M.L. Jain, J.

(1) On 6-7-1962 an agreement of lease was reached between the respondent Smt. Girnari Devi and Gopal Dass, Dev Kumar and Chatur Bhuj Aggarwal (herein the Aggarwals) in respect of the disputed premises No. 20/1, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. One of the material conditions of this agreement was that the period of lease shall be ten years with effect from 15-7-1962. Another important term was that the Aggarwal were authorised to assign the demised premises for the use of any of the companies in which they or any of them is a director or for the use of any of the firms in which they or any of them is a partner. Out of them, Gopaldas and Dev Kumar arc since December 1959 two of the directors of M/s. Devi Dayal Metal Industries (Pvt) Ltd. (herein the appellants). The correspondence that ensued between the parties with regard to the payment of rent from 21-5-1963 onwards shows that rent was payable and was paid by the appellants. Chatur Bhuj Aggarwal has signed all these letters as Manager in charge of the appellants. On 25 9-1963 two letters were sent on behalf of the appellants to the landlady saying 'we would like to refer to the assurance you had given while we took the premises from you that you will yourself arrange for a separate electric connection for us', and 'providing us the water facilities with a separate water meter'. On 13-9-1971 the Advocate of the landlady served a notice on the appellants terminating their tenancy with effect from 31-10-1971. No reply was sent by the appellants to this notice. Another notice was sent on 16-2-1972 requesting the appellants to pay all the arrears of rent from February, 1970 and deliver vacant possession by 31-3-1972. The appellants' advocate replied on 24-3-1972 that it was not denied that his clients (that is the appellants) were tenants in respect of the said property. It was also claimed in this reply that as per the lease deed the appellants were granted permission to use the space for business along with other sister concerns. It was further alleged that the tenancy of his clients cannot be terminated as alleged in para 5 of the notice.

(2) On 18-4-1972 the respondent landlady filed the present eviction application under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (herein the Act) against the appellants on the ground that they had sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the premises in favor of M/s. Bralco Metal Industries Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Hindustan Chains Pvt. Ltd. On 19-5-1972 the advocate of the appellants wrote to the respondent enclosing cheque drawn by Hindustan Chains for payment of rent from 1-3-1972 to 31-5-1972 in respect of the premises in the name of the appellants. But in, their written statement dated 14-7-1972 the appellants denied that they were the tenants. They stated that as per the lease agreement dated 6-7-1962 the, Aggarwals were the tenants. They further stated that the appellants and M/s. Bralco Metal Industries and Hindustan Chains Pvt. Ltd. are sister concerns and one or more of the Aggarwals are the directors in one or the other of the said companies. In para 4 of the replication, the applicant landlady stated that excepting the appellants there is no other tenant of hers in the disputed premises.

(3) The learned Addl. Controller by his order dated 17-12-1979 accepted the application and passed and order of eviction against the appellants He held that the rent has always been paid by the appellants and the correspondence between the parties was proved to show that they were the tenants. He further came to the conclusion that on the date of the application the Aggarwals were not the tenants. The learned Addl. Controller also observed that at any rate they had assigned their rights in favor of the appellants and, thereforee, there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the present parties. As regards parting with possession without consent of the landlady, he held that it had taken place as the appellants were a juristic person and have delivered possession to the other two companies which are also juristic person. An appeal was taken against the order of the Addl. Controller. It was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 9-3-1983. Hence, this second appeal.

(4) The substantial point of law agitated is that the application for eviction is liable to be dismissed because the original tenants were not made parties to the application for eviction. The precise contention is that the appellant were not the tenants while an application on the ground of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act can be filed only against the tenant. The basis for this contention is the agreement of 6-7-1962. That agreement was required to be registered, but it was not registered. The question is whether this document is admissible in evidence and if so, to what extent. In Sardar Amur Singh and another v. Smt. Surinder Kaur, 1976 Rcr 47, it was held that in case of a lease which requires to be registered, but has not been registered, the period of lease and the terms of the lease cannot be proved by admitting such lease deed in evidence. But it can be used to show the nature of possession and the relationship of landlord and tenant. This is so because Section 49 of the Registration Act provides that a document which requires to be registered, cannot affect any immovable property comprised therein nor can it be received in evidence of any transaction affecting such property, except as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or of a part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, or as evidence of any such collateral transaction as does not require to be effected by registered instrument. Both the authorities below have found that a relationship of landlord and tenant existed in fact between the respondent and the appellants and not between the Aggarwals and the respondent. The original agreement of lease between the landlady and appellants was not acted upon. That finding is based upon the fact that the appellants had been paying the rent and that they did not deny the tenancy in reply to the notice and that was the earliest opportunity for them to do so. It will not improve their position if they became wiser at the time of filing the written statement and denied the tenancy. There is no rent receipt in favor of the Aggarwals. Prakash Ghand (AW 1) deposed that the agreement was not acted upon and that evidence has not been rebutted. The appellants produced only one witness Rameshchand (RW 1). He deposed that he joined as accountant in 1968. He was paid by Hindustan Chains. He certainly did not know what transpired between 1962 and 1968. Yet he admitted that when the premises were taken, Since then the appellants have been paying the rents. He also disclosed that Hindustan Chains were paying the rent. That shows subletting and parting with possession.

(5) Mr. Bhatia for the appellants urged that the unregistered- instrument shows that the respondent and the Aggarwals were the tenants and further the permission to the appellants to use the premises were collateral transactions which can be proved by the said instrument. He laid great Stresa upon the two terms of the agreement. One is that the Aggarwals were permitted by the agreement to assign the premises for use by concerns like the appellants and that is how the appellants were permitted to use the premises and to pay rent. That does not turn the appellants into tenants. The other term of the same deed is that the lessees were to deliver the demised premises to the Lesser on the expiry of the lease, etc. which shows that Aggarwals continued to be tenants because, it was their liability to deliver the premisei. But the short answer to this submission will be that the terms cannot be read into evidence. Moreover, according to the recitals the lessees include permitted assigns and there has been an absolute assignment of tenancy in favor of the appellants. If the appellants were the assigns, they have the obligation to deliver the demised premises to the Lesser. But it has not been possible for the appellants to dislodge their admissions that they were the tenants and were paying rent. The appellants are, thereforee, tenants within Section 2(1) of the Act in spite of the said agreement. The Aggarwals needed no more to be made parties to the application. In that view of the matter, the submission of Mr. Bhatia fails. The findings of fact arrived at by the courts below are not vitiated in any manner and do not call for any interference.

(6) The appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellants shall, however, vacate the premises within a period of three months, provided they continue to pay the damages for use and occupation.