J.N. Sharma, J.
1. In order to appreciate the scope of this matter now pending before the full Court, the order dated July 28, 1994 passed by the learned Judge may be quoted -
'The question for determination in these two Writ Petitions is as to whether a Crafts Inspector or Instructors working in the Basic Training Institute of the Government of Manipur is a workman within the meaning of Rule 3(b) and the note appended thereto of the Manipur Service Laws (1st Amendment) Rules, 1976 liable to retirement from service at the age of 60 years instead of 58 years.
The petitioners' case is that they were workmen as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Judgment dated January 18, 1984 in Civil Rule No. 31 of 1983. The respondent's case, on the other hand, is that the petitioners being Instructors are doing the work essentially that of a teacher and the Supreme Court in the case of A.S. Sundarambal v. Goa, Daman and Diu reported in (1989-I-LLJ-61) has held that a teacher does not do any skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work and hence is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Mr. Jagatchandra, learned Additional Government Advocate, submits that in view of the said decision of the Apex Court, the judgment dated January 18, 1984 of the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Rule No. 31 of 1983 is no longer good law.
Mr. Kh. Chonjohn Singh and Ms. Ch. Shantibala Devi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submit in reply that the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court reported in (1989-I-LLJ-61) (SC) (supra), was only with regard to teachers employed in schools and colleges imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate teaching but so far as Craft Instructor or Instructress are concerned such as the petitioners they did not impart any general education but do a lot of manual and technical work while imparting training to the in service teachers of different educational institutions. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, the nature of the work done by the Craft Instructor or Instructress is entirely different from that of general teachers of Schools and colleges and the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court will not be applicable to them.
In view of the aforesaid rival submissions of the counsel for the parties and in view of the aforesaid Judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1989-I-LLJ-61) (SC) (supra). I am of the opinion that the judgment dated January 18, 1984 in Civil Rule No. 31 of 1983 rendered before the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court will require reconsideration of a Division or a large Bench. Accordingly this case may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders for reference to an appropriate Bench.
In the meanwhile, parties are directed to file their respective affidavit and document relating to the nature of work done by the Crafts Instructor or Insructress namely the petitioners.
Judge.'
2. This matter now has been concluded by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court rendered in Ms. A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu reported in (supra). In paragraph 1 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has laid down the law as follows at page 64 :-
'The Court held that the employee, Mukherjee, involved in that case was not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Act because he was not mainly employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward, which were the only two classes of employees who qualified for being treated as 'workman' under the definition of the expression 'workman' in the Act, as it stood then. As a result of the above decision, in order to give protection regarding security of employment and other benefits to sales representatives, Parliament passed a separate law entitled the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976. It is no doubt true that after the events leading to the above decision took place Section 2(s) of the Act was amended by including persons doing technical work as well as supervisory work. The question for consideration is whether even after the inclusion of the above two classes of employees in the definition of the expression 'workman' in the Act a teacher in a school can be called a workman. We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate education cannot be called as 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that teachers cannot be treated as 'workmen' as defined under the Act. It is not possible to accept the suggestion that having regard to the object of the Act, all employees in an industry except those falling under the four exceptions (i) to (iv) in Section 2(s) of the Act should be treated as workmen. The acceptance of this argument will render the words to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work meaningless. A liberal construction as suggested would have been possible only in the absence of these words. The decision in May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their workmen, (1961-II-LLJ-94)(SC) precludes us from taking such a view. We therefore, hold that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant was not a 'workman' though the school was an industry in view of the definition of 'workman' it now stands.'
3 In the case of State of Orissa v. Adwait Charan Mohanty (1996-III-LLJ (Suppl)-49) the Supreme Court has referred to Orissa Service Code Rule 71 (a), and the Supreme Court pointed out that an Artisan who is a Class III Cadre is to retire on completion of 58 years and the Supreme Court rejected the contention that every artisan is a workman if he produces an article with dexerity or service with dexterity by manual or technical labour. The Supreme Court pointed out in the case that even a Director of Town Planning or Chief Architect can be considered to be an artisan, but they are not workmen. The next case is 1997 7 SCC 754: (State of Orissa v. Sadhu Charan Pradhan) wherein the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 7 and the law has been laid down as follows:-
'It is significant to note that the 'Government establishment' has been omitted after amendment of the Note and the Note as it existed now would apply only to those employees on monthly rate of pay in any industrial or work charged establishment and not those employees working in any Government establishment.
Admittedly the respondent is working in the Government establishment and the Note on which the Tribunal relied would be inapplicable to his case. This very note was the subject-matter of interpretation in the case of Adwait Mohanty where also the question was if an artisan in the Government establishment would retire at the age of 58 years or on his attaining the age of 60 years. This Court after considering the relevant rules came to the conclusion that an artisan in the circumstances being a Government employee would retire on his completion of 58 years of age. Statement of law by this Court in the case of Adwait Mohanty fully covers the facts of this case and the relevant rules on the subject.'
4. Accordingly in view of this position of law the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court stands overruled and the Craft Instructor or Insructress in the Basic Training Institute cannot be deemed to be workmen within the meaning of Rule 3(b) and the note thereof in the Manipur Services Laws (First Amendment) Rules 1976. They are bound to retire on completion of the age of 58 years and not on completion of 60 years. All the writ petitions arc accordingly dismissed. Stay orders are vacated. In the meantime some of the writ petitioners have retired from service others will retire at the completion of 58 years and they shall be given the retirement benefits considering them to have retired at the age of 58 years. But it is made clear that the salary which has been received by them because of the interim stay orders passed by this Court, shall not be recovered by the authority,
5. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly.