

Committee of Management and anr. Vs. State of U.P. and ors.

Committee of Management and anr. Vs. State of U.P. and ors.

SooperKanoon Citation : sooperkanoon.com/492295

Court : Allahabad

Decided On : Aug-01-2005

Reported in : 2005(4)ESC2474

Judge : B.S. Chauhan and ;Dilip Gupta, JJ.

Acts : [National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993](#) - Sections 14, 14(6) and 18; Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 - Sections 28(5) and 37(2); Uttar Pradesh State Universities (Amendment) Act, 2004; University Grant Commision Act - Sections 3, 3(3) and 22

Appeal No. : C.M.W.P. No. 6791 of 2005

Appellant : Committee of Management and anr.

Respondent : State of U.P. and ors.

Advocate for Def. : Neeraj Tripathi and ;Pankaj Mittal, Advs. and ;S.C.

Advocate for Pet/Ap. : Ravi Kiran Jain and ;Shamim Ahmad, Advs.

Disposition : Petition dismissed

Judgement :

1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 19.1.2005 which has been passed by the Chancellor of the Bhim Rao Ambedkar University, Agra (hereinafter referred to as the 'University') and for a direction upon the

respondents to treat the affiliation granted to the Institution by the earlier orders dated 7.11.1998 and 30.10.2002 as permanent affiliation w.e.f. 1.7.2002 and restrain the respondents from interfering with the continuance of the B.Ed. Course in the Institution.

2. The Faiz-E-Aam Modern Degree College, Mathura is affiliated to the University. In order to impart education in the B.Ed. Course it sought recognition from the Regional Committee under the provisions of Section 14 of the [National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993](#) (hereinafter referred to as the 'NCTE Act') and in this context a communication dated 21.8.1998 was sent by the Northern Regional Committee of NCTE to the College granting recognition to B.Ed, one year course from the academic session 1998-99 with annual intake of 60 students. It was also specifically mentioned in the letter that the recognition was subject to the condition that the Institution shall continue to fulfil the norms laid down under the Regulations and shall submit the annual report in this regard. After having obtained the aforesaid recognition, the College also approached the University for granting affiliation to the B.Ed. Course and by a communication dated 7.11.1998, the University was informed by the office of the Chancellor that temporary affiliation for a period of three-years w.e.f. 1.7.1998 had been granted to the College under Section 37 (2) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Universities Act'). Accordingly, the College admitted students to the B.Ed. Course. However, by the order dated 23.7.1999 the Regional Committee withdrew the recognition under Section 14 of the NCTE Act. This order was challenged by the College by filing an appeal under Section 18 of the NCTE Act before the National Council for Teacher Education (hereinafter referred to as the 'Council'). This appeal was dismissed by the Council on 7.7.2000 but against the said order a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 30533 of 2000 was filed which was ultimately allowed on 21.10.2003 and the orders dated 23.7.1999 and 7.7.2000 were quashed. The matter was remanded to the Council to decide afresh.

3, In the meantime, as the temporary affiliation granted to the College in respect of B.Ed. Course was expiring on 30.6.2001, an order dated 30.10.2001 was sent from the office of the Chancellor of the University extending the temporary affiliation for a period of one year w.e.f. 1.7.2001. The said extension was,

however, subject to the four conditions stipulated in the order, which are as follows :

(a) If the College has not obtained the recognition from NCTE for the academic session 2001-02, then the extension granted shall automatically come to an end,

(b) The College shall comply with the directions contained in the Government Orders issued from time to time regarding the admission, fees, appointment of teachers etc. and the University shall ensure compliance of the Government Orders.

(c) The College shall comply with the requirements stipulated in the First Statute of the University relating to temporary affiliation.

(d) The College shall remove the defects pointed out by the Inspection Panel.

4. On 14.1.2004 the Council allowed the Appeal filed by the College and reversed the order dated 23.7.1999 of the Northern Regional Committee. The Chancellor of the University also considered the extension of temporary affiliation to the B.Ed. Course which stood expired on 30.6.2002 but by the order dated 19.1.2005, rejected the same.

5. In the impugned order dated 19.1.2005 the Chancellor of the University has noticed that the term of the temporary affiliation earlier granted expired on 30.6.2002 and for extension of the same for the academic session 2002-03 neither the University had sent any proposal to the Chancellor of the University and nor had the State Government sent any recommendation and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Chancellor to consider the grant of extension in the temporary affiliation for the session 2002-03. The Chancellor also noticed that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court on 14.10.2004 in Writ Petition No. 41021 of 2004 the University had made an inspection of the College and submitted its report dated 22.12.2004 before the Chancellor. In the said report the University had not made any recommendation for extension of affiliation to the B.Ed. Course in the College and it had merely submitted the report for taking necessary action. The Chancellor of the University has further observed in the impugned order that the

inspection report submitted by the University reveals the following facts :

- (a) the College was running in the campus of the Intermediate College though it had a separate building,
- (b) the College was running from July, 2002 to January, 2004 without any recognition from the Regional Committee constituted under the NCTE Act merely on the basis of the interim order granted by this Court,
- (c) the College did not have the required Library, Laboratory and Playground as was expected from a College which had been running for five years,
- (d) the College did have a Hostel but it was not satisfactory,
- (e) the College had not employed qualified Teachers during the last five years and neither the teachers had been duly selected and approved the University,
- (f) even without there being any affiliation for the academic session 2003-04 the College had admitted students which amounted to gross indiscipline.

6. The impugned order further shows that in the academic session 2003-04 the College had admitted such students who had not even appeared at the Entrance Examination conducted by the University for the purposes of admission to the B.Ed. Course and, in fact, it had admitted students on its own. The University, therefore, did not hold any Examination for such students.

7. It is in these circumstances that the Chancellor of the University did not grant any retrospective extension in the temporary affiliation to the B.Ed. Course of the College. It is this order dated 19.1.2005 which has been impugned in the present petition.

8. We have heard Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners assisted by Sri Shamim Ahmad. Learned Standing Counsel has appeared for respondent No. 1 while Sri Neeraj Tripathi has appeared for respondent No. 2 and Sri Pankaj Mittal, learned Counsel has appeared for respondent No. 3.

9. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5881 of 2002, Committee of Management v. Chancellor and Ors., the Chancellor of the University should not have granted time bound temporary affiliation. He further submitted that in view of the various provisions contained in the NCTE Act and the Universities Act, it was obligatory on the part of the Chancellor of the University to have granted affiliation to the B.Ed. Course in the College once the Regional Committee had granted recognition to the B.Ed. Course of the College under the provisions of the NCTE Act and that in any view of the matter, the order passed by the Chancellor of the University is arbitrary and is liable to be quashed by this Court.

10. Sri Neeraj Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Chancellor of the University and Sri Pankaj Mittal, learned Counsel appearing for the University, however, submitted that after the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5881 of 2002 on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, a proviso to Section 37 (2) of the Universities Act was inserted by U.P. Act No. 1 of 2004 w.e.f. 11.7.2003 which provides that if in the opinion of the Chancellor, a College fulfils the conditions of affiliation, the Chancellor may grant sanction of affiliation to that College or enlarge the privileges thereof in specific subjects for one term of a Course of study on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit. They further submitted that mere recognition of the B.Ed. Course by the Regional Committee constituted under the NCTE Act does not automatically entitle the College to claim affiliation from the Chancellor as a matter of right because such affiliation is granting by the Chancellor under Section 37 (2) of the Universities Act when the College fulfils the conditions enumerated under the provisions of the Act, Statutes and the Ordinances of the University. It was also submitted that the order of the Chancellor does not suffer from any infirmity and that the Chancellor was justified in refusing to grant retrospective affiliation w.e.f. 1.7.2002 since the report of the Inspection Panel had pointed out various infirmities of serious nature, which could not have been ignored.

11. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and have examined the materials available on record.

12. The first contention of Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners is that in view of the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5881 of 2002 the Chancellor was not justified in earlier granting temporary affiliation to the B.Ed. Course of the College, and, therefore, the earlier affiliation granted on 7.11.1998 for a period of three years should be taken as permanent affiliation instead of temporary affiliation. In reply, learned Counsel for the respondents have submitted that the judgment delivered by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition was prospective in nature since in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment the direction was given that in future if an application for affiliation is made by any College or Institution, then either permanent affiliation should be granted or the application should be rejected but there should not be any temporary affiliation and further after the aforesaid judgment was delivered, Section 37 (2) of the Act was amended by adding a proviso which empowers the Chancellor of the University to grant affiliation for one term of a course of study on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit.

13. From the records, we find that while considering the case of the College for extension of the temporary affiliation to the B.Ed. Course w.e.f. 1.7.2001 the Chancellor of the University by his order dated 30.10.2001 extended the temporary affiliation for a period of one year after imposing four conditions to which have referred to above. The decision relied upon by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners has no application to the facts of the present case because the Chancellor of the University had not granted any temporary affiliation after the decision was given by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. As seen above by the said decision, the Court merely directed that in future if an application for affiliation was made by any College or Institution, then either permanent affiliation should be granted or rejected but no temporary affiliation should be granted. In any view of the matter once the proviso to Section 37 (2) of the Act was inserted by U.P. Act No. 1 of 2004 w.e.f. 11.7.2003, the Chancellor could grant temporary affiliation for one term of a Course.

14. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners then submitted that once the recognition had been granted by the Regional Committee constituted under the NCTE Act, it was obligatory on the part of the Chancellor of the

University to have granted affiliation to the College in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 14(6) of the NCTE Act which provides that every Examining Body, on receipt of the order under sub-section (4) grant affiliation to the Institution where recognition has been granted.

15. Learned Counsel for the respondents, however, contended that in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 37(2) of the Universities Act, the Chancellor of the University could grant affiliation only if it fulfilled such conditions of affiliation as may be prescribed and these Conditions were stipulated in Chapter XII of the First Statutes of the University. He further submitted that even otherwise it was not open to the College to raise such a contention since while seeking affiliation, it had submitted the application under the provisions of the Universities Act. In the present case admittedly the College had taken resort to the provisions contained in the Universities Act and the First Statutes of the Universities while seeking affiliation to the B.Ed. Course. Even a perusal of the judgment and order dated 1.10.2004 in 'Writ Petition No. 41021 of 2004 filed by the petitioners clearly shows that the only contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners was that the Chancellor was bound to grant permanent affiliation in view of the judgment and order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 5881 of 2002. It was never the case set up by the petitioners before the Chancellor of the University that he was bound to grant affiliation in view of the recognition granted by the Regional Committee constituted under the NCTE Act. The representation dated 14.10.2004 by the petitioners before the Vice-Chancellor of the University which had been filed pursuant to the judgment and order dated 1.10.2004 also does not show that such a contention was raised and even a perusal of the letter dated 24.1.2005 sent by the petitioners to the Vice-Chancellor of the University after the order dated 19.1.2005 was passed by the Chancellor of the University clearly shows that the College had requested the University that in case any deficiencies had been pointed out by the Inspection Panel constituted by the University, then the College should have been intimated about the deficiencies. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to consider the submission raised by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners in this case.

16. In the end, Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of the Chancellor was liable to be set. aside since the deficiencies shown in the Inspection report were not only vague but were also incorrect.

17. Learned Counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the Inspection Panel which is an Expert Body constituted by the University for the purposes of examining the College had submitted a detailed report and even in the writ petition, the petitioners have not been able to point out that the appointment of the Teachers to the B.Ed. Course had been approved by the University or that students for the academic session 2003-04 had been admitted in accordance with the provisions of the Notification issued by the State Government under Section 28(5) of the Universities Act.

18. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties. Before we examine the correctness of the order dated 19.1,2005 passed by the Chancellor of the University, we consider it appropriate to remind ourselves about the observations made by the Supreme Court in Prof. Yash Pal and Anr. v. State of Chattisgarh and Ors., 2005 (2) ESC 129 (SC), in which the Supreme Court pointed out the importance of a Degree granted by the University and observed as follows :

'A degree conferred by a University is a proof of the fact that a person has studied a course of a particular higher level and has success fully passed the examination certifying his proficiency in the said subject of study to such level. In the case of a Doctorate degree, it certifies that the holder of the degree has attained a high level of knowledge and study in the concerned subject by doing some original research work. A "University degree confers a kind of a status upon a person like a graduate or a postgraduate. Those who have done research work and have obtained a Ph.D., D. Lit., or D.Sc. degree become entitled to write the word 'Doctor' before their name and command certain amount of respect in society as educated and knowledgeable persons. That apart the principal advantage of holding a University degree is in the matter of employment, where a minimum qualification like a graduate, postgraduate or a professional degree from a

recognised institute is prescribed. Even for those who do not want to take up a job and want to remain in private profession like a doctor or lawyer, registration with Medical Council or Bar Council is necessary for which purpose a degree in medicine or law, as the case may be, from an institution recognised by the said bodies is essential. An academic degree is, therefore, of great significance and value for the holder thereof and goes a long way in shaping his future. The interest of society also requires that the holder of an academic degree must possess the requisite proficiency and expertise in the subject which the degree certifies.

Mere conferment of degree is not enough. What is necessary is that the degree should be recognised. It is for this purpose that the right to confer degree has been given under Section 22 of the UGC Act only to a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, Provincial Act or State Act or an institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 or an institution specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer or grant degrees. Sub-section (3) of this section provides that 'degrees' means any such degree as may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, be specified in this behalf by the Commission by notification in the official Gazette. The value and importance of such degrees which are recognised by Government was pointed out by a Constitution Bench in *Azeez. Basha. v. Union of India*, : [1968]1SCR833 .'

19. The Supreme Court further emphasised the importance of 'University' and observed as follows :

'As shown earlier, University is a whole body of teachers and scholars engaged at a particular place in giving and receiving instructions in higher branches of learning; and as such persons associated together as a society or corporate body, with definite organisation and acknowledged powers and privileges and forming an institution for promotion of education in higher or more important branches of learning and also the colleges, building and other property belonging to such body. Other necessary attributes of University are plurality of teachers teaching more than one higher faculties and other facilities for imparting instructions and research provision for residence and must have certain standard of instructions providing for graduate and post-graduate levels of study. It pre-supposes existence of a

campus, classrooms, lecture theatres, libraries, laboratories, offices, besides some playgrounds and also sport facility for overall development of personality of the students. However, under the provisions of the impugned Act, a proposal which is on paper and merely gives some kind of a plan or scheme to be done in future is notified as a University. When the Constitution has conferred power on the State to legislate on incorporation of University, any Act providing for establishment of the University must make such provisions that only an institution in the sense of University as it is generally understood with all the infrastructural facilities, where teaching and research on wide range of subjects and of a particular level are actually done, acquires the status of a University.'

20. We must also remind ourselves about the scope of judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to referable to the broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.

21. The parameters of the Court's power have been analysed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay and Ors. v. Afahindra and Mahtndra Ltd. and Ors., : [1983]144ITR225(SC) . We reproduce paragraph 11 of the said judgment :

'By now, the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the same are well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from Barium Chemicals, : [1967]1SCR898 case on the point. Indisputably, it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of its later decisions in Smt Shalini Soni v. Union of India, : 1980 CriLJ1487 , has observed thus : 'It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an

implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote.' Suffice it to say that the following passage appearing at pages 285-86 in Prof. De Smith's treatise 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th Edn.) succinctly summarises the several principles formulated by the Courts in that behalf thus : 'The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it : it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations, must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account; and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidity contained within each category.'

22. In *State of U.P. and Ors. v. Renusagar Power Co. and Ors.*, : AIR 1988 SC1737 , It was held that exercise of administrative power will be set aside if there is a manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary.

23. The famous 'Wednesbury Case' *Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn.*, (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA), is considered to be the landmark in so far as the basic principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory direction are concerned. We quote a passage from the judgment of Lord

Greene which is as follows :

'It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters, which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters, which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.... In another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another.'

24. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarised in 1985 by Lord Diplock in *Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service*, 1984 (3) All ER 935, (commonly known as CCSU case) as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community. Lord Diplock observed in this case as follows :

'...Judicial review has I think, developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community.'

Lord Diplock explained 'irrationality' as follows :

'By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness'. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.'

25. In *Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham*, : (2000) IILLJ648SC , the Supreme Court after referring to the aforesaid two cases namely *Wednesbury* case and *CCSU* case held as follows :

'We are of the view that even in our country in cases not involving fundamental freedoms--the role of our Courts/tribunals in administrative law is purely secondary and while applying *Wednesbury* and *CCSU* principles to test the validity of executive action or of administrative action taken in exercise of statutory powers, the Courts and tribunals in our country can only go into the matter, as a secondary reviewing Court to find out if the executive or the administrator in their primary roles have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them in the light of *Wednesbury* and *CCSU* tests. The choice of the options available is for the authority; the Court/tribunal cannot substitute its view as to what is reasonable.'

26. In *Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar*, : (2003) IILLJ150SC , the Supreme Court held as follows :

'It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary.... If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated.'

27. In *People's Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.*, 2004 AIR SCW 379, while dealing with the same issue, the Supreme Court observed as under :

'The jurisdiction of this Court in such matter is very limited. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review in such matters unless it is found that

formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fide, dishonesty or corrupt practice. The order can be set aside if it is held to be beyond the limits for which the power has been conferred upon the authorities by the Legislature or is based on the grounds extraneous to the legislation and if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction required thereunder.'

28. In *State of N.C.T. of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo*, 2005 AIR SCW 1987, the Supreme Court in paragraphs 16 and 18 held as follows :

'16. ..One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is 'illegality' the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'.

18. The Court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient.'

29. It is in the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court that the order of the Chancellor has to be examined.

30. A perusal of the order dated 19.1.2005 passed by the Vice-Chancellor of the University clearly shows that it is based upon the report of the Inspection Panel constituted by the University which had pointed out the various deficiencies to which we have elaborately referred to in the preceding paragraphs. The Chancellor was conscious of the fact that the University had not made any favourable recommendation for extension of the temporary affiliation to the B.Ed. Course in the College and had merely forwarded the report of the Inspection Panel containing the various deficiencies. The most important is in respect of the quality of the Teachers engaged by the College for the B.Ed. Course. The report clearly mentions that the appointment of the Teachers had not been approved by the University. This fact has not been denied in the writ petition and the only statement that has been made is that the list had been sent to the University for its approval.

What is also disturbing is that the report mentions that the admissions had been granted to the B.Ed, Course in utter violation to the orders issued by the Government under Section 28 (5) of the Act. The fact has also not been disputed. In our opinion, these are grave deficiencies and, therefore, the order passed by the Chancellor of the University refusing to extend the term of temporary affiliation to the B.Ed. Course cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory or irrational. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners.

For all the reasons stated above, we cannot grant any relief to the petitioners. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

SooperKanoon - India's Premier Online Legal Search - sooperkanoon.com