

Maniraj vs T.C.Pradeepa

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Court : Kerala

Decided On : May-17-2022

Judge : Honourable Mr. Justice Anil K.Narendran,Honourable Mr.Justice P.G. Ajithkumar

Appeal No. : OP (RC)/3/2019

Appellant : Maniraj

Respondent : T.C.Pradeepa

Judgement :

C.R.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR TUESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF MAY 2022 / 27TH VAISAKHA, 1944 O.P.(RC) NO. 199 OF 2018 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 31.08.2018 IN R.C.R.P.NO.1 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE-III), THALASSERY AND THE ORDER DATED 19.10.2015 IN E.P.NO.307 OF 2012 IN R.C.P.NO.63 OF 1996 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL MUNSIF), KANNUR

PETITIONERS:

1 PADIKKAL SURESH AGED 84 YEARS, S/O. PADIKKAL DEVAKI, DOOR NO.622, NEAR ENGLISH CHURCH, TALAP, KANNUR-2. 2 PADIKKAL GEETHA, AGED 52 YEARS, D/O. PADIKKAL DEVAKI, -DO-DO. 3 PADIKKAL USHA, AGED 50 YEARS, D/O. PADIKKAL DEVAKI, -DO-DO. BY ADVS. SMT.SHIBI. K.P. SRI.C.K.SUNIL SMT.T.T.JAYANTHY SMT.K.S.ARUNI RAJ RESPONDENT: T.C. PRADEEPA AGED 52 YEARS, D/O. T.M. SATHYANARAYANAN, OFFICE EXECUTIVE, RESIDING AT SATHYA PRABHA, KAKKAD, KANNUR-670005. BY ADVS. SRI.SUNIL V.MOHAMMED SHRI.CHANDRAN K.C. M.HEMALATHA THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 31.03.2022, ALONG WITH O.P.(RC).3/2019, THE COURT ON 17.05.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR TUESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF MAY 2022 / 27TH VAISAKHA, 1944 O.P.(RC) NO. 3 OF 2019 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 31.08.2018 IN RCRP NO.2 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE-III), THALASSERY AND THE ORDER DATED 19.10.2015 IN E.P.NO.308 OF 2012 IN R.C.P.NO.67 OF 1996 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF), KANNUR PETITIONERS: 1 MANIRAJ AGED 75 YEARS, S/O.MULLATHUKANDY VAAJA PALANI NAIKER, RESIDING AT R.R.IV-621, NEAR ENGLISH CHURCH, TALAP, KANNUR - 2. 2 HEMA AGED 73 YEARS, D/O.MULLATHUKANDY VAAJA PALANI NAIKER, -DO- -DO- 3 VIJAYAN AGED 70 YEARS, S/O.MULLATHUKANDY VAAJA PALANI NAIKER, -DO- -DO- BY ADVS. K.R.AVINASH (KUNNATH) ABDUL RAOOF PALLIPATH E.MOHAMMED SHAFI RESPONDENT: T.C.PRADEEPA D/O.T.M.SATHYANARAYANAN, AGED 52 YEARS,

OFFICE EXECUTIVE, RESIDING AT SATHYA PRABHA, KAKKAD, KANNUR - 670 005. BY ADVS. SRI.SUNIL V.MOHAMMED SHRI.CHANDRAN K.C. THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 31.03.2022, ALONG WITH OP (RC).199/2018, THE COURT ON 17.05.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: C.R.

JUDGMENT

Ajithkumar, J.

These Original Petitions are filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India. The common order, Ext.P2 dated 31.8.2018 of the Rent Control Revisional Authority (Additional District Judge- III), Thalassery, in RCRP Nos.1 and 2 of 2006, which were filed under the proviso to Section 14 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act) is under challenge. As per Ext.P2, order of the Execution Court (Principal Munsiff), Kannur, dated 19.10.2015, Ext.P1 was reversed.

2. R.C.P.Nos.63 and 67 of 1996 were filed by one

Puthenpurayil Rajan. He was the landlord. He filed the Rent Control Petitions seeking eviction of the respective tenants under Section 11(3) of the Act. The order of eviction became final when this Court on 31.5.2011 dismissed the respective Rent Control Revisions preferred by the tenants. As per the order in the Rent Control Revisions, this Court directed the Execution Court to keep the execution proceedings in abeyance till 31.12.2011, subject to the following conditions:-

The revision petitioners file an affidavit before the

execution court or the rent control court, as the case may be, undertaking to give peaceful surrender of the building in question to the respondent on or before 31.12.2011 and undertaking further to discharge the arrears

of rent, if any, within six weeks from today and also to pay occupational charges at the existing contract rent rate to the respondent without fail. We make it clear that the revision petitioner will get the benefit of time granted as above only if he files the affidavit on time and honours the undertakings therein.

3. The respective tenants, who are the petitioners herein, did not file an affidavit as directed above. The landlord

Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan filed execution petitions for getting delivery of the respective petition schedule rooms. He could not, however, take delivery of the premises for, he died on 13.12.2011.

4. After the death of Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan, the

respondent herein filed E.P.Nos.307 and 308 of 2012 in the respective Rent Control Petitions before the Execution Court for getting delivery of the petition schedule premises. She claimed rights under an unregistered Will executed by Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan. The execution petitions were contested by the petitioners on identical grounds. It was contended that the Will propounded by the respondent is a forged one and that was why the execution petitions filed by Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan, namely, E.P.Nos.91 and

99 of 2011 were not pursued. The Will propounded by the respondent is a fabricated one and is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It was further contended that eviction was sought by Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan on the ground that he wanted the petition schedule rooms for his starting an automobile workshop with parking facility and as he is no more, order of eviction has become inexecutable.

5. The respondent claimed before the Execution Court that she was the legatee under Ext. A1, Will dated 7.9.2003 executed

by Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan and hence she is the legal representative entitled to execute the orders of eviction. That apart, Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan obtained the petition schedule premises from her wife, Smt. Vinodhini, on her death, and as the

couple died issueless, this property should naturally devolve upon her relatives only. The respondent contended that she being the daughter of the sister of Smt. Vinodhini, she is an heir by operation of the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and therefore there is nothing unusual in executing such a Will. Accordingly, the respondent contended that she had every right to get the orders of eviction executed. The other contention

that with the death of Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan, the ground for eviction ceased to exist and hence the order of eviction has become inexecutable is refuted contending that on becoming the

order of eviction final and the property has become assets of

Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan, his subsequent death cannot have the effect of nullifying the order of eviction.

6. The Execution Court recorded oral evidence of PW1 and

marked Exts.A1 and A2. After elaborate consideration, the Execution Court had come to the conclusion that execution of Ext.A1 Will was not properly proved and therefore, the respondent was not entitled to pursue the execution petitions. In the revision filed by the respondent under the proviso to Section 14 of the Act, the Revisional Authority found that the evidence on record was sufficient to prove execution of Ext.A1. Accordingly, the Revisional Authority held that E.P.Nos.307 and 308 of 2012 are maintainable. The Execution Court was thereby directed to effect delivery, within a period of two weeks.

7. On 21.12.2018, these Original Petitions were admitted and notice was directed to the respondents. Further proceedings in the execution petitions were stayed initially for a period of one month and the order has been extended from time to time and is in force.

8. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

9. Two questions involved in this matter. Firstly, whether

on the death of Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan the order of eviction has become inexecutable. Secondly, whether the respondent has obtained the right and interest of the landlord in the petition schedule premises.

10. The learned counsel appearing for the respective

petitioners would submit that since the eviction was ordered on the ground of bona fide need of the building for own occupation of the landlord, his death eclipsed on the said need whereby the

order of eviction has become inexecutable. It is contended that

the Revisional Authority went totally wrong in holding that the death did not have the result of annulling the order of eviction, since the death was after the order had become ripe for execution.

11. We have pointed out above that the revision petition was dismissed, however, granting time till 31.12.2011 to the petitioners-tenants to vacate the buildings. This Court granted

time by directing to keep the proceedings in the execution petition in abeyance on the specific condition that the tenants should file an affidavit before the Execution Court or the Rent Control Court within six weeks from the date of that order ie.31.5.2011 undertaking to surrender vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the landlord on or before 31.12.2011. It was made clear that the benefit of such extension of time would be available only if the tenants file the affidavit on time. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners did not file affidavits within the time of six weeks fixed by this Court. Thereby the tenants forfeited their right to continue in the premises till 31.12.2011 and the order of eviction has become executable on the date of expiry of six weeks from 31.5.2011 itself.

12. A similar situation was considered by this Court in

Puthiya Purayil Kanamadathil Valsala v. Sulochana K.C. and others [2019 (4) KLJ 732]. In that case, eviction was ordered on the ground of bona fide need of one of the landlords, the 5 th petitioner therein, that he required to start a garment unit in

the petition schedule premises. When the matter reached this Court by the tenant filing a Revision Petition, this Court directed to

grant the tenant a period of eight months to vacate the premises, subject to the condition that he should file an affidavit before the Execution Court undertaking to vacate the premises. In compliance of that order, the tenant had filed an undertaking on 08.04.2019. The period of eight months granted to the tenant to vacate the premises was to expire on 22.09.2019. The 5th petitioner died on 04.07.2019. Legality of execution of the order of

eviction in the said circumstances was in question. This Court held

that the order of eviction has become final and the fruits of the decree formed part of the estate of the deceased, which his legal

heirs are entitled to enjoy. On the death of the landlord, an order

for eviction on the ground of bona fide need would not become a nullity by operation of any law and therefore the same could not be said inexecutable. This Court took the said view following the principles laid down by the Apex Court in P.V.Papanna and others v. K.Padmanabhaiah [(1994) 3 SCC 316].

13. The only difference to this case from the facts of the

afore-mentioned decision is that the petitioners herein did not file the affidavit of undertaking as directed in the orders in the Revision Petitions. The consequence of the failure to file affidavit

as envisaged in the orders is that the tenants became disentitled to continue in the premises till 31.12.2011. That means on the lapse of six weeks from 31.05.2011 the order of eviction has become final and formed part of the estate of Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan. Therefore, the principle laid down by this Court in Puthiya Purayil Kanamadathil Valsala (supra) is equally applicable to this case. We respectfully agree with the said preposition. Accordingly, we find no error in the finding of the Revisional Authority that the legal representative of Sri.Puthenpurayil

Rajan has every right to execute the order of eviction.

14. This takes us to the next contention raised by the

petitioners that since Sri. Puthenpurayil Rajan died, it is not possible for him to occupy the tenanted premises for the intended purpose, and therefore they will be entitled to have re-entry as provided in section 11(12) of the Act. As such the execution proceedings will be a futile exercise and therefore the execution petitions are liable not to be entertained. Section 11(12) confers a statutory right on the quondam tenant, the tenant who was evicted, to apply for restitution to the Rent Control Court, if the landlord fails to occupy the building within one month of the

delivery without reasonable cause. Object behind this provision is to protect tenants from unscrupulous evictions. In a logical interpretation we can see that the legislature intended only that the landlord shall not be allowed to evict a tenant on the ground of bona fide need of own occupation, unless he really needs it. If, after eviction, for a contributing reason he fails to occupy the building, the tenant has every right to repossess it. On the other hand, if the non occupation is on account of some supervening reasons like death, destruction of building, etc., that does not create a cause of action under section 11(12) of the Act.

15. Legislative intent is more clear if we look at the 3rd proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The 3rd proviso obligates a purchaser of the building, in respect of which there already is on

order of eviction on the ground of bona fide need, to convince the

Court that the purchaser too has a bona fide need, if he has to get vacant possession of the building. Such a restriction is not there if the transfer is by succession, be it testamentary or intestate. Therefore, we hold that the Execution Petitions are maintainable and would not come within the mischief of Section 11(12) of the Act.

16. The respondent claiming to be the legatee under

Ext.A1, sought to execute the order of eviction and hand over possession of the tenanted premises to her. One of the grounds to find the said claim in favour of the respondent by the Revisional Authority is that the petitioners were not entitled to deny the title to the petition schedule premises by virtue of the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the said view is obnoxious, inasmuch as, the petitioners never attorned the respondent as the landlord, and therefore, such a bar is not applicable to the petitioners. The definite case of the petitioners is that the respondent has not obtained the right of the landlord, either by way of intestate succession or under Ext.A1 Will having its execution not been proved, and therefore there cannot be any estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act.

17. In *Thomas P. E. and others v. Abraham Jose Rocky and others* [2019 (3) KLT 140], this Court while considering a

similar plea has held

On a careful reading of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, it will be clear that what is prohibited therein by a rule of estoppel is to the effect that a tenant shall not

dispute title of his landlord at the time of induction. But, the provision does not preclude a tenant from disputing the derivative title of a third party, who claims title on the basis of transfer from the inducing landlord. Our view is fortified by a pronouncement by the Apex Court in *Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sharif* [1990 KHC 707 : (1990) 1 SCC 252]. We shall quote the relevant observations: "A tenant already in possession can challenge the plaintiffs' claim of derivative title showing that the real owner is somebody else, but this is subject to the rule enunciated by Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The section does not permit the tenant, during the continuance of the tenancy, to deny that his landlord had at the beginning of the tenancy a title to the property. The rule is not confined in its application to cases where the original landlord brings an action for eviction. A transferee from such a landlord also can claim the benefit, but that will be limited to the question of title of the original

landlord at the time when the tenant was let in. So far claim of having derived a good title from the original landlord is concerned, the same does not come under the protection of the doctrine of estoppel, and is vulnerable to a challenge. The tenant is entitled to show that the plaintiff has not as a matter of fact secured a transfer from the original landlord or that

the alleged transfer is ineffective for some other valid reason, which renders the transfer to be non-existent in the eye of law....."

18. Viewed in the light of that principle the position is clear.

The petitioners dispute validity of the Ext. A1 Will, under which only the respondent now claims the right. Therefore we agree with the contention of the petitioners that they are not bound by the restriction against denial of landlords title contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act.

19. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent

contended that validity of the Will cannot be challenged by the petitioners, they being total strangers. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in *Bismillah Be (dead) by LRs. v. Majeed Shah* [(2017) 2 SCC 274] will answer that question, wherein it was held-

Though by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of his landlord during continuance of the tenancy, yet the tenant/lessee is entitled to challenge the derivative title of an Assignee/Vendee of the original landlord (Lessor) of the demised property in an action brought by the Assignee/Vendee against the tenant for his eviction from the demised property under the Rent laws. xx xx xx Once the Assignee/Vendee proves his title to the demised property, the original tenancy devolves on the

Assignee/Vendee and tenant/lessee by operation of law on the same terms and conditions on which it was entered into with the original landlord/lessor and

continues till either modified by the parties or is determined by the landlord in accordance with law. Therefore, the petitioners can certainly dispute the validity of Ext.A1 Will, to which alone the respondent traces her title to the petition schedule shop rooms.

20. As per Section 14 of the Act an order of eviction is to be

executed by the Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area where the building is situated, as if it were a decree passed by him. Therefore the provisions for execution of a decree in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are applicable to execution of an order of eviction under the Act. Under Section 146 of the Code a proceeding may be taken by the person claiming under the decree-holder except as otherwise provided by the Code. The Explanation to Rule 16 of Order 21 of the Code says that a transferee, whom includes a legatee of rights in the property which is the subject-matter of the suit, may apply for execution of the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by the rule. Therefore, if the respondent proves that Ext. A1, Will is genuine and valid, she steps into the

shoes of the decree-holder and becomes the holder of the decree. Then she has every right to execute the orders of eviction.

21. Having the respondent propounded Ext.A1 Will to claim

the right under Sri.Puthenpurayil Rajan, it is her burden to prove not only its due execution, but also that it is not vitiated by any suspicious circumstance. Reference may be made in this regard to the decision of the Apex Court in H.Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N.Thimmajamma and others [AIR 1959 SC 443]. It was observed that in the light of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1923 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act the test shall be as to whether the testator signed the Will and whether he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will. The Court held as under:

"18. ...Thus the question as to whether the Will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last Will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the Will? Did he understand

the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will? Did he put his signature to the Will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of Wills. It would

prima facie be true to say that the Will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of Wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. By "free and capable testator" is generally meant that the testator at the time when he made the Will had a sound and disposing state of mind and memory. Ordinarily, the burden of proving the due execution of the Will is discharged if the propounder leads evidence to show that the Will bears the signature or mark of the testator and that the Will is duly attested. For proving attestation, the best evidence would naturally be of an attesting witness and indeed the will cannot be used as evidence unless at least one attesting witness, depending on availability, has been called for proving its execution as required by S.68 of the Evidence Act...."

22. Regarding the nature of proof required to prove execution and attestation of a Will, the Apex Court in *Dhanpat v. Sheo Ram (Deceased) through LRs. and others* [(2020) 16 SCC 209] held thus: 23. .. at least one of the attesting witnesses is

required to be examined to prove his attestation and the attestation by another witness and the testator. In the present case, DW3 Maha Singh deposed that Chandu Ram had executed his Will in favour of his four grandsons and he and Azad Singh signed as witnesses. He deposed that the testator also signed it in Tehsil office. He and Azad Singh were also witnesses before the Sub-Registrar. In the cross-examination, he stated that he had come to Tehsil office in connection with other documents for registration. He deposed that Ex.D4 - the Will, was typed

in his presence. He denied the question that no Will was executed in his presence. There was no cross - examination about his not being present before the Sub-Registrar. Once the Will has been proved then the contents of such document are part of evidence. Thus, the requirement of Section 63 of the Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act stands satisfied. The witness is not supposed to repeat in a parrot like manner the language of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. It is a question of fact in each case as to whether the witness was present at the time of execution of the Will and whether the testator and the attesting witnesses have signed in his presence. The statement of the attesting witness proves the due execution of the Will apart from the evidence of the scribe and the official from the Sub-Registrar's office.

23. In this case, Ext.A1 Will is an unregistered one. Since it

is not mandatory to register a Will, proof of its execution and attestation does not have any difference, whether or not it is registered. Therefore the facts of this case are similar, in material particulars, with the facts of Dhanpat (supra).

24. PW1 is one of the attesting witnesses. His deposition is

very cryptic. He is an Advocate by profession. He deposed that Ext.A1 Will was written by Sri.Rajan and when he signed it, he as well as the second witness Sinoj were there. His further version is that he as well as Sri.Sinoj had signed Ext.A1. The rest is evident from Ext.A1; Sri.Rajan signed it as the testator, PW1 and Sri.Sinoj signed it as witnesses. Only question put to PW1 in the cross-examination was that Ext.P1 was not executed or signed by Sri.Rajan, which is duly denied by him. When the assertions of PW1 with respect to signing of Ext.A1 by Sri.Rajan in the presence of himself and Sri.Sinoj as also, both of them had signed it as witnesses is not challenged in the cross- examination, there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve him. It follows that the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act are sufficiently satisfied. Therefore we hold

that finding of the Revisional Authority that Ext.A1 was duly proved has no infirmity and is liable to be affirmed.

25. Main circumstance pointed out as suspicious is that the

respondent did not come forward to pursue the execution petitions filed by Sri.Puthanpurayil Rajan. Those execution petitions were dismissed as withdrawn and after the lapse of a few months, the respondent filed fresh execution petitions. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit, had Ext.A1 been really executed by Sri.Puthanpurayil Rajan, there would not have been any difficulty for the respondent to get impleaded in the execution petitions filed by him. It is also alleged that only because Ext.A1 is a subsequently created one, such a delay had occurred. On the death of Sri.Puthanpurayil Rajan what advice was received by the counsel appearing for him in the Execution Petitions is not known. Unless the respondent approached the counsel, there would have been an opportunity to continue with the pending execution petitions. In the absence of any evidence with respect to those aspects, the said circumstance cannot be a reason to suspect genuineness of Ext.A1.

26. Regarding the testamentary capacity of

Sri.Puthanpurayil Rajan, there need not be any doubt. He died on 13.12.2011 whereas, Ext.A1 was executed on 07.09.2003. During all the intervening period, he had been active, as could be gathered from the fact that he had been prosecuting the present

litigations. Whether he disinherited any near relatives in preference to the respondent is not asserted or attempted to be proved by the petitioners. It is beyond dispute that the respondent is a near relative of the wife of the testator, who predeceased him. It has also come in evidence that the testator obtained the petition schedule premises by inheritance from his wife and both of them died issueless. In the said circumstances, the legacy in favour of the respondent vide Ext.A1 Will cannot be said to be

quite unnatural. Accordingly, we hold that the respondent successfully dispelled the suspicious circumstances pointed out by

the petitioners and none of such circumstances is sufficient to vitiate Ext.A1. Hence there is nothing preventing the respondent to rely on Ext.A1 to lay her claim for pursuing the execution of orders of eviction. In view of that matter, findings rendered by the Revisional Authority that the Execution Petition Nos.307 and 308

of 2012 are maintainable does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. We find that these original petitions are devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. The original petitions are accordingly dismissed and the common order of the Revisional Authority(Additional District Judge-III), Thalassery in Rent Control Revision Petition Nos.1 and 2 of 2016 is confirmed. Sd/- ANIL K.NARENDRA JUDGE Sd/- P.G. AJITHKUMAR JUDGE dkr APPENDIX OF O.P.(RC) NO.199 OF 2018 PETITIONER EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER OF THE PRINCIPAL MUNSIF COURT, KANNUR IN EP EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT-III) THALSSERY, IN RCRP 1/ 2016 & RCRP 2/2016. APPENDIX OF O.P.(RC) NO.3 OF 2019 PETITIONER EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER OF THE PRINCIPAL MUNSIF COURT, KANNUR IN EP EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT-III) THALASSERY IN RCRP

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