BhaktIn Bai and ors. Vs. Jarnail Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/511607
SubjectInsurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtMadhya Pradesh High Court
Decided OnMar-27-2000
JudgeV.K. Agarwal, J.
Reported in2(2000)ACC781
AppellantBhaktIn Bai and ors.
RespondentJarnail Singh and ors.
Excerpt:
- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs. - their counsel filed an application for adjournment as well as an opportunity to lead additional evidence. it has further been submitted that the appellants were illiterate and poor persons and have not been in a position to adduce further evidence. however, they shall not be afforded another opportunity, if they fail to do so. it is directed that the appellants as well as the respondents shall be afforded one more opportunity to adduce evidence.orderv.k. agarwal, j.1. this appeal is directed against the order dated 12.5.1997 in claim case no. 1/4 by iind additional motor claims tribunal, rajnandgaon, whereby the application for adjournment filed on behalf of the appellants/claimants was dismissed, so also the claim petition itself.2. it appears that the appellants/claimants have filed an application under section 166 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 claiming compensation on account of death of ramesh kumar in a motor accident arising out of collision of two trucks. the appellants/claimants adduced some evidence, but on a subsequent opportunity and hearing for adducing further evidence, the appellants were absent. their counsel filed an application for adjournment as well as an opportunity to lead additional evidence. that application was dismissed by the impugned order and consequently the claim petition was also dismissed.3. learned counsel for appellants has mainly urged that, even if the prayer and application for adjournment filed by the appellants/claimants did not find favour with the tribunal, since the appellants had adduced substantial evidence, their claim petition should have been decided on the basis of the evidence already led by them. it has further been submitted that the appellants were illiterate and poor persons and have not been in a position to adduce further evidence. it has, therefore, been urged that though several opportunities have been granted to adduce evidence, but it is submitted that if one more opportunity is granted to the appellants they would be able to substantiate their claim.4. learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 stated that in case the appellants are granted opportunity to adduce evidence, the respondent should be permitted to lead evidence in rebuttal. counsel for both the parties agreed that they would be keeping their witnesses present on the date fixed by the tribunal in that regard.5. after considering the contentions as above, it appears that the appellants/claimants had already adduced evidence in the case. in the circumstances the tribunal was not justified in dismissing the claim petition without consideration of the evidence already placed on record by the appellants, merely because it did not find it proper to allow the application for adjournment. the claimants/appellants, therefore, deserve hearing in the matter. the matter deserves to be remanded for decision on merits. it also appears just and proper to grant one more opportunity to the appellants/claimants to adduce such additional evidence as they may choose. however, they shall not be afforded another opportunity, if they fail to do so.6. accordingly, the appeal is allowed. the impugned award is set aside. the case is remanded to the tribunal for decision afresh in the light of above observations. it is directed that the appellants as well as the respondents shall be afforded one more opportunity to adduce evidence. they shall themselves be responsible for keeping the evidence ready on a date to be fixed by the tribunal in that regard and shall not be entitled to any further opportunity in the above regard. the evidence already led by the appellants shall be treated as their evidence. the tribunal shall after affording an opportunity to the parties as above and after hearing them, shall decide the petition afresh and pass a fresh award on merits.
Judgment:
ORDER

V.K. Agarwal, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 12.5.1997 in Claim Case No. 1/4 by IInd Additional Motor Claims Tribunal, Rajnandgaon, whereby the application for adjournment filed on behalf of the appellants/claimants was dismissed, so also the claim petition itself.

2. It appears that the appellants/claimants have filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation on account of death of Ramesh Kumar in a motor accident arising out of collision of two trucks. The appellants/claimants adduced some evidence, but on a subsequent opportunity and hearing for adducing further evidence, the appellants were absent. Their Counsel filed an application for adjournment as well as an opportunity to lead additional evidence. That application was dismissed by the impugned order and consequently the claim petition was also dismissed.

3. Learned Counsel for appellants has mainly urged that, even if the prayer and application for adjournment filed by the appellants/claimants did not find favour with the Tribunal, since the appellants had adduced substantial evidence, their claim petition should have been decided on the basis of the evidence already led by them. It has further been submitted that the appellants were illiterate and poor persons and have not been in a position to adduce further evidence. It has, therefore, been urged that though several opportunities have been granted to adduce evidence, but it is submitted that if one more opportunity is granted to the appellants they would be able to substantiate their claim.

4. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 stated that in case the appellants are granted opportunity to adduce evidence, the respondent should be permitted to lead evidence in rebuttal. Counsel for both the parties agreed that they would be keeping their witnesses present on the date fixed by the Tribunal in that regard.

5. After considering the contentions as above, it appears that the appellants/claimants had already adduced evidence in the case. In the circumstances the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the claim petition without consideration of the evidence already placed on record by the appellants, merely because it did not find it proper to allow the application for adjournment. The claimants/appellants, therefore, deserve hearing in the matter. The matter deserves to be remanded for decision on merits. It also appears just and proper to grant one more opportunity to the appellants/claimants to adduce such additional evidence as they may choose. However, they shall not be afforded another opportunity, if they fail to do so.

6. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned award is set aside. The case is remanded to the Tribunal for decision afresh in the light of above observations. It is directed that the appellants as well as the respondents shall be afforded one more opportunity to adduce evidence. They shall themselves be responsible for keeping the evidence ready on a date to be fixed by the Tribunal in that regard and shall not be entitled to any further opportunity in the above regard. The evidence already led by the appellants shall be treated as their evidence. The Tribunal shall after affording an opportunity to the parties as above and after hearing them, shall decide the petition afresh and pass a fresh award on merits.