K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham - Court Judgment

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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in the high court of judicature at madras dated:10. 01.2013 coram: the hon'ble mrs.justice r.banumathi and the hon'ble mr.justice k.k.sasidharan l.p.a.nos.3 to 6 of 2012 k.vijayalakshmi .... appellant in lpa.no.3 of 2012 k.perumalsamy ... appellant in lpa.nos.4 to 6 of 2012 vs.1. b.prakasham, the general manager (tn), food corporation of india, 124, greams road, chennai.2. d.muthuramalingam, the manager, karur vysya bank, 280, wgc road, thoothukud”002. ... respondents in all l.p.as prayer: lpa.nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under clause 15 of the letters patent against the order dated 4.6.2012 in contempt petition nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this court. common judgment whether the single judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and.....

Judgment:

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.

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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'id' => '964153',
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		'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2013-01-10',
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		'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
)
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3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S & C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.

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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
)
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8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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$title_for_layout = 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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		'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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		'court' => 'Chennai',
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		'decidedon' => '2013-01-10',
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		'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against." 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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		'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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		'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: "11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)" 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.

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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.

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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
)
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17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:

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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.

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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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		'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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		'court' => 'Chennai',
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		'decidedon' => '2013-01-10',
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		'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
)
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22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'casename' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi Vs. B.Prakasham',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'K Vijayalakshmi Vs B Prakasham - Citation 964153 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '964153',
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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judge' => 'THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI',
			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
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usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”

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			'appellant' => 'K.Vijayalakshmi',
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			'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p style='text-align: justify;'>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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		'judgement' => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:</p><p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.</p><p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.</p><p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”</p><p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.</p><p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.</p><p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.</p><p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.</p><p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.</p><p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.</p><p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.</p><p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.</p><p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.</p><p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.</p><p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.</p><p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.</p><p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.</p><p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:</p><p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.</p><p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.</p><p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.</p><p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:</p><p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.</p><p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.</p><p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.</p><p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.</p><p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.</p><p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”</p><p>10. 01.2013',
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	(int) 0 => 'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:',
	(int) 1 => '<p>10. 01.2013 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI AND THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 K.Vijayalakshmi .... Appellant in LPA.No.3 of 2012 K.Perumalsamy ... Appellant in LPA.Nos.4 to 6 of 2012 Vs.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. B.Prakasham, The General Manager (TN), Food Corporation of India, 124, Greams Road, Chennai.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. D.Muthuramalingam, The Manager, Karur Vysya Bank, 280, WGC Road, Thoothukud”',
	(int) 4 => '<p>002. ... Respondents in all L.P.As Prayer: LPA.Nos.3 to 6 of 2012 are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 4.6.2012 in Contempt Petition Nos.426, 423, 424 and 425 of 2012 respectively on the file of this Court. COMMON JUDGMENT Whether the single Judge digressed from the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction and whether the Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable and whether there was any wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 2.6.2011 made in O.A.No.491 of 2011 are the points falling for consideration in these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>2. Brief facts leading to the Letters Patent Appeals are as follows:- The Appellant - Vijayalakshmi had participated in the tender floated by Food Corporation of India for construction of godown at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT in pursuance to notice inviting tender (Phase-III) issued by Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai. Appellant K.Perumalsamy had participated for three centres viz., Tenkasi (15,000 MTS), Virudhunagar (10,000 MTs) and Kovilpatti (10,000 MTs). One of the essential conditions for participation of a tenderer was that he should own land or hold it on lease for a minimum period of thirteen years and produce the documentary proof to that effect. By way of exception, persons, who did not satisfy either of the two conditions but intended to acquire land by way of ownership/lease within 90 days from the date of acceptance of tender, were permitted to participate in the tender if they furnish an undertaking to that effect along with a supplementary guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee at the rate of Rs.100/- per MT of storage capacity issued by nationalised Bank and valid for a minimum period of six months from the submission of the tender. Since the Appellant(s) did not own land or hold land on lease at the time of submitting tender, the Appellant(s) had furnished affidavit of undertaking on 9.11.2010 stating that she/he would be acquiring the identified land in Aruppukottai/ Kovilpatti within ninety days from the date of acceptance of the tender. The Appellant(s) Vijayalakshmi and Perumalsamy have furnished bank guarantee(s) bearing Nos.9 of 2010 and 11 of 2010 respectively for Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, which is valid for the period from 4.10.2010 to 3.4.2011 as security.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>3. Since the Appellant(s) were the successful tenderers in that tender, the same was accepted by the competent authority viz., the General Manager, Tamil Nadu Food Corporation of India, Tamil Nadu Region in letter of Memorandum dated 25.01.2011. In pursuance thereof, agreements dated 23.3.2011 were entered into between the Appellant(s) and Food Corporation of India. The period of ninety days stipulated for acquiring land for construction of godown was to end on 25.4.2011 and the Appellant(s) have not produced any document to prove acquisition of land within the stipulated period. The Appellant(s) made a representation requesting to grant fifteen working days with effect from 14.5.2011 i.e., till 28.05.2011 to acquire the land for construction of godowns and also another request by e-mail addressed to the Chairman and Managing Director, F.C.I. Headquarters, New Delhi marking a copy to Regional Office at Chennai. The General Manager, Food Corporation of India Regional Office, Chennai informed the Appellant(s) that extension will not be considered under any circumstances. Since the Appellant(s) failed to acquire the land within the stipulated period of ninety days and that it amounted to breach of contract, by letter dated 13.5.2011, FCI Regional Office at Chennai terminated the contract and agreement dated 23.3.2011 entered with Appellant(s) for construction of godown facility. The Appellant(s) were also informed that the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- furnished by them to FCI for non-performance of the contract is forfeited and that FCI invokes bank guarantee bearing No.9 of 2010 (Vijayalakshmi) for Rs.10,00,000/- and 11 of 2010 (Perumalsamy) for Rs.10,00,000/-; Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>4. The Appellant(s) issued legal notice to Food Corporation of India calling upon them to appoint arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute. While Food Corporation of India was in the process of appointing arbitrator to resolve the dispute as per Clause 17 of the agreement, the Appellant(s) have filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act seeking for interim injunction restraining Food Corporation of India from acting upon the termination of the agreement vide letters of even date i.e., dated 13.5.2011 bearing Lr.not S &amp; C.6(2)/PEG-2008/2010 VOL V for construction of the godown at Aruppukottai (Vijayalakshmi) and at Kovilpatti. (Perumalsamy). By Order dated 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications. Subsequent to the order of interim injunction, by letter dated 4.10.2011 the Appellant(s) were informed that Executive Director (South) Food Corporation of India has been appointed as arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement dated 23.3.2011 to resolve the dispute.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. In the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant(s) have filed their claim statement and respondents filed their counter statement. After hearing both sides, the learned Arbitrator passed the award on 6.1.2012 inter alia holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- for not completing the construction of godown is just and proper. Challenging the award, the Appellant(s) are said to have preferred petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. Contempt Petition:- According to the Appellant(s), they have intimated the respondents about the interim order dated 2.6.2011 and that they sent written communication enclosing the copy of the order on 2.6.2011. While so, the act of Food Corporation of India for invocation of the bank guarantee when the injunction is in force amounts to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated 2.6.2011. It is the case of Appellant(s) that the order of injunction granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is not limited till the passing of the arbitral award and after passing the award there is an appeal remedy available under Section 34 of the Act, and till the disposal of the appeal under Section 34 of the Act, the injunction granted under Section 9 of the Act is valid and would continue in force. According to the Appellant(s), they have given notice to the Bank that they are about to file petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the Bank should not release the amount. The Appellant(s) filed Contempt Petition alleging that the 1st respondent, having knowledge about the injunction order and in wilful disobedience of the order dated 2.6.2011 had illegally invoked the bank guarantee and that the Bank is also having the full knowledge about the order dated 2.6.2011 and the Bank released the Bank guarantee in wilful disobedience of the order and thereby both the respondents committed contempt of Court and therefore is liable to be prosecuted under Contempt of Courts Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. After referring to Paragraph No.22(i) and 22(ii) of the Arbitral award, the learned single judge held that the Appellant(s) cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the Appellant(s) cannot get the relief of an interim order and at the maximum if the Appellant(s) are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent. Holding that no case is made out for entertaining the Contempt Petition, learned single Judge dismissed all the contempt petitions. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the Contempt Petitions, the Appellant(s) have preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised regarding maintainability of the appeals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, appeal can be filed only against the order convicting/punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case, the contempt proceedings were dismissed as no case was made out, the appeals under Section 19 cannot be entertained. The learned counsel further submitted that Contempt of Courts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regarding filing of appeal and when the order is not appealable under Section 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated .09.2008 in Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Sri Balaji Industries.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that where the single judge decides an issue and makes observations relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings, the Appellant(s) are entitled to file an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was submitted that while dismissing the contempt petition, in Paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge made certain observations which prejudicially affect the rights of the Appellant(s) and hence the appeals are maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Coop.Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others and Division Bench judgment of this Court in (2006) 1 CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Jeenath Roadways.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. We will first consider whether in the present case intra Court Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable. Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:- 19. Appeal.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed - (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench or the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.&quot; 11. Holding that an appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt, in (1996) 4 SCC 41.- State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S.Allibhoy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words any order have to be read with the expression decision used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order is not independent of the expression decision. They have been put in an alternative form saying order or decision. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression any order is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>12. Referring to the various decisions, in (2006) 5 SCC 39.- Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank case, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the position in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings as under: &quot;11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)&quot; 13. The learned counsel for Appellant(s) submitted that as per the principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Cooperate Bank Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 399.in para 11(v), when the Court decides an issue or issues or make any direction or observation, the Appellant(s) are entitled to maintain the appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) CTC 24.S.Arumuganainar, Senior Manager, Transport (South), Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Jeenath Roadways and 2006(2) CTC 9.Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association. In 2006(1) CTC 247.the learned single Judge in the contempt petition held that there was no deliberate violation and closed the Contempt Petition. While closing the contempt petition, the learned single Judge held that in view of inconvenience caused to the petitioner, and also the incompatibility expressed by the respondents in respect of punishing the respondents, the learned single judge gave certain directions, which would meet the ends of justice. In 2006(1) CTC 247.directions were issued in exercise of contempt jurisdiction and the appeal was actually filed on the ground that the learned single Judge having found that there was no wilful and deliberate violation of the order ought not to have travelled beyond the scope of contempt petition by issuing several directions affecting the rights of the parties. In those facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench opined that the directions issued by the learned single Judge was neither incidental nor clarificatory but independent positive directions which were beyond the scope of contempt petition and on that ground entertained the Letters Patent Appeal and allowed it. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the directions issued by the learned single judge, which were beyond the scope of controversy of the contempt petition, Division Bench entertained the Letters Patent Appeal.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. In 2006(2) CTC 9.- Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders' Welfare Association, the learned single Judge warned the respondent to be careful in future and thereafter, gave certain directions and closed the contempt petition. Against that, appeal was filed. The Division Bench held that the appeal was maintainable in view of the direction issued by the single Judge and that the parties affected therein were not before the learned judge.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>15. The above decisions were referred and elaborately considered by the Division Bench in an unreported decision of this Court in Contempt appeal Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 dated 25.09.2008 (Bell Products Pvt.Ltd. Vs. M.K.Gupta, Proprietor, Balaji Industries). The Division Bench held that the consistent view of Madras High Court is that appeal is not maintainable against the order dismissing contempt application and refusing to exercise the contempt jurisdiction.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>16. Considering the present case in the light of the above principles, it is seen that in paragraph No.3 of the Order, the learned single Judge observed that at the maximum if the petitioners are to succeed they can only get damages from the respondent and they cannot enforce any specific relief in terms of the agreement and even if the award is set aside the petitioner cannot get the relief of interim order. While considering the question whether alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and passes an order either absolving or punishing the contemnor for contempt. While passing the order either absolving or punishing them for contempt, based on the materials produced before it, the Court has to make necessarily certain observation. In the present case, while holding that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition, the learned judge made certain observations, which were just and necessary for disposal of the contempt petition. It cannot be said that the observations made are on the merits of the matter or that the learned judge travelled beyond the contempt jurisdiction so as to entertain an appeal. Since the learned single judge held that no case is made out for entertaining the contempt petition and that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court, we are of the opinion that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>17. Notwithstanding that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable, in view of the elaborate submissions made, on the materials produced before us, we have also considered the questions whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. By the Order dated 13.5.2011, the contract was terminated. In the said letter dated 13.5.2011, Food Corporation of India clearly indicated that as per the terms of the contract, Corporation is forfeiting the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- and also invoking bank guarantee. The relevant portion of the said letter dated 13.5.2011 sent to appellant Vijayalakshmi reads as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>4. In the aforesaid circumstances which clearly indicate that there has been breach of the fundamental contract committed by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, the Food Corporation of India hereby terminates the contract and agreement dated 23.03.2011 entered with Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi, for construction of godown of capacity 10000 MT at Arupukottai and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India with immediate effect i.e. 13.05.2011 resultantly, the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only) furnished by Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to Food Corporation of India, for non-performance of the aforesaid agreement stands forfeited and the Food Corporation of India invokes the Bank Guarantee No:09/2010, dated 4/10/2010 for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), issued by Corporation Bank, Tuticorin, furnished in support of the undertaking of the said Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi to acquire ownership of the property morefully described in the Schedule to this notice and submit proof of such ownership by 25.04.2011. Needless to add here that such action is being taken without prejudice to the rights of Food Corporation of India to recover any other further amounts due from Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi for breach of the aforesaid agreement, which stands terminated. The Food Corporation of India also reserves its right to invite fresh tender for construction of godown and subsequent lease to Food Corporation of India at Arupukottai for a capacity of 10000 MT at the risk and cost of Smt.K.Vijayalakshmi.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>18. The Appellant(s) have sent a legal notice dated 20.5.2011 to the Food Corporation of India to appoint an arbitrator as per Clause 17 of the agreement to resolve the dispute. On 2.6.2011, interim injunction was granted in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the same was communicated to Food Corporation of India. The Appellant(s) on 19.9.2011 (by FAX:0461-234005: SPEED POST: (e-mail) were informed that Mr.P.P.Singh, Executive Director (South), Food Corporation of India Zonal Office, Chennai would function as the sole arbitrator in terms of the agreement dated 23.2.2011. In the said communication, the Appellant(s) were also called upon to extend the validity of the bank guarantee for a further period of six months. Since there was no reply received from the Appellant(s) for the proposal of extending the validity of the bank guarantee and in order to maintain existing status quo, the Food Corporation of India had sent the letter dated 27.9.2011 stating that if the Appellant(s) do not ensure for extending the validity of bank guarantee beyond 3.10.2011, the Bank would retain the proceeds of the Bank guarantee in a fixed deposit for the time being awaiting the outcome of the arbitral reference/further orders of the Court.',
	(int) 21 => '<p>19. By its letter dated 10.10.2011, Corporation Bank, Tuticorin Branch informed Food Corporation of India stating as under: In view of the above, please note that we are unable to treat the BGs as invoked by the impugned letter dated 13.05.2011, unless and until the litigation reached into a finality in the said litigation before the High Court of Madras. Please also note that we are unable to keep the BG amount in interest fetching FDs without instructions from the surety and as per the conditions of the BG. This is for your information.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>20. The Arbitral award was passed on 6.1.2012 holding that the invocation of Bank guarantee was just and proper. Paragraph No.22(iv) of the Arbitral Award reads as under:',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. iv). The invocation of the bank guarantee for Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) for not acquiring the land and forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) for not completing the construction of godown, that had been furnished by the claimant to the respondent as security for the performance of those obligations in terms of the tender, is just and proper.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>21. Thereafter, Food Corporation of India sent a letter to the Corporation Bank on 6.1.2012 stating that the Arbitral dispute has been decided in favour of Food Corporation of India by the award dated 6.1.2012, and requesting the Corporation Bank to make the payment.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>22. The contention of respondent/ Food Corporation of India is that by the letter of termination of the contract dated 13.5.2011 itself, the Bank guarantee was invoked and the subsequent correspondence with the Bank was only consequential of the said invocation of bank guarantee. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. Suffice to note that the forfeiture of account and invocation of bank guarantee was only subject to the interim order passed by the Court on 2.6.2011. Since the Appellant(s) have challenged the arbitral award dated 6.1.2012, in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we do not propose to express any opinion on these aspects and the issues are left open.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>23. For the foregoing reasons, the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. The dispute regarding invocation of Bank guarantee and forfeiture of the security amount are left open. However, there is no order as to costs. (R.B.I.,J.) (K.K.S.,J.) 10.01.2013 Index:Yes Internet:Yes usk Copy to: Sub.Asst.Registrar Original Side High Court Madras. R.BANUMATHI,J.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>AND K.K.SASIDHARAN,J.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>usk Pre-Delivery Judgment in L.P.A.Nos.3 to 6 o”',
	(int) 29 => '<p>10. 01.2013'
)
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