1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE28H DAY OF APRIL2016BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN WRIT PETITION No.14965/2016 (S-RES) BETWEEN : PROF. H. MAHESHAPPA S/O H. GONIBASAPPA, AGED ABOUT56YEARS, VICE-CHANCELLOR, VISVESVARAYA TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, (UNDER SUSPENSION) “JNANA SANGAMA”, BELAGAVI – 590018, PERMANENT RESIDENT OF NO9 PUTTENAHALLI, J.

P. NAGAR, 7TH PHASE, BENGALURU – 560078. ... PETITIONER R (BY SRI P. S. RAJAGOPAL, SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI S. R. DODAWAD, ADV.) AND:

1. THE HON’BLE GOVERNOR OF KARNATAKA CUM THE CHANCELLOR OF VISVESVARAYA TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, RAJ BHAVAN, BENGALURU – 560001, REP. BY ITS SECRETRY. VISVESVARAYA TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY “JNANA SANGAMA”, BELAGAVI – 590018, REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR.

2.

3. 2 THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPT. OF HIGHER EDUCATION (UNIVERSITY) M. S. BUILDINGS, BENGALURU – 560001. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI S. S. NAGANAND, SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI K. KRISHNA, ADV. FOR C/R1; SRI T. S. VENKATESH, ADV. FOR R2; SMT. PRATHIMA HONNAPURA, HCGP FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES226& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE NOTIFICATION DATED143.2016 ISSUED BY THE R-1 VIDE ANNEXURE-K AND ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING :

ORDER

Challenging the Notification (suspension order) dated 14.03.2016, passed by His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka, as the Chancellor of Visvesvaraya Technological University, Belgaum, whereby the petitioner, the Vice-Chancellor of the said University has been suspended, the petitioner has knocked at the doors of this court.

2. Briefly the facts of the case are that by a notification dated 30.06.2010 with effect from 02.07.2010, the petitioner, Prof. H. Maheshappa, was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the said University. The said appointment was for a 3 period of three years. However, prior to completion of the said tenure, by notification dated 21.06.2014, the petitioner’s term as the Vice-Chancellor was extended till 30.06.2016. During his tenure as the Vice-Chancellor, a large number of complaints were made with regard to the irregularities and illegalities committed by the University. Therefore, by order dated 19.12.2014, a One Man Fact Finding Committee, consisting of Justice Ajit J.

Gunjal, a retired Judge of this court, was constituted by the Chancellor of the University. However, subsequently as Mr.Justice Ajit J.

Gunjal expressed his inability to continue with the fact finding proceedings, by notification dated 08.05.2015, the Chancellor constituted another One Man Fact Finding Committee by invoking his powers under Section 11 (1) and (2) of the Visvesvaraya Technological University Act, 1994 (“the Act” for short). The Committee was of Mr.Justice K. N. Keshava Narayana, a retired Judge of this court. According to the notification, twenty-three points were referred to the Committee and the Committee was requested to not only enquire and report on these 4 twenty-three points, but was also requested to submit its recommendations within two months from the date of constitution of the Committee.

3. On 30.12.2015, the committee submitted its first interim report. Considering the contents of the report, considering the finding of the committee, by letter dated 21.01.2016, the Chancellor called upon the Vice-Chancellor, the petitioner, to submit his comments/explanation within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the letter. Since the first report did not cover all the points of reference, on 28.01.2016, the committee submitted a second report with regard to Ref. Point Nos. 25 to 28. Having received the second report on 03.02.2016, the Chancellor again issued another notice calling upon the petitioner to submit his comments/explanation with regard to the findings of the Committee.

4. By letter dated 05.03.2016, the petitioner sought an extensions of time for submitting his comments/explanation. By letter dated 10.03.2016, the Chancellor informed him that he is granted three days time i.e., till 13.03.2016 for 5 submitting his comments/explanation. According to the petitioner, the 12th and 13th March, 2016 were Saturday and Sunday and on 14th March, 2016, the petitioner was required to attend the Karnataka Education Summit and Awards 2016, a function organized by the University itself. Therefore, according to the petitioner, he was preoccupied with the said function, and, thus, could not tender his comments/explanation by 13.03.2016. Therefore, in the evening of 14.03.2016, the petitioner again sent another letter seeking extension of time till 17.03.2016. However, on 14.03.2016, the Chancellor issued the impugned order of suspension, thereby suspending the petitioner with immediate effect.

5. The petitioner did submit his explanation on 15.03.2016 before the Chancellor. He also submitted a representation, on the said date, requesting the Chancellor to revoke the suspension order dated 14.03.2016.

6. Having considered the explanation submitted by the petitioner, on 28.03.2016, the Chancellor wrote a letter to the Chief Minister, bringing it to his notice the facts 6 mentioned above and also bringing to his notice that under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, the procedure for enquiry, penalty and removal of the Vice-Chancellor has been prescribed. However, further action needs to be initiated by the State Government. Therefore, for taking necessary action, the Chancellor sent copies of several complaints, reports of the Committee, the notice issued to the petitioner, reply submitted by the petitioner, and the copy of suspension order. In furtherance of the letter dated 28.03.2016, the Chief Minister has informed the Chancellor by letter dated 04.04.2016, that he has also issued instructions to the Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education to initiate the necessary action immediately as per Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. Hence, this petition before this court.

7. Although the letter dated 28.03.2016 and the letter dated 04.04.2016 have not been expressly challenged before this court in the writ petition, but during the course of argument, Mr. P. S. Rajagopal, the learned Senior Counsel 7 for the petitioner has requested that this court should also deal with these two letters mentioned above.

8. Mr. P. S. Rajagopal, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 14.03.2016 on the following pleas :- Firstly, although the Chancellor may be the head of the University, as contemplated under Section 11 of the Act, but he cannot act as an unbridled horse. As the Chancellor himself is a creation of a statute. His powers have been defined by the Act. Therefore, he is required to act within the four corners of the law. Secondly, according to the Notification dated 08.05.2015, the Chancellor had claimed that he is invoking his power under Section 11 (1) and (2) of the Act. However, the said provisions, do not bestow any power upon the Chancellor to constitute a Committee. Therefore, the very constitution of the Committee was an illegal one. Thirdly, under Sections 9 and 13 (4B) of the Act, the power to constitute a One Man Fact Finding Committee is bestowed only upon the State Government, and not upon the 8 Chancellor of the University. Therefore, the very constitution of the Committee by the Notification dated 08.05.2015 is de hors the law. Fourthly, the constitution of the Committee was challenged by the Registrar of the University before this court in a writ petition, namely W.P.No.60592/2014. By order dated 27.02.2015, the said writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The Registrar had filed a writ appeal, namely W.A.No.100143/2015 before the learned Division Bench of this court. By judgment dated 24.04.2015, the learned Division Bench has opined that the Committee is deemed to have been constituted under Section 9 of the Act. Fifthly, Section 9 of the Act, itself bestows a pivotal role on the Vice-Chancellor. For, Section 9 (7) clearly lays down that “the State Government shall direct the Vice- Chancellor to initiate such an action as has been directed by the State Government with respect to findings in the report of enquiry or inspection.” Therefore, the findings given by the Committee, constituted under Section 9 of the Act, could not 9 have formed the basis for passing of the suspension order against the petitioner. Sixthly, Section 13 of the Act, as amended in 2014, contains the procedure for removal of the Vice-Chancellor in furtherance of a contemplated disciplinary enquiry. The learned Senior Counsel has argued that even the power to suspend would have to be read in the light of Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. Since the power of removal bestowed upon the Chancellor is to be exercised only on the advise of the State Government, therefore, even the power to suspend can be exercised only upon the advise of the State Government. However, the State Government has never advised the Chancellor to suspend the petitioner. Therefore, the Chancellor was not justified in invoking his power of suspension. Seventhly, according to the impugned order dated 14.03.2016, the Chancellor has invoked his power under Section 11 and 13 of the Act read with the General Clauses Act. However, according to the learned Senior Counsel, Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, cannot be 10 invoked once there is a specific provision contained in the University Act itself. Hence, the Chancellor is not justified in claiming that the suspension order is being passed under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. In order to buttress this plea this plea, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Shrimati Hira Devi and Others v. District Board, Shahjahapur through the Collector [ AIR1952SC362. Eighthly, even if Section 16 of the of the General Clauses Act could be invoked, for the sake of argument, even then, the power to suspend cannot be undefined. Perforce, it has to be exercised within the four corners of the law. Ninthly, in the two reports submitted by the Committee, the Committee did not recommend that action needs to be taken against the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the finding of the Committee could not form the basis of the suspension order. Tenthly, suspension is an interim measure in the aid of disciplinary procedure. Thus, suspension is generally passed either when a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated, or a criminal proceeding has commenced 11 against the delinquent officer. Relying on the case of Union of India and Another v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [ (2013) 16 SCC147, the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that the power of suspension could not be exercised in an arbitrary manner, without any reasonable ground, or as vindictive misuse of power. The suspension order could be passed by the Chancellor only after considering the impact, the continuation of the Vice-Chancellor in his office would have upon the public interest. Before the said power can be invoked, there has to be a strong prima-facie case against the Vice-Chancellor. But, considering the fact that the Committee has not even recommended any action against him, no prima-facie case exist against the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the suspension order is an illegal one. Eleventhly, relying on the case of L. Murthy v. Commissioner of Transport [ ILR1986KAR3057, the learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued that before a suspension order could be passed, a departmental enquiry should be “contemplated”. However, on 14.03.2016, no departmental enquiry was contemplated against the 12 petitioner. Therefore, the suspension order has been passed in a most arbitrary manner. Hence, it deserves to be set aside by this court. Lastly, challenging the legality of the letter dated 28.03.2016, the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, it is for the State Government to decide, whether to initiate any proceeding for the removal of the Vice-Chancellor or not ?. Therefore, the Chancellor was not within his power to issue directions to the State Government to initiate the proceedings under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. Therefore, the letter dated 28.03.2016 is in violation of Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act.

9. On the other hand, Mr. S. S. Naganand, the learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.1, the Chancellor, has raised the following contentions before this court:- Firstly, Section 10 of the Act lists the officers of the University, namely the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor and others. Section 11 (1) of the Act clearly states that the Governor of the State of Karnataka shall by 13 virtue of his office be the Chancellor of the University. Thus, the Chancellor happens to be the highest constitutional authority of the State. Moreover, Section 11 (2) of the Act clearly states that the Chancellor shall be the Head of the University. According to Section 11 (4) of the Act, the Chancellor is empowered to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred on him by this Act or the Statutes. According to the learned Senior Counsel, being the Head of the University, the Chancellor, perforce, is required to look after and to protect the interest of the University. Since a pivotal role has been bestowed upon the Chancellor, he has certain inherent powers which he may invoke in order to protect the interest of the University. Secondly, the Chancellor had received a large number of complaints with regard to irregularities and illegalities committed by the University. These complaints not only pointed to certain procedures adopted by the University , which were violative of the Act, violative of the Government Orders and of other Laws of the State, but also revealed that 14 grave financial loss was caused to the University by the University Officers, including the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the malfunctioning of the University was a cause for concern for the Chancellor. Since under the Act, as the Head of the University, he is duty bound to protect the interest of the University, the Chancellor had no other option but to appoint a One Man Fact Finding Committee which would enquire into the complaints received by him. Therefore, by notification dated 08.05.2015, the Chancellor constituted a One Man Fact Finding Committee consisting of a retired judge of this court. Thirdly, when the constitution of the said Committee was challenged by the Registrar before this court, as mentioned above, the learned Division Bench did not hold that the Committee is deemed to be constituted under Section 9 of the Act. But, in fact, the learned Division Bench clearly opined that the Committee has been constituted under the inherent powers of the Chancellor. Therefore, the Chancellor not only had inherent power to constitute the 15 Committee, but most importantly, the finding of the Committee could form the basis for the suspension order. Fourthly, a distinction has to be made between a suspension and a removal. Although Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act deal with the power of removal, neither of these two provisions deal with the power of suspension. In fact, there is not a single provision provided under the Act which grants the power to suspend to the Chancellor. Since a specific provision has not been provided for, for the power to suspend in the Act, therefore the Chancellor was justified in invoking the power under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. Hence, the impugned order clearly refers to the General Clauses Act. Fifthly, it is unfair to say that the power is being exercised arbitrarily. For, the power is being exercised in order to protect the reputation and interest of the University. In order to substantiate the said plea, the learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this court to Ref. No.6 of the Committee’s Report. Ref. No.6 dealt with “Outsourcing of Examination Management System of the University at 16 Exorbitant Rates”. In its conclusion the Committee has clearly held that “before accepting the rate quoted by the sole tenderor, the matter should have been placed before the Technical Committee or before the Finance Committee and the tender ought to have been approved by the Executive Council. Even if the order of the Vice-Chancellor directing the issue of work order to the agencies treated as the one exercise of power under Section 14 (6) of the Act, the same ought to have been reported to the authority which ordinarily deals with such matters i.e., the Executive Council. However, the said procedure was never adopted.” According to the Senior Counsel, while dealing with Ref.No.7, it was pointed out that inadmissible payment of Rs.4193.34 Lakhs was made to the University College teaching staff by the Vice-Chancellor de hors the Government orders. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel, a strong prima-facie case does exist against the petitioner that he has not only abused his powers, but has indulged in certain questionable procedures. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, considering the categorical findings given by the 17 Committee, and in order to protect the reputation and the interest of the University, the Chancellor had no other option but to issue the impugned order. Sixthly, since the power to suspend is an inherent power of the Chancellor, the said power should neither be read as emanating from nor in the light of Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. Therefore, the procedure provided under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act cannot be read as procedure to be utilized before passing a suspension order. According to the learned Senior Counsel, if the interpretation given by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted by this court, it would tantamount to ignoring the plain language of and Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. Section 13 (4A) does not uses the words “shall not be suspended” in its language. But to accept the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner would, perforce, lead to substitution of the words “shall not be suspended” into Section 13 (4A) of the Act. Thus, this court would end up amending the Act – a power not bestowed upon this court. Therefore, according to the learned Senior 18 Counsel for respondent No.1, the power to suspend is an inherent power; the said power has been exercised by the Chancellor for legitimate ends. Seventhly, once the Chancellor had received the report of the Committee, even if the Chancellor wanted an enquiry to be initiated against the Vice-Chancellor, he could not have done so suo-moto. For, the power to initiate a proceeding against the Vice-Chancellor, for his removal, is bestowed upon the State Government and not upon the Chancellor. But, nonetheless, after going through the Committee’s report, further action had to be initiated. Therefore, the impugned order has used the words “pending contemplation of further action”. Considering the scope of Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, the only further action which could be contemplated by the Chancellor was to bring the reports to the notice of the State Government. By letter dated 28.03.2016, the Chancellor had brought the reports of the Committee, reply statement by the petitioner, notices issued to the petitioner etc., to the notice of the State Government. In fact, according to the letter dated 28.03.2016, it is only 19 after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner that the Chancellor had concluded that further action, under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, needs to be initiated. Hence, by writing the letter dated 28.03.2016, bringing the extent of irregularities, illegalities, and mismanagement prevailing in the University and committed by the Officers of the University, the Chancellor had merely acted in accordance with law. Therefore, there is nothing illegal about the letter dated 28.03.2016. Lastly, in response to the letter written by the Chancellor, the State Government, by letter dated 04.04.2016, has already decided to initiate the proceedings under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, and necessary instructions have been issued by the Chief Minister to the Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education. Therefore, according to the learned Senior counsel for respondent No.1, the impugned order is legally valid one, and does not call for any interference by this court.

10. Heard the learned counsel for parties, perused the impugned order and the records. 20 11. This case raises certain interesting legal issues for consideration of the court which are as under: Firstly, what is the role of the Chancellor under the Act ?. Secondly, whether the Chancellor has the power to appoint a One Man Fact Finding Committee or not ?. Thirdly, whether under the Act the Chancellor has the power to suspend the Vice-Chancellor or not ?. Fourthly, whether in the absence of clear provision in the Act, the Chancellor can claim an inherent power to suspend, and can invoke the said power under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act or not ?. Fifthly, whether the power to suspend is subject to the procedural requirements of Sections 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act ?. Sixthly, what are the circumstances under which the inherent power to suspend can be invoked by the Chancellor ?. 21 Seventhly, whether the impugned order dated 14.03.2016 falls within the circumstances under which the power of suspension could be invoked ?. Eighthly, whether the Chancellor was justified in invoking his power to suspend considering the facts of the case ?. Lastly, what relief can be granted by this court ?.

12. Undoubtedly, Section 11 of the Act, declares the Chancellor to be “the Head of the University”. Needless to say, the Head of the University is the patriarch of the University. As a patriarch, it is his moral and legal duty to safeguard the interest of the University, to ensure that the University is being run in accordance with not only the Act, but also in accordance with the he other laws of the State, and of the nation. It is for him to protect the reputation of the University. It is for him to ensure that the University is not being run in an inefficient and corrupt manner. And to say the least, it is for him to ensure that the University adheres to the Rule of Law. Thus, a vast responsibility has been bestowed upon the Chancellor. 22 13. The learned Senior Counsel for petitioner is not justified in claiming that in the writ appeal filed by the University, namely the Registrar of Visvesvarayya Technological University v. The Chancellor [Writ Appeal No.110143/2015 dated 24.04.2015]., the learned Division Bench had opined that the Committee, which has given the report in the present case, is deemed to have been constituted by the Chancellor under Section 9 of the Act. A bare perusal of the judgment dated 24.04.2015 passed by the learned Division Bench clearly reveals that the learned Division Bench was of the opinion that “in his capacity as the Head of the University and in the light of the provisions adverted to above, the Chancellor does have inherent power to find out the truth or otherwise made in the management of the University. Therefore, the Chancellor would be well within his powers to appoint a Committee to enquire into the alleged mismanagement, irregularities and illegalities committed by the University”. Therefore, the issue, whether the Chancellor has the power to constitute a Committee is no longer res integra in the light of the opinion expressed by the 23 learned Division Bench in the aforementioned case. Therefore, the Chancellor constituted the Committee by invoking his inherent power.

14. According to Section 13 (2) of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor of the University. Hence, the power to appoint would necessarily include the power to suspend. Thus, the Chancellor would have the power to suspend the Vice-Chancellor as well.

15. Sections 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act are as under : “[(4A) The Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of willful omission or refusal to carry out the provisions of this Act or for abuse of the powers vested in him and on the advice tendered by the State Government on consideration of the report of an inquiry ordered by it under sub-section (4B). (4B) For the purposes of holding an inquiry under this section, the State Government shall appoint a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. The inquiry authority shall hold the inquiry after giving an opportunity to make representation by the Vice- 24 Chancellor and shall submit a report to the State Government on the action to be taken including penalty if any to be imposed, and the State Government Shall on consideration of the report advice the Chancellor. The Chancellor shall act in accordance with such advice.].” 16. Although the learned Senior counsel for petitioner has pleaded that the Act contains a specific provision bestowing the power of suspension upon the Vice- Chancellor, he has failed to point out any such specific provision in the Act. He has merely pleaded that the power to remove contained in Section 13 (4A) of the Act would by inference include the power to suspend the Vice-Chancellor. However, the said plea is unacceptable as there is a distinction between suspension and removal. Hence, the Act does not contain any specific provision, which bestows the power of suspending the Vice-Chancellor upon the Chancellor. Although the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that the power to suspend should be read in the light of Section 25 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, the said submission is unacceptable: Firstly, in case a provision is unambiguous, it should be read in its plain and grammatical meaning. Sub-section 4A of Section 13 of the Act is unambiguous as it deals only with the power of removal of the Vice-Chancellor, but does not deal with his suspension. Therefore, to accept the interpretation submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would tantamount to substituting the words “Vice-Chancellor shall not be suspended” before the words “be removed from his office”. Secondly, this court does not have the power to amend the law. Thirdly, to amend Sub-section 4A of Section 13 would be to do violence to the said provision. Therefore this court has to accept Section 13 (4A) and (4B) in its plain and grammatical meaning. Thus, these provisions are limited only to the power of removal, and do not extend to the power to suspend. 26 17. Since Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act are unconcerned with the power to suspend the Vice-Chancellor, the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel that the procedure laid down by the said provision for removal should equally be accepted for suspending the Vice-Chancellor is clearly untenable. While Section 13 (4A) and (4B) place fetters on the power of the Chancellor to remove the Vice- Chancellor, the said provision do not limit the power of the Chancellor to suspend the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, this court would not be justified in reading the requirements of Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act and in holding that the Chancellor cannot suspend the Vice-Chancellor without the advise of the State Government.

18. A bare perusal of the provision clearly reveal that, it is the State Government which has been bestowed with the power to appoint a person, to enquire into the working of the Vice-Chancellor, and it is for the State Government to consider the report of the Committee and to advise the Chancellor accordingly. According to Sub-section (4A) of Section 13 of the Act, the Chancellor can remove the 27 Vice-Chancellor only upon the advice of the State Government. Thus, even these two provisions do not bestow the power of suspension upon the Chancellor.

19. The above discussion makes it amply clear that the Act does not bestow the power to suspend upon the Chancellor by any of its provisions. According to Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, the authority having the power to appoint also have the power to suspend. Therefore, Section 16 of the General Clauses Act bestows an inherent power to suspend, on the appointing authority. Since the Chancellor is, indeed, the appointing authority, therefore, he has inherent power to suspend the Vice-Chancellor under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. Hence, the Chancellor was justified in invoking his power under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, while passing the impugned order.

20. The question is not merely confined to the existence of the power, the issue, in fact, moves further to the exercise of power. The issue is, under what circumstances, can the power to suspend be invoked by the Chancellor ?. Although in service jurisprudence the power to 28 suspend is cribbed, cabined and confined to merely two circumstances, namely when a departmental enquiry is contemplated, or the delinquent officer faces a criminal proceeding. But considering the fact that the Chancellor has been saddled with great responsibilities of looking after the welfare of the University, the power of suspension can also be invoked in order to protect the reputation and interest of the University. The said power purposefully has been bestowed on a constitutional post holder. It would not be fair to say that merely because the Chancellor is trying to protect the University, he is exercising the power in an arbitrary manner. The exercise of his power would have necessarily to be examined in the facts and circumstances of each case, in order to conclude whether the power has been exercised legally or illegally.

21. Since the reports submitted by the Committee are not under challenge before this court, since the reports may form the basis for any action contemplated against the petitioner, this court refrains from expressing any opinion about the contents of the finding of the committee. 29 22. In the case of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), while the Hon’ble Supreme Court had warned that the power of suspension should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner, and without any reasonable ground, or as a vindictive misuse of power, but it had defined certain circumstances in which the said power could be invoked: before passing the suspension order, the competent authority, according to the Apex Court, is duty bound to consider the gravity of the alleged misconduct, i.e., serious act of omission, or commission, and the nature of evidence available. It should also consider whether a strong prima-facie case exists against the delinquent, and if the charges were proved, whether it would entail ordinarily imposition of major punishment, i.e., removal or dismissal from service ?. The authority should also consider the issues as to what would be the impact, in the minds of the public, if the delinquent officer were continued in the office while facing a departmental inquiry, or a criminal charge?. It should also consider the possibility that the delinquent 30 officer may misuse his presence in the office to derail the contemplated departmental enquiry.

23. The learned Senior Counsel for petitioner has harped on the fact that the Committee never recommended that any action, much less a suspension order, should be passed against the petitioner. But a bare perusal of the Reference made to the Committee, clearly reveals that the Committee was required to look into the irregularities, illegalities and mismanagement being committed in the University. It was not required to recommend about the action which may be taken against the delinquent officers, including the Vice- Chancellor. It is for this reason that the Committee did not make any recommendation with regard to the possible action to be taken against the Vice-Chancellor. Moreover, considering the fact that any action to be taken against the Vice-Chancellor is within the power of the State Government, or of the Chancellor, the Committee has refrained from expressing its opinion with regard to the action that may be taken against the Vice-Chancellor. But mere lack of recommendation by the Committee would not 31 rob the Chancellor of his inherent power to suspend the Vice- Chancellor. Therefore, lack of recommendation on the part of the Committee does not buttress the case of the petitioner.

24. Moreover, a bare perusal and that too, a passing glimpse of the Committee Report does indicate that not only the University and its officers, but even the Vice-Chancellor has violated the Government Orders, some of the laws prevailing in the State, which has led to grave financial loss for the University. The term used by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), is “a strong prima-facie case against the delinquent officer”. The word ‘prima-facie’ is a common term in law, which merely means that the needle of suspension should point to the act or omission allegedly committed by the delinquent person. Although this court refrains from giving any judicial finding about the contents of the Committee’s Report, but a bare perusal of the Committee’s Report does indicate that there is a needle of suspension which points to the irregularities, illegalities and mismanagement committed by the Officers of 32 the University, including the Vice-Chancellor. Once there is a strong prima-facie case against the Vice-Chancellor, in order to protect the reputation and interest of the University, the Chancellor was certainly justified in passing the impugned order.

25. To a limited extent, the learned Senior Counsel for petition may be justified in contending that on 14.03.2016, no departmental enquiry was contemplated against the petitioner. However, the question is whether the Chancellor has the power to initiate a departmental enquiry against the Vice-Chancellor or not?. Under Sections 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act, the power to initiate a proceeding for the removal of the Vice-Chancellor is bestowed upon the State Government and not on the Chancellor. As the patriarch of the University, the Chancellor could only request the State Government to initiate the proceedings, but by himself, he could not start a departmental enquiry against the Vice- Chancellor. Moreover, as the Head of the University, and as laid down in the case of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), he could only deal with the issues, whether continuation of 33 the Vice-Chancellor would adversely affect the image of the University or not?. Whether the continuation of the Vice-Chancellor would give ample opportunities to the Vice-Chancellor to derail the contemplated departmental enquiry or not ?. Therefore, considering these two aspects of the case, and considering the limited power with which the Chancellor is bestowed, the Chancellor was certainly justified in invoking his inherent power to suspend the petitioner.

26. The logical consequence of suspending the petitioner would be to initiate further proceedings against him. After all, the petitioner could not be kept in an animated suspension till the end of his tenure, till 30th June, 2016. For, having considered the Committee’s Report, having examined the reply submitted by the petitioner, the Chancellor came to the conclusion that the proceedings need to be initiated by the State Government, by invoking its powers under Sections 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. Therefore, the Chancellor was certainly justified in not only requesting the State Government to initiate the proceeding, but also in 34 sending the relevant documents for consideration of the State Government by letter dated 28.03.2016. Since the letter dated 28.03.2016 is merely a logical corollary of his act of having suspended the Vice-Chancellor, the letter dated 28.03.2016 is legally valid. Lastly, considering the findings of the Committee’s Report, considering the fact that needle of suspicion does point to the Vice-Chancellor, the State Government is legally justified in issuing directions for initiating the proceedings under Section 13 (4A) and (4B) of the Act. For, the findings of the Committee have to be taken to its logical conclusion. Thus, the letter dated 04.04.2016 is legally valid.

27. To conclude, this court does not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 14.03.2016, or in the letters dated 28.03.2016 and 04.04.2016. For the reasons stated above, this court does not find any merit in the present writ petition. It is, hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Np/- Sd/- JUDGE