A.B. Pal, J.
1. A This second appeal has arisen from judgment and order dated 28.09.2005 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Aizawl, Mizoram in RFA No. 19 of 2004 dismissing the appeal of the Union of India and affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District on 10.11.2003 in Civil Suit No. 2 of 1999.
2. The material facts necessary for disposal of this second appeal by the Union of India and others against concurrent findings of the Courts below should be noticed at the outset. The first three respondents/plaintiffs are husband, wife and their daughter who filed the Civil Suit No. 2 of 1999 against the Union of India and three other official defendants. The plaintiffs are the legal heirs of Mura (L). The land in dispute measuring 5.5 acres was covered by permit No. 570/75 issued under Section 3 of Mizoram (Agricultural Land) Act, 1963. Within the said area there was a fishpond measuring 1/2 bigha. In 1982 an agreement was entered into between Mura (L) and the BRTF, an organization under the Union of India, for occupation of the land by the BRTF on one time payment of Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) as rent for a period of 10(ten) years. The period ended 1992. During this period Mura (L) died survived by his son, the first respondent. In 1992 itself, the son of Mural (L) obtained land settlement certificate No. 126 of 1992 covering the entire area. But the appellant herein neither vacated the said land nor agreed to pay any rent for their occupation after the period of ten years. The fishpond, which as per the agreement was to be maintained by the appellant, was virtually filled up and the fish were appropriated or damaged. When approached, the appellants allegedly denied the title of the plaintiffs, which compelled them to file the suit seeking a direction for payment of the rent from 1992 as may be assessed by the District Collector, Aizawl, the fourth respondent herein. Further prayer was for compensation against damage of the fishpond to be assessed by the said collector.
3. The suit was decreed on the basis of the materials placed on record by the parties directing that the rent to be paid by the appellants herein from 1992 shall be assessed by the District Collector, Aizawl. Further direction has also been given to assess compensation for the damage of the fishpond.
4. In the appeal preferred by the appellants herein several grounds were taken of which the first and foremost is about the title of the plaintiffs, who are admittedly legal heirs of Mura (L). The learned appellate Court found no reason to take a different view from that of the learned Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the present second appeal has been preferred under Rule 18 of Rules for the Regulation of the Procedure of officers Appointed to Administer Justice in the Lushai Hills 1937 (for short Administration of Justice Rules) read with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1998.
5. I have heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned CGC, for the appellants and Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the respondent. Learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the permit under Section 3 of Mizoram (Agricultural Land) Act, 1963 was issued in favour of the Mura (L) for a period of five years only in the year 1975. Thus the validity of the permit expired in 1980. Again it was renewed in 02.07.91 for another period of five years which expired in 1995. BRTF occupied the land in the year 1982 when there was no permit in favour of Mura (L) and therefore, the agreement in question has no legal force. The BRTF being in occupation since 1982, renewal of the permits on 02.07.91 in favour of the Mura is contrary to the provision of the Mizoram (Agricultural Land) Act 1963. Admittedly, Mura expired in 1988 leaving behind the plaintiffs/respondents herein and at the time of his death there was no permit covering the suit land in his name. Though BRTF continued in occupation of the suit land from 1982, the State Government of Mizoram issued Land Settlement Certificate in favour of Mura (L) and thereafter in favour of the first respondents herein, which was again contrary to the provision of Mizoram (Agricultural Land) Act 1963.
6. A As regards the fishpond, the same was not possessed by the appellant and therefore, they should not have any liability for damage of the same. According to the learned Counsel both the Courts below committed serious error by not considering the fact that the permit or LSC as the case may be should not have been issued in favour of Mura (L) or his son in violation of the Mizoram (Agricultural Land) Act 1963. The same having done the permit and the land settlement certificate cannot have any legal force and therefore, both the Courts should have held that the appellants herein have no legal obligation to pay rent for occupation on said land to the plaintiffs/respondents who have no manner of title to the same.
7. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/espondents on the other hand has submitted that the appeal itself was time barred when it was re-submitted after withdrawal. Rule 18 of the Administration of Justice Rules clearly provides that an appeal must be filed within thirty days from the date of judgment impugned and such period will be extended by the time required for obtaining certified copy of the judgment. No prayer was submitted for condonation of delay. Referring to the provision of the decision of this Court in Dipak Das v. Dharjyadhan Deb and Ors. reported in 1997 (2) GLT 293, the learned Counsel submits that Court cannot extend the period of limitation by allowing the party to withdraw the appeal with liberty to re-submit the same.
8. This issue may be closed at this stage by saying that though Rule 18 of the Administration of Justice Rules does not say anything about condonation of delay, Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be availed of for condonation of delay. No doubt there was no prayer for condonation of delay on the part of the appellants herein, but once the Court permitted the appellants to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file afresh within the period specified, the same amounts to condonation of the delay. This issue need not detain me any further.
9. In the second limb of submission, teamed counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents argue that the permit issued in favour of the Mura (L) and the LSC issued in favour of the plaintiffs cannot called in question by the appellants herein by way of filing written statement as defendants. No separate suit or counter claim was filed by them to challenge the permit or LSC as the case may be. It is further submitted that once they have entered into an agreement with Mura(L) to occupy the land measuring 5.5 acres on one time payment of Rs. 5000/- as rent for a period of 10 years, it is not open to the appellants to challenge the title of Mura (L) or his legal heirs. Finally, the learned Counsel submits that in the second appeal the High Court has little scope to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below.
10. The admitted position that has emerged from the above controversy is that the land measuring 5.5 acres was legally hold by Mura (L) by virtue of a permit granted under the Mizoram (Agricultural Land) Act, 1963. I have gone through the agreement between the Mura (L) and the appellants herein, whereby the BRTF become a tenant on payment of consolidated amount of Rs. 5000/- for a period of 10 years. During the period of ten years never the question of title of Mura was raised by the said tenant. In 1992 land settlement certificate was issued in favour of Mura though he was no longer alive at that time and thereafter the said LSC was re-issued in the name of his son, the first respondent herein. There is no material on record to show that at any point of time BRTF, while occupying said land, came to be the owner by virtue of any permit or LSC. Being a tenant it is not open to the appellant to challenge the title of the landlord taking the opportunity that for certain period the permit issued under the said Act was not in force.
11. The agreement in question has clearly mentioned about existence of a fishpond which was required to be repaired and renovated by the appellants herein and, therefore, if there has been any damage found by the District Collector, the plaintiffs/ respondents are certainly entitled to compensation therefor. The admitted position being that by virtue of the permit of the LSC Mura and his legal heirs continued to be the owner of the said land and the appellants were in occupation of the same by virtue of an agreement, there is no validity in the plea of the appellants that they are not liable to pay any rent after 1992 because of defect in the title of the plaintiffs/respondents for certain intervening period. As regards the area of the land it would appear that in the agreement the area has been clearly mentioned to be 5.5 acres. There is no scope to take different view.
12. As regards the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere in the second appeal learned Counsel for the respondents have placed several decisions, which in my view needs no discussion. It needs no emphasis to say that the High Court shall not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts unless it can be shown that such finding are perverse. Only on substantial question of law this Court in second appeal can exercise its jurisdiction. But in this case no such question has at all surfaced for consideration of this Court. Neither in the memo of appeal nor in the order at the time of admission such substantial question of law has been framed. Though this second appeal has been filed under Rule 18 of the Administration of Justice Rules, it cannot and has not widened the jurisdiction of this Court in second appeal in view of the fact that the appeal has been filed not only under Rule 18 but also under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code.
13. Par the reasons and discussions aforementioned, this second appeal has no merit. Accordingly the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost.