B. Sudershan Reddy, J.

1. This is an application to recall the order of the Division Bench dated 11.6.1999 made in WP No. 8939 of 1999. The respondents in the writ petition are the petitioners in this application purported to have been filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. That in order to appreciate the question as to whether any case is made out for recalling the order of the Division Bench dated 11.6.1999 made in W.P No. 8939 of 1999, a few relevant facts may have to be noticed leading to the filing of this application.

3. The respondents herein claiming themselves to be the true and absolute owners of the land admeasuring Ac.3.98 cents in Sy.No. 449/5A2C2 situated in Kanigiri Town and Mandal, Prakasam District (for short 'the said land') filed the writ petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking appropriate directions as against the petitioners herein to initiate proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') and pay compensation in respect of the said land. The case set up by them is that the 2nd petitioner issued notification under Section 4(1) of the Act vide his proceedings dated 30.11.1985 proposing to acquire an extent of Ac. 13.84 cents including the said land belonging to the respondents in Sy.No. 449/3 of Kanigiri Town for the purposes of providing house sites to the weaker sections of the society. Advance possession of the land was delivered to the beneficiaries on account of which the respondents-writ petitioners were dispossessed from the said land. Thereafter, the petitioners herein for whatever reason did not issue declaration as is required under Section 6 of the Act even though possession of the land had been taken over. No award has been passed within two years from the date of notification. Consequently, the notification dated 30.11.1985 had lapsed. It is further stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that adjoining the said land, another extent of Ac.8.88 cents was also sought to be acquired under the same notification for providing house sites to Girijans and Dommaras and also for construction of a Social Welfare Hostel. For one or the other reason, further proceedings could not be taken up for want of funds or change of procedure. It is asserted that the writ petitioners were dispossessed and the beneficiaries were put in possession of the said land. Thereafter, the 2nd petitioner herein issued another notification published in the A.P Gazette dated 23.2.1993 proposing to acquire an extent of Ac.9.86 cents of land in Sy.No. 449/3 by excluding the said land belonging to the respondents-writ petitioners. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act has also been issued and published and Award has been passed in respect of the remaining land vide Award dated 30.10.1993. Repeated representations were made requesting the petitioners herein to publish the draft notification and declaration under the provisions of the Act and to pass an award duly fixing the compensation. As no steps were taken, the writ petition has been filed by the respondents-writ petitioners.

4. The writ petition came up before a Division Bench of this Court and the same was disposed of at the admission stage vide order dated 11.6.1999 and the operative portion of the order reads as under:

'Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader, we direct the respondents to take steps to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and comply the other formalities like the notification under Section 6 of the Act followed by issuance of notifications under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act and make an award enquiry and pass the Award and also pay the compensation as may be determined, within a period of six (6) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.'

5. The petitioners herein filed a review petition along with a petition to condone the delay of 91 days in filing the review petition on 24.9.1999. The Division Bench by its order dated 22.9.2000 dismissed the application to condone the delay of 91 days in filing the review petition in the following manner:

'We do not find any plausible reasons for condoning the delay. Petition dismissed'.

6. Be it noted that a detailed affidavit has been filed in support of the application to condone the delay and the contents thereof which we shall refer to while adverting to the contentions urged before us.

7. Thereafter, the petitioners herein filed petitions for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court challenging the order dated 11.6.1999 made in W.P. No. 8939 of 1999 as well as the order dated 22.9.2000 made in W.P. M.P. No. 26957 of 1999 (petition to condone the delay in filing the review petition). The Supreme Court rejected both the special leave petitions vide its order dated 16.7.2001 in the following manner:

'The Special leave petitions are dismissed both on the ground of delay and merits'.

8. Thus, the proceedings in the Supreme Court came to an end and finally stood terminated vide the orders referred to above. Thereafter, the present application has been filed by the petitioners on 27.4.2002 with the following prayer:

'For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to recall the order of the Division Bench dated 11.6.1999 in W.P No. 8939 of 1999 and pass such other or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case'.

9. In the affidavit filed in support of the application filed by the petitioners, it is stated that the respondents-writ petitioners were guilty of fraudulent conduct and the orders obtained by them being vitiated by fraud, cannot be permitted to stand and must be recalled. The judgment now sought to be recalled was secured by the respondents-writ petitioners through fraudulent conduct. Chronology of events leading to filing of the present application is provided in the affidavit itself. The chronology of events inter alia reveals that the respondents-writ petitioners presented a sale deed for registration on the stamps purchased on 2.11.1993. The document purported to be the sale deed is executed by 32 persons being Nayee Brahmins and their descendants to whom pattas were granted under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. According to the petitioners, the recitals in the document are patently dishonest. It wrongly declared that the consideration for the sale has been paid on 12.1.1987 i.e., nearly seven years earlier and possession had been handed over to them then itself. The second important false statement was that the land contained no structures. The sale deed which was initially impounded was later on registered after payment of deficit stamp duly of Rs. 39,798/ - under Section 42 of the Indian Stamp Act. Thereafter, a representation was made by the respondents-writ petitioners on 18.8.1997 inter alia stating that they purchased the same from one Paluri Sivaiah and 31 others under registered sale deed dated 2.11.1993. In the representation, it is recited that the persons who were in possession were granted certificate of possession although this fact is wrongly twisted to make it appear that those encroachers got into possession only recently, while they were in possession since 1972.

10. That on 20.3,1998, acting on the representation made by the respondents-writ petitioners, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Kanigiri submitted proposals for acquisition of the said land duly mentioning the Nayee Brahmins as the pattedars and enjoyers. But the said proposals were not published. That on 11.9.1998, the Superintendent of the Mandal Revenue Office, Kanigiri himself mischievously and without authority of law put up the proposals to the Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer, Kanigiri for approval of acquisition of the said land duly mentioning as if the respondents-writ petitioners are pattedars and enjoyers. The proposals emanated at the instance of the respondents-writ petitioners. These proposals ignored the admitted facts that the land was awarded and occupied and the occupants have built up the houses and the pattas under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Occupants of Homesteads (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Homesteads Act') were already granted. That after making proper enquiry, the Mandal Revenue Officer on 22.3.1999 had taken up the question of regularizing the encroachments in the said land and the enquiry made in this regard revealed that the encroachers had been in possession of the property since 1972 and they have also put up structures on the lands and they have been given possession certificates earlier in 1993 itself. The 2nd petitioner herein on the basis of the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 25.3.1999 accepted the proposal of the Mandal Revenue Officer and accordingly by his order dated 31.3.1999 directed regularization of the encroachments under the Homesteads Act. That on 8.4.1999, the encroachments were accordingly regularized and ownership certificates were approved under the Homesteads Act by the Mandal Revenue Officer and he distributed pattas to 146 residents, each of whom was in possession. A layout was prepared by the Revenue Department. The Panchayat provided amenities like internal roads etc.

11. Sri T. Anantha Babu, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the facts that are stated in the affidavit filed in support of the present application reveal not only the fraud but virtually a conspiracy hatched by the respondents-writ petitioners to get the land compulsorily acquired which was never in their possession and at any rate, from whom the possession had never been taken over by the petitioners. Learned Advocate-General submitted that none of these facts mentioned hereinabove find place in the affidavit filed by the respondents-writ petitioners in support of the writ petition. This Court without directing any rule nisi and notice to the petitioners herein disposed of the writ petition at the admission stage depriving the petitioners herein of their legitimate right to file counter and oppose the writ petition for grant of any relief whatsoever. The sum and substance of the submissions made by the learned Advocate General is that the order passed by this Court is the result of fraud played and perpetuated by the petitioners. Learned Advocate General pressed three important factors into service in support of the plea of fraud played by the respondents-writ petitioners. Firstly, that the respondents-writ petitioners kept quiet ever since 1985 when the notification proposing to acquire the and in question alleged to have been issued and possession was taken over even prior to the said notification. The writ petition filed in the year 1999 is grossly barred by limitation, if not hit by laches. Secondly, pattas were granted under the provisions of the Homesteads Act to the persons in possession even on 8.4.1999, which the respondents-writ petitioners were aware as is evident from the fact that they have challenged the same in W.P. No. 10693 of 1999. That another fact pressed into service is that the Court committed mistake in accepting the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition in disposing of the writ petition at the admission stage.

12. Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the present application filed by the petitioners herein with a prayer to recall the order. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is no distinction in law between the review and recall of the order. That after dismissal of the special leave petitions filed by the petitioners herein, it is not open for this Court to reopen the proceedings for its consideration in any manner whatsoever, be it in a petition to review or recall the order. Learned Senior Counsel contended that Courts cannot put Damocles sword hanging on the head of any litigant in perpetuity. The proceedings initiated by an aggrieved party have to come to an end and attain finality. Learned Senior Counsel while not quarrelling with the proposition 'fraud unravels everything' submitted that attainment of finality of the orders passed by the Court is also a matter of public policy. It is contended that if such applications are entertained for consideration of the Court, there will be no end to the litigation between the parties. Learned Senior Counsel also contended that the very grounds stated in the present application were stated not only in the review petition filed by the petitioners herein but also in the special leave petitions filed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in its discretion and wisdom dismissed the special leave petitions and this Court cannot presume that the grounds raised in the special leave petitions were ignored and not taken into consideration by the Supreme Court.

13. Learned Advocate-General, however, contended that in public law remedies, the Court's jurisdiction is unlimited and whenever it comes to its notice that fraud has been played by any party to the proceedings, the Court in its discretion even suo motu is entitled to recall the order.

14. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made during the course of hearing of this application.

15. The important question that falls for consideration is whether the present application filed to recall the order dated 11.6.1999 is maintainable after dismissal of special leave petitions filed by the very petitioners by the Supreme Court ?

16. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 SC 1780, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question as to the effect of dismissal of the special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order. It was observed thus:

'the effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal of a special leave petition without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to be that this Court had decided only that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted. This conclusion may have been reached by this Court due to several reasons. When the order passed by this Court was not a speaking one, it is not correct to assume that this Court had necessarily decided implicitly all the questions in relation to the writ proceeding is a wholly different and distinct proceeding. Questions which can be said to have been decided by this Court expressly, implicitly or even constructively while dismissing the special leave petition cannot, of course, be re-opened in a subsequent writ proceeding before the High Court. But neither on the principle of res judicata nor on any principle of public policy analogous thereto, would the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition operate to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding namely, the writ proceeding before the High Court merely on the basis of an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided by this Court at least by implication'

17. It was a case where the appellant therein challenged the Award of the Industrial Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India by filing a special leave petition, which was dismissed by a non-speaking order. Thereafter, the appellant approached the High Court by preferring a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash the same Award of the Labour Court. The High Court took the view that the dismissal in limine by the Supreme Court of the special leave petition filed against the Award by a non-speaking order precluded the appellant therein from challenging the said Award before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, It is under those circumstances, the said observations were made by the Supreme Court.

18. In Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhamuaran, : AIR1999SC1486 , a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that the High Court had no power or jurisdiction to review the self-same order which was the subject-matter of challenge in SLPs after the challenge had failed. The Supreme Court strongly disapproved the practice of the High Courts reviewing their own orders even after the dismissal of the special leave petitions filed challenging the very order against which special leave petitions were filed and dismissed by the Supreme Court. In the said case, the Rent Controller ordered eviction of the appellant therein in an eviction petition filed by the respondents on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the premises. The appellate authority set aside the order of the Rent Controller on some grounds with which we are not concerned. That challenging the said order, a revision petition in the High Court was filed and the High Court by order dated 7.1.1987 dismissed the revision petition confirming the view of the appellate authority. That against the said order of the High Court, special leave petitions were filed. The appellant therein appeared on caveat in the Supreme Court. Both sides were represented and after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the special leave petitions were dismissed on 16.9.1987. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions, respondents filed review petition in the High Court seeking review of the order dismissing the revision petitions. There was also a delay of 221 days in filing the review petitions in the High Court after the dismissal of the special leave petitions. The High Court not only condoned the delay of 221 days but also reviewed the earlier orders, reversed the orders made in the revision petitions and allowed the revision petitions and ordered eviction of the tenants-appellants. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants went before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed thus:

'The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the self-same order had been dismissed by this Court after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, to say the least, was not proper'.

19. That another three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Kunhay Ammed v. State of Kerala, : [2000]245ITR360(SC) , after an elaborate consideration of the matter, it was held that on dismissal of a special leave petition without giving any reason, the main judgment of the High Court does not merge with the order of the Supreme Court, and, therefore, the order of the Supreme Court does not constitute res judicata in case a special leave petition is filed against the order passed in the review petition against the main judgment of the High Court. The Supreme Court after referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in Abbai Maligai's case (supra), observed :

'The underlying logic attaching efficacy to an order of the Supreme Court dismissing SLP after hearing Counsel for the parties is discernible from a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran. In the matter of eviction proceeding initiated before the Rent Controller, the order passed therein was subject to appeal and then revision before the High Court. Special leave petitions were preferred before the Supreme Court where the respondents were present on caveat. Both the sides were heard through the Senior Advocates representing them. The special leave petitions were dismissed. The High Court thereafter entrained review petitions which were highly belated and having condoned the delay reversed the orders made earlier in civil revision petitions. The orders in review were challenged by filing appeals under leave granted on special leave petitions. This Court observed that what was done by the learned Single Judge was 'subversive of judicial discipline'. The facts and circumstances of the case persuaded this Court to form an opinion that the tenants were indulging in vexatious litigations, abusing the process of the Court by approaching the High Court and the very entertainment of review petitions (after condoning the long delay of 221 days) and then reversing the earlier orders was an affront to the order of this Court. However the learned Judges deciding the case have nowhere in the course of their judgment relied on doctrine of merger for taking the view they have done. A careful reading of this decision brings out the correct statement of law and fortifies us in taking the view'.

20. That after review of the entire law on the subject, the Supreme Court summed up the conclusions as under:

(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.

(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal.

(iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter or challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, Tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.

21. Similar issue has once again fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court in K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy, : [2001]3SCR473 . The facts leading to the decision in K. Rajamouli's case (supra) may have to be briefly noticed in order to appreciate the principle laid down in the said decision! The Arbitrators appointed to resolve the dispute between the parties gave the Award on 11.7.1987 directing certain sums to be paid by the appellant therein to the respondent in three instalments. The respondent filed the suit with a prayer to grant decree in terms of Arbitration Award. The said suit was decreed. The decree did not provide for any pendente life interest. The decree holder put the decree in execution. In the execution proceedings, the decree holder claimed pendente lite interest. It was rejected by the executing Court. The decree holder thereafter filed a civil revision petition before the High Court against the order passed by the executing Court which was dismissed by the High Court. The decree holder thereafter filed another interlocutory application before the Trial Court for amendment of the decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure with a prayer to grant pendente lite interest. The trial Court rejected the application of the, decree holder against which the decree holder preferred a civil revision petition before the High Court. The High Court allowed the said revision petition and awarded interest to the decree holder by amending the decree of the Trial Court. The appellant therein filed a review petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the said review petition, the appellant herein filed a special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court dated 27.11.1992 on 10.1.1993. The Supreme Court summarily rejected the special leave petition without assigning any reasons. The appellant filed the review petition before the Supreme Court and the review petition was also dismissed. The High Court also dismissed the review petition. The appellant thereafter filed special leave petition against the order dated 7.2.1993 passed by the High Court rejecting the review petition. The Court granted leave and the special leave petition was converted into the civil appeal.

22. The Supreme Court after referring both the decisions in Abbai Maligai's case (supra) and Kunhay Ammed's case (supra) noticed that 'the decision in the case of Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm was distinguished on the ground that the question of merger of the judgment of the High Court with the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the special leave petition was not considered and further in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm the review petition was filed after a long delay of 221 days after the special leave petition was dismissed by the High Court which was held to be abuse of the process of law'. The Supreme Court following the decision in the case of Kunhay Ammed (supra) observed:

'we are of the view that the dismissal of the special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court would not constitute res judicata when a special leave petition is filed against the order passed in the review petition provided the review petition was filed prior to filing of special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court. The position would be different where after dismissal of the special leave petition against the main judgment a party files a review petition after a long delay on the ground that the party was prosecuting remedy by way of special leave petition. In such a situation the filing of review would be an abuse of the process of the law. We are in agreement with the view taken in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm that if the High Court allows the review petition filed after the special leave petition was dismissed after condoning the delay, it would be treated as an affront to the order of the Supreme Court. But this is not the case here'.

23. That a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of the judgment in K. Rajamouli's case (supra) rendered by the two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the Spl. Dy. Collector (LA) Steel Plant, Vizag and Anr. v. N. Gopalakrishnaiah and Ors., 2003 (1) Decision Today (AP) 490. In the said case, the writ petitioners therein filed a writ petition questioning the action of the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition in having issued memo dated 27.3.2002 as illegal and unconstitutional and prayed to quash the same with a consequential direction to issue a fresh notification for acquiring the land under the provisions of the Act. On a consideration of the submissions made on either side, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on 23.10.2002 and accordingly held that the entire land acquisition proceedings initiated under the notification dated 25.9.1989 are vitiated as the notification had lapsed by afflux of time. Consequently, a direction was issued for issuance of a fresh notification and to pass orders in accordance with law. The said judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge was challenged by the Special Deputy Collector in W.A. No. 533 of 2003, which was dismissed by the Division Bench on 3.4.2003. Against the decision in W.A No. 533 of 2003, the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition sought leave to appeal by filing Special Leave Appeal (Civil) No. 8326 of 2003. The said SLP was dismissed on 8.5.2003. After dismissal of the S.L.P. the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition on 13.6.2003 filed application seeking review of the judgment dated 3.4.2003 of the Division Bench, There was a delay in filing the review petition. As such, an application seeking condonation of delay of 41 days in preferring the review has also been filed. The ground seeking condonation of delay and as well as review was that as the Supreme Court has been approached to have the judgment of this Court set aside, but the S.L.P was dismissed by one line order, therefore, the Special Deputy Collector was advised to seek review of the judgment. That in a case where an order rejecting the S.L.P is passed without going into the merits, there is no merger and accordingly review would lie to the High Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kunhay Ammed's case (supra). It is under those circumstances, the review petition was filed with a prayer for condonation of delay urging that there were strong grounds on which there is likelihood of the judgment being reviewed in view of the settled legal position.

24. In the said case, the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the Special Deputy Collector, made similar submissions that were made before us by submitting that there were strong grounds on which the judgment delivered by the Bench in W.A. No. 533 of 2003 is liable to be reviewed, and, therefore, there is no reason that the Court will not exercise the power of review. The learned Advocate General appears to have submitted that even if the Court was of the view that the application seeking review for one reason or the other would not be maintainable or is barred by limitation, the Court is empowered to exercise its suo motu power to review the judgment. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kunhay Ammed's case (supra). That as in the present case, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents therein raised a preliminary objection as regards maintainability of the review petition after the dismissal of the S.L.P, apart from questioning the bona fides of the Special Deputy Collector in seeking to have the delay condoned. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Rajamouli's case (supra) in support of the submission that filing of the review petition after the SLP is dismissed would be an abuse of process of the law and if the High Court allows the review petition filed after the special leave petition has been dismissed after condoning the delay, it would be treated as an affront to the order of the Supreme Court.

25. The Division Bench in order to consider the question as to the maintainability of the review petition filed in the facts and circumstances even proceeded on the assumption that there is a very good case in favour of the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition on the basis of which the judgment rendered in WA No. 533 of 2003 would be liable to be reviewed and deserves to be reheard on merits. The Division Bench observed that in K. Rajamouli's case (supra), the Supreme Court having considered both the decisions, namely Kunhay Ammed's case (supra) and Abbai Maligai's case (supra), resolved the controversy saying that the dismissal of special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court would not constitute res judicata when a special leave petition against the order passed in the appeal provided review petition was filed prior to filing of special leave petition against the main judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that:

'but the position would be different where after dismissal of special leave petition against the main judgment, a party files a review petition with application seeking condonation of delay on the ground that the party was prosecuting remedy by way of special leave petition. It was held that such in a situation, filing of review would be an abuse of the process of law. Thus, the Supreme Court agreed with the view taken earlier in Abbai Maligai's case (supra) that if the High Court allows the review petition, filed after the special leave petition was dismissed after condoning the delay, it would be treated as an affront to the order of the Supreme Court. Distinction was drawn in those cases where review is sought along with an application for condonation of delay after dismissal of SLP holding that view as laid down in Abbai Maligai's case to be the correct one.

In the circumstances aforementioned, when the later decision of Supreme Court has analysed and explained the earlier two decisions on the point making out distinction, as pointed out above, there is no option left with us except to hold that it will not be permissible for us to entertain review application or to condone delay in filing the same. It will also not be permissible for us to exercise suo motu power of review even assuming that there is a good ground to review the order'.

26. However, the endeavour of the learned Advocate General is to convince us that the view of the Supreme Court in Kunhay Ammed's case (supra) decided by a Larger Bench of three Judges is that the main judgment of the High Court does not merge with the order of the Supreme Court where a SLP is dismissed without giving any reason, and, therefore, the order of the Supreme Court does not constitute res judicata and so the Smaller Bench which decided K. Rajamouli's case (supra) could not lay down a different proposition. We find it difficult to accept the submission as that Kunhay Ammed's case (supra) was specifically referred to and interpreted in K. Rajamouli's case (supra), it is not open to us to independently enquire into the question as to what is the exact ratio laid down in Kunhay Ammed's case (supra). In view of the clear proposition of law is enunciated by the Supreme Court after referring to its earlier decisions, it would not be open to this Court and in fact, we are precluded from resorting to any interpretative process for the purpose of ascertaining whether those propositions could logically emerge from the issues that fell for consideration before the latter Smaller Bench. Once the judgment rendered by a Larger Bench is understood by the latter Smaller Bench of the Supreme Court and ratio is culled out, under no circumstances it shall be open to this Court to make any further enquiry but to follow the latter Bench judgment

27. The facts in the instant case have already been noticed. The writ petition filed by the respondent-writ petitioners was allowed by this Court by its order dated 11.6.1999 directing the petitioners herein to take steps to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and comply with the other formalities and pass award and also pay compensation as may be determined within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. That a review petition was filed along with a petition to excuse the delay of 91 days. This Court by its order dated 22.9.2000 dismissed the petition to condone the delay resulting in dismissal of the review petition. That on 8.5.2001 special leave petitions were filed for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court against the dismissal of petition to condone the delay as well as the main order rendered in the writ petition dated 11.6.1999, The said special leave petitions were dismissed 'both on the ground of delay and merits'. The present application has been filed to recall the self-same order, which was the subject-matter of challenge in the SLPs in the Supreme Court and after the challenge had failed our considered opinion, no review petition or petition to recall could be maintained and in the facts and circumstances of the case, any order in this application may be affront to the order of the Supreme Court.

28. Learned Advocate-General, however, contended that this Court's power under Article 226 of the Constitution are plenary in nature and are not fettered by any legal constrains to correct its own mistake, The order can be rectified and recalled at any time to correct the miscarriage of justice.

In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, it was observed thus:

'Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to visualize the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And Clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review the order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, this Court has the inherent power to make such order as may be necessary in the interests of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice'.

29. We are required to notice that almost on the very self-same grounds, the petitioners herein have made an attempt to get the main order reviewed and having failed in their attempt, carried the matter to the Supreme Court by way of special leave petitions which were dismissed both on the ground of delay and merits. We cannot presume that this Court earlier while rejecting the petition to condone the delay did not look into the grounds which are selfsame as the one raised in the present application. Nor can we imagine that the Supreme Court did not advert itself to similar grounds raised in the special leave petitions. In the circumstances, if any, further exercise of power results in disturbing the finality of orders. In our considered opinion, the question is not one of jurisdiction but exercise of the same.

30. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition to recall the order dated 11-6-1999. The same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.