W.P.No.23925/2018 - 1 - IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE29H DAY OF JUNE, 2018 PRESENT HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI, CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE KRISHNA S. DIXIT WRIT PETITION NO.23925 OF2018(GM-RES) PIL BETWEEN: DR. SEKHAR.S.IYER (PARTY IN PERSON) AGED ABOUT60YEARS S/O LATE B.V.SESHADRI IYER # NO.155, 3 B CROSS MATHURA NAGARA MYSORE – 570 016 (BY DR. SEKHAR.S. IYER, PARTY-IN-PERSON) AND: ... PETITIONER1 2.
3. 4. CHIEF SECRETARY GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE – 560 001 UNDER SECRETARY-CS & DPAR (STATE PROTOCOL) GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001 SECRETARY TO GOVERNOR RAJABHAVAN BENGALURU – 560 001 SRI G PARAMESHWAR DEPUTY CHIEF MINISTER G o K, BENGALURU – 560 001 ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI UDAY HOLLA, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W SRI D. NAGARAJ, AGA) W.P.No.23925/2018 - 2 - THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES226AND227OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION DATED235.2018 VIDE ANNEX-A PASSED BY R-2 & ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, CHIEF JUSTICE, MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER
(Oral) The petitioner, Dr.Sekhar S. Iyer, said to be a Professor of Business Law and Management and, after retirement, serving as Director at Vivekananda College, Puttur, Dakshina Kannada District, has filed this petition, purportedly as a public interest litigation (‘PIL’), seeking to raise the question that the designation of the fourth respondent of this writ petition as Deputy Chief Minister of Karnataka is wholly unconstitutional, as the concept of Deputy Chief Minister is nowhere contemplated in the Constitution of India. The petitioner submits that the appointment of any person as Deputy Chief Minister only creates confusion in the public as also in bureaucracy; and is only sub-serving the political causes of the persons concerned. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed for quashing the notification dated 23.05.2018, whereby the Governor of Karnataka has W.P.No.23925/2018 - 3 - appointed the fourth respondent as Deputy Chief Minister of Karnataka in exercise of the powers under Article 164(1) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, being a professor and well-informed about the legal system, on being queried about the decisions of Courts on the subject, frankly submits that he is aware of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.M.Sharma v. Shri Devi Lal and Others: AIR1990SC528 but contends that the said decision was rendered on the statement made by the learned Attorney General and no law was declared by the Supreme Court. The petitioner would also submit that 28 years have elapsed since rendering of the said decision by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in the present context and perspective, the matter deserves to be considered by this Court. Having heard the petitioner at some length and having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that this petition sans public interest and having no merits either, deserves to be dismissed with costs. In K.M.Sharma’s case (supra), when the question was raised about description of respondent therein as Deputy W.P.No.23925/2018 - 4 - Prime Minister, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the submissions of the learned Attorney General and observed as under: the substantial part. This Court in the reported decision said: “4. Relying on a bench decision of this Court in the case of Virji Ram Sutaria v. Nathalal Premji Bhanvadia, (1969) 2 SCR627: (AIR1970SC657 learned Attorney General further contends that the prescribed oath should be divided into two parts, one which is descriptive and the other which contained And according to him, as long as the substantial part is properly followed, a mere mistake or error in the descriptive part would not vitiate the oath.
5. “In this case, as we have already noted the essential, requirement of Art. 173 read with Form VII-A was that the person taking the oath or making the affirmation would bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. The words which precede this portion are merely descriptive of the person and of his nomination as a candidate.” 6. In view of the clear statement made by the learned Attorney-General that respondent No.1 is just a Minister like other members of the Council of Ministers though he has been described as Deputy Prime Minister but the description of him as Deputy Prime Minister does not confer on him any powers of the Prime Minister, along with his other submissions, we think the first contention raised by the petitioner has no force. So far as the second contention is concerned, the petitioner himself does not press it.” W.P.No.23925/2018 - 5 - It is also noticed that consistently, the High Courts have rejected such submissions and petitions. The learned Single Judge of this Court (as His Lordship then was) in the case of P.Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka: ILR1993Kar 2226, dealt with the same issue, when raised against description of the third respondent therein as Deputy Chief Minister; and, while following the decision in K.M.Sharma (supra), dismissed the said petition. In the case of Devidas s/o Venkatrao Pawar v. Shri Gopinath Mundhe and Others: AIR1996Bom 1, the Division Bench of Hon’ble Bombay High Court also, while following the aforesaid decision in K.M.Sharma, dismissed a similar nature petition, while observing as under: “… … There is no separate form for administering oath either for the Chief Minister or the Deputy Chief Minister. The prescribed Form V in Schedule III is for administering oath to a Minister. Secondly, describing the respondent No.1 as Deputy Chief Minister is descriptive of him as Deputy Chief Minister only, for all purposes he is Minister when it is common ground that there is no constitutional sanction for the office of the Deputy Chief Minister as such. The Apex Court in the reported decision (AIR1990SC528 reiterated the view that the words which precede the essential requirement of oath as provided in Article 173 read with Form VI-A, which is similar to Form V of Article 164 in the present case, are descriptive of a person and that though W.P.No.23925/2018 - 6 - that description "of Deputy Prime Minister does not confer any power of Prime Minister". In that case the oath administered to Shri Devi Lal was also challenged on the same ground and the Apex Court observed that merely describing Shri Devi Lal as Deputy Prime Minister could not vitiate the oath administered under Article 173 read with Form VI-A in Schedule III to the Constitution. We have already stated that in this case also there is no quarrel the respondent No.1 was administered oath as per Article 164 read with Form V in Schedule III to the Constitution which contains the person taking oath or making affirmation would bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and uphold sovereignty and integrity of India. Thus, applying the same principle as laid down by the Apex Court in the case cited supra, the ground to challenge the oath administered to the respondent No.1 must fail.” In the case of Nirdesh Kumar Dixit and Others. V. Smt. the essential requirement that Renuka Choudhury and Ors:
2005. (2) ESC978 a Division Bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, again with reference to the aforesaid decision in K.M.Sharma, rejected the petitions against description of Deputy Chief Minister and State Ministers. Learned Advocate General, Sri Uday Holla appearing for the State submits that his stand is exactly the same as had been in the aforesaid decisions on behalf of the respective respondents. W.P.No.23925/2018 - 7 - We are clearly of the view that with the consistent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as also of different High Courts, it is beyond the pale of doubt that mere description of any Minister in the Council of Ministers as Deputy Chief Minister does not confer the person concerned with any powers of the Chief Minister and does not result in any unconstitutionality. That being the position, we are further clearly of the view that there had been absolutely no justification for filing this writ petition as a PIL. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Others: (2010) 3 SCC402 with reference to several of the past decisions, and while reiterating that the jurisdiction of PIL is required to be dealt with consciously and only for genuine public causes; and while issuing several directions to curb the unnecessary approach to the Constitutional Courts in the name of PIL so as to maintain the purity and sanctity of PIL jurisdiction, has observed, inter alia, as under: “143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has W.P.No.23925/2018 - 8 - come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and non-monetary directions by the courts.
144. In BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India this Court recognized that there have been, in recent times, increasing instances of abuse of public interest litigation. Accordingly, the Court has devised a number of strategies to ensure that the attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. Firstly, the Supreme Court has limited standing in PIL to individuals "acting bona the Supreme Court has sanctioned the imposition of "exemplary costs" as a deterrent against frivolous and vexatious public interest litigations. Thirdly, the Supreme Court has instructed the High Courts to be more selective in entertaining the public interest litigations. fide."
Secondly, 145. In S.P. Gupta case this Court has found that this liberal standard makes it critical to limit standing to individuals "acting bona fide”. To avoid entertaining frivolous and vexatious petitions under the guise of PIL, the Court has excluded two groups of persons from obtaining standing in PIL petitions. First, the Supreme Court has rejected awarding standing to "meddlesome interlopers". Second, the Court has denied standing to interveners bringing public interest litigation for personal gain.
146. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti the Court withheld standing from the applicant on grounds that the applicant W.P.No.23925/2018 - 9 - brought the suit motivated by enmity between the parties.
147. Thus, the Supreme Court has attempted to create a body of jurisprudence that accords broad enough standing to admit genuine PIL petitions, but nonetheless limits standing to thwart frivolous and vexations petitions. The Supreme Court broadly the frivolous public interest litigation petitions by two methods-one monetary and second, non- monetary. tried to curtail 148. The first category of cases is that where the Court on the filing of frivolous public interest litigation petitions, dismissed the petitions with exemplary costs. In Neetu v. State of Punjab, the Court concluded that it is necessary to impose exemplary costs to ensure that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the courts.
149. In S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda the Court warned that (SCC p. 745, para
18) it is of utmost importance that those who invoke the jurisdiction of this Court “seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed”.
150. In Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India this Court went a step further by imposing a monetary penalty against an Advocate for filing a frivolous and vexatious PIL petition. The Court found that the petition was devoid of public interest, and instead labelled it as "publicity interest litigation". Thus, the Court dismissed the petition with costs of Rs.10,000.
151. Similarly, in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's monetary penalty against a member of the Bar for filing a frivolous W.P.No.23925/2018 - 10 - the Court concluded and vexatious PIL petition. This Court found that the petition was nothing but a camouflage to foster personal dispute. Observing that no one should be permitted to bring disgrace to the noble profession, the imposition of the penalty of Rs. 25,000 by the High Court was appropriate. Evidently, the Supreme Court has set clear precedent validating the imposition of monetary penalties against frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions, especially when filed by advocates. that 152. This Court, in the second category of cases, even passed harsher orders. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Zail Singh the Supreme Court observed that (SCC p. 400, para 17), "we would have been justified in passing a heavy order of costs against the two petitioners" for filing a "light- hearted and indifferent" PIL petition. However, to prevent "nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion", the Court opted against imposing monetary costs on the petitioners. In that case, this Court concluded that the petition was careless, meaningless, clumsy and against public interest. Therefore, the Court ordered the Registry initiate prosecution proceedings against the petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act. Additionally, the court forbade the Registry from entertaining any future PIL petitions filed by the petitioner, who was an advocate in that case. to 153. In J.
Jayalalitha v. Govt. of T.N. this court laid down that public interest litigation can be filed by any person challenging the misuse or improper use of any public property including the political party in power for the reason that interest of individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to a larger public interest.
154. This court has been quite conscious that the forum of this court should not be abused by any one for personal gain or for any oblique W.P.No.23925/2018 - 11 - In BALCO this court held motive. the jurisdiction is being abused by unscrupulous persons for their personal gain. Therefore, the court must take care that the forum be not abused by any person for personal gain. that 155. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware this court expressed its anguish on misuse of the forum of the court under interest litigation and observed (SCC p. 595, para
12) that the the garb of public the interest “[p].ublic litigation judiciary has is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. ... The court must not allow its process oblique considerations...” abused to be for 156. case In Thaware the Court encouraged the imposition of a non-monetary penalty against a PIL petition filed by a member of the bar. The Court directed the Bar Councils and Bar Associations to ensure that no member of the Bar becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and/or abetting files frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name of Public Interest Litigation. This direction impels the Bar Councils and Bar Associations to disbar members found guilty of frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions.” filing The present one is an apposite example of entirely frivolous, meaningless, unnecessary and unwarranted PIL petition in this Court and that too, by none other but a person W.P.No.23925/2018 - 12 - who is engaged in teaching Business Law and is not oblivious of the legal process. In view of the above, we consider it necessary to saddle the petitioner with heavy costs. However, the petitioner has pleaded before us that he had no ill-intent in filing this petition and he may be excused this time; and for that matter, he would undertake to render pro bono services. Even while taking the words of the petitioner as stated, we find it rather imperative that this petition be dismissed with costs; of course, the amount of costs may be diverted towards some welfare measure. In the circumstances of the case, despite having expressed serious reservations on this nature petition, we are yet keeping the quantum of costs on the lower side in view of the submissions made by the petitioner in the last. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand), to be deposited by the petitioner within 30 days from today with the Deputy Commissioner of Dakshina Kannada District. If this amount of costs is not deposited by the petitioner within 30 W.P.No.23925/2018 - 13 - days from today, the Deputy Commissioner concerned shall ensure its recovery from the petitioner in accordance with law. On being deposited/recovered, the Deputy Commissioner concerned shall remit the amount aforesaid to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, who shall utilize the same for Victim Compensation Scheme cases. The pending interlocutory application also stands disposed of. Sd/- CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- JUDGE AHB