach police for recovery of ornaments. According to learned senior counsel, material on record shows that petitioners never intended commission of suicide by Bharat, they were merely trying to recover the ornaments. According to learned senior counsel, accepting the prosecution version as it is, no case is made out warranting framing charge against the petitioners for offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. Criticism the approach of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge learned senior counsel has pointed out that the impugned order does not make a reference to the material on which conclusion regarding existence of prima facie case is based. Reading of the order gives an impression that charge is being framed on the sole consideration that the offence is of a serious nature. The approach of learned Assistant Sessions Judge is improper, as the material on record, accepted as it is, does not make out a prima facie case. Thus, petitioners 1 to 5 deserve to be discharged.
10. Learned APP Smt. Ranjana Reddy, has argued the. matter of length. According to learned APP. Deceased -Bharat was a sensitive person. False allegations in respect of misappropriation of money and ornaments were levelled against him, over a period of one year. Deceased had earlier made an attempt to commit suicide. Inspite or that the persecution continued. The threats of police action during the quarrel is the proximate cause for the suicide. According to learned APP material on record does make out a prima facie case. Therefore, it is not necessary to interfere with the order passed by the trial Judge. In support of her contention, learned APP has placed reliance on the ruling of the Bombay High Court reported in 2004 All MR 501 in the matter of Sujit Dinanath Sadan v. State of Maharashtra.
11. The principles governing framing of charge or discharge are by now well-settled. At the stage of framing of the charge, the Judge has to weigh and sift the evidence for a limited purpose of ascertaining whether a prima facie case has been made out against the accused warranting framing of charge. The evidence on record has to be taken at it face value for ascertaining whether that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Evidence must indicate that if unrebutted it would result in conviction. 1 must hasten to add that sufficient ground for proceeding is not the ground required for conviction of the accused but a ground for putting him to trial. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect in the matter of State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari reported in : 2000CriLJ944 . Referring to this aspect, the Apex Court observed in para No. 4 of the report as under:
4. It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the material produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then the charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
12. The approach to the issue of framing charge has to be pragmatic. Insistence merely on completing the formalities results in putting an innocent person to trial. Thus, charge should not be framed in cases where the available material does not disclose the ingredients of the offence with which the accused is charged. Framing of charge in such cases is an exercise in futility and results in wasting valuable time of the Court. This aspect is covered by the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration and Ors. (supra). In para No. 15 of the report. Their Lordships of the Apex Court observed:
15. But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of workload. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself.
13. With this, we may turn to the issues involved in the present case. Petitioners 1 to 5 are indicted for commission of offence punishable Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In the prosecution for offence punishable Under Section 306, the material on record must establish that the accused instigated commission of suicide. Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code defines 'abetment' and Section 306 makes abatement to commit suicide punishable. Thus, it would be worthwhile to reproduce both these sections. The Sections read:
Section 306 : If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 107 : A person abets the doing of a thing, who -
First - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
14. Abatement is an essential ingredient of Section 306. As can be seen from the definition of abatement in Section 107, abetment can take different forms but here we are concerned with the abatement in the form of instigation of a person to commit suicide. In this behalf, learned senior Counsel has referred to the ruling of the Apex Court reported in Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P. reported in : 2002CriLJ2796 . Referring to the true import of the concept of instigation their Lordships of the Apex Court observed in para No. 13 of the report:
13. The word 'instigate' denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation.
15. Reference is also made to the ruling of M. P. High Court reported in in the matter of Deepak v. State of M.P. in which D. M. Dharmakdhikari J. {as His Lordship then was}, has laid down the proposition that the act of the accused can be a cause for commission of suicide but this is not sufficient for prosecution; the prosecution has to show the accused intended such a result. In that case, the girl was threatened with defamation, if she refused to have sexual intercourse with two accused. Soon thereafter girl committed suicide leaving a suicidal note. In this background, it was contended that the act of the accused might have been a motive for committing suicide but the act did not constitute a act of abatement within the meaning of Section 306 read with Section 107 of the IPC. Accepting this contention, His Lordship observed in para No. 9 of the report that 'neither there was any intention nor any positive act on the part of the accused to instigate her or aid her in committing suicide. The two accused persons, therefore, cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. and their conviction on that count by the trial Court, is liable to be set aside.
16. The material on record will have to be examined keeping in view legal principles applicable. In the present case, learned APP has made a reference to the earlier attempt of the deceased for committing suicide. It can be seen that the deceased made an attempt to commit suicide in the month of May 1995. On that occasion, though the deceased did not leave a suicide note, he wrote a letter to his in-laws mentioning therein that he was offended by the false allegation in respect of misappropriation by petitioners 1 to 5. Contents of this letters throw light on the psychological disposition of the deceased. On that occasion, due to timely intervention, the catastrophe was averted. Learned APP submits that inspite of the fact that there was an attempt at committing suicide, harassment continued and finally as a result of the quarrel on 12-12-1995, the deceased left the house and committed suicide. According to learned APP, material on record, therefore, makes out a prima facie case and justify framing of the charge. This contention is fallacious. It is the prosecution case that there was some dispute regarding misappropriation of money from the funds placed at the disposal of the deceased during the course of construction of NISAS building. It can also be seen that there was some controversy over the ornaments in the locker which was in the name of deceased with the Bank of Maharashtra, Chalisgaon Branch. The deceased was not handing over the ornaments, therefore, petitioner No. 2 was advised by her husband to open another locker; but the deceased assured that he will hand-over the ornaments, in the presence of Petitioners No. 1. It appears that this was the reason that after arrival of petitioner No. 1 on 10-12-1995, the first quarrel which took place at about 10 O'clock on 11-12-1995 was over the dispute regarding handing over of gold ornaments. There were disputes between the deceased and Petitioner No. 1 regarding misappropriation of money and usurpation of the ornaments. We are, however, concerned here only with the proximate cause, that is, the quarrels which preceded the suicide. It would also be pertinent to keep in mind that since earlier attempt of suicide no one referred to the misappropriation of money and the controversy centered round the ornaments in the locker which undisputedly belonged to Petitioner No. 1.
17. In the quarrel that took place on the night on 11-12-1995, petitioner No. 1 demanded ornaments weighing 780 gms. which were with the deceased, In presence of the family members namely, Nana Ravindra, Alka and Anjana and mother Dhudkabai. Deceased, however, avoided to hand over the ornaments though petitioners No. 1 had given key of the locker to the Nana and petitioners 1 and 2 told deceased that he should take out the ornaments from the locker and hand over the ornaments to them. The conduct of deceased appears to have annoyed petitioner No. 1, as can be seen from the reference in the statement of Nana that petitioner No. 1 rushed at the deceased for assaulting him. However, nothing happened on that day. Quarrel broke out again on 12-12-1995 at about 10 o'clock, in the night. On this occasion also, deceased avoided to hand over the ornaments. As the deceased was not amenable to persuasion, Petitioner No. 1 made it clear that he will have to approach the Police and asked petitioner No. 2 to go the Police Station with her father (petitioner No. 4) so that the law can take its own course. Nana and Ravindra entreated petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 not to approach the Police, but he did not yield to their persuasion. Thus, Petitioner No. 2 left the house for the Police Station and returned with the Police Officer, having seen the arrival of Police, deceased was advised to leave the house and P.S.I. Kshrisagar was informed that the deceased has left the house.
18. Evidence on record accepted as it is shows that deceased left the house, on account of quarrel which took place on the night of 12th, because the dispute was taken to the Police. Subsequent developments barring suicide note, are not very clear from the record. It appears that deceased reached 'Shangrila' Lodge at Aurangabad, at about 3.20 a.m. He then wrote suicide note at about 5.00 a.m. and, thereafter, committed suicide. The suicide note contains some allegations regarding Hawala business and possession of several passports by Petitioners 1 and 2, apart from the allegations regarding torture for misappropriation of funds. The deceased has made an effort to absolve himself of the blame regarding misappropriation of money and ornaments. The suicide note, however, makes it clear that the proximate cause was the quarrel which took place on 12th during the course of which steps were taken to hand him over to the Police. Ignoring everything and accepting the prosecution case as it is, the suicide is admittedly committed in view of the quarrel on the earlier day regarding ornaments. Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 not only threatened but approached Police as the ornaments were not returned by the deceased. It is not disputed by the prosecution that because of arrival of the police, the deceased left the house. Therefore, the threat of police action can be said to be the cause for commission of suicide. What is required to be shown is that petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 intended that deceased should commit suicide. Material to establish this ingredient is absent. The approach adopted by petitioners 1 and 2 show that they were constrained to take recourse to the legal remedy available to them for obtaining their ornaments which were in the custody of the younger brother. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the threat of police action amounts to an instigation for commission of suicide. The threat can be construed as a motive for commission of suicide. However, there is nothing on record to show that the result was intended by petitioners 1 to 5. On the contrary, record shows that the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 were trying to recover their own ornaments from the deceased and for that purpose they proposed to pursue the legal remedy available to them. The material on record discloses that Nanasaheb and Ravindra had entreated Petitioner No. 1 not to approach the Police. It is not disputed that deceased fled from the house on noticing the approach of Police Officer, These facts show that all was not well and that the deceased was not willing to face police enquiry. Be that, as it may; ignoring all these facts even if it is assumed that because of threat of police action, the deceased has committed suicide, there is no material to show that this result was intended by any of the petitioners. Therefore, material on record taken at its face value does not disclose an essential ingredient of Section 306. As the material on record does not disclose abatement of suicide by the Petitioners, there is no justification for framing of charge in the present case. The trial if held, would be an exercise in futility. Thus, the impugned order cannot be upheld. The impugned order is, thus, quashed and set aside and the petitioners are discharged. Revision is thus allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of Prayer Clause 'D'.