R. Saibaba Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Hyderabad and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
labour and industrial - employment - petitioner was son of deceased employee of corporation - sought employment in corporation under scheme earmarking 30% of jobs to children of deceased employees - widow of deceased employee opted for pecuniary benefits under said scheme - dependents of employee cannot go for both - held, petitioner not entitled for benefit under said scheme. - all india services act, 1951.sections 8 & 11 & a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control rules, 1961, rule 5: [v.v.s. rao, g. yethirajulu & g. bhavani prasad, jj] refusal by landlord to receive rent - deposit of rent in court - held, a tenant has the option to take recourse to section 8 in case of refusal or evasion by landlord to receive rent and if landlord were to not name a bank or refuse even the money order of rent, the tenant can deposit the rent in accordance with sub-rules (1) to (3) of rule 5. the notice to person entitled to rent and proper maintenance of accounts of such deposits under sub-rules (4) and (5) of rule 5 are solely dependent on compliance with sub-rule (3) by the tenant. the payment or deposit of rent under section 11 read with sub-rule (6) of rule 5 arises only in respect of a tenant who did not take recourse to section 8 or section 9 before an application for eviction has been made against him in respect of any rent in arrears by date of that application, whereas in respect of rent that becomes subsequently due since date of application for eviction, the tenant is bound to pay or deposit regularly until termination of proceedings in order to enable him to contest the application. any violation of section 11(1) to (3) and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 makes the tenant liable for the adverse consequences under sub-section (4) of section 11. thus, the provisions of section 11 and sub-rule (6) of rule 5 are intended only to ensure the payment and deposit of rent including arrears during pendency and till termination of proceedings for eviction. the forfeiture of right of tenant to contest in case of default is to protect the rights and interests of landlord pending such an application for eviction, but not to confer any right on tenant to plead that all defaults committed by him prior to application for eviction can never be considered wilful, if he were to deposit all arrears of rent due within fifteen days under rule 5(6) read with sub-section (1) of section 11. the object and effect of section 11 and sub-rules (1) to (5) to rule 5, the former being for protection of landlord during pendency of eviction proceedings and the later being for protection of tenant to avoid any liability for eviction on ground of wilful default. consequently, while taking recourse to section 8 by tenant is optional, once that option is exercised, compliance with sub-rules (1) to (5) of rule 5 becomes mandatory in the sense that any non-compliance with prescribed procedure will positively indicate the wilful nature of default committed in paying or tendering rent as prescribed. while deposit of rent in terms of provisions of act and the rules amounts to valid tender of rent to landlord, the failure to comply with rule 5 (3) requiring delivery of a copy of the challan for deposit of rent in office of controller or appellate authority, as the case may be, so as to enable controller or appellate authority to cause maintenance of proper accounts under sub-rule (5) and give notice of deposit to person amounts to wilful default in making valid payment or lawful tender of the rent by the tenant to the landlord. thus, where a tenant obtains an order to deposit rent, same shall be deposited at least by the last day of the month following that for which rent is payable and rent challan shall be delivered in the office of controller within a reasonable time so that rent controller can take necessary action for service of notice of deposit under sub-rule (4) of rule 5 of the rules within seven days of such delivery. in the absence of compliance in so depositing rent and delivering challan in the office of controller, tenant shall be deemed to have committed wilful default. - india trade promotion organisation, new delhi 1994 ii clr 305. in the said decision the learned judge of the karnataka high court held that the mere fact that the petitioner therein had received financial benefits which she was otherwise legitimately entitled to receive owing to her husband's death is not a good ground to disentitle her to seek appointment on compassionate grounds. clearly provides for two options, namely. the facts narrated supra clearly go to show that after the death of the employee, the widow of the employee opted for pecuniary benefits under the scheme and it is not the case of the petitioner that his mother did not receive the pecuniary benefits under the scheme. it may be so, but this court while deciding hard case cannot lay down bad law.orders.r. nayak, j. 1. the petitioner is the son of a deceased employee by name r. govinda swamy who was working as fitter in the establishment of the respondent-corporation. it is averred that r. govinda swamy died in harness on 2-9-1986 and at that time the petitioner was said to be a minor. the petitioner on attaining the age of majority made an application seeking employment in the services of the corporation under a scheme framed by the corporation authorities earmarking 30% of jobs to the children of deceased employees. it is further averred that in pursuance of the said application the petitioner was called for interview on 14-8-91 and he was interviewed also. but the petitioner did not receive any communication from the corporation authorities as to what happened to the interview conducted by them. therefore, the petitioner on 9-6-1994 caused a notice through lawyer. a reply was sent by the corporation on 16-6-94 informing petitioner that after the death of his father his mother opted for receiving pecuniary benefits under the scheme and not for employment, and accordingly pecuniary benefits were extended to the widow-mother. it is also stated at para 8 that the mother of the petitioner died on 1-3-1990 itself. 2. sri jayaprakasha rao, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that extension of pecuniary benefits under the scheme to the deceased-mother would not absolve the corporation authorities from the duty of appointing the petitioner to a suitable post under the scheme and the action of the authorities in refusing the appointment to the petitioner is violative of article 14 of the constitution. in support of his submission mr. jayaprakasha rao would place reliance on the decision of the karnataka high court reported in usha ram prasad v. india trade promotion organisation, new delhi 1994 ii clr 305. in the said decision the learned judge of the karnataka high court held that the mere fact that the petitioner therein had received financial benefits which she was otherwise legitimately entitled to receive owing to her husband's death is not a good ground to disentitle her to seek appointment on compassionate grounds. the judgment indicates that the pecuniary benefits extended to the wife of the deceased was otherwise available to her. but that decision is not helpful to the petitioner having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. the scheme framed by the authorities of the a.p.s.r.t.c. clearly provides for two options, namely. (i) option to receive pecuniary benefits or (ii) option to seek employment to the children of the deceased employee. the facts narrated supra clearly go to show that after the death of the employee, the widow of the employee opted for pecuniary benefits under the scheme and it is not the case of the petitioner that his mother did not receive the pecuniary benefits under the scheme. if that is so, now it is not permissible for the petitioner to turn round and say that he is also entitled to the other alternative benefit contemplated under the scheme. the dependents of the deceased employee cannot have both. they have to necessarily opt for one of the two. looking from that angle, i do not find any irregularity or illegality committed by the corporation authorities in denying the appointment to the petitioner. sri jayaprakasha rao with his usual persuasion submit that pecuniary benefits would not a substitute for granting employment. it may be so, but this court while deciding hard case cannot lay down bad law. 3. in the result and for the foregoing reasons, i dismiss the writ petition. the parties are directed to bear their own costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

S.R. Nayak, J.

1. The petitioner is the son of a deceased employee by name R. Govinda Swamy who was working as Fitter in the establishment of the respondent-Corporation. It is averred that R. Govinda Swamy died in harness on 2-9-1986 and at that time the petitioner was said to be a minor. The petitioner on attaining the age of majority made an application seeking employment in the services of the Corporation under a scheme framed by the Corporation authorities earmarking 30% of jobs to the children of deceased employees. It is further averred that in pursuance of the said application the petitioner was called for interview on 14-8-91 and he was interviewed also. But the petitioner did not receive any communication from the Corporation authorities as to what happened to the interview conducted by them. Therefore, the petitioner on 9-6-1994 caused a notice through lawyer. A reply was sent by the Corporation on 16-6-94 informing petitioner that after the death of his father his mother opted for receiving pecuniary benefits under the scheme and not for employment, and accordingly pecuniary benefits were extended to the widow-mother. It is also stated at para 8 that the mother of the petitioner died on 1-3-1990 itself.

2. Sri Jayaprakasha Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that extension of pecuniary benefits under the scheme to the deceased-mother would not absolve the Corporation authorities from the duty of appointing the petitioner to a suitable post under the scheme and the action of the authorities in refusing the appointment to the petitioner is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of his submission Mr. Jayaprakasha Rao would place reliance on the decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in Usha Ram Prasad v. India Trade Promotion Organisation, New Delhi 1994 II CLR 305. In the said decision the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that the mere fact that the petitioner therein had received financial benefits which she was otherwise legitimately entitled to receive owing to her husband's death is not a good ground to disentitle her to seek appointment on compassionate grounds. The judgment indicates that the pecuniary benefits extended to the wife of the deceased was otherwise available to her. But that decision is not helpful to the petitioner having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. The scheme framed by the authorities of the A.P.S.R.T.C. clearly provides for two options, namely.

(i) option to receive pecuniary benefits or

(ii) option to seek employment to the children of the deceased employee.

The facts narrated supra clearly go to show that after the death of the employee, the widow of the employee opted for pecuniary benefits under the scheme and it is not the case of the petitioner that his mother did not receive the pecuniary benefits under the scheme. If that is so, now it is not permissible for the petitioner to turn round and say that he is also entitled to the other alternative benefit contemplated under the scheme. The dependents of the deceased employee cannot have both. They have to necessarily opt for one of the two. Looking from that angle, I do not find any irregularity or illegality committed by the Corporation authorities in denying the appointment to the petitioner. Sri Jayaprakasha Rao with his usual persuasion submit that pecuniary benefits would not a substitute for granting employment. It may be so, but this Court while deciding hard case cannot lay down bad law.

3. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the writ petition. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.