

Springfield Tp. Sch. Dist. Vs. Knoll

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Court : US Supreme Court

Decided On : Apr-17-1985

Appeal No. : 471 U.S. 288

Appellant : Springfield Tp. Sch. Dist.

Respondent : Knoll

Judgement :

Springfield Tp. Sch. Dist. v. Knoll - 471 U.S. 288 (1985)

U.S. Supreme Court Springfield Tp. Sch. Dist. v. Knoll, 471 U.S. 288 (1985)

Springfield Township School District v. Knoll

No. 82-1889

Argued January 14, 1985

Decided April 17, 1985

471 U.S. 288

*CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT*

SYLLABUS

Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court on April 21, 1981, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that petitioner School District, in August, 1979, May, 1980, and December, 1980, had discriminated against her on the basis of sex in failing to promote her to an administrative position. The court dismissed the 1983 claim because it was not brought within the 6-month limitations period under the Pennsylvania statute applicable to actions against a government official for acts done in the execution of his office. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 6-year "residuary" provision of the Pennsylvania limitations scheme was applicable.

Held: The Court of Appeals' judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in the light of the decision in *Wilson v. Garcia, ante* p. [471 U. S. 261](#) , that all 1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the person.

699 F.2d 137, vacated and remanded.

PER CURIAM.

On April 21, 1981, respondent commenced this action alleging, in part, that the petitioner School District discriminated

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against her on the basis of sex in failing to promote her to an administrative position. She sought equitable and compensatory relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the alleged acts of discrimination which occurred in August, 1979, May, 1980, and September, 1980.

The District Court dismissed the 1983 claim because it was not brought within the 6-month limitations period which applies to

"[a]n action against any officer of any government unit for anything done in the execution of his office, except an action subject to another limitation specified in

this subchapter."

42 Pa.Cons.Stat. 5522(b)(1) (1982). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the "application of the six-month limitations period would be inconsistent with the policies and legislative history underlying 1983," and that "the six-year residuary provision of the limitations scheme should govern this dispute." 699 F.2d 137, 139 (CA3 1983). We granted certiorari, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), and heard argument.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is now vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of our decision in *Wilson v. Garcia*, ante p. [471 U. S. 261](#) , in which we have held that all 1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the person.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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