ORDER
1. These two Criminal Writ Petitions filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be disposed of through a common judgment. The petitions are substantially between the same parties and the points of law and the facts that are involved are also common. The petitions raiseissues of considerable importance and of far-reaching consequence. I am, therefore, outlining the brief heads that fall for determination in these petitions which are as follows:--
A) What are the rights that have vested in the Custodian under the Textile undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 after takeover, and whether the property of the Company, namely, the proprietorship of the existing Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 can in law be said to have been transmitted to the Custodian as a consequence of such take-over?
B) Whether the Custodian, after such takeover, can be categorised only as the permitted user, or whether the proprietorship of the trade-marks can be said to have been transmitted to the Custodian thereby extinguishing the rights of the company that earlier vested in it?
C) Whether, after such take-over, the registered owners of the trade-marks can be prosecuted for offences involving illegal or unauthorised user of these trade-marks without the knowledge and consent of the Custodian?
D) Whether, in the face of such a prosecution, it is open to the registered owners to move the High Court by way of a petition u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Art. 227 of the Constitution of India for the purposes of quashing of the criminal proceedings?
E) Whether it is at all permissible to prosecute the registered proprietor of a trademark for an offence of unauthorised user of his own trade-mark under these circumstances?
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petitions are as follows :
In the year 1983, the Government of India enacted the Textile undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 thereinafter referred to as 'the Take-over Act') and by virtue of that Act, took over the management of several textile undertakings. Two of such undertakings were the Finley Mills Ltd. andthe Gold Mohur Mills Ltd. we are, in the present Petitions, concerned with the Finlay Mills Ltd. and its Directors along with their representatives, who have been prosecuted by the officers of the National Textile Corporation Ltd. for infringement of the trade-marks that were owned by the Finlay Mills Ltd. It is an admitted position that the Finlay Mills Ltd., even after the take-over, continue to function as a limited Company. The subsequent Act of nationalisation of the Company that was contemplated in the year 1983 has so far not taken place. Under the present Act of1983, it is only the management of the undertaking that has been taken over by the National Textile Corporation, which has been designated as 'the Custodian' under the Take-over Act. It appears from the record that the Finlay Mills Ltd., who are the registered owners of several trade-marks that are registered in their name, initially sought to prosecute the National Textile Corporation for unauthorised user of the trade-marks in question. Subsequent to this, the Finlay Mills Ltd. filed a suit on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court, being Suit No. 1815 of1984, for the purposes of obtaining an injunction restraining the National Textile Corporation from using the trade-marks in question. On an interim application for injunction being made by the plaintiffs in that suit, the learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the application, and it is against this order that the plaintiffs went in appeal to the Division Bench. The Division Bench by its order dated 12-6-1986 dismissed the appeal and in the course of the order observed that the National Textile Corporation was authorised to use the trade-marks in question.
3. Pursuant to this order of the Division Bench, the officers of the National Textile Corporation, acting under the assumption that the observations of the Division Bench conferred on them not only the right to use the trade-marks but the exclusive right to do so to the exclusion of other parties, instituted certain prosecutions against the Finlay Mills Ltd. and its directors and representatives alleging that the user on their part of the trade-marks in question constituted offences punishable u/ Ss. 78 and 79 of the Trade andMerchandise Marks Act, 1958. In view of the fact that some of the products manufactured by the Finlay Mills Ltd. and the National Textile Corporation, which has now taken over the unit, are extremely well-known in the market in different parts of the country, such prosecutions were instituted not only in the city of Bombay but in Calcutta and elsewhere. The accused moved the Calcutta High Court by way of a Petition No. C.O. 15611 (W) of 1988, which petition came to be decided by the learned single Judge through his judgment and order dated 12-11-1990. The learned single Judge upheld the position that the accused cannot in law be prosecuted for the user of the trade-marks in question and that consequently the criminal prosecutions were liable to be quashed.
4. The present two petitions are directed against the criminal complaints pending in the city of Bombay. Criminal writ petition No. 814 of 1989 is directed against Criminal Cases Nos. 16 and 17 I & R of 1989 filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, and Criminal Writ Petition No. 1091 of 1989 is directed against Criminal Cases Nos. 89 I & R and 90 I & R of 1987 filed before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. It is relevant to mention that no process has been issued in these proceedings, but the grievance of the petitioners is that the learned Magistrates have forwarded the complaints to the concerned Police Authorities with a direction, that the matter be investigated into and that the goods, which are the subject-matter of the complaints, be seized. As is inevitable, acting on this direction, the police appear to have seized certain quantities of textiles at different places, and it is the case of the petitioners that they are seriously prejudiced by this action. In the first complaint pending before the Esplanade Court, the investigating officer had filed a report dated 11-7-1977 (sic) before the learned Magistrate, which is at Exhibit 'F'. The Police Officer had reported to the Court that the accused, who are the registered owners of the trade-marks, had every right to use the trade-marks and that consequently, according to him, no offence has been disclos-ed. The complainant thereafter made an application to the trial Court that the matter be reinvestigated. A grievance was sought to be made in the course of the pleadings of these petitions that such an application is quite unprecedented and was unjustified on the . special facts of this case. It is necessary to deal with that aspect of the matter as the proceeding itself deserves to be quashed on a point of law and hence there can be no question of any further investigation.
5. Jt is against this background that the present petitioners filed these petitions and invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with a prayer that the criminal proceedings instituted against them be quashed on the ground that they are not maintainable in law. It is the contention of the petitioners in the present petitions that the Finlay Mills Ltd., even prior to the take-over of the management, were involved in two distinct forms of business with regard to manufacture of the textiles that are covered by the present set of trade-marks. According to the petitioners, one part of the goods were manufactured by them in their own unit or undertaking, i.e., the one that has been taken over by the National Textile Corporation, and a certain quantum of the goods were manufactured by other parties under an agreement with the Finlay Mills Ltd. and that the petitioners were responsible for the quality of those goods which were also marketed under the same trade-marks. It is, therefore, their case that there existed two separate and distinct lots of goods, both of which emanated from the two different streams of sources in respect of which the same sets of trade-marks were used by them. These averments made by the petitioners in the present Petitions have not been disputed by the Respondents, either through an affidavit or in the course of the hearing. It, therefore, follows that the petitioners were all along using the trade-marks on two independently distinct sets of goods, the second category of which they continued to market even after the take-over of this unit. It is further relevant to record that this is a distinguishing feature as far as the present set of petitions is concerned, because even in the suit filed by the present petitioners before theOriginal Side of the High Court, in which proceedings the Division Bench had occasion to deliver the judgment and order dated 12-6-1986, it was the case of the petitioners that they still continue to produce and Market goods which were covered by the trade-marks of which they arc the registered owners through sources other than the units which have been taken over by the National Textile Corporation. It was their contention in the civil proceedings that they, as the registered owners of the trade-marks, had the exclusive right to use these trade-marks to the exclusion of the National Textile Corporation and the Division Bench negatived this last contention by holding that the National Textile Corporation also has the right to use the (Trade-marks in question. In the present proceedings, the position is the reverse in so far as the petitioners have been prosecuted by the National Textile Corporation authorities on the ground that they have committed offences by continuing to use the trade-marks which, the National Textile Corporation contends, have vested exclusively in them.
6. At the commencement of the hearing, Mr. Thakore, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1, raised two preliminary objections before me with regard to the maintainability of the present petitions. Mr. Thakore contended that, in the first instance, it is not open to the petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India in the present proceedings. It was his contention that the proceedings before the Magistrates are still at a very preliminary stage, that the learned Magistrates have only forwarded the complaints to the Police in normal course under the powers vested in them under the Code of Criminal Procedure for an enquiry and report, that as far as the action of the learned Magistrates was concerned, it was wholly justified and consequently that there is no warrant for the High Court to exercise its powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. Basically, what Mr. Thakore has contended was that the general power of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution is a power that is normally invoked only in cases where it is contended that anauthority of the Court subordinate to the High Court has committed a grave error which requires rectification. In so far as the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrates is concerned, it does not suffer from any such error, and it is, therefore, his contention that the powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked.
7. As against this, Mr, Chitnis, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has drawn my attention to a Division Bench judgment of the Nagpur Bench of this Court in the case of Shyamrani v. State of Mah. 1990 M LJ 975. In that judgment, the High Court was called upon to decide as to whether the powers u/ S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure independently or read with An. 227 of the Constitution or independently under Art. 227 of the Constitution could be invoked at the instance of a party who has already availed of a remedy of revision u/S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Division Bench answered the question in the affirmative. In that case, while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the Division Bench summarised the position by stating that no statute can bar the constitutional remedy provided for under Art. 227 of the Constitution. We are not immediately required to go into this aspect of the matter in any depth, because the present case stands on a much stronger footing in so far as the petitioners have not availed of any revisional remedy. The petitioners in this case have come up to the High Court and have invoked the inherent powers as also the general power of superintendence basing their grievance on a pure and substantially legal challenge. The learned single Judge of this Court, who admitted these petitions after hearing both parties, had obviously come to the conclusion that this was a fit case where the petitioners have approached the High Court on a substantial point of law. To my mind, this case involves more than one such substantial point of law which virtually goes to the very root or the genesis of the prosecution and consequently it cannot be argued that the High Court was in error in having entertained the present petitions either under Art. 227 of theConstitution or u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Had the trial Court examined the facts and the law carefully, and had the complainant been sufficiently fair in placing all relevant material before the learned trial Court, the subsequent police action would have been avoided. Mr. Thakore is, therefore, incorrect when he contends that a grave error has not resulted in this case.
8. The second preliminary objection canvassed by Mr. Thakore was with regard to the powers of the High Court u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Thakore has very rightly contended that the powers of the High Court u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are required to be exercised very sparingly and only in those of the cases where the interests of justice so required. For this purpose, it will have to be demonstrated that a situation has arisen whereby the petitioners are left with no alternative or option at that particular point of time in the proceedings except to invoke the special powers of the High Court, in the absence of which they are likely to be gravely prejudiced. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition enunciated by Mr. Thakore that the High Court will not normally interfere in a proceeding where the petitioners have a remedy before the trial Court and further that the High Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial Court and that too at a preliminary stage of a proceeding. If, however, it is demonstrated that a single or a series of prosecutions have been instituted as in the present case, that orders or directions have been issued in those prosecutions which have grave and far-reaching consequences, such as seizure of their goods and stoppage of their business, and it is further demonstrated that the Accused who are petitioners before this Court have virtually no remedy which they can legitimately avail themselves of before the trial Court, then the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court in such a case would, to my mind, be justified.
9. 1 shall presently deal with the relevant case law u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the appropriate part of this judgment, but suffice it to say that on the factsof the present case and on the points of law that are canvassed in this case, the preliminary objection of Mr. Thakore that the present petitions ought not to be entertained, cannot, to my mind, be accepted.
10. The first point canvassed by Mr. Chitnis is a mixed question of fact and law. He has placed reliance on the averments made in the petitions and on the undisputed factual position as emerges from the pleadings in the civil proceedings between the parties. He has stated that the present case presents certain unique facts which would perhaps not be present in other similar cases. Those facts have already been set out by me, namely, that the present petitioners, who arc the registered owners of the trade-marks in question were, even prior to the take-over of the present unit, manufacturing and marketing the same goods in respect of which they have been prosecuted in the present set of cases through the manufacturing units other than the one which has been taken over by the National Textile Corporation. It is the case of Mr. Chitnis that there were two distinct sets of goods which emanated from two different sources, both of which were covered by the present set of trade-marks. Admittedly, the present accused were, therefore, using the trade-marks on goods that they manufactured in units other than the one taken over by the National Textile Corporation and they continue to do so even up to the present point of lime.
11. The second factual contention raised by Mr. Chitnis, about which there is also no dispute, is that the entire set of the trademarks were registered in the names of the Finlay Mills Ltd. and the Registrar of Trademarks has confirmed in writing that the registration in the names of the petitioners continues up to the present point of time and furthermore that the National Textile Corporation has not taken any steps whatsoever for the purpose of getting themselves registered as the owners of the trade-marks in question. Mr. Thakore has stated that this position is incorrect in so far as the officers of the National Textile Corporation had, in fact, approached the Registrar of Trade-marks on more than one occasion and had also pointedout to him that they desired to take the necessary steps for the purpose of having the entries altered to their names and that they were already informed by the officers that no such applications would be entertained by the Registrar, because the Finlay Mills Ltd. have filed a suit which is pending before the High Court and the matter is sub judice. Assuming that the statements made by Mr. Thakore are correct, it does not alter the factual position at all in so far as this Court is required to go by the position as it obtains on record, namely, that the Finlay Mills Ltd. on the dates when the prosecutions were instituted against them before the trial Court were, in fact, the registered owners of the trade-marks in question. This position is of considerable significance.
12. Mr. Chitnis has drawn my attention to certain provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. He has referred to the definition of the term 'registered trade mark' in S. 2(r) of the Act, which defines the 'registered trade mark' as a trade mark which is actually on the register. S. 2(o) of the Act defines 'register' as being the Register of Trade Marks referred to the S. 6. S. 6 of the Act, in turn, refers to the Register of Trade Marks maintained by the Trade Marks Registry. S. 2(s) of the Act defines 'registered user' as a person who is for the time being registered as such u/S. 49 of the Act. S. 49 of the Act, in turn, prescribes the manner in which the Registry can entertain an application from a registered user of a trade-mark. It is relevant at this stage to point out that the Act itself contemplated a situation whereby the registered proprietor in relation to the trade-mark and the registered user can be two different parties. It is significant to record that even though Mr. Thakore has pointed out that the officers of the National Textile Corporation did approach the Trade Marks Registry orally with the request that they be registered as users of the trade-mark, admittedly, they did not prefer any application, nor have they been registered as the users of the trade-marks in question. Mr. Chitnis has also drawn my attention to the definition of the term 'permitted use' as obtains in S. 2(m) of the Act which, basically, deals with the user ofthe trade-mark by a registered user in relation to goods whereby the registered user complies with the conditions or restrictions to which the registration of the trade-mark is subject.
13. Mr. Chitnis has also relied on S. 2(v) of the Act, which defines the term 'trade mark' as follows:--
'(v) 'trade mark' means -
(i) in relation to Chapter X (other than S. 81) a registered trade mark or a mark used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor to use the mark; and
(ii) in relation to the other provisions of this Act, a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right, either as proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark whether with or without any indication of the identity of that person, and includes a certification trade mark registered as such under the provisions of Chap. VIII.'
Reliance was thereafter placed by Mr. Chitnison S. 28 of the Act, which dealt with the rights conferred on the registered proprietor of a trade-mark by virtue of such registration. Briefly stated, S. 28 of the Act confers on the registered proprietor an exclusive right of use of the trade-mark and the right to take action in cases of infringement. It is important to record here that S. 28, sub-sec. (3) does contemplate a situation whereby two or more persons are registered as proprietors of trademarks which are identical. Suffice it to say that if it was the contention of the National Textile Corporation that by operation of law they have become the registered proprietors of the trade-marks, it was open to them to have taken necessary steps for the purpose of getting themselves registered as proprietors of the trade-marks either jointly with the present petitioners or to their exclusion. Obviously, no such steps have been taken.
14. On the basis of the provisions of theAct set out by me, in law and by virtue of the fact ihat the Finlay Mills Ltd. are and continue to be the registered proprietors of the trade-marks in question, there cannot be any question of the institution of a prosecution against the petitioners for infringement of their own trade-marks. Dealing with the provisions of the take-over Act, Mr. Chitnis submitted that a reference to the statement of objects and reasons will indicate that the Government initially promulgated an Ordinance which came to be replaced by this Act, which was essentially a stop-gap arrangement directed towards the ultimate objective of nationalisation of the undertakings in question. It is stated in the statements of objects and reasons as follows:--
'Once the basic decision of nationalisation was taken, a genuine apprehension arose in the Government's mind that unless the management of the concerned undertakings was taken over on an immediate basis there might be large-scale frittering away of assets which would be detrimental to the public interest. It thus became urgently necessary for Government to take over the management of the undertakings in the public interest.'
Section 3 of the Take-over Act, with which we are immediately concerned, and in particular sub-sees. (1) and (2) of that Section, state as follows:--
Management of certain textile undertakings to vest in the Central Government -
On and from the appointed day the management of all the textile undertakings shall vest in the Central Government.
The textile undertaking shall be deemed to include all assets, rights, leaseholds, powers, authorities and privileges of the textile company in relation to the said textile undertaking and all property, movable and immovable, including lands, buildings, workshops, projects, stores, spares, instruments, machinery, equipment automobiles and other vehicles, and goods under production or in transit, cash balances, reserve fund, investments and booklets and all other rights and interests in or arising out of such property aswere, immediately before the appointed day, in the ownership, possession, power or control of the textile company whether within or outside India and all books of account, registers and all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto.'
There van be little dispute about the fact that the object of promulgating this Act was in order to take over the management of the textile undertakings in question. As very clearly set out in S. 3(1) of the Take-over Act, on and from the appointed day, which in this case was 18-10-1983, the management of all textile undertakings has vested in the Central Government. The Take-over Act does not define the term 'management'. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Take-over Act indicates that the term 'textile undertaking' shall be deemed to include all assets, rights, etc. that are specified in that sub-section.
15. In this context, it is necessary to set at rest the rival contentions canvassed before me by the contesting parties. Mr. Chitnis emphatically contended that by virtue of the promulgation of this Act, all that has been taken over is the management of the textile undertaking or unit of the Finlay Mills Ltd. He also pointed out that u/S. 2(d) of the Take-over Act, the term 'textile undertaking' has been defined as to mean an undertaking specified in the second column of the First Schedule of the Act. A reference to the First Schedule will indicate that the Act has drawn a distinction and has, in fact, segregated the unit from the body corporate in all these cases. As far as the petitioners are concerned, the Finlay Mills Ltd.'s textile unit in question appears in column (2) and it is the management of this unit that is vested in the Central Government on and from 18-3-1983. The name of the owner appears in column (3) and that is the Finlay Mills Ltd., which is the body corporate, and it is, in fact, a separate and distinct juridical person which has been separated from the unit or undertaking as set out in column (2). The Finlay Mills Ltd. remains untouched and unaffected save and except to the extent that the management and control over the unit, which originally vested in the limited Company, has now been transferredon and from 18-3-1983 to the National Textile Corporation. Though the Take-over Act does not define the term 'management', it would be useful to refer to the definition of the term 'management' as is set out in Balck's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 865, which is as follows :--
'Management -- Government, control, superintendence, physical or manual handling or guidance, act of managing by direction or regulation, or administration, as management of family, or of household, or of servants, or of great enterprises, or of great affairs.'
16. Dealing with the term 'management' in Words and Phrases legally defined, Volume 3, Third Edition, Pages 91 and 92, the learned Authors have, on the basis of the enactments in force in those countries, defined the term as constituting management and supervision of all matters connected with the user and supervision/provision of facilities and it further defines the term as meaning the power vested in the acts involved in the supervising and controlling of property.
17. On the basis of these definitions, there can be no dispute about the fact that what has vested in the National Textile Corporation, and to my mind what the Finlay Mills Ltd. have been divested of, is the general control, superintendence and guidance in matters of day to day administration which includes requisition of the textile units or undertakings. It is necessary to clarify that the Act of nationalisation of the Mills, though contemplated, has so far not taken place and, therefore, we are still in the position as if obtained as on 18-3-1983; while only the management of the textile undertaking has been vested in the Central Government under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Take-over Act, the control over the property, which is necessarily a function of the management, and the user of the trademarks, which the Division Bench of this Court has categorised as the property of the undertaking, can be said to have vested in the National Textile Corporation. This would consequently, within the frame work of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, put the National Textile Corporation in the legalstatus of a permitted user of the trade-marks in question. It is necessary to clarify here that a careful examination of all the provisions of the Take-over Act indicates that nowhere in the Act is there any reference specifically to the trade-marks. There is also no specific mention anywhere in the Act of the fact of the registered owners, namely, the Finlay Mills Ltd. who in this case constitute a Company, i.e., the petitioners before me, having been divested of their rights as registered proprietors of the trade-marks.
18. Whereas Mr. Chitnis has contended that the effect of the Take-over Act is very limited and that it does not in any way alter the position of the rights that had been vested in the registered proprietors, namely, the petitioners, Mr. Thakore has very forcefully submitted that by virtue of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Take-over Act read with S. 7 of the Act, this Court must hold that whatever rights the petitioners originally possessed stand extinguished as far as the trade-marks are concerned. S. 7 of the Takeover Acf reads as follows:--
'7. Act to have overriding effect.-
The provisions of this Act or any notification, order or rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law (other than this Act) or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act or in any decree or order of any Court.'
It is the submission of Mr. Thakore that by virtue of the provisions of S. 7 of the Takeover Act, which have an overriding effect as far as the provisions contained in any other law which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are concerned, that by necessary implication, the rights, if any, created under the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 stand automatically extinguished. I am unable to accept this submission canvassed by Mr. Thakore for the reason that, as pointed out by me earlier, the present Act does not make any reference specifically or even indirectly to the extinguishment of the rights that are vested in the registered owners of the trade-marks, namely, the Finlay MillsLtd. It is very significant that there is no such mention because it must be presumed that it was to the knowledge of the Legislature at the time when provision was being made for the take-over of the unit that the textile products manufactured in the units are necessarily covered by trade-marks and that unless a specific provision is made in respect of these trade marks that it could not have been possible for the units to continue to manufacture those products. The fact that no provision has been made specifically providing for the transfer or transmission of the trade-marks to the National Textile Corporation and consequently for extinguishment of the rights conferred thereunder from the original registered owners, it must be implied that the Legislature did not intend any such extinguishment. It is true that the Division Bench of our High Court has construed the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Takeover Act to mean that the National Textile Corporation will have the right to use the trade marks in question and the reason why the Division Bench took such a view was because the Division Bench, while construing the term 'property' has observed that the trade marks must be construed as property of the undertaking and consequently that the undertaking would be entitled to use this trade mark. What we are concerned with in the present case is the question as to whether the registered proprietors, namely, the Petitioners, can continue to use the trade marks after 18-10-1983, i.e., after the date when the management has vested in the National Textile Corporation. For the reasons that are being set out by me above, there can be no doubt or dispute that the present petitioners, who are the registered proprietors of the trade marks, had and continue to have every right to the user of the trade marks in question.
19. Mr. Chitnis further contended in support of his submission that a reference to the provisions of S. 44 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 is relevant. It was the argument of Mr. Thakore, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the National Textile Corporation, that on and from 18-3-1983, by virtue of the vesting of the management in the National Textile Corporation, the trademarks have been transmitted to the National Textile Corporation. Mr. Thakore placed heavy reliance on the definition of the term 'transmission' appearing in Section 2(w) of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which reads as follows:--
'2(w) 'transmission' means transmission by operation of law, devolution on the personal representative of a deceased person and any other mode of transfer, not being assignment;'
It is the submission of Mr. Thakore that the act of vesting of the management as contemplated in the Take-over Act presupposes that the trade-marks have been transmitted to the National Textile Corporation by operation of law.
20. It is necessary to refer to the definition of the term 'transmission' as appears in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, Page 1344, which reads as follows:--
'Transmission. In the civil law, the right which heirs or legatees may have of passing to their successors the inheritance or legacy to which they were entitled, if they happen to die without having exercised their rights.'
It is very clear from this definition that the term 'transmission' by operation of law presupposes the class of cases as are set out in the definition, namely, that as a result of orders passed in judicial proceedings, or as a result of survivorship, or any other such case, a trade mark can be said to devolve on another person by operation of law. In the present case, in the absence of any specific provision in the Take-over Act, it will not be possible to uphold the contention that the trade marks in question have devolved on the National Textile Corporation by operation of law. A further reference to Section 44 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 will indicate that even as far as the assignments and transmissions are concerned, for such assignments or transmissions to be legally enforceable, the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 specifies a certain procedure. Section 41 of the Act reads as follows:--
'44. Registration of assignments and transmissions.
(1) Where a person becomes entitled by assignment or transmission to a registered trade mark, he shall apply in the prescribed manner to the Re?istrar to register his title, and the Registrar shall on receipt of the application and on proof of title to his satisfaction, register him as the proprietor of the trade mark in respect of the goods in respect of which the assignment or transmission has effect and shall cause particulars of the assignment or transmission to be entered in the register :
Provided that where the validity of an assignment or transmission is in dispute between the parties, the Registrar may refuse to register the assignment or transmission until the rights of the parties have been determined by a competent Court.
(2) Except for the purpose of an application before the Registrar under sub-section (1) or an appeal from an order thereon, or an application under Section 56 or an appeal from an order thereon a document or instrument in respect of which no entry has been made in the register in accordance with sub-section (1), shall not be admitted in evidence by the Registrar or any Court in proof of title to the trade mark by assignment or transmission unless the Registrar or the Court, as the case may be, otherwise directs.'
It is abundantly clear from the provisions of Section 44 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 that, in the first instance, the party who claims rights by virtue of assignment and transmission is required within the framework of this Act to get himself registered and furthermore as per the proviso to that Section, where the validity of an assignment or transmission is disputed, the Registrar may refuse registration and until the rights of the parties have been determined by competent Court, no such registration shall take place. By necessary implication, it follows that without registration of the assignment or transmission no rights can be pleaded on the ground that the trade marks have been assigned or transmitted. Admittedly, in the present case, the civil suit filed by the Petitioners is pending decision before this Court and under the provisions of the interim ordersthe Court has clearly empowered the National Textile Corporation to use the trade marks in question. The Court was also conscious while making that order of the fact that the present petitioners are manufacturing the same goods and that they are using the trade marks and the Court has not made any observation in its order to the effect that such user was either impermissible or that the same did not have legal sanction. In the circumstances, Mr. Chitnis's reliance on the provisions of Sec. 44 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 is justified and it will have to be held that the present petitioners cannot, in any event, be prosecuted for the infringement of the trade marks on the ground that they have been divested of their proprietary rights.
21. Mr. Chitnis has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumat Prasad v. Sheojanan Prasad, : 1972CriLJ1707 . In that case, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the distinction between a 'trade mark' and a 'property mark' as is envisaged under Section 179 of the Indian Penal Code. While dealing with the distinction, in paragraph(7) of the judgment, the Supreme Court had occasion to observe as follows (at page 2490 AIR 1972):--
'The concept of a trade mark is distinct from that of a property mark. A mark, as defined by Rule 2(1)(i) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter or numerical or any combination thereof. A trade mark means a mark used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor to use that mark. The function of a trade mark is to give an indication to the purchaser or a possible purchaser as to the manufacture or quality of the goods, to give an indication to his eye of the trade source from which the goods come, or the trade hands through which they pass on their way to the market.'
It follows from the observations of the Supreme Court that the purpose behind the fixation of the trade mark is essential in orderthat the customer should be certain of the source, that is, who is the manufacturer as also the quality which would be associated with a product coming from that manu-facturer.
22. My attention was also drawn to a decision of the House of Lords in the case of Secouturier v. Rey (1910) AC 262. Their Lordships of the House of Lords in that case were called upon to adjudicate upon a dispute of a rather interesting nature pertaining to the trade mark of a particular brand of liqueurs manufactured originally by certain monks in France. After the monks were required to leave France, they took with them the trade secret and went away to Tarragone in Spain. They continued to manufacture and market the liqueur known as 'Chartreuse'. A dispute arose in the U.K. because the Liquidator of Abbe Rey, which was the mother house of the monks in question originally in France and which continued to market the same product, sought to bring an injunction against the product marketed by the monks from Spain which, in fact, was the original product. The House of Lords, following the decision of the French Court, took the view that no such injunction was permissible in so far as the monks, who were the original owners and rightful manufacturers of the product, could not be slopped from marketing it. The reason behind it was that as far as the customers or consumers were concerned, they had every right to go by the name or the trade mark which, in turn, signified to them the guarantee that the product had emanated from the source, namely, the owners of that trade mark and that consequently they were getting the type of quality and product which was associated with that source. On the basis of this decision, Mr. Chitnis has contended that it will have to be held that the present petitioners, who are the registered owners and original manufacturers of the textiles in question, must be said to possess the legal right to continue with the user of the trade marks in dispute. As indicated by me earlier, if the rights of the petitioners have not been exlinguished, then the position gets doubly fortified by the view expressed by our Supreme Court and by their Lordships of the House of Lords that the present petitionersare justified in continuing to use the trade marks in question.
23. Considerable reliance was sought to be placed by Mr. Thakore on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N.T. Corpn. Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd., : [1986]2SCR187 . That was a case between the National Textile Corporation and Sitaram Mills Ltd. The dispute in that case briefly centred round the question as to whether a separate division of the company, which carried on business in real estate, can be said to have been taken over under the provisions of the Take-over Act. It was demonstrated to the Supreme Court in that case that the division in question was an intrinsic part of the textile unit in so far as the profits earned by that real estate division were, in fact, being ploughed back into the textile business of the unit that had been taken over and consequently the Supreme Court held that it was inseparable from the unit and, therefore, the control over the said division must be said to have been vested in the National Textile Corporation. Mr. Chitnis seeks to distinguish the case of N.T. Corpn. Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. (supra) from the present one basically on the ground that the Supreme Court in that case was concerned with tangible assets which were a part and parcel of the unit that was taken over. He contends that, in the present case, we are concerned with the rights in law and not with any tangible assets and that his clients are not making any claim to any such assets in respect of which control or management has vested in the National Textile Corporation.
24. Apart from the distinction made by Mr. Chitnis, the case of N. T. Corpn. Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. is distinguishable on facts. In that case, the two business consisted of industrial galas and industrial lands whereas in the present case, we do not find any such factual position. Apart from that, there is no real dispute with regard to any property, tangible or otherwise, and therefore, to my mind, the decision in the case of N.T. Corpn. Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. has no application as far as the present proceedings are concerned. Mr. Chitnis also placed strong reliance on the recent judgment of a learnedsingle Judge of the Calcutta High Court in similar dispute between these very parties. The learned single Judge in that case had considered the ambit and scope of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Take-over Act and has, in the very first instance, recorded the finding that it is only the management of the textile undertaking and nothing else that has been taken over. The learned Judge has drawn a distinction between a trade mark and between the management of plant and machinery or real estate, etc. and observed that it is the second category of property that is squarely covered by th decision in the case of N.T. Corpn. Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. The learned Judge has further observed that as long as the proprietorship and ownership of the trade marks continue to remain with the petitioners no prosecution is maintainable against them. The learned Judge has also observed that there is no automatic transmission of the ownership of the trade marks to the National Textile Corporation by virtue of the provisions of the Act. I am fully in agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court as far as these aspects of the case are concerned.
25. The learned single Judge has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha : 1982CriLJ819 . As it was the contention of Mr. Thakore that the present proceedings are only at the stage of investigation and that any interference would be premature in law, it was the contention of Mr. Chitnis that, on the basis of this and other judgments, this Court will be justified in quashing an investigation if the facts so justify. Chandrachud, C.J. (as he then was) has considered the case law in detail and has clearly observed that in a case where an investigation is in progress and the First Information Report prima facie discloses the commission of an offence that the investigation cannot be interfered with in keeping the rule enunciated in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad's case and that the Court has no power to stop the investigation. His Lordship further observed that the correct position in law is that ifFirst Information Report does not disclose the ingradients of an offence that the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation. It is not a requirement of law that an investigation once commenced cannot be interfered with until the proceeding crystallises into a regular criminal case before the Court. This view has been supported by A.N. Sen, J. as also by Varadarajan, J., though the reasoning of the learned Judges is slightly different. In paragraph (65) of the judgment, the learned Judge (A.N. Sen, J.) has observed as follows ` :--
'The propositions enunciated by the Judicial Committee and this Court in the various decisions which 1 have earlier noted are based on sound principles of Justice. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and properly may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the court zealously guards them and protects them.'
It very clearly emerges from this decision that in an appropriate case, the High Court would be justified in interfering even at the stage of investigation and in quashing a private corn-plaint, even if it is at the preliminary stage of enquiry which is a procedure parallel to a proceeding commenced on a Police complaint. Mr. Chitnis has placed reliance on one more decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. R.K. Srivastav : 1989CriLJ2301 . While dealing with the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court has observed that where the First Information Report on its face value does not make out any offence, the criminal proceeding instituted on its basis is liable to be quashed. In this particular case, the State Bank of India had lodged a First Information Report alleging certain offence and it was Ihe contention of the accused that the facts of the case did not make out the necessary in-gradients that are required for the institution of a criminal prosecution. Even though the investigation was at a preliminary stage, the Supreme Court quashed the First Information Report in this case. It necessarily follows that the submission advanced by Mr. Thakore that this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot quash a criminal proceeding, which is at the enquiry/ investigation stage, deserves to be rejected.
26. My attention was also drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhavrao J. Scindia v. Sambhajirao C. Angre : 1988CriLJ853 .The Supreme Court, while dealing with the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, observed as follows 711 of AIR 1988 :--
'When a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.'
The Supreme Court in that case not only reiterated the principle that a criminal proceeding commenced under circumstances which constitute a misuse or abuse of judicial process would necessarily include a situation where the particular accused cannot in law be prosecuted for particular offences and held that such a prosecution should not be allowed to continue in the public interest. The Supreme Court has occasion to observe that it is the duty of the High Court to very carefully examine the material before it and ascertainwhether the possibility of a conviction is bleak. The Supreme Court consequently observed that in such cases where the accused in all probability would not be convicted, the continuance of the prosecution is liable to be quashed. I am of the view that as far as the present case is concerned that not only is it squarely covered by the decision in Madhav-rao, J. Scindia's case but presents an even stronger case for qaushing. The accused before me, who are the registered proprietors of the trade marks, can never be convicted on these complaints for the offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and therefore, the continuance of the prosecution against them would not be justified.
27. As indicated earlier, the officers of the National Textile Corporation, who are the prosecuting authority, acting under the assumption that they are in law entitled to stop the use of the trade marks in question by other parties, which included the registered owners, instituted the present prosecutions. They also instituted similar prosecutions in other parts of the country on the same ground. The commencement of further prosecutions would have been inevitable because every time the petitioners marked their goods with the trade marks on them, the officers of the National Textile Corporation, when it came to their notice, would have proceeded. The inevitable result would have been that the petitioners would have to stop their business until the respective rights of the parties were determined by the first of the criminal Courts which took up the cases for hearing. The issue as to whether the registered proprietor of a trade mark can be prosecuted for the infringement of his own trade marks in the facts and circumstances of this case is not something that is a matter of evidence. The relevant provisions of the law and the accompanying facts were all before the trial Court and they are also before this Court. In the light of this position, it is essential and very much in the interest of justice that the High Court should interfere at this point of time because these cases squarely come within the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Nagawwa v. Veeranna's case : 1976CriLJ1533 . The Supreme Court specified that where the grounds on which the prosecution is based arc so absurd that no prudent person would sanction the continuance of such a prosecution that it is a fit case for quashing. Had the complainant frankly informed the learned trial Magistrate that he is proceeding against the registered proprietors of the trade marks, the learned Magistrate would have immediately been put on their guard and would have straightway entered into an enquiry and, in all probability, would have refused to entertain the complaints. It was for this reason that the accused were described as persons unknown or the names of some other agents of the petitioners were set out clearly creating the impression on the learned Magistrate that these cases are not different from the numerous other ones where unauthorised infringement of the trade marks takes place. Had the facts been clearly set out without any degree of vagueness and without any degree of suppression before the trial Court, there is no dispute that the learned Magistrate would have clearly dismissed the complaints on the ground that it is quite absurd to conceive of a prosecution against the registered proprietors in respect of their own trade marks. In this view of the matter, the proceedings are liable to be quashed, because their continuance would only be oppressive and to no useful purpose.
28. Reliance was also sought to be placed by Mr. Chitnis on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan : 1989CriLJ1005 . In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with an offence under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, which the High Court had quashed on the ground that the quality of evidence before the trial Court was such that it was unlikely to result in a conviction. The Supreme Court has found fault with the approach of the High Court in so far as it has been very clearly held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court at the preliminary stage is not permitted to weigh the evidence and give its findings on the appreciation of evidence. All that the High Court is permitted to do is to examine as towhether the offence is spelt out or not. In those cases only where the ingradients of the offence are not made out is the High Court permitted to quash the proceedings. Mr. Thakore relied heavily on the observations in this decision and contended that it was premature for the petitioners to contend that they can or cannot be convicted, that they will have to wait until the enquiry is concluded and that it is open to them to raise all their submissions before the trial Court either at the stage of issuance of process or in the course of the trial.
29. I am not in agreement with the submissions advanced by Mr. Thakore because on the peculiar facts of the present case, the position that emerges Sri law is that the prosecution is misconceived in so far as the present accused cannot be convicted of the offences with which they stand charged in the special facts and circumstances of this case. In actual fact, having regard to their statuses being the registered proprietors of the trade marks and the fact that their rights are not extinghished, it cannot even be contended at the very inception that they have committed offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It has rightly been pointed out on their behalf that they are unable to stop the consequences of the continuance of the prosecution, namely, the seizure of the goods, and they are unable to apply to the trial Court for a discharge as no process has yet been issued by the trial Court. In these circumstances, the petitioners had no alternative remedy but to move this Court in exercise of its inherent powers.
30. Mr. Chitnis further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chanrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh, : 1982CriLJ1731 . He contended, rather strongly, that the present prosecution has been initiated by a frustrated complainant who has not succeeded in his various actions against the present petitioners, and out of a sense of vendetta has now started prosecuting them in various Courts in the city of Bombay and other cities such as Calcutta and Madras. He has characterised the institution of the present prosecution as apatent abuse of the machinery of the criminal Court. The Supreme Court in the decision relied on by him was dealing with a case of a landlord and had occasion to observe (at pp. 1243 and 1244 of AIR 1982 SC):--
'Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal Court. Complainant herein is an advocate. He lost in both the courts in the rent control proceedings and has now rushed to the criminal court, This itself speaks volumes. Add to this the fact that another suit between the parties was pending from 1976. The conclusion is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court in this background is an abuse of the process of law and the High Court should not have glossed over this important fact while declining to exercise its power under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
The Supreme Court had observed that having lost in several civil courts in several proceedings that the complainant had involved the powers of the criminal Court purely in order to harass the accused and that such conduct not only requires to be deprecated but that the proceeding required to be quashed. On the other hand, Mr. Thakore pointed out that if the National Textile Corporation, which was a responsible Public Sector Corporation, came across cases involving infringement of trade marks, affecting thereby its business, it would require, as of necessity, that its officers adopt all legal proceedings that were open to them and that there is no warrant to allege any mala fides. Mr. Thakore is fully justified in his submission as far as this aspect of the case is concerned. It is necessary also to add that on the facts of the present case, and in particular on the basis of the observations of the Division Bench, the officers of the National Textile Corporation may have bona fide believed that the trade marks had vested exclusively in them and that consequently they were of the view that they were entitled to stop others from using them and were required to take necessary legal steps to prevent what they understood to be infringement or misuse. If, under such belief, the present prosecution were commenced, they could notbe characterised as a mala fide exercise. However, in the light of the fact that on true and proper construction oi' the facts and law, since no infringements under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act can be alleged against the present petitioners in respect of the disputed set of trade marks, the prosecution commenced by the officers of the National Textile Corporation would consequently be still-born exercise and it is necessary that the proceedings be quashed in exercise of the powers vested in this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
31. Mr. Thakore pointed out -that the Calcutta High Court has not considered the implications of Section 7 of the Take-over Act. It his view, by virtue of the provisions of Section 7 of the Take-over Act, the proprietary rights in respect of the trade marks have been transmitted to the National Textile Corporation as an institution land consequently it is his contention that the National Textile Corporation has in law become the rightful owner to the exclusion of the present petitioners and that the prosecutions are, therefore, justified. Having analysed the relevant provisions of the Take-over Act and the law on the point, it is very clear that this submission is misconceived and, therefore, deserves to be rejected. Mr. Thakore has further contended that having regard to the . provisions of Section 7 of the Take-over Act, the onus of proving that they acted honestly or bona fide shifts to the accused and that in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court cannot consider the likely defence of the accused and give them the benefit thereof. What Mr. Thakore seems to have overlooked is that he proceeded on the assumption that the accused, who are before the Court, can rightly be charged for having committed those offences. In a case where the Accused are themselves the registered proprietors and in a case where it can be legally demonstrated that they are rightfully using the trade marks, the question of considering any defence does not arise and the prosecution itself is misconceived.
32. It is necessary, in passing, to deal with the Division Bench judgment of this Court referred to by me earlier. The Division Bench of this Court was concerned with a very limited aspect of the dispute and, in any event, did not examine the legalities with regard to the commission of offences under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The plaintiffs before the Division Bench, who are the present petitioners, had only contended that the National Textile Corporation should be restrained from using the trade marks in question. The Division Bench in this judgment examined the relevant provisions at an interlocutory stage for deciding as to whether the National Textile Corporation could be stopped from using the trade marks. In the course of this limited enquiry, all that the Division Bench has observed for the reasons set out in that judgment is that the National Textile Corporation had the right to use the trade marks in question. There is no dispute or quarrel with regard to this finding, but the points that are canvassed in the present proceedings are entirely different from those which arose before the Division Bench. There is, therefore, no conflict between the findings of the Division Bench in its interlocutory order and the view that I have taken in the present case.
33. In the light of the findings recorded by me above, and for the reasons set out in this judgment, the criminal proceedings pending before the trial Courts will have to be quashed.
34. In the result, both the criminal writ petitions succeed. The rule in each of them is made absolute with the clarification that Criminal Cases Nos. 16 and 17 I & R of 1989, on the file of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, and Criminal Cases Nos. 89 I & R of 1987, on the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplande, Bombay, are quashed along with the proceedings that are an off-shoot and emanate from these complaints. The interim orders passed in these Criminal Writ Petitions stand vacated. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
35. Mr. Chitnis, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has pointed out that certain goods have been seized from the petitioners and their agents in the course of the enquiry. He has pointed out that applications for the return of the property are pending before the learned Magistrates and that the petitioners are prejudiced by virtue of the fact that those applications have so far not been decided. In the light of the present judgment, the learned Magistrates are directed to expeditiously dispose of the applications for the return of property that have been made by the petitioners, preferably within an outer limit of one month.
36. Order accordingly.