A.B. Pal, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree dated 3-7-1999 and 8-7-1998 respectively in Money Suit No. 40 of 1995 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division). Court No. 1, Agartala. By the impugned judgment and decree the suit of the plaintiff-appellant herein has been dismissed.
2. I have heard Mr. S. Lodh, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and Mr. D. R. Choudhury learned Counsel for the defendant-respondents.
3. The material facts leading to the present proceeding may briefly be noted first. The plaintiff-appellant, a reputed and renowned lawyer, was engaged by the National Insurance Company Ltd. (for short. Insurance Company), the defendant-respondent herein, in an arbitration proceeding between one Rakhal Sharma and the said Insurance Company. The award of the Arbitrator made against the Insurance Company was pending in the Court of learned Sub-Judge, Agartala, West Tripura. On 26-3-1993 the plaintiff-appellant being the lawyer informed the Insurance Company the award so made by a letter addressed to its Divisional Manager. The said letter reads thus:
Deepak K. Biswas
Advocate
Gauhati High Court
Agartala Bench.
26 March 1993
Re : Arbitration award in Case No. T.S. (ARB)23/90 (Sri Rakhal Sharma)
Sir,
Kindly find herewith the copy of the award of the joint arbitrators passed on a reference made by the Court of the Sub-Judge Agartala. The award was delivered to me on 20-3-93, and was filed in the Court on the same date. As such we are required to file objection, if any, within 19-4-93.
You are, therefore, requested to offer your comments on the judgment and award and send it to me within a week's time so that I may prepare the objection if so advised.
I have been conducting the case both before the Sub-Judge and the Arbitrators since 1990, and pending final bill I may kindly be allowed lump-sum advance Of Rs. 2500/- for which a bill is forwarded herewith. I would be thankful if you arrange payment of my bill early.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Deepak K. Biswas)
But no comment or instruction was offered and so no objection could be filed. In the result the award was made a rule of the Court. Thereafter, the respondent asked the appellant to explain as to why no step was taken by him in the arbitration case, which had surprised the appellant. Though the appellant then visited the Office of the Insurance Company and had shown copy of his letter noted above, the said Company appointed Mr. P. B. Dhar, Advocate to file First Appeal No. 128/1994 against the judgment and award of learned Sub-Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in the above noted proceeding. As the appeal could not be filed within time, a prayer for condonation of the delay was preferred wherein the entire burden of the delay in presenting the appeal was assigned to the appellant by stating that due to negligence, inaction and lack of responsibility he did not inform his client about the outcome of the said proceeding. Such a statement was wrong, defamatory and harmful. Further grievance of the appellant is that Mr. P. B. Dhar, learned Counsel engaged later to file the appeal, made defamatory remarks before the High Court while moving the prayer for condonation of delay. Thus the instant suit was filed for a decree of damage to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/- on the sole ground that the disparaging remarks and defamatory statements as noted above substantially damaged the professional advantage and personal reputation of the appellant.
4. The Insurance Company denied the allegation of the appellant contending inter alia that no disparaging or defamatory remarks have ever been made in the petition for condonation of delay by Mr. P. B. Dhar, learned Counsel engaged by the Company, What has been stated in the condonation petition to explain the delay is only a mere statement of facts as to how the delay in presenting the appeal had occurred.
5. The question that had fallen for consideration before the learned Trial Court was whether any defamatory statement was at all made in the petition for condonation of delay against the appellant and whether Mr. P. B. Dhar, the learned Counsel of the said Company made defamatory statement against him while moving the said prayer for condonation, causing thereby substantial damage, personal reputation and professional advantage of the appellant herein.
6. Exbt. 1 is the prayer for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act preferred by the Insurance Company in First Appeal No. 128/1994, on careful perusal of which the learned Trial Court came to the definite finding that no defamatory statement had been incorporated therein. Mr. Lodh, learned Counsel for the appellant herein, however, made strenuous efforts to draw my attention to Paras 3 & 4 of the said petition and explain the contents in support of his contention that statements contained therein is totally untrue. It would be evident from the letter dated 26-3-1993 that the appellant had duly informed the Insurance Company about the award made by the Arbitrator and the need to file written objection for which necessary comments were called for, The contention of learned Counsel for the Insurance Company is that the said letter dated 26-3-1993 was only a communication about the award passed by the Arbitrator seeking comments for the purpose of filing objection. No communication was made by the appellant to the Company after the judgment and decree were passed by the learned Sub-Judge in Arbitration Case T.S. (ARB) 23/90. Therefore, it cannot be said that the statement made in para 3 of the condonation petition explaining the delay is in any way a wrong and false statement. As regards the contention made in paragraph 5 of the said condonation petition, attempt was made to show that if the limitation was accepted to have commenced from the date of knowledge about the decree passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, the appeal was not time barred. The only remark contained in this paragraph is that the appeal could have been filed within time if the appellant herein, being engaged counsel of the Company, had informed about the outcome of the arbitration proceeding before the learned Sub-Judge. The learned Trial Court observed that Mr. P. B. Dhar (PW.2), learned Counsel engaged by the Insurance Company later for filing the appeal had unhesitatingly denied to have made any disparaging remarks against the appellant herein. The judgment of this Court in First Appeal No. 128/94 delivered on 19-12-1994 contains nothing to show that Mr. P. B. Dhar had made any defamatory remarks against the appellant herein. The relevant part of the said judgment and order reads:.Mr. Dhar's contention is that the appeal could not be presented before the Court in time not because the appellant-petitioner was at fault but because there was some communication gap which occurred on account of the latches on the part of the lawyer who was conducting the arbitration case before Arbitrator...
It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the Company that if any disparaging remarks were at all made by Mr. Dhar in the open Court it would have certainly found place in the said judgment and order. The words 'on account of laches on the part of the lawyer who was conducting the arbitration case before the Arbitrator' do not necessarily mean that it was an onslaught on the personal integrity or reputation of the appellant herein. After arriving at such findings, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit.
7. Mr. Lodh has endeavoured to focus on the nature of a defamatory statement in order to show that the statements made in the petition for condonation of delay amounted to defamation. In the book 'Salmond on the Law of Torts' following proposition on the nature of defamatory statement has been made at page 181:
A defamatory statement is one which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers; which tends, that is to say, to lower him in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally and in particular to cause him to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, dislike, or disesteem.
At page 186 of the said book following has been made:
The question was not whether the defendant intended any such reference, but whether any person to whom the statement was published might reasonably think that the plaintiff was the person referred to.
As regards the proof of defamatory statements, the observation at page 189 reads thus:
Although the proper interpretation of a statement alleged to be defamatory may give rise to difficult questions of construction, there is one point which is perfectly clear and unquestioned: a statement is none the less defamatory because the defendant did not intend to bring the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule or contempt. The meaning to be attached to it is not necessarily the meaning with which the defendant published it but that which is, or may be presumed to be, reasonably given to it by the person to whom it is published. A defamatory purpose will not render the defendant liable if the statement has for others no libellous significance; conversely, an innocent intention will be no defence for a person who makes a statement which has a defamatory meaning for those to whom he makes it, though the fact that his intention was innocent may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages.
8. Per contra, drawing my attention to Exbt. 8, which is a letter by the Divisional Manager of the Company to the appellant herein, Mr. Choudhury tried to explain that there was no motivated intention to defame the prestige of the plaintiff-appellant in the public eyes. He assured that the Company had no intention to defame and sincerely regretted the incidents which had hurt the appellant.
9. Upon perusal of this letter as well as other correspondence marked as Exbt. 4, 5 & 6 it would appear that the Company had no motive or ill will to defame the appellant herein and that the condonation petition, as drafted by Mr. P. B. Dhar explaining the delay was accepted by the Company. It is not in dispute that though the appellant informed the Company about the award of the Arbitrator, no communication was ever made by him to the said Company after the award was made a Rule of the Court and as a result delay in presenting the appeal had occurred. In the condonation petition this factual position was only highlighted as otherwise there would have remained little justification in the prayer for condonation of delay. The submission of Mr. P. B. Dhar recorded by this Court in the above noted order does not reflect that it is in any way disparaging in character or the same was intended to affect the reputation of the appellant herein.
10. For the reasons and the discussions made above, I am of the considered view that the impugned judgment dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant does not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity calling for interference by this Court. Accordingly, this appeal having no merit stands dismissed with no order as to cost.