I.A. Ansari, J.
1. This First Appeal has been resisted at its very threshold by raising, undoubtedly, a very interesting question of law at the very stage of its admission.
2. This appeal has arisen out of the Judgment and Decree, dated 11.10.2002, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Barpeta in Title Suit No. 8/99.
3. The material facts and various stages, which have led to this appeal, may, in a nutshell, be stated as follows :-
(i) The appellants instituted, as plaintiffs, Title Suit No. 8/99 aforementioned seeking declaration of their rights, title and confirmation of possession over the suit land, the case of the plaintiffs being, briefly stated, thus : The plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit premises as tenant and had been paying rents in accordance with the agreement of tenancy. In course of time, some disputes arose between the heirs of deceased 'and lord, namely, Birendra Kr. Roy as regards the ownership of the suit premises and as they declined to accept monthly rent from the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs started depositing rents in the Court in accordance with law. The plaintiffs had some conversion with Naresh Roy, one of the heirs of deceased Late Birendra Kr. Roy aforementioned, and Naresh Roy had told the plaintiffs that the suit premises would be sold to the plaintiffs, but, subsequently, with the help of a Power of Attorney executed, the suit properties were sold of by the heirs of the said deceased in favour of respondent Nos. 19 to 28 and a Sale Deed was accordingly executed. Upon purchase of the suit properties, the defendants aforementioned demanded that the plaintiffs vacate the suit premises. Hence, the suit.
(ii) The defendant Nos. 18-28 contested the suit by laying a counter-claim, their case being, in brief, thus : Sri Birendra Kr. Roy had 3 sons, namely ; (1) Ramesh Roy, (2) Naresh Roy and (3) Kamakhya Roy. These heirs rented out the suit houses to three parties, plaintiffs being one of such parties. During the continuance of the monthly tenancy, Kamakhya Roy and Ramesh Roy expired. Naresh Roy looked after the suit properties. As he was having difficulty in looking after the suit property from Howrah, where Naresh Roy resides, he executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant No. 18, namely ; Khanindra Nath Das. Though the said Attorney asked the plaintiffs to deposit the house rent with him as per the conditions of the said Power of Attorney, the plaintiffs did not deposit the house rent with defendant No. 18. Thereafter, the defendant No. 18 informed the tenants about landlord's proposal for the sale of the suit land to the tenants. Though two of the tenants, namely, Dilip Saha and Nripen Saha purchased the land, the plaintiffs refused to purchase the same. The defendant No. 18, therefore, executed a Sale Deed in favour of the defendant Nos. 19-28 on 21.9,1999. After purchase of the suit land, the defendants 19-28 informed the plaintiffs about their said purchase, but the plaintiffs did not pay the house rent to these defendants too. The plaintiffs, thus, became defaulter. This apart, the suit premises are bona fide required by the contesting defendants for running their own business. The defendants, accordingly, prayed for appropriate decree for eviction of the plaintiffs from the suit premises, for recovery of possession thereof, rent, etc.
(iii) On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court pronounced its impugned judgment, dated 11.10.2002, aforementioned, whereby, the plaintiffs suit failed, but the counter claim was allowed. The impugned decree accordingly followed.
4. The appellant have come before this Court with the present appeal impugning the whole decree with prayer, inter alia, that their suit seeking declaration of their rights, title and interest to the suit property be decreed and the extent to which the impugned decree directs their eviction from the suit property, recovery of rent, etc., be set aside.
5. I have perused the materials on record including the impugned judgment and decree. I have heard Mr. B.R. Dey, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants, and Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants respondents, who are caveators in this appeal.
6. Resisting this appeal at the very stage of admission, Mr. B.K. Goswami has made me traverse through Order VIII, Rule 6A of the CPC and has submitted to the effect that a counter-claim, being a cross suit, stands on the same footing as does a regularly instituted suit and that the forum of appeal arising out of such a decree will be determined on the basis of the value of the original suit and the value of the counterclaim separately.
7. It is also submitted by Mr. Goswami that Code of Civil Procedure does not determine as to where an appeal will lie against a decree and it is Section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, which lays down the court, where an appeal will lie. According to Section 21, points out Mr. Goswami, an appeal from a decree of a Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), will lie to the District Judge, if the value of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 50,000. In the case at hand, further points out Mr. Goswami, since the counter-claim of the defendants was valued at Rs. 18,021, it logically follows that the impugned decree to the extent that the same allows the counterclaim, the appeal will lie before the District Judge, but for the remaining part of the decree, relating to the suit of the plaintiffs, which was valued at Rs. 1,92,000, the appeal will He, according to Section 21, before the High Court.
8. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. B.R. Dey, has submitted that provisions for counterclaim have been introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and, hence, the purpose of a counter-claim will stand defeated if the decree given in such a suit is required to be divided, as per the reliefs granted, for the purpose of constituting the right to appeal against such a decree. It is submitted by Mr. Dey that since it is in the suit of the plaintiff that the counterclaim is laid by the defendant, it is the value of the suit of the plaintiff, which will determine as to where the appeal will lie. Since in the case at hand, points out Mr. Dey, plaintiffs suit was valued at Rs. 1,92,000, the appeal will lie before the High Court in respect of the reliefs, which the plaintiffs had sought for in the suit as well as in respect of the counter-claim, which the defendants had laid in the plaintiffs suit. Support for his submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Dey from Gurbachan Singh v. Bhag Singh and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1087 and Jag Mohan Chawla and Anr. v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2222.
9. Before entering into the merit of the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the parties, it is pertinent to note that the Code of Civil Procedure, as correctly pointed out by Mr. Goswami, nowhere lays down as to where an appeal will lie from a decree. As far as the State of Assam is concerned, the forum of appeal is to be determined by Section 21 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 aforementioned. It is also true that according to Section 21 (as per the amended Act) an appeal from a decree of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) will lie before the District Judge, if the value of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 50,000, but if the value of such a suit exceeds Rs. 50,000, the appeal will He before the High Court.
10. Ordinarily, therefore, an appeal from a decree, which has been rendered by a Civil Judge (Senior Division) in a suit, which is valued at Rs. 1,92,000, will lie before the High Court, but a suit for eviction of a tenant valued at Rs. 18,021, if decreed, can be appealed before the District Judge. Viewed from this angle, the submissions made by Mr. Goswami are, undoubtedly, attractive that the extent to which the impugned decree declines to give relief to the plaintiff in his suit, which is valued at Rs. 1,92,000, the appeal can be preferred before the High Court, but to the extent to which the impugned decree allows the counter-claim of the defendants, which is valued at Rs. 18,021, appeal, if any, will lie before the District Judge, Barpeta. Can such an interpretation be given to a case of counter-claim, which is governed by Order VIII, Rule 6A of CPC The answer to this question necessitates a close reading of the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 6A. Hence, for the sake of brevity, Order VIII, Rule 6A is quoted herein below :
'6A. Counter-claim by defendant. - (1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counterclaim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not :
Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court.
(2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.
(3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court.
(4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.'
11. A close reading of Order VIII, Rule 6A shows that when a counter-claim is made by the defendant, it cannot exceed pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, which is in seisin of the plaintiffs suit. Thus, both the original suit as well as the counter-claim has to be well within the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, where the suit is instituted.
12. A careful reading of Rule 6A(2) shows that though a counter-claim is, in effect, a cross suit, the object is to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the one and the same suit in respect of both, i.e., the suit as well as the counter-claim. The expression used in Sub-rule (2) that the counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross suit 'so as to enable the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and the counter-claim' makes it abundantly clear that the object of making statutory provisions
for counter-claim is to enable the court to pronounce one final judgment in the suit and thereby avoid multiplicity of suits or proceeding.
13. It may be noted that the concept of counter-claim, as correctly submitted by Mr. Goswami, is basically a judge-made law inasmuch as even in the absence of provisions of counter-claim in the CPC, Courts used to allow setting up of counter-claim in, at least money suits and it is only in the 1976 that the concept of counter-claim was given of statutory recognition with wider scope making it clear that the counterclaim may or may not be covered by the cause of action, which arose in the suit.
14. Since the prime object of Rule 6A is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, it logically follows that whenever a decree is passed in a suit, wherein a counter-claim is filed, such a decree will be considered as an indivisible decree and the appeal will also lie before one forum, the forum being the Court, where appeal will lie depending upon the value of the plaintiffs suit irrespective of the value of the counterclaim. Any other interpretation of Rule 6A would lead to dangerous situations making the administration of justice a complete farce. For instance, if against the counter-claim of the defendants, the present appellants file, an appeal before the District Judge, Barpeta, and against the refusal to grant decree in their own suit, the appellants prefer an appeal before the High Court and if the District Judge, Barpeta, rejects the appeal and the High Court allows the appeal, the question will be as to which decree will be, eventually, executed. If the High Court allows the appeal arising out of the suit of the plaintiffs, it will mean that plaintiffs will be entitled to a decree of declaration of their rights, title and interest and possession over the suit premises, as have been sought for by the appellants, but at the same time, the decree of the District Judge given by the District Judge, in the appeal arising out of the counter-claim, will make the appellants liable for the eviction from suit premises. In order to avoid collision course of such a devastating nature, a pragmatic interpretation is to be attributed to Rule 6A, I have, therefore, no reservation in holding that the decree, which follows the judgment in the suit in which counter-claim is laid, shall be appellable depending upon the value of the original suit of the plaintiff and not the value of the defendant's counter-claim.
15. It is important to note that though counter-claim is a cross suit and even if the suit is stayed, discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded in terms of Rule 6A of Order VIII, the fact remain that the counter-claim is not an independent suit. This being the position, there can be no doubt in coming to the conclusion that when the counter-claim is not an independent suit, the appellate forum will be determined on the basis of the value of the plaintiff's suit and not the value, which the defendant vests in its counter-claim made in the suit.
16. Reference made by Mr. B.R. Dey to the case of Gurbachan Singh (supra) and Jag Mohan Chawla (supra) is not therefore, misplaced.
17. I am guided to adopt the above views from the law laid down in Gurbachan Singh (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held as follows :-
'It is true that Rule 6A(a) was introduced by Amendment Act of 1976. Preceding the amendment, it was settled law that except in a money claim, counter-claim or set off cannot be set up in other suits. The Law Commission of India had recommended, to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings right to the defendants aim in Rule 6 in the same suit irrespective of the fact whether the cause of action for counter-claim or set off had accrued to defendant either before or after the filing of the suit. The limitation was that the counter-claim or set off must be pleaded by way of defence in the written statement before the defendant filed his written statement or before the time limit for delivery the written statement has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. Further limitation was that the counter-claim should not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, by laying the counter-claim pecuniary jurisdiction of the court cannot be divested and the power to try the suit already entertained cannot be taken away by accepting the counter-claim beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction.' (emphasis is added)
18. In the case of Jag Mohan Chawla (supra), the Apex Court has succinctly laid down the law on the subject of counter-claim in the following words :-
'The counter-claim could be treated as a cross suit and it could be decided in the same suit without relegating the parties to a fresh suit. In Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6A, the language is so couched with words of wide width as to enable the parties to bring his own independent cause of action in respect of any claim that would be the subject-matter of an independent suit. Thereby, it is no longer confined to money claim or to cause of action of the same nature as original action of the plaintiff. It need not relate to or be connected with the original cause of action or matter pleaded by the plaintiff. Instead of relegating the defendant to an independent suit, to avert multiplicity of the proceeding and needless protection, the Legislature intended to try both the suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and cross suit and have them disposed of in the same trial. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the cause of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit.' (emphasis is supplied)
19. In the result, and for what has been discussed above, I am of the firm opinion that this appeal is admissible against the entire decree, which stands impugned in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, admitted for hearing.
20. No formal notices need be served on the respondents inasmuch as they have already entered appearance.
21. The caveat shall accordingly stand discharged.
22. With the object of expeditious disposal of this appeal, it is directed
that the appeal be listed for hearing on 10.3.2003. In the meanwhile,
call for the LCRs.