Hanuman Prasad and anr. Vs. Bhagwati Prasad and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/447500
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided OnJan-30-1902
JudgeKnox and ;Blair, JJ.
Reported in(1902)ILR24All236
AppellantHanuman Prasad and anr.
RespondentBhagwati Prasad and anr.
Excerpt:
civil procedure code, section 596 - appeal to his majesty in council--decree involving indirectly some question respecting property of the value of ten thousand rupees or upwards. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. knox and blair, jj.1. this is an application for leave to appeal to his imperial majesty in council. the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance was under ten thousand rupees in value, but in an affidavit, which is attached to the application, it is stated that the title to an eight-anna share in mauza kot kamarhya of pandit hira nand chaube and of pandit chattardhari chaube depends on the decision of the same question, and that the title of other purchasers to the rest of the villages mentioned in the schedule annexed to the petition depends on the same question. in this way it is sought to make out that, though the value of the matter directly in dispute is below ten thousand rupees, yet the decree of this court involves indirectly questions to or respecting the entire property mentioned in the schedule, which is valued at about 1,50,000 rupees. none of the properties which are said to be affected by the decree of this court, and which are not in dispute before us, are or have been made the matter of any suit yet instituted. they may or may not hereafter be subject-matters of suits. our decree may or may not involve, directly or indirectly, a claim or question to, or-respecting them. at present all this is a matter of pure conjecture. the application is therefore opposed on the ground that as the value of the subject-matter is not ten thousand rupees this application should be rejected. the question of law, too, which is involved, is not a question of great public or private importance, and it is urged that for these reasons it cannot be held to come within the term 'a substantial question of law.' in support of this contention reference is made to the case of radha krishn das v. rai krishn chand (1901) i.l.r. 23 all. 415 and to the case of banarsi prasad v. kashi krishna narain (1901) i.l.r. 23 all. 227 p. 231. we have examined the question which is said to be involved, and we determine that it is not a substantial question of law within the meaning of the terms of section 596 of the code of civil procedure. we are also of opinion that when it is laid down that the decree must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of ten thousand rupees in value or upwards, the reference is to suits in existence and not to suits, if we may so term it, in gremio futuri. in this view we are supported by what is stated as the unanimous opinion of their lordships of the privy council in the case of moofti mohummud ubdoollah v. baboo mootechund (1837) 1 moo. i.a. 363. we may also refer to the observations made in the case of baboo gopal lall thakoor v. teluk chunder rai (1860) 7 moo. i.a. 548. we therefore direct that this application stand dismissed with costs.
Judgment:

Knox and Blair, JJ.

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Imperial Majesty in Council. The subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was under ten thousand rupees in value, but in an affidavit, which is attached to the application, it is stated that the title to an eight-anna share in mauza Kot Kamarhya of Pandit Hira Nand Chaube and of Pandit Chattardhari Chaube depends on the decision of the same question, and that the title of other purchasers to the rest of the villages mentioned in the schedule annexed to the petition depends on the same question. In this way it is sought to make out that, though the value of the matter directly in dispute is below ten thousand rupees, yet the decree of this Court involves indirectly questions to or respecting the entire property mentioned in the schedule, which is valued at about 1,50,000 rupees. None of the properties which are said to be affected by the decree of this Court, and which are not in dispute before us, are or have been made the matter of any suit yet instituted. They may or may not hereafter be subject-matters of suits. Our decree may or may not involve, directly or indirectly, a claim or question to, or-respecting them. At present all this is a matter of pure conjecture. The application is therefore opposed on the ground that as the value of the subject-matter is not ten thousand rupees this application should be rejected. The question of law, too, which is involved, is not a question of great public or private importance, and it is urged that for these reasons it cannot be held to come within the term 'a substantial question of law.' In support of this contention reference is made to the case of Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand (1901) I.L.R. 23 All. 415 and to the case of Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (1901) I.L.R. 23 All. 227 p. 231. We have examined the question which is said to be involved, and we determine that it is not a substantial question of law within the meaning of the terms of Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are also of opinion that when it is laid down that the decree must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of ten thousand rupees in value or upwards, the reference is to suits in existence and not to suits, if we may so term it, in gremio futuri. In this view we are supported by what is stated as the unanimous opinion of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Moofti Mohummud Ubdoollah v. Baboo Mootechund (1837) 1 Moo. I.A. 363. We may also refer to the observations made in the case of Baboo Gopal Lall Thakoor v. Teluk Chunder Rai (1860) 7 Moo. I.A. 548. We therefore direct that this application stand dismissed with costs.