Ponnala Narsing Rao Vs. Nallolla Pantaiah and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- preamble: [s.b. sinha & deepak verma, jj] scope of act - held, a statute which seeks to take away a persons right in property deserves strict construction. however, it is also well settled that the courts are required to give purposive construction to a statute to see that the purpose and object thereof is fully attained. this act is a special statute. it is a complete code in itself. the purpose and object for which it was created was to punish the persons who were involved in the acts of criminal misconduct in respect of defrauding banks and financial institutions. its object was to see that the properties of those who were involved shall be appropriated for discharge of liabilities not only of banks and financial institutions but also other governmental agencies including the income-tax department. it is, however, not an expropriatory legislation as such. the act provides for sufficient safeguards in the matter of sale of properties by auction or otherwise towards discharge of debts of the notified persons. it provides for grant of full opportunity of hearing to the notified persons. notified persons have special knowledge of the facts relating to their assets and liabilities and, therefore, can always show that the have been notified wrongly or that their properties are not liable for sale either because their liabilities can otherwise be discharged or the quantum of liabilities projected by the custodian is not correct. in construing the statute of this nature the court should not always adhere to a literal meaning but would construe the same, keeping in view the larger public interest. for the said purpose the court may also take recourse to the basic rules of interpretation, namely, ut res magis valeat quam pereat to see that a machinery must be so construed as to effectuate the liability imposed by the charging section and to make the machinery workable. sections 3 & 4(1): [s.b. sinha & deepak verma, jj] applicability property purchased by notified parties themselves as members of group in name of one or other whether rigours of section 4(1) would apply held, sub-section (1) of section 4 applies to the third parties and not to any notified party. it is only when a property has been purchased in the name of a third party by a notified party from the tainted funds acquired by him during the window period that the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4 would apply. but in a case where the properties have been purchased by the notified parties themselves as members of a group in the name of one or the other, the rigours of sub-section (1) of section 4 shall not apply. section 3 on the other hand, postulates automatic statutory attachment of the properties of the notified party. the acquisition of the properties whether prior to the window period, during the window period or thereafter can be attached for the discharge of liabilities. therefore, it cannot be said that the advances made by notified person to the appellants, his family members for the purpose of purchase of properties would amount to benami transactions whereof sub-section (1) of section 4 shall apply. section 3: [s.b. sinha & deepak verma, jj] application for denotification withdrawal of earlier application held, reasons of delay of said application cannot be assigned as reason in support of same. plea that applicants wanted to file fresh application cannot be a reason in the absence of proper and sufficient explanation for withdrawal of earlier application. section 3: [s.b. sinha & deepak verma, jj] properties of notified person held, the attachment of all properties of notified person in terms of sub-section (3) of section 3 is automatic. the attachment restricts sale of the properties which have been acquired from illegal securities transaction. the sub-section specifically mentions that on and from the date of the notification any property, movable or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified under the act shall stand attached. the said sub-section does not provide for any qualification that the properties which are liable to be attached should relate to the illegal securities transaction in respect of which the act was enacted. had the intention of the parliament been so, it would have clearly mentioned it. it is well settled that when the meaning of the words used in an act is plain and clear, effect must be given thereto. section 3: [s.b. sinha & deepak verma, jj] attachment of property cut-off date held, the cut-off date for the attachment of the property of notified person is the date of notification. all properties of the persons on the said date automatically stand attached. the statutory window period is irrelevant for the attachment of the property. it would have no bearing on the said attachment. provisions of section 3(2) should not be read into section 3(3). though section 3(3) is dependent on section 3(2) for its operation, but once section 3(2) comes into operation, section 3(3) becomes independent of it and accordingly the qualifications of section 3(2) cannot be read into section 3(3). emphasis must be placed on a plain reading of the said section. had it been the intention of the legislature to attach only those properties acquired within the statutory period, it would have clearly said so. the statutory window period is only a relevant criterion for application of section 3(2) and, therefore, has no bearing on the application of section 3(3). a plain reading of section 3(3) would suggest that all properties of the notified persons on the date of the said notification would automatically stand attached irrespective of the fact as to whether they had been acquired before, during or even after the statutory period. a logical corollary of this would be that all income accruing or arising from the said property even after the date of attachment would also automatically stand attached. however, property acquired by a notified person after the notification under the special act cannot be attached. that property does not come within the purview of the section 3 (3). sections 3 & 4(1): [s.b.sinha & deepak verma, jj] properties of notified person order for sale order passed by special court without weighing submissions and counter-submissions of both parties in proper perspective order was set aside and matter remanded for consideration thereof afresh. - 2. so far as the first contention is concerned, it must be noted that only documentary evidence was produced before the authorities below on the basis of which judgments were rendered against the petitioner by the lower appellate court as well as by the high court.order1. we have heard learned advocates for the parties. three main contentions were canvassed before us by learned counsel for the petitioner. firstly, that the respondents' predecessor-in-interest who was admittedly protected tenant of the lands had orally surrendered his tenancy rights years back in 1951 and that, therefore, there was no question of their asking for restoration of possession from the petitioner who had purchased these lands after surrender, from the original owner inamdar years back in 1954 and prior thereto the petitioner was in possession on yearly leases from the government. secondly, the application under section 32 of the a.p. (telangana area) tenancy and agricultural lands act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') was filed after unreasonable delay and should have been dismissed on that ground. thirdly, the land in question was inam land and, therefore, the provisions of section 32 of the act were not attracted.2. so far as the first contention is concerned, it must be noted that only documentary evidence was produced before the authorities below on the basis of which judgments were rendered against the petitioner by the lower appellate court as well as by the high court. the theory of 'oral surrender' has been disbelieved by the appellate court by relying on evidence in the shape of entry in tenancy register which shows that the respondents' predecessor was a protected tenant all throughout and that entry was never changed. so far as the petitioner is concerned, he relied upon a khasra entry which shows that in 1954 he was put in possession as an owner of this land and there was an endorsement that in prior years he was in possession since three years. in which capacity was he in possession prior to 1954 is a question which could have been examined only in the light of the petitioner's own evidence on oath. he did not think it fit to enter the box to prove that case. under these circumstances it was rightly held by the lower appellate court and as confirmed by the high court that the theory of oral surrender of protected tenancy rights prior to 1954 cannot be believed. the first contention, therefore, fails.3. so far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under section 32 of the act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time. it may be because of such belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected. it may have changed its position in the meantime. equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent large amounts on land by improving it. but all these questions have to be pleaded and proved. surprisingly, no such contention was ever canvassed much less tried to be proved on any equitable ground by the petitioner. therefore, this second contention on the facts of the present case cannot be sustained. it has also to be noted that no plea of adverse possession was put forward by the petitioner in support of his case.4. so far as the third contention is concerned, it is the petitioner's own case that the respondents' predecessor had surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the ex-inamdar and from him he had purchased the lands. but before that the government had auctioned the land on one-year basis. consequently at the time when the petitioner entered the land, whether it had remained an inam land or not was an important question to be decided. no such contention was canvassed by the petitioner either before the appellate court or before the high court. hence this third contention cannot survive for consideration at this late stage.5. in the result, this special leave petition fails and is dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. We have heard learned advocates for the parties. Three main contentions were canvassed before us by learned counsel for the petitioner. Firstly, that the respondents' predecessor-in-interest who was admittedly protected tenant of the lands had orally surrendered his tenancy rights years back in 1951 and that, therefore, there was no question of their asking for restoration of possession from the petitioner who had purchased these lands after surrender, from the original owner inamdar years back in 1954 and prior thereto the petitioner was in possession on yearly leases from the Government. Secondly, the application under Section 32 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was filed after unreasonable delay and should have been dismissed on that ground. Thirdly, the land in question was inam land and, therefore, the provisions of Section 32 of the Act were not attracted.

2. So far as the first contention is concerned, it must be noted that only documentary evidence was produced before the authorities below on the basis of which judgments were rendered against the petitioner by the lower appellate court as well as by the High Court. The theory of 'oral surrender' has been disbelieved by the appellate court by relying on evidence in the shape of entry in tenancy register which shows that the respondents' predecessor was a protected tenant all throughout and that entry was never changed. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he relied upon a khasra entry which shows that in 1954 he was put in possession as an owner of this land and there was an endorsement that in prior years he was in possession since three years. In which capacity was he in possession prior to 1954 is a question which could have been examined only in the light of the petitioner's own evidence on oath. He did not think it fit to enter the box to prove that case. Under these circumstances it was rightly held by the lower appellate court and as confirmed by the High Court that the theory of oral surrender of protected tenancy rights prior to 1954 cannot be believed. The first contention, therefore, fails.

3. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time. It may be because of such belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected. It may have changed its position in the meantime. Equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent large amounts on land by improving it. But all these questions have to be pleaded and proved. Surprisingly, no such contention was ever canvassed much less tried to be proved on any equitable ground by the petitioner. Therefore, this second contention on the facts of the present case cannot be sustained. It has also to be noted that no plea of adverse possession was put forward by the petitioner in support of his case.

4. So far as the third contention is concerned, it is the petitioner's own case that the respondents' predecessor had surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the ex-inamdar and from him he had purchased the lands. But before that the Government had auctioned the land on one-year basis. Consequently at the time when the petitioner entered the land, whether it had remained an inam land or not was an important question to be decided. No such contention was canvassed by the petitioner either before the appellate court or before the High Court. Hence this third contention cannot survive for consideration at this late stage.

5. In the result, this special leave petition fails and is dismissed.