S.P. Khare, J.

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Code)' against the order dated 19-12-2000 in M.J.C. No, 37 of 1996 of the 9th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur by which her application under Section 340 of the Code for prosecuting R. D. Agrawal, an Officer of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation for perjury punishable under Section 193, I.P.C. has been rejected,

2. Plaintiff Kamalvasini Agrawal had instituted Civil Suit No. 150-A of 1995 for eviction of defendant-Hindustan Petroleum Corporation under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on the ground that the suit accommodation was bona fide required by her for carrying on her own business. That suit was decreed on 22-1-1996. During the pendency of that suit R. D. Agrawal, an Officer of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, was examined as a witness on behalf of the defendant. He deposed before the Court that: 'There is a plot measuring 7000 sq. ft. behind the suit accommodation on which the construction can be carried out'. According to the plaintiff this was a false statement made by non-applicant R. D. Agrawal (D.W. 2) as there was no such plot behind the suit accommodation. In his deposition dated 1-7-1966 it is shown that there is a vacant plot of land behind the suit accommodation. The area of that plot was 100 x 55 feet.

3. The trial Court in a well considered order keeping in view the relevant principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in several decisions held : 'It is not expedient in the interest of justice' to prosecute R. D. Agrawal for the offence of perjury. The trial Court was of the opinion that he has not intentionally given any false evidence and prima facie he has not committed any perjury. It was also observed that the Officer of the Corporation was not going to have any advantage in making the said statement and the explanation given by him in his evidence was quite satisfactory.

4. In this appeal it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that there was no plot of 7000 sq. ft. behind the suit accommodation and, therefore, the statement made by R. D. Agrawal was prima facie false and it was incumbent upon the trial Court to file a complaint against him as required by Section 340 of the Code. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Re : Suo Motu Proceedings against R. Karuppan (2001) 5 SCC 289 : 2001 Cri LJ 2611, has been cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his argument. It has been observed in this decision by the Supreme Court that unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the Courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the Courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let loose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the Courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to survive, effective action is the need of the time. An earlier decision of the Supreme Court in K. Karunakaran v. T.V. Eachara Varrier (1978) 1 SCC 18 : 1978 Cri LJ 339 has also been cited.

5. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court Were made in a different 'fact-situation', the same cannot be lifted and fitted in an altogether different context. In the said judgment there is a quotation which depicts the correct legal position. It is pointed out therein that perjury was committed when, after a 'lawful oath' was administered in a 'judicial proceeding', a per-son swore 'absolutely and falsely' concerning a point 'material' to the issue in question. In the present case, as stated above, the portion of the deposition of R, D. Agrawal, which according to the plaintiff constitutes perjury, cannot be said to be 'utter blatant falsehood' or 'absolutely false'. The witness has given a proper explanation and the ground for his earlier statement. The recital in the lease deed and the map annexed thereto is the basis of his oral evidence indicating alternative accommodation available with the plaintiff. Therefore, his version cannot be said to be wit out any basis. It cannot be said even, remotely that he has intentionally given any false evidence. Therefore, the trial Court is correct in its view that it is not a fit case where the witness should be prosecuted for perjury. It is really not expedient in the interest of justice. It is well settled that a party cannot be permitted to vindicate personal vendetta or to settle his private score. Provision in Section 340 of the Code cannot be allowed to be used for self-aggrandisement. The prosecution for perjury can be directed in the larger interest of the administration of justice. The Court must form an opinion that the prosecution is 'expedient in the interest of justice'. This is sine qua non for proceeding to launch a prosecution for perjury. The expression 'It is expedient in the interest of justice' involves a careful balancing of many factors. It is only in suitable and glaring cases of deliberate falsehood that such a prosecution should be launched.

6. The Supreme Court has cautioned long back in Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1971 SC 1367 : 1971 Cri LJ 1096, that indiscriminate prosecutions under Section 193, I.P.C. resulting in failure are likely to defeat the very object of such prosecution. It has been laid down that the prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by Courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. Following this decision the Supreme Court has again observed in M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana (2000) 1 SCC 278 : 2000 Cri LJ 388 : 'It is settled law that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent upon the Court to order prosecution, but requires the Court to exercise judicial discretion to order prosecution only in the larger interest of the administration of justice'. Recently the Supreme Court in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 1 SCC 253 : 2002 Cri LJ 548 has again observed that the Court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into.

7. It has also been observed in K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1831 : 1992 Cri LJ 2781 that it is incumbent that the power given by Section 340 of the Code should be used with utmost care and after due consideration. Such a prosecution for perjury should be taken only if it is expedient in the interest of justice. It was earlier observed by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh AIR 1982 SC 1238 : 1982 Cri LJ 1731, that day in and day out in Courts averments made by one set of witnesses are accepted and the counter averments are rejected. If in all such cases complaints under Section 199, I.P.C. are to be filed not only there will open up floodgates of litigation but it would unquestionably be in abuse of the process of the Court.

8. In this case the trial Court did not consider it expedient to prosecute R. D. Agrawal for perjury. The discretion exercised by the trial Court should not be lightly interfered with in appeal. That was laid down by the Supreme Court in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 : 1956 Cri LJ 326.

9. In view of the above discussion this appeal is dismissed in limine