| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/447308 |
| Subject | Property |
| Court | Allahabad |
| Decided On | Jun-22-1928 |
| Reported in | AIR1930All22 |
| Appellant | Murli |
| Respondent | Ghamar and ors. |
Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 967 would be whether the parties concerned had any other property out of which they could meet the necessary expenditure, whether it would not have been possible to raise the sum by mortgage instead of selling the house outright and matters of a like nature.1. this second appeal arises from a suit brought by some members of a joint hindu family for a declaration that the deed of sale in respect of their house, dated 27th. july 1927, executed by bhagwan das on their behalf as next friend when they were minors and by mt. munni in favour of the present defendant-appellant was invalid, and claiming restoration of possession to the plaintiffs. the sale consideration was rs. 1,400, and the plaintiffs claimed that there had been no necessity for the execution of the sale deed. the defence was that the sale had been concluded in order to pay off the plaintiffs' debts, and there was also a plea that rs. 1,000 had been spent by the defendant-appellant on the house.2. both the courts below have found that legal necessity has been proved to the extent of rs. 967 out of the sale consideration of rs. 1,400 and they have decreed the plaintiffs' claim on condition that they repay rs. 967 the sum which is found to have been advanced for legal necessity.3. in the light of the recent decisions of their lordships of the privy council it is clear that this finding is not in accordance with the law as at present in force. the sale is either wholly valid or invalid, according as it is found to have been made for necessity or the reverse. it is clear from the case of sri krishan das v. nathu ram and the case of gauri shankar v. jiwan singh which had been published when the present suit was before the lower courts that suits of this nature must be considered from a rather different point of view from the one that used to be favoured in this province. considerations that would be of importance in order to decide whether it was necessary to sell the house in suit in order to raise a sum of rs. 967 would be whether the parties concerned had any other property out of which they could meet the necessary expenditure, whether it would not have been possible to raise the sum by mortgage instead of selling the house outright and matters of a like nature. there is not at present material on the file to enable us to decide this question, and we there fore remit the following issue to the lower appellate court:was there no way in which the sum of rs. 967 could have been raised by the joint family except by the sale of the house in suit.3. it may be necessary in order to reply to this question, to find out what the value of the house was in 1917, and if so, or if it is desirable for any other reason, the parties will be allowed to adduce fresh evidence.4. the finding on this issue should be returned by 20th october and ten days thereafter will be allowed to the respondents for filing objections.
Judgment:1. This second appeal arises from a suit brought by some members of a joint Hindu family for a declaration that the deed of sale in respect of their house, dated 27th. July 1927, executed by Bhagwan Das on their behalf as next friend when they were minors and by Mt. Munni in favour of the present defendant-appellant was invalid, and claiming restoration of possession to the plaintiffs. The sale consideration was Rs. 1,400, and the plaintiffs claimed that there had been no necessity for the execution of the sale deed. The defence was that the sale had been concluded in order to pay off the plaintiffs' debts, and there was also a plea that Rs. 1,000 had been spent by the defendant-appellant on the house.
2. Both the Courts below have found that legal necessity has been proved to the extent of Rs. 967 out of the sale consideration of Rs. 1,400 and they have decreed the plaintiffs' claim on condition that they repay Rs. 967 the sum which is found to have been advanced for legal necessity.
3. In the light of the recent decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council it is clear that this finding is not in accordance with the law as at present in force. The sale is either wholly valid or invalid, according as it is found to have been made for necessity or the reverse. It is clear from the case of Sri Krishan Das v. Nathu Ram and the case of Gauri Shankar v. Jiwan Singh which had been published when the present suit was before the lower Courts that suits of this nature must be considered from a rather different point of view from the one that used to be favoured in this province. Considerations that would be of importance in order to decide whether it was necessary to sell the house in suit in order to raise a sum of Rs. 967 would be whether the parties concerned had any other property out of which they could meet the necessary expenditure, whether it would not have been possible to raise the sum by mortgage instead of selling the house outright and matters of a like nature. There is not at present material on the file to enable us to decide this question, and we there fore remit the following issue to the lower appellate Court:
Was there no way in which the sum of Rs. 967 could have been raised by the joint family except by the sale of the house in suit.
3. It may be necessary in order to reply to this question, to find out what the value of the house was in 1917, and if so, or if it is desirable for any other reason, the parties will be allowed to adduce fresh evidence.
4. The finding on this issue should be returned by 20th October and ten days thereafter will be allowed to the respondents for filing objections.