Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

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			'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque;',
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			'counselplain' => ' Sumerdan, P.P. for Sarkar',
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			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
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			'decidedon' => '1949-10-17',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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		'judge' => ' Verma, C.J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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- industrial disputes act, 1947. section 2(s): [m.s. shah, sharad d. dave & k.s. jhaveri,jj] workman part time employees held, part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. the ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the legislature in the definition of working journalist in the working journalists and other newspaper employees (conditions of service and miscellaneous provisions) act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior act i.e. industrial disputes act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. the expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
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			'appealno' => 'Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949',
			'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'citingcases' => '',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sumerdan, P.P. for Sarkar',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'PC',
		'decidedon' => '1949-10-17',
		'deposition' => 'Reference accepted',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Verma, C.J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1950Raj8',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Rama and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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$ctype = ''
$caseref = 'Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

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                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors Vs Rama and ors - Citation 750614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '750614',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 145(4) and 147',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949',
			'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sumerdan, P.P. for Sarkar',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'PC',
			'decidedon' => '1949-10-17',
			'deposition' => 'Reference accepted',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Verma, C.J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1950Raj8',
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			'respondent' => 'Rama and ors.',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 145(4) and 147',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949',
		'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sumerdan, P.P. for Sarkar',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'PC',
		'decidedon' => '1949-10-17',
		'deposition' => 'Reference accepted',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Verma, C.J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1950Raj8',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Rama and ors.',
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orderverma, c.j.1. i have before me a recommendation by the district magistrate of nagaur that an order passed by a magistrate of parbatsar on 25th october 1943 be set aside.2. kama, sukha and jetha filed an application under section 147, criminal p. c., in the court of the magistrate in question on 18 th september 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of bhanwar singh and bhopal singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. bhanwar singh and bhopal singh appeared before the court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by rama sukha and jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field.....

Judgment:

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
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ORDER

Verma, C.J.

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
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1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949',
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		'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
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2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 145(4) and 147',
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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
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3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
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		'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
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4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).

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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'
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5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 145(4) and 147',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949',
			'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
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			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'
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6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 145(4) and 147',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Ref. No. 12 of 1949',
			'appellant' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Bhanwar Singh and ors. Vs. Rama and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947. Section 2(s): [M.S. Shah, Sharad D. Dave & K.S. Jhaveri,JJ] Workman  Part time employees  Held, Part time employees are not excluded from the definition of workman in Section 2(s) merely on the ground that they are part time employees. The ex abundante cautela use of the words either whole time or part time by the Legislature in the definition of working journalist in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, does not mean that the definition of workman in the prior Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to exclude part-time employees from the definition of workman. The expression part time has nothing to do with the nature of appointment, but it only regulates the duration of working hours for which and appointee is required to work. If a person fulfils the test of a workman, he cannot be excluded from the definition only on the ground that he is a part-time employee. However, the Court will have to apply various tests applicable fort determining the relationship of employer and employee such as the control test, the integration or the organization test. The control test is one of the important tests, but is not to be taken as the sole test. It is also required to be examined whether the person was fully integrated into the employers concern or has remained apart from and independent of it. The other facts which may be relevant are as to who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, to organize the work, etc. A full time worker usually works in a week for 40 hours or more depending on the award or agreement. If a person falls under the definition of workman under Section 2(s) and does not fall in any excluded category, he will be covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act, and he will be entitled to all the benefits under the said Act. A perusal of Section 2(s) indicates that it does not specifically refer to a part-time workman nor does it specifically exclude a part-time workman from the definition of :workman. Since the number of hours is not the determining criterion for deciding whether a person falls within the definition of workman or not, it cannot be said that a part-time worker is not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of the I.D. Act. However, to decide the status of a worker rendering services for less than 40 hours a week, various aspects are required to be considered. The control test, the integration test and all the other relevant tests are as much applicable for deciding the status of a person rendering service on part-time basis as these tests are required to be applied for deciding the status of a person rendering the services on full-time basis. Since persons may be engaged for part-time work for various reasons, while deciding the question whether a person rendering services on part-time basis is a workman or not, the nature of the industry, the nature of services being rendered by the person, the terms and conditions of engagement and various other factors will have to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion whether such a person falls within the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Sometimes looking to the nature of the establishment and its activities, the employer may need the services of a person only for a few hours in a day. Depending on his requirement, the employer may employ two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker. Similarly, it may be more convenient for the concerned person to do work on part-time basis rather than for full time. However, convenience per se of the employer or the employee by itself does not confirm or negate the status of such person as a workman within the meaning of the I.D. Act, but the tests relevant for determining the status of a workman such as control test and integration test will be required to be applied. If a person is working with two employers on part-time basis on the same day, it may result into an anomalous situation and the Court will have to consider the nature of engagement in both the establishments. However, mere possibility of such an anomaly resulting by itself does not take away the status of the concerned person as a workman from both the establishments, but while granting and moulding the reliefs the Court will take these facts into consideration.  -  The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded.',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Verma, C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.</p><p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.</p><p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.</p><p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.</p><p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).</p><p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.</p><p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '750614',
	(int) 1 => 'bhanwar-singh-ors-vs-rama'
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$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/750614/bhanwar-singh-ors-vs-rama'
$ctype = ''
$caseref = 'Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Verma, C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. I have before me a recommendation by the District Magistrate of Nagaur that an order passed by a Magistrate of Parbatsar on 25th October 1943 be set aside.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Kama, Sukha and Jetha filed an application under Section 147, Criminal P. C., in the Court of the Magistrate in question on 18 th September 1948 and alleged that they had a right of way across the field of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, that the latter were interfering with their eight and that this dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh appeared before the Court in obedience to the process issued by it and submitted that there was a foot path across their field which could be used by Rama Sukha and Jetha, but that the latter wanted to take their carts across the field and this they were not entitled to do. Daring the pendency of these proceedings; Rama, Sukha and Jetha presented an application praying that an ad interim order be issued enabling them to carry their manure from their Dhani along the disputed path in carts to their field within the boundary of the village, Rampura. They alleged that they had about 200 cartloads of manure which had to be transported to their field in Rampura, and that the path in question being the shortest route (three-fourth of a mile in length) should be allowed to be used by them because the alternative path was longer by about one and a half miles, and that would mean loss of time and money to them, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh opposed this application, but the learned Magistrate granted it, subject to certain safeguards. He directed that the applicants should transport the manure along the path in question for a period of four days and the opposite parties, Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh, were ordered not to interfere with the passage of the carts across their field along the path during those four days. He further ordered that an Ameen be deputed to supervise and to see that the carts passed along the path in question so that no damage or inconvenience was caused. Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh filed a revision petition against this order in the Court of District Magistrate, Nagaur, and contended that the Court below was not authorised by law to pass an interim order of this nature and that therefore, the order in question was illegal and ultra vires. The District Magistrate has accepted the contention put forward on behalf of Bhanwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and has as already stated, recommended to this Court that the order in question be set aside.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. Neither of the parties has appeared al-though notices have been duly served on them. The learned Public Prosecutor has appeared and I have heard him. He has supported the recommendation made by the learned District Magistrate.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The learned District Magistrate has based his recommendation on two grounds. The first ground is that, in view of all the facts and circumstances, there did not, in his opinion, exist any such emergency as could justify such an order. This may be described as a ground of fact. The second ground, which may be described as the ground of law on the basis of which the revision petition was filed, is that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. He has in this connection, mentioned two decisions, (1) Bamchandra v. Shankarrao, A.I.R. (19) 1932 Nag. 83 : (33 Gr. L. J. 556) and (2) Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozaharul Haque, A. I. R. (27) 1940 cal 330 : (41 cr. L. J. 728).',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. I have examined the record and have considered the grounds stated by the District Magistrate in support of his recommendation. I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the recommendation of the learned District Magistrate is well founded. Both the grounds mentioned above are, in my opinion, correct. The learned District Magistrate is quite right in holding that, on the facts, there was no justification for such an order, even if the trial Magistrate was authorized by the law to make such an interim order in proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C. The other ground mentioned by the learned District Magistrate is also correct. In my opinion, he is quite right in saying that a Magistrate, in whose Court proceedings under Section 147, Criminal P. C., are pending is not authorized by the law to pass such an order. The second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, on which the trial Magistrate relied, does not authorize such an order.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. For the reasons stated above, I accept the reference and set aside the birder passed by the Magistrate of Parbatsar on 26th October 1948.<p>',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
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