Ramjit and Others Vs. Ramadevi and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- [p.b. gajendragadkar, c.j.,; k.c. das gupta,; k.n. wanchoo,; n. rajgopala ayyangar, jj.] the petitioner is the owner of certain land in kanpur, u.p. on a previous occasion land acquisition proceedings were taken regarding this land for acquiring it for an industrialist. the petitioner questioned' the validity of these proceedings and this court by its judgment reported as r. l. arora v. state of u.p; [1962] supp. 2 s.c.r. 149, quashed the notification made under s. 6 of land acquisition act, 1894. thereafter certain amendments were made to ss. 40 and 41 of that act by the land acquisition (amendment) act, 1961. the petitioner thereupon filed before this court a petition under art. 32 of the constitution challenging the validity of the amended ss. 40, 41 and s. 7 of the amending act. the petitioner contended that the said sections violated art. 31(2) and art. 19(1)(f) of the constitution inasmuch as cl. (aa) of the amended s. 40 provided that all acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building are permissible even though the building may not be for a public purpose. the validity of s. 7 of the amending act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened art. 31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before july 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so in fact. section 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before july 20, 1962 and after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on the basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose. held (per p. b. gajendragadkar, c.j., k. n. wanchoo, k. c. das gupta and j. c. shah jj.): (i) if the language of a provision of law is capable of only one construction and if according to that construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it must be struck down. a literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to look at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used. the mysore state electricity board v. bangalore woollen, cotton ,and silk mills, [1963] supp. 2 s.c.r. 127; followed. (ii) it is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way will be consistent with the constitution and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional the court would bear in favour of the former construction. kedar nath singh v. state of bihar, [1962] supp. 2 s.c.r. 769, followed. 134-159 s.c.-50 (iii) applying the above principles of construction it cannot be paid that s. 40(aa) contravenes art. 31(2) for the public purpose required therein is present where land is acquired for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be engaged. nor can it be said that the provision is hit by art. 19(1)(f) or it would be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property. the amendments to s. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of c.l (aa) in s. 40(1) and would therefore be equally valid. (iv) the first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the amendment act merely lays down that where a notification under s. 6 of the act cannot be justified under cl. (a)1 and cl. (b) of s. 40(1) it will be juded in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa) and it satisfies those provisions the acquisition will be deemed for the purpose of that clause as if that clause existed at the relevant time,though in actual fact it did not. the first fiction does not provide that even though the purpose of the acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa) it will still be deemed to be a public purpose. therefore a. 7 does not violate art. 31(2). (v) the acquisition made before july 20, 1962 as well as the acquisitions made thereafter have to satisfy the conditions of cl. (aa) of s. 40 and s. 7 of the amendment act validates only acquisitions before july 20, 1962 which actually satisfy the provisions in cl. (aa). therefore it cannot be said that s. 7 violates art. 14. (vi) section 7 specifically validates acquisition made before july 20. 1962 "notwithstanding any judgment, decree or orders of any court' and therefore the petitioner's contention that the acquisition of the petitioners land declared to be invalid by reason of the judgment of this court reported as r. l. arora v. state of u.p., [1962] supp. 2 s.c.r. 149 is bad is rejected. (vii) the various provisions in the agreement between the government and the industrialist for whom the land in question has been acquired conclusively establish that the acquisition is for a public purpose within the meaning of cl. (aa) of s. 40. province of bombay v. kusaldas s. advant, [1950] s.c.r. 621, distinguished. (viii) a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is justified considering the object behind cl. (aa) of s. 40 of the act and therefore it does not violate art. 14. per ayyangar j. (dissenting) (i) the wording of cl. (aa) of s. 40 is not capable of two interpretations and there is no ambiguity in the wording- it is a well established principle of construction that it is only when there is an ambiguity and the words are capable of more than one construction that any extrinsic aid in the shape of the purpose of the legislature or the object of the legislation come in for consideration where the language of an act is clear and explicit the court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. the intention of the legislature is not a matter to be speculated upon. interpretation or construction cannot mean that a court first reaches a conclusion as to what in its opinion the legislature intended, even though this involves attributing a meaning divorced from the words used and then adjust the meaning to the conclusion it has reached. warburton v. loveland, 2 d. & cl. (h.l.) 480. salomon v. a. salomon & co., [1897] a.c. 22 and cox v. hakes, 15 app. cas. 506,followed. (iv) the only way cl. (aa) could be read is to relate the words "public purpose" to the nature of the industry carried on by the company and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic aide or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammer, can the reference to public purpose be related to the building or work for which the acquisition is permitted to be made- (v) where the provisions, as in the present case, gives a case blanche to government to acquire land for any purpose it is not possible to sustain the validity of such law and strike down merely the particular acquisition where land is acquired for a purpose which is not a public purpose, for here the vice is in the law itself and not merely in its application. clause (aa) of s. 40 is violative of art. 21(2) of the constitution. - we, therefore, are not satisfied that the appellant's claim had been properly dealt with.1. this appeal by special leave is directed against the summary dismissal of the writ petition by the allahabad high court on 22nd october, 1980. the entire dispute is confined to the question as to whether a petition for substitution had been filed in the pending action before the munsif on 23-12-1974 for bringing on record the legal representatives of smt. tulsa. a certified copy of the petition is claimed to have been taken by the appellant and mr. pramod swarup, advocate for the appellant has asserted that the said certified copy was in his custody and was shown to this court when the special leave was granted. according to him his brief has been lost and he has reconstituted his record; therefore, he is not in a position to produce original certified copy and a photostat copy has now been produced.2. in case the certified copy of the judgment as claimed was taken there would be material available to establish the fact. order sheet of the case between july and december, 1974 had not been traced. it is the stand of the appellant that petition for substitution has remained undisposed of. the high court during the pendency of the writ petition by interim direction had required the trial court to dispose of the pending substitution petition but on the plea that same was not available and perhaps had not been filed the direction of the high court was not implemented. the allegation is that the papers have been lost in the court. it is the paramount duty of the court to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the litigating parties on account of some lapse on its part. we, therefore, are not satisfied that the appellant's claim had been properly dealt with. we set aside the order of the high court and remit the matter to it with the direction that the high court while retaining writ petition on its record may direct an inquiry to be instituted either by the district judge or by the trial court as to the fact of filing of the substitution petition. both parties should be given full opportunity to place their claims as to the filing of that matter. a lot of time has been lost and mrs. rani chhabra is justified in making the demand that the fruits of the decree have yet not been made available to the respondents; we, therefore, direct, the high court to ensure the disposal on or before 21-12-1990.3. status quo as ordered shall continue for two months with liberty to the appellant to apply to the high court for further directions. no costs.