A. Devi Vs. Ch. Janaki and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as of the kind or degree indicated or implied by the context. therefore, the term such board will have to mean a divisional board of or the level of divisional board or the state board. the divisional board holds the examination and issues certificates after 10th and 12th standard examinations. the state board advises the state government on policy matters, ensures uniform pattern of secondary and higher secondary education, lays down principles for determining syllabi, prescribes text books, etc. the cantonment board does not discharge any of such duties nor is there any other board or body under the cantonments act discharging any such duties. the duties of the cantonment board are laid down in section 62 and amongst others, clause (xiv) lays down the duties of establishing and maintaining or assisting primary schools only. the cantonment board is not required to enter into the area of secondary education. therefore, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. that being the position, it is not possible to accept it to be a recognised school for being a private school under the act. for the reasons state above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. orderghulam mohammed, j.1. this revision is directed against an order dated 21-8-2001 passed by the learned motor accidents claims tribunal-cum-ii additional district court, kurnool in i.a.no. 556 of 2000 in o.p.no. 334 of 1996.2. the petitioner is a widow. her husband died in an accident due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle. therefore, the petitioner herein approached the tribunal to award just compensation under the provisions of the motor vehicles act by filing mvop no. 334 of 1996, but the said petition was dismissed for default. then she filed a petition to set aside the said dismissal order and since there was a delay of 732 days in filing the said petition, she filed i.a. no. 556 of 2000 under section 5 of the limitation act to condone the said delay of 732 days. the reason assigned was that due to mistake and oversight she has not filed the petition in time. the trial court held the delay has not been properly explained in the affidavit and therefore declined to condone the delay and accordingly dismissed the said application. aggrieved by the said order, this revision is preferred.3. learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the motor vehicles act itself is a beneficial legislation, and therefore the petition filed for condoning the delay in filing the petition for setting aside the default order ought to have been considered liberally.4. however, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that there was inordinate delay and the said delay was not properly explained and therefore the court below exercising the discretion vested in it has rightly declined to entertain the application.5. having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, i am of the considered view that as it is a case of death of the husband of the petitioner and as m.v. act is a beneficial legislation, the court below should have liberally construed the matter and condoned the delay. instead, the trial court dismissed the application merely on the ground that the delay has not been properly explained.6. considering the facts and circumstances, the delay is condoned and the order passed by the lower court dismissing the m.v.o.p. for default is set aside and the said o.p. is restored to file. the court below is directed to dispose of the o.p. expeditiously within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by determining the compensation in accordance with law.7. the c.r.p. is allowed accordingly.

Judgment:
ORDER

Ghulam Mohammed, J.

1. This revision is directed against an order dated 21-8-2001 passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-II Additional District Court, Kurnool in I.A.No. 556 of 2000 in O.P.No. 334 of 1996.

2. The petitioner is a widow. Her husband died in an accident due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle. Therefore, the petitioner herein approached the Tribunal to award just compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act by filing MVOP No. 334 of 1996, but the said petition was dismissed for default. Then she filed a petition to set aside the said dismissal order and since there was a delay of 732 days in filing the said petition, she filed I.A. No. 556 of 2000 Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the said delay of 732 days. The reason assigned was that due to mistake and oversight she has not filed the petition in time. The trial Court held the delay has not been properly explained in the affidavit and therefore declined to condone the delay and accordingly dismissed the said application. Aggrieved by the said order, this revision is preferred.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the Motor Vehicles Act itself is a beneficial legislation, and therefore the petition filed for condoning the delay in filing the petition for setting aside the default order ought to have been considered liberally.

4. However, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that there was inordinate delay and the said delay was not properly explained and therefore the Court below exercising the discretion vested in it has rightly declined to entertain the application.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that as it is a case of death of the husband of the petitioner and as M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation, the Court below should have liberally construed the matter and condoned the delay. Instead, the trial Court dismissed the application merely on the ground that the delay has not been properly explained.

6. Considering the facts and circumstances, the delay is condoned and the order passed by the lower Court dismissing the M.V.O.P. for default is set aside and the said O.P. is restored to file. The Court below is directed to dispose of the O.P. expeditiously within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by determining the compensation in accordance with law.

7. The C.R.P. is allowed accordingly.