B.G. Deo, J.
1. This is an application filed under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the original accused No. 4, the present applicant Narayandas son of Gopikisan Sarda, Proprietor of M/s. Sarda Goods Transport, Bhandara Road, Bagadganj, Nagpur, for quashing the proceedings against him and others in Criminal Case No. 191 of 1978, pending on the file of the 7th Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur.
2. The challenge to the aforesaid proceedings is mainly on two grounds. Firstly, according to the applicant Narayandas Sarda (original accused no. 4), there was no prima facie case against him and the order passed against him for issuing process under sections 467, 471, 407 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, was an abuse of the process of law. The second and the most important challenge to these proceedings is on the ground that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 191 of 1978 instituted in the year 1978 (the complaint having been filed on 13-2-1978 before C.J.M. who then transferred it to J.M.F.C. on 20-2-1978) have been pending since then at the stage of recording evidence before charge. Not a single witness was examined in that case before filing of this application. The applicant has a constitutional right to speedy trial as implied in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the said right having been compromised so far for a period of nine years till this application was filed and even till today till the application is being decided, amounts to a gross abuse of the process of law and therefore, the entire proceedings deserve to be quashed to save the applicant and the other accused from further harassment. The learned Advocate Shri Gaikwad for non-applicant No. 2 has echoed the said feelings, while Shri Ghate for the complainant (non-applicant No. 1) has contended that quashing the proceedings in a serious case like this would not be conducive in the interest of justice and in the interest of society at large.
3. I have heard at length Shri Shukla for the applicant (original accused No. 4) Shri Ghate for non-applicant No. 1 Bank (original complainant), Shri Gaikwad for non-applicant No. 2 (original accussed No. 1) and Shri Patil for State.
4. A brief resuming of the facts alleged in the complaint and a narration of this protracted proceeding is necessary to understand the points involved in this case. The non-applicant No. 1, the original complainant, is Indian Bank represented through its authorised Officers. It is a Nationalised Bank established under the Banking Companies Act. The non-applicant No. 2 S. Srinivasagam (original accused No. 1) is a businessman and deals in pulses, grains, etc. and is also a commission agent. The complainant Bank alleged that the applicant Narayandas Sarda (original accused No. 4) was an agent of one Raju and Mannar Lorry Transport, Nagpur, of which the non-applicants No. 3, and 4 (now deleted) (original accused No. 2 and 3 respectively) were partners. The said Transport Company was a common carrier. It had entered into arrangements with the Indian Bank Association and got itself classified as approved carrier. The non-applicant No. 2 S. Srinivasgem (original accused No. 1) had an account with the complainant Indian Bank (non-applicant No. 1) which had granted credit facility of Rs. 4,00,000/- to him. The complainant Bank used to advance money to non-applicant No. 2 S. Srinivasagam (original accused No. 1) on the strength of the lorry receipts received by it which were issued by the common carrier Raju and Mannar Lorry Transport, Nagpur. A number of lorry receipts were produced by non-applicant No. 2 S. Srinivasagam (original accused No. 1) to the Bank for various consignments, for example, Lorry Receipt No. 3304 dated 25-1-1977 valued at Rs. 17840/- (Annexure 'A'), Lorry Receipt No. 3335 dated 15-2-1977 valued at Rs. 12,835/ (Annexure 'B'), Lorry Receipt No. 3341 dated 21-2-77 valued at Rs. 19,110/ (Annexure 'C'), Lorry Receipt No. 3343 dated 21-2-77 valued at Rs, 9260 (Annexure 'D'), Lorry Receipt No. 3342 dated 23-2-77 valued at Rs. 9260/ (Annexure 'E'), Lorry Receipt No. 3358 dated 25-2-77 valued at Rs. 19,216/ (Annexure 'F') representing a consignment of 190 of bags of 'popat' and Lorry Receipt No. dated 25-2-1977 valued at Rs. 13,875 (Annexure 'G') representing a consignment of 90 bags of grain. All these Lorry Receipts were drawn in favour of the complainant Bank as the consignee.
5. The complainant alleged that by producing the lorry receipts along with the bills and other documents, the complainant Bank was induced to part with respective amounts on the clear understanding that the goods mentioned have in fact been despatched or accepted for despatch to the destinations and the documents will be met at the destinations by appropriate remittances by purchasers in payment of the goods sent. It was only against the security of goods mentioned in the lorry receipts that the complainant parted with the respective amounts in favour of the accused. The Complaint further alleged :
'The complainant Bank had paid the price of the goods in advance and the goods were entrusted to the accused No. 4 as the authorised agent of accused 2 and 3 on terms stated above. The accused No. 2 and 3 in collusion and conspiracy with the accused No. 1 and 4 misappropriated the goods or in the alternaive committed criminal breach of trust in disposing of the goods contrary to the trust reposed in them. The accused No. 2 and 3 along with accused no. 1 and 4 have thus committed the offence punishable under section 407 read with section 34, I.P.C.'
The complainant alleged that original accused No. 1 S. Srinivasagam had a Bank account with it and he, with common desire and conspiracy with accused Nos. 2 to 4, withdrew the aforesaid valuable considerations on the basis of the lorry receipts and the series of acts are so connected as to form the same transaction. All those acts were done by the accused with common intention having conspired together and offences of criminal breach of trust, dishonest misappropriation of property, falsification of documents were committed by all the accused and they could be tried in one trial for all the offences charged.
6. The complaint was presented in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur on 20-2-1978 for offences punishable under sections 420, 407, 468, 471 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, by the complainant Indian Bank , alleging common intention on the part of all the accused of cheating the complainant Bank. The process was issued to all the accused under the following order passed by the Court :
'Issue process to all accused u/s 420, 468. 471, I.P.C. on payment of P.F. within 3 days.'
7. The complaint was dismissed by order dated 2-5-1979 which is reproduced below :
Order
Complainant is absent. None for him till 4 P.M. Complainant has not paid process fee since 2-10-78 in spite of orders. Complaint is dismissed u/s 204(4), Cri.P.C.'
8. An application (Exhibit 40 ) was made by the complainant Bank on 4-5-1979 for restoration of the complaint. The learned Magistrate heard the application and passed the following order on 10-5-1979;
Order
'Heard. Complaint was dismissed on technical grounds under section 204(4), Cri.P.C. for non-payment of P F. since 2-10-78. Counsel for complainant relies on A.I.R.1930 Bom 10 in support of his application. Their Lordships have held that the case can be revived if it is dismissed on technical grounds only as one of the mode as complainant can again file a fresh complaint. Accused have not yet appeared and there will be no prejudice to accused. Hence, the case is ordered to be restored to file. Complainant to pay P.F. within 7 days.'
It appears that after the second order of issuing process, the accused were present on 9-7-1980. What transpired during that period is not known. There is an application on 9-7-80 on the part of the complainant for adjournment. The same was the case on 25-8-1980. Then there was no time to the Court for taking up the case and on 18-11-1980 accused No. 3 filed a pursis (Exhibit 80). No order appears to have been passed on the pursis (Exhibit 80). The record of the order sheets shows that from 18-1-1980 to 26-7-1984 i.e. for a period of four years, no progress was made in the case which was adjourned from time to time, at times on an application by the complainant and many other times as the Court was busy with other matters. A perusal of the order sheets would show that for a period of four years from 1980 to 1984 the delay was caused on account of want of time to the Court and also to the complainant. It was for the first time on 26-7-1984 that the case was fixed for evidence before charge. Even thereafter on 23-8-84, it was the complainant who applied for adjournment. On 20-12-84 the complainant applied for issuing requisition to the High Court for getting the record of the relevant civil suit from the High Court. The original documents in that suit could have been called or a certified copy could have been obtained. The record was received on 27-12-88. From then onwards, the case was adjourned from time to time, although all the accused were present, for evidence before charge. In the meantime, the original accused No. 2 Mr. K.S. Raju Naidu expired. On 9-12-1986, original accused No. 3 Mr. R. Nagamanlckan was found absent. The complainant applied vide Exhibit 98 for issue of a bailable warrant against original accused No. 3 by Hamdast. The case was dragged on in 1987 for return of the bailable warrant, as it appears that the complainant had not paid the process fees for a considerable period i.e. from 9-12-1986 to 18-3-87. On 7-7-1987 fresh bailable warrant was issued. However presence of original accused No. 3 R. Nagamanikan could not be secured, as it appears till 19-6-1989 mainly because the complainant had not paid the process fees. On 2-8-1986, the Court was informed by pursis (Exhibit 97) that original accused No. 2 K.S. Raju Naidu had expired. The complainant took time for ascertainment of the fact of demise of original accused No. 2 K.S. Raju Naidu till 8-7-1987. In the year 1986 and 1987, the case lingered on till the pursis was filed by the complainant Bank. At the same time, original accused No. 3 R. Nagamanickan was not present and it was because of the complainant's default in the payment of process fee that bailable warrants are not issued and the year 1987 passed. The order-sheets dated 18-2-1989, 27-3-1989, 26-4-1989 and 19-6-1989 respectively (the last order sheets) show that for want of payment of process fee the case has to be adjourned from time to time and now the case stands fixed on 5-8-1989 for went of payment of P.F. to secure the presence of original accused No. 3 R. Nagamanickan.
9. Some salient features deserve notice. Lorry Receipt No. 384 dated 27-2-1977 (Annexure 'A') gave rise to the offences for the first time. The complainant, however, did not report the matter to the police nor did the learned Magistrate take any action for obtaining the police report under section 202 of the Cri.P.C. The complaint itself was lodged after full one year i.e. in the year 1978. The statement of the complainant was recorded on 2-10-1978 and there was delay on the part of the complainant for payment of process fee from time to time. All the accused remained present on 9-7-1980. In the meantime, original accused No. 2 K.S. Raju Naidu died and time was consumed and the case was adjourned for four years for hearing on Exhibit 80. Thereafter till date, the delay caused was squarely for want of payment of process fee by the complainant.
10. There is no doubt that some period of delay caused is attributable to want of time to the Court.
11. Yet another feature to be noted is that it was the original accused No. 1 S. Srinivasagam against whom the brunt of allegations i.e. misappropriation of amounts, breach of trust, falsification of documents etc. were made. The present applicant Narayandas Sarda (original accused No. 4) has contended that he was neither the agent of M/s Raju and Mannar Lorry Transport Company not did he forge any documents. Another contention raised by the applicant was that the facts alleged disclosed essentially a civil offence in which there was a remedy in Civil Court. The learned Counsel for non-applicant No. 1, Shri Ghate, in the course of his arguments, informed the Court that a civil suit had in fact been filed It was dismissed by the trial Court but was decreed by the High Court only as against original accused No. 1 S. Srinivasagam. This fact also deserves consideration while considering the question of delay.
12. Since the contention of the applicant that no case was made out against him required investigation of facts, the only question that needs to be determined is: Whether, on account of the inordinate delay in this protracted trial, there has been an abuse of the process of law resulting in great harassment to the applicant hand other accussed ?.
13. The Supreme Court has time and again considered the question of speedy trial in a catena of decisions and observed that a speedy trial was implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, though not specifically enumerated as fundamental right in our Constitution. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India : [1978]2SCR621 .
14. Later, in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, : 1979CriLJ1036 it was held that although speedy trial was not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it was implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21. It was further observed :
'That Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just' .................... There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonable expenditious trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.'
15. In State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar : 1981CriLJ159 , the trial was protracted for twenty years. The prosecution under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and the accused were mostly responsible for the slow pace of the case which lasted for twenty years. It was observed while quashing the protracted trial :
'There has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage.'
There is no gain-saying of the fact that such a limit has already ben transgressed in the instant case.
16. In the case of S.Guin v. Grindalys Bank Ltd., : 1986CriLJ255 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court found fault with the High Court's order of a retrial, after a period of six years, merely on the ground of delay, even though on merits the order was incorrect.
17. In the case of Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (1988)III SVLR (CR) 8 decided on 18th July, 1988. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :
'Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 9 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us, cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law.'
In view of the delay. Their Lordships of the Supreme court found that it was just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further.
18. Even if the accused were responsible for the delay in a large measure, the High Court had quashed the proceedings as the trial was protracted for twenty years and Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had refused to interfere with the said order of the High Court.
19. In a recent case reported in : 1989CriLJ802 Diwan Naubat Rai & others v. State, delay of thirty days was not found sufficient by the Supreme Court to quash the trial, although the charges were not framed within a years after direction by the Supreme Court.
20. In the case of Raghubir Singh and others v. State of Bihar : 1987CriLJ157 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that right as to infringement of speedy trial cannot be inferred merely from delay in police investigation. It depends on facts and circumstance of each case. Several questions arise for consideration in this connection. Whether Article 21 of the Constitution has been infringed or not is ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of criminal justice even as 'acting fairly' is of the principles of natural justice and a 'fair and reasonable procedure' is what is contemplated by the expression 'procedure established by law' in Article 21. The questions which arise for consideration are:
1. Was there delay ?
2. How long was the delay?
3. Was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances ?
4. Was the delay unreasonable ?
5. Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency ?
6. Was any part of the delay causes by the tactics of the defence ?
7. Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies ?
8. Did the accused have the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial ?
9. Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence ?
10. Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct to his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused ?
A prayer for quashing the investigation was rejected without expressing an opinion on the merits of the case. In the last analysis, therefore, whether there was an abuse of the process of law, whether there was an inordinate delay and the implicit fundamental right of speedy public trial was infringed or not, are all questions which depend on facts and circumstances of each case. When the delay is not due to the fault on the part of the accused and the investigation and trial dragged on for twenty years, the proceedings were quashed in Madheshwar dhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, : AIR1986Pat324 . It was also observed that there should be an outer limit of seven years for conducting investigation and original trial.
21. Having considered the various aspects of the case, it must be observed that right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India as the fundamental right and a delay of eleven years, in the facts circumstances of the present case cannot be considered as 'fair and reasonable' and conducive in the interest of justice. When this application for quashing the proceedings was filed, there was a delay of nine years. The charge had also not been framed till the. Even after two years, the framing of the charge has not seen the light of the day. Such a protracted litigation by itself, is an abuse of the process of law and as the order-sheets show and the complainant Bank be held to be squarely responsible for the delay of the litigation from time to time from its very inception till date.
22. The Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition N. 61 of 1988 decided on 21st April, 1989 Shanta Vithal Chahande v. State of Maharashtra and others quashed the prosecution of a lady under sections 420, 120-B, 511 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in which even the charge was not framed till the writ petition was decided. The delay of that protracted trial was eleven years. The challenge was under Article 21 of the Constitution for violation of the fundamental rights. The Division Bench had an occasion to refer to a number of decisions, including the one cited and had upheld the challenge.
23. Having regard therefore, to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law involved, I have no doubt in my mind that there is a gross abuse of the process of law in the instant case and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 191 of 1978 have to be quashed as against all the accused, including the present applicant. The entire proceedings against all the accused can be quashed under the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure code, to prevent the abuse of the process of law which is common to all the accused.
24. In the result the criminal application is allowed. The proceedings against the applicant and other accused under sections 467, 471, 407, read with section 34 of the Indian Penal code, then pending on the file of the 7th Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur in Criminal Case No. 191 of 1978 are hereby quashed and set aside, in terms of prayer C lause (ii).