Ashok Vs. Ashok Thakur and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/511038
SubjectInsurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtMadhya Pradesh High Court
Decided OnMar-14-1995
JudgeJ.G. Chitre, J.
Reported inI(1995)ACC536
AppellantAshok
RespondentAshok Thakur and ors.
Excerpt:
- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs.j.g. chitre, j.1. this revision is being finally decided on the prayer of both the parties.2. the main grievence of the petitioner is that the tribunal rejected the prayer for interim relief under section 140 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as act), for no reasons, shri rajpal submitted that there is a certificate from the medical practitioner from chaithram hospital certifying that the petitioner suffers 10% permanent disability because of the accident in question.3. the principle behind enacting section 140 of the act is benevolent and it is specially made for the purpose of giving interim relief to a victim who has approached the tribunal for getting the compensation for the permanent disability suffered by him in an accident in which vehicle has been involved. when there is a certificate of medical practitioner certifying a permanent disability, there is no reason for tribunal to reject a prayer for interim relief in view of section 140 of the act. therefore, the tribunal has obviously committed the illegality.4. it is to be noted that when the tribunal is entertaining an application preferred by a victim of motor accident, in view of section 140 of the act, the tribunal has not to probe the issue with detailed enquiry. it is to ascertain whether motor vehicle was involved in the said accident and whether the claimant has made out a prima facie case of permanent disability. in view of section 142 of the act, the claimant should not be asked to lead the evidence to the point of proving the fact required in any litigation, for final verdict to be given. that much of evidence is not necessary while disposing of an application connected with section 140 of the act, of claimant made to the tribunal in respect of a claim in which motor vehicle is involved in the accident. the tribunal has to dispose of such application in spirit in which sections 140 and 142 of the act have been enacted.5. i find substance in the submission made on behalf of opponent no. 3 by shri chawla that some claimants deliberately delay the hearing of such cases for the purpose of earning more interest. shri rajpal has submitted that the present claimant is not interested in delaying the matter. it has been pointed that the matter has been fixed for recording of evidence on 24.3.95. shri rajpal for petitioner has also expressed his desire to lead evidence before the tribunal as early as possible and to get it decided as early as possible. therefore, the anxiety lingering in the mind of shri chawla, counsel for opponent no. 3 would be removed. both the contesting parties and the tribunal are directed to decide the claim expeditiously so as to avoid delay.6. in the result, the opponents, jointly and severally are directed to pay sum of rs. 12,000/- (rs. twelve thousand) to the petitioner within a month. if the said sum is not paid within a month, the petitioner would be entitled to get interest at the rate of 12% per annum on said amount till the said amount is paid c.c. on payment.
Judgment:

J.G. Chitre, J.

1. This revision is being finally decided on the prayer of both the parties.

2. The main grievence of the petitioner is that the Tribunal rejected the prayer for interim relief under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as Act), for no reasons, Shri Rajpal submitted that there is a certificate from the medical practitioner from Chaithram Hospital certifying that the petitioner suffers 10% permanent disability because of the accident in question.

3. The principle behind enacting Section 140 of the Act is benevolent and it is specially made for the purpose of giving interim relief to a victim who has approached the Tribunal for getting the compensation for the permanent disability suffered by him in an accident in which vehicle has been involved. When there is a certificate of medical practitioner certifying a permanent disability, there is no reason for Tribunal to reject a prayer for interim relief in view of Section 140 of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal has obviously committed the illegality.

4. It is to be noted that when the Tribunal is entertaining an application preferred by a victim of motor accident, in view of Section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal has not to probe the issue with detailed enquiry. It is to ascertain whether motor vehicle was involved in the said accident and whether the claimant has made out a prima facie case of permanent disability. In view of Section 142 of the Act, the claimant should not be asked to lead the evidence to the point of proving the fact required in any litigation, for final verdict to be given. That much of evidence is not necessary while disposing of an application connected with Section 140 of the Act, of claimant made to the Tribunal in respect of a claim in which motor vehicle is involved in the accident. The Tribunal has to dispose of such application in spirit in which Sections 140 and 142 of the Act have been enacted.

5. I find substance in the submission made on behalf of opponent No. 3 by Shri Chawla that some claimants deliberately delay the hearing of such cases for the purpose of earning more interest. Shri Rajpal has submitted that the present claimant is not interested in delaying the matter. It has been pointed that the matter has been fixed for recording of evidence on 24.3.95. Shri Rajpal for petitioner has also expressed his desire to lead evidence before the Tribunal as early as possible and to get it decided as early as possible. Therefore, the anxiety lingering in the mind of Shri Chawla, Counsel for opponent No. 3 would be removed. Both the contesting parties and the Tribunal are directed to decide the claim expeditiously so as to avoid delay.

6. In the result, the opponents, jointly and severally are directed to pay sum of Rs. 12,000/- (Rs. twelve thousand) to the petitioner within a month. If the said sum is not paid within a month, the petitioner would be entitled to get interest at the rate of 12% per annum on said amount till the said amount is paid C.C. on payment.