V.A. Mohta, J.
1. By this Letters Patent Appealunder the provisions of Civil P, C, before amendment of 1976, the judgment of the learned single judge dated 14th/21st July 1967 confirming the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court for partition and separte possession of 28/288 th shae in field survey No. 187/6 of Mouza Malkapur, has been challenged.
2. the suit hads been filed on 30-11-1940 initially claiming relief in respect of filed survey No. 187/2, By various amendments the description of the property and so also the survey number of the filed waschanged from 187/2 to 187/6, on the ground of mutual mistake, Intially the applications for amendment were rejected and shit dismissed. Dismissal was confirmed up to stage of second appeal. However, the amendmants came to be allowed by this Court in a Letters Patent Appeal and matter remended for fresh enquiry (L. P. A. NO. 4 of 1947 decided on 13 the March 1952).
3. The trialCourt after remand held ...... issues in favour of the plaintiff but ..........as not maintainable on of necessary parties. The First Appellate court allowed the appeal. The second appeal filed by the present appellants (original defendants 12 )a)to 12 (c) and 13) before theHigh Court was dismissed.
4. M/s Binraj Murlidhar Shop of Malkapur the respondent No. 1/original plaintiff had earlir filed a suit for realization of tis debt in the year 1926 being Civil suit No. 11 of 1926 form defendants 1 to 6 in the present suit, Aziz Begum mother of defendant 1,, and the Samdani Begum. The said wuit was compromisesthedebtors agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/- In satisfaction of that amount the debtors sold their undivided share inthtwo fields described sold there undivided share in the two fields described as filed survey Nos. 180 and 187/2 of Malkapur bya registeredsale deed dated 30-11-1928 M/s Binraj Murlidhar was not given possession of theproperty. Second suits for partion and separate possession of certainproperties including the two fields referred toabove between theeight dobtorsd and their co-shares had earlier commenced in 1919 in whicha preliminary decree form partitionand separate possession was passed on 17th March 1925. A Commissioner for effecting partition as contemplated under O. 20, R. 18 (2) Civil P. C. was appointed ans the Collector was directed to partition the estate assessed to the revenue. Some property was actually partitioned and in respect of some the process was going on. M/s Binraj Murlidhar got itself impleaed in the proceedings for partion of field survey Nos. 180 and d187 on thebasis of sale deed dated 30-11-1928 Share in respect of field survey No. 180 was actually handed over to thesaid shop. On 11-12-1932 the following orde came to be passed.
'Mr. Gupta appears for the applicant. He does not wish to proceed agasint the field survey No. 187 as there is some mistake in Khatedor's right for the time being and wants to proceed against field survey No. 1809 only at Kalkapur Intimation of the effect will be sent to the collector.'
5. As indicated earlier, the present suit was filed on 30-11-1940, in which several amendments were made from time to time.......... Filed survey No. 187'2 was wrongly described as having an area of 7 Ares 18 junthas. The description indicated that real intention of bothe parties was to transfer 1 acre 17 junthas of land of the shae of debtors infield survey No. 1817/6 area 5 acrea 16 gunthas of mouza Malkapur having a well therin. In this suit only 8 defendation out ot total 25 in the suit of 1909 were made parties. Out of these 8 defendant defendant 7 was a receiver of the properties file of Additionalk District Judge, Khamgaon, filed against the insolvent Khwara Kutubuddin.
6. Now, the factual position as regards the mutrual mistake in the decription of the property and nuber of field is duly established on the basis of evidence andthose findings cannot be and are not questioned before us. The first point rarised by Shri Bodbe the learned counsel for appellants relates totheapplicability of the bar of S. 47 Civil p. C. to the present suit. The substance of th contention is that this question about partion and possetion of filed survey No. 187/6 (which was subject matter of a decree for partition andpossession in suit of 1909) can decided onlyby theCourtin execution proceedings and not by a separates uit. It is further contended that the plaintiff had actually appliced for substitution and indeed had gor phsical possession of one out of he two properties and under the circumstances theywere not entitled tofile a separate suit. We do not see any substance inthis contention for variety of reasons. In the first place no final decree ascontemplated under. S. 47, Civil P. c. was passed in 1909, suit. Only preliminary decree proceedings were than going on the theyhad not terminated into final dicree. Section 2(2) defines 'decree' as follows:
'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication whichso far as regards the Court expressing it conslusively determines therights of the parties with regard toall or anyof the matters ibcontroversy in the suit and may be either preliminary of final. It shallbe deemed toinclude therejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within S. 47 or S. 144 but shall not include -
any adjudicaiton formwhich an appeal.
any orde of dismissal of default.
Explanation - A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have tobe taken before the suit can be complety disposed of. It final when such adjudication complety disposes of the suit It may be partlyl preliminary andparty find.'
It is a settled position inlaw final decree proceedings are more continuation of the preliminary decree proceedings and there is no executable decree unless final decree proceedings are finally disposed of. In this connection reference may be made to the following observations in a decision of this Court of First Appeal No, 136 of 1980 and others, decided of 24-2-1982 in the matter of Marotrao Balaji Chavre v. Laxman tanba Shigru : 1982(2)BomCR233 .
'It is obvious that final decree proceedings are mere continuation of the preliminary decree proceedings andas the matter is not disposed of there is no executable decree and consequently S. 47, Civil P. C. cannot be attracted.'
7. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the decree for partiion as far as property covered by O. 20, R. 18 (1), Civil P. C. is covered is inthenature of a final decree (Sis). It is difficult to accept this contention. Heavy reliance was placed in support of the proposition on the case of R ambai Govind v. Anant Daji AIR 1945 Bom 338 The point involved in thesaid matter was whether an application tosend papers to the Collector for partition was governed By Art. 181 or 182 of the Old Limitation Act, It was held that such anapplication is inth nature of mere proceedings in the suit rather than an application toexecute the decree and hence. No period of limitation for making it was prescribed.. Far formsupporting thepoint canvassed the following abservations in the said judgment clearly indicate that a decree passed even under O. 20 R. 18(1) is in it very nature preliminary.
'A decree under O. 20 R. 18(1) does not direct the judgment debtor to obey it. It declears the shares of the different shares and directs the partitionto be made by the made by the Collector that the judgment dobtor can be called upon to the decree holder in possession of the share allotted to him. It is only at that stage that the decree can be regardedf as having become final and capable of execution.'
Referring to Civil Mausual issued on this court for the guidance of civil courts nit is observed;
'This view finds supports in the instructions contained in the Civil Manual issued by this Court In R. 1 in Chap 12 of Vol 1 of the Manual (at Page 145, 1960 Edn )., preliminary decree are divided into two clases those in which further action for final decrees is to betaken forthwith by the Courts suo motu without any application form a party and those in which subsequent proceedings for passings final decrees so not arise as a matter of course. The former are dirfted to thetreated as pending ans hsownas such in the monthly returnas and the records of such suits are to be retained and the records of such suits are to be retained in the orginalCourt until finaldecrees are passed therein while the latter are to be treated as disposed of and shown as such in the monthluy returns and the records should be forwarded totherecord keeper of theDistrict court and may be called for when subsequentlyu required.. A partition decree under O. 29. R 18(2) is included in theformer class of preliminary decrees and one unde O. 20 R. 18 (1) is included in the latter class be it noted, of perliminary decree. These instructions are being followed ever since the Civil P. C. 1908, was enacted and a partition decree whether under Sub-sec-r (1) or unde Sub-r (2) is classed as a preliminary decree,'
8. there is yet another angle to the controversy it sithis. The controversy in the present suit is between a party to 1909 suit and his representative Is such controversy covered BY. S. 47 Civil P. C.? Section 47 before its amendment by Amendment Act 104 of 1976 read as under:
'47 Question to be determined by the Court executing decree - (1) Allquestion arising between the parties to the suit in which thedecree was passed or thir representatoves and releting to the execution dischange or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.
(2) The court may subject to any objection as to limitation of jurisdiction treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary order payment of any additional court fees.
(3) where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party suchquestion shall for the purposes of this section be determined by the Court.
Explanation - For the purpose of this section a plaintiff whose shsuit has beeb dismissed defendant against whom a suit had been dismissed and a purchaser at a sale in exection of the decree are parties to the suit.
The above explanation was subsitituted by Act 66, of 1956 and several changed have beeb brought aboutby 1976 amendment Sub-section (2) had been omitted andnew Explaintion it is virtually the same except that it omits reference to auction purchaser that it omits reference toauntion purchaser Explanation II specially deals with auction purchase. This change legislatively resolves a judicial conflict above auction purchasers' rights under this section. Explanation old or new foes not fall for consideration of the is matter. Having regard totheclear language use in and the legislative intientive behind S. 47 it seems tous clearthey any dispute between a pary to the suit and his representative cannot come under the said provision. The case of he Seth Kedar Nath v. Arun Chandra AIR 1937 742 pithily puts the proposition thus.
'The mere fact that the two person who are litigiting are either parties or representatives of the parties would nt intiself be sufficient for example a judgment debtor might have transferred his interest by a volutary sale toa thrid party and then there may be a dispute between the judgment debtor and this third party as to theextent of theproperty whichhas passed under it. The judment debotor is of course a party to thesuit and the transferee is a representative of that party. But thedispute between them cannot be sadi tobe a dispute arising between the parties to the said because it is a dispute between one party and his own representative.
In the case of Hamidgani Ammal v. Ammasahib Ammal Aair 1941 Mad 898 it is observed:
'Section 47, Civil P. C. only requires tobe decided in execution proceedings those questions whicharise between parites totheauit in which thedecree has been passed or their representatives and whicn relate to the execution discharge or satifiction of the decree. Where a stranger to the suit claimes as his immovable property which has been the subject matter of a decree, that claim cannot in law be regrated as being a question relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree.'
The decision in Seth kedar Nath's case ( : AIR1937All742 has been followed by a larger Full Bench by the same court In Mst. Suraj Dei v, Mst. Gulab Dei, : AIR1955All49
9. Even the case of Mohammad Akhtar Ali v. Badrudin : AIR1973Pat187 to which our special attention was drawn does not lay down to thecontrary. It merely holds that (I) the word 'parties in s. 47 is not confined to parties arrayed on one side and (ii) even a dispute between representatives of a party which affects theopposite party or his representative is in relation toexecution, discharge or satissfaction of the decree and is covered by the said provision.
10. the second point relatesto limitation The plaintiff purchased thejoint right title and interest of he debtors in the property on 30-11-1928 and thereafter applied to the Court which passed decree in 1909 suit for getting its share partitional.It was on 11-1-1932 rthat theplaintiffs made a statement that it did not wish to proceed in the matter of other field for the reasons stated in the order sheet. This suir was filed on 30-11-1940 The present appellants were jointed as parties by subsequent amendment dated 10the July 1941. Considering thenature of the relief ultimately claimed inthis suit various amendements were allowed. The suit as amended claims insubstances therelief of partition and separate possesion of property indentily of whichwas no in dispute.Mistake layinthe description. Area and mumber of field. The auit is not based on mistake and the question of rectification of sale deed is merely incidental. Under the circumstances, Art. 96 of the old Limitation Act would not apply. It is contended that the only article applicable to the suit was Act. 120 which provides a limitation of six years form the accrual of the cause of action. We donot agree. For getting such a relief in the matter of immovable property either Art. 136 or 144 would apply. Both provide a limitation of 12 years. It is unnecessary to go into the debate as to which to the two articles applies as susit is inany casewithin 12 years formthe sale deed. The First Appellate Court as well as the learned single Judge were also right inholding that no question of limitation really arose inthematter in the whole background, mistake about filed survey number was discoveredafter the filing of thesuit and for all these reasons late joinder of appellants on 10 the July 1941 would not make the suit time barred. Rightly it has been held that cause of action to claim partition was continuing.
11. Third and last point relates to the maintainability of the suit of want of all the 27 defendants in 1909 suit as parties to the suit. We dono see any substance inthis point either. Out of 27 persons s7 had share in the filed, Receriver was representing the estate. He was impleaded as defendant. 7 Those who had disputed thepossession of the appellants were jointed as parties,. Heirs of the debtors vendors were also impleaded. The written statement does not disclose the names of the necessary parties. The suit after amendment was concerned not withfield survey No. 187/2 but with field survey No. 187/6 The defendant did not amend the written statement. The plea to the effect 'that the suit was bad for defect of parties' was casually made, It is not domonstrated as towhich other party had subsisiting interest in the field. The litigation went on for years together. No aggrived party has made any grievance andunder allthese circumstances, the First Appellate Court as well ast helearned single Judge were quite right incoming to the conclusion that thesuit could not be thrown onthis ground.
12. for all these reasons we ssee no merit inthis appeal which is dismissed. Under the circumstances, we propose of make no order as to costs.
13. Appeal dismissed.