The New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Manish Gupta and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/953041
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided OnOct-11-2012
Case NumberM.F.A. No. 6950 of 2007 c/w. & M.F.A. NOS. 6952 of 2007 & 15422 of 2007 (MV)
Judge AJIT J. GUNJAL & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA
AppellantThe New India Assurance Company Limited
RespondentManish Gupta and Others
Excerpt:
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motor vehicles act - section 166 - section 173(1) - high court act and rules - section 9 - whether the medical expenses incurred by injured, who has taken a mediclaim policy can seek reimbursement of the medical expenses expended by him both under the mediclaim policy as well as the amount, which is claimed under section 166 of motor vehicle act - claimant had suffered grievious injuries - tribunal has taken into consideration the nature of injuries, the amount spent towards medical expenses, pain and suffering, the loss of amenities and has awarded which was challenged – court held, medical treatment of claimant has been reimbursed under the mediclaim policy. hence, we propose to deduct the said amount from total compensation awarded under the heading of medical expenses –.....
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(prayer: this m.f.a. is filed under section 173(1) of mv act against the judgment and award dated 27.11.2006 passed in mvc no.7158/04 on the file of additional judge, member, motor accident claims tribunal-v, court of small causes, metropolitan area, bangalore (scch-05), awarding a compensation of rs. 1,37,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of petition till date of deposit.) ajit j. gunjal, j., 1. both these appeals have been referred to us by an order of reference dated 19.06.2009. we presume that the matter is referred to us under section 9 of the high court act and rules. the order of reference would read as under: “ ……….i deem it appropriate to direct the registry, to place the record of these two appeals before my lord the honorable chief.....
Judgment:

(Prayer: This M.F.A. is filed under Section 173(1) of MV Act against the Judgment and Award dated 27.11.2006 passed in MVC No.7158/04 on the file of Additional Judge, Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-V, Court of Small Causes, Metropolitan Area, Bangalore (SCCH-05), awarding a compensation of Rs. 1,37,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% P.A. from the date of petition till date of deposit.)

Ajit J. Gunjal, J.,

1. Both these appeals have been referred to us by an order of reference dated 19.06.2009. We presume that the matter is referred to us under Section 9 of the High Court Act and Rules. The order of reference would read as under:

“ ……….I deem it appropriate to direct the registry, to place the record of these two appeals before my lord the Honorable Chief Justice, with a request to refer the matters to the Division Bench for resolving the conflict and to pronounce on the issue authoritatively………”

2. The vexed question in these two appeals is with reference to reimbursement of the medical bills in a claim petition under the heading of medical expenses.

3. These appeals are by the Insurance Company questioning the common judgment and separate awards dated 27.11.2006 passed in MVC No. 7156/2004, MVC No. 7157/2004, and MVC No.7158/2004. The 1st respondent in all these appeals and another had filed claim petitions under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 claiming compensation on account of injuries sustained by them in a road traffic accident, which had occurred on 21.06.2004. The claim petitions were contested by the appellants and issues were framed based on the pleadings of the parties. The claimants got examined themselves in all the claim petitions, so also the Doctors. On the basis of the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, the Tribunal has granted compensations of Rs. 2,04,000/- in MVC No. 7156/2004, Rs.1,96,000/- in MVC 7157/2004 and in MVC 7158/2004 a sum of Rs. 1,37,000/- has been awarded. In MVC No. 7156/2004 a sum of Rs.1,14,000/- has been awarded as medical expenses, in MVC No. 7157/2004 a sum of Rs. 1,19,600/- has been awarded as medical expenses whereas in MVC 7158/2004 a sum of Rs. 97,000/- is awarded as medical expenses. Indeed these headings would take it into its fold conveyance, extra nourishment etc. The insurer is questioning the judgment and award passed in these claim petitions on the ground that the compensation determined is excessive and is not commensurate with the injuries suffered. But however the main contention, it appears as could be found from the reference order is only in respect of the compensation, which is determined under heading of medical expenses.

4. The reference order discloses that the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shaheed Ahmed V/s. Shankaranarayana Bhat and another reported in ILR 2008 KAR 3277 has observed that the amount received by the claimant under the Mediclaim policy will not come in the way of claiming medical expenses. But however, another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Binup Kumar R. V/s. Prabhakar H.G. and another reported in 2010 ACJ 2742 has observed that the amount claimed by the claimants under the Mediclaim policy will have to be deducted while awarding damages under the heading of medical expenses inasmuch as there cannot be a double payment under the very same head. The learned Single Judge in Shaheed Ahmed’s case has pressed into service a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Helen C. Rebello and others V/s. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Another reported in 1999 ACJ 10 wherein the Apex Court has ruled that the amount received by the claimants under the Life Insurance Policy, on the death of the insured is not required to be deducted from the compensation to be determined under the Motor Vehicles Act.

5. Indeed, the question which is posed to us is, whether the medical expenses incurred by the injured, who has taken a Mediclaim policy can seek reimbursement of the medical expenses expended by him both under the Mediclaim Policy as well as the amount, which is claimed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act.

6. Mr. C.R. Ravishankar, learned counsel appearing for the insurer, in support of the plea that there will be double payment inasmuch as there would be unjust enrichment, contends that the decision of the learned Single Judge to hold that the claimants can claim damages both under the Mediclaim Policy as well as under the claim petition does not lay down the correct law and that the decision of the Apex Court is only with reference to the Insurance Policy, which the insured had taken on his life. He further submits that, if the claimants are permitted to claim compensation under the heading of medical expenses both under the Mediclaim Policy as well as under the Motor Vehicles Act, it would amount to double payment and unjust enrichment.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents-claimants, in support of the plea that the claimants are entitled to claim compensation both under the Mediclaim Policy as well as under the Motor Vehicles Act, submits that identical view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. He submits that having regard to the ruling of the Apex Court as well as the learned Single Judge and the ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the award passed by the Tribunal does not warrant interference and the Court should lean in favour of the opinion rendered in Shaheed Ahmed’s case.

8. Undisputedly in the case on hand, the insurer is not questioning the determination of the award under the other heads i.e., pain and suffering, loss of income during treatment period and loss of amenities. The cudgel of the insurer appears to be only in respect of the medical expenses, wherein the claimants have claimed both under the Mediclaim Policy as well as under the Motor Vehicles Act.

9. It is not disputed before us that the claimants in all the claim petitions have suffered personal injuries. Indeed the compensation or the damages in respect of personal injuries are required to be broadly classified into two classes; one is pecuniary and another is non-pecuniary. The heads under non-pecuniary damages are pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life. The pecuniary damages are where the actual amount is expended by the claimant. The medical expenses would fall under this genre i.e., pecuniary loss sustained by the injured person. Undoubtedly, in the case on hand, the claimants in all the appeals have taken Mediclaim Policy. In all these claim petitions the claimants have undergone various treatments and have incurred medical expenses. Indeed the claimants are entitled to recover all the expenses reasonably incurred in the treatment of their injuries. This includes fees for medical advice and for surgical operations, the cost of treatment and care in a hospital or nursing home, and the cost of surgical appliances and of drugs and other prescriptions. Presumably, the cost of a holiday for convalescence is also admissible, if the holiday is reasonably taken, on medical advice, as part of the treatment. Fresh air and good food can be curative factors just as much as medicine.

10. When considering whether an item should be set off, it helps to go back to basic principles. Damages for financial loss are assessed so as to give compensation for the actual loss in money which the claimant has sustained or will sustain. In the case of British Transport Commissioner V/s. Gourley reported in 1955 (3) All E.R. 796 has observed thus:

“The basic principle, so far as loss of earnings and out of pocket expenses are concerned, is that the injured person should be placed in the same financial position so far as can be done by an award of money as he would have been had the accident not happened……”

11. The second question arises when, because of the accident, the claimant would receive some benefit, which he would not otherwise have received. There is no such universal rule that all such benefits should be set-off as against financial loss. Prima facie, it has been said, such a benefit should be taken into account to arrive at the total loss, but there are number of exceptions. The House of Lords in the case of Hussain V/s. New Taplow Paper Mills Limited, reported in 1988(1) A11ER 541 has observed thus:

“The question whether the payments under the long-term sickness benefit scheme were deductible in assessing damages awarded to an employee for loss of earnings was to be determined according to whether, after the first 13 weeks of incapacity, the payments were to be made for merely a few weeks or for the rest of the employee’s working life. The payments made under the scheme by the defendants in the first weeks after the expiry of the period of 13 weeks of continuous incapacity were indistinguishable in character from the sick pay which the plaintiff received during the first 13 weeks, since they were payable, under a term of the plaintiff’s contract, by the defendants to the plaintiff qua employees as a partial substitute for earnings and were the very antithesis of a pension, which was payable only after employment ceased. The fact that the defendants happened to have insured their liability to meet those contractual commitments as they arose did not affect the issue in any way. Accordingly, the benefits were to be brought into account and deducted from the awards for pre-trial and future loss of earnings.”

12. The general law is that where a claimant’s medical expenses have been paid for him under a private medical insurance scheme to which he subscribes, which is run by the insurance companies, the question of whether he is entitled nevertheless to claim the expenses as part of his damages is a question which does not arise because the insurances under these schemes, unlike the accident policies considered when dealing with loss of earning capacity are regarded as indemnity insurances which entitle the insurers themselves to recover their outlays directly from the tortfeasor through the medium of subrogation. Thus, the injured party does not have any stand to claim the medical expenses. He has been made whole by his insurers who in their turn step into his shoes and make the claim for the monies expended by them. Indeed the insurer’s monies are required to be classified broadly under the two categories. One is the medical insurance towards the amount expended towards the treatment for the injuries suffered. The other could be the accident insurance policy, the monies from which he could deploy as he cares between the payment of his medical expenses and the replenishment of his loss earnings or which indeed he may spend in any other way he chooses. In that case on hand, there shall not be any deduction.

13. Undoubtedly, the claimant in entitled to damages for the medical expenses reasonably incurred by him as a result of the injury. No authority is required to support this statement for cases are legion which include such outlays in the damages awarded. Expenses of medical treatment, of attendance of Doctors and Nurses, of medicines and appliances, of hospital fees, of transportation to the Hospital of nursing attendance between the place of injury and the claimant’s home; these are all recoverable. The only condition is that they should be reasonable, a condition implied in the reference to reasonableness. Both the expenses already incurred at the time of the trial and prospective expenses are recoverable and the rules of procedure require that the expenses already incurred and paid be pleaded as special damage and the prospective expenses as general damage, the division, which depends purely on the point of the time that the case comes for hearing, implies no substantive differences.

14. With this background, we are required to look into the two decisions, which are referred to us. In Shaheed Ahmed’s case the learned Single Judge of this Court placed reliance a decision rendered by the Apex Court Helen C. Rebello and others V/s. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Another reported in 1999 ACJ 10. What fell for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the amount received by the claimants under the Life Insurance Policy of deceased was deductible from the compensation computed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court has emphatically observed that the amount received by the claimants under the Life Insurance Policy is not at all deductible. Undoubtedly, the deceased therein had taken a Life Insurance Company Policy to which the deceased had contributed substantially every year, which is more popularly called as premium. Any amount, which is received or receivable by the claimants is only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction. The Apex Court in the said decision has observed thus:

“Thus, it would not include that which claimants receives on account of other forms of death, which he would have received even apart even from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received (sic.) out of such insurances on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso of section 95.”

The Apex Court, in the very same decision has further observed thus:

“It provides where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident in spite of no fault of the owner of the vehicle, an amount of compensation fixed therein is payable to claimant by such owner of the vehicle. Section 92-B ensures that the claim for under Section 92-A is in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect whereof under any other provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.”

15. In our view that the decision of Apex Court is with reference to the claim petition where the claimants’ husband/father died in the accident. Undoubtedly, the deceased had taken a life insurance policy. It is also to be noticed that the deceased had paid the premiums. The condition of the policy was that the deceased, if he survived could be entitled for the policy amount i.e., the sum assured and in case he did not survive before the policy matured then his kith and kin i.e., the wife and children are entitled for the sum assured. Indeed in these circumstances, the Apex Court was of the view that the question of deducting the amount, which the claimants received under the Life Insurance Policy did not arise but however, in the case on hand, claimants had taken a Mediclaim Policy. The said Mediclaim Policy was alive at the time of the accident and it was for a period of one year. After the conclusion of one year, the policy would lapse and the insurer is required to take a fresh policy.

16. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Binup Kumar R. V/s Prabhakar H.G. and another reported in 2010 ACJ 2742 was of the view that the claimants cannot get the benefit both under the Mediclaim policy as well as under the Act. The learned Single Judge has also drawn as analogy in the case of a Government Servant inasmuch as whatever the amount a Government Servant gets reimbursed from his employer, the said amount will be deducted from out of the total amount arrived at by the Tribunal and the balance will have to be paid to him. On the same lines, whatever the amount the claimant gets from any scheme like Mediclaim etc., the said amount will have to be deducted from the actual amount payable to the claimant.

17. Insofar as the two decisions on which the claimants would placed reliance is the Full Bench ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Kashiram Mathur and others V/s. Sardar Rajendra Singh and another reported in 1983 ACJ 152 has opined that there shall not be any deductions in respect of the amount, which is received under the (1) Life Insurance Policy (2) Provident Fund; (3) Family Pension; (4) Gratuity. Insofar as the ex-gratia payment is concerned, the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was of the view that it is deductible from the amount of compensation. The Madhya Pradesh High Court was of the view that the amount, which is receivable by the claimants under Life Insurance Policy cannot be deducted for the reason that the said amount of Insurance is under a contract and for which deceased had paid premiums. The receipt of such amount is not deductible from the damages payable to them. The deceased had not insured himself and paid premiums all the years during his lifetime for the benefit of the tort-feaser. This sum represents his thrift for his own benefit and for the benefit of his family. Thus, the tort-feaser could not seek advantage out of this receipt.

Provident fund constitutes, that which the deceased had himself deposited out of his salary for the rainy day. This amount was payable to him and the family would have been benefited even if the deceased were alive. The amount was not an advantage by reason of his death. The principle as applicable in case of Insurance Amount will apply to payment of Provident Fund and this sum is not deductible from compensation.

Gratuity under the conditions of service was the right of the deceased employee after completing certain years of service and if he survived, he would have received the same and his dependants would have taken advantage thereof. Payment of gratuity was not necessarily consequential to his death but was otherwise also payable to him and therefore this sum is also not deductible from compensation.

A Family pension is payable on the basis of the contribution made by the employee in some from or other or it may be entirely paid by the employer. If the pension is non-contributory, i.e., paid by the employer on his own, a deduction could be made only if the Tribunal has considered all the probable benefits available to the deceased in his full span of life while determining the amount of compensation i.e., probable increments to the deceased in salary and dearness allowance, prospects of his possibility of useful employment of retirement, then deduction on account of family pension paid to the claimants can be made. But however, otherwise, the family pension is not deductible. We are in respectful agreement with the opinion rendered by the Full Bench.

18. The tests to be applied for determining the ‘pecuniary advantage’ which has to be deducted from the amount of compensation in a case of death are:

(1) Onus is on the insurer to establish that some pecuniary benefit or reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit to the claimants, is resulting from the death of the deceased.

(2) Damages to be awarded to the claimants are compensatory and not punitive. Therefore, the test that no advantage should accrue to the wrong-doer would not be applicable.

(3) Where death has merely accelerated the receipt of benefits, which the claimants would have, in any case, received at some future date in such cases pecuniary benefits come to the claimants not by reason of the death. The pecuniary advantage received by the claimants is the advantage gained by acceleration of their interest.

(4) Benefits received from the employer, in some cases may be held to come to the claimants by reason of death. But, if the benefits are shown to have been received merely out of consideration for these claimants, e.g., contributions by co-workers to relieve the needs of the claimants, then such benefits cannot be held to have been received merely by reason of death of the deceased.

(5) Lastly, if there is any doubt as to whether the balancing principle extends to any class of benefit not covered by any binding authority, the doubt has to be resolved in favour of the claimants inasmuch as in such a case the defendant must be held to have failed to discharge the burden placed on him to justify such deduction.

19. With reference to the deductions under the Mediclaim, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation V/s. Priyank reported in 2000 ACJ 701, placing reliance on the full bench decision has observed that the amount received by the insured under the Mediclaim policy is not deductible inasmuch as the claimant has received these amount under the contract of insurance, for which he had paid premium. We are unable to persuade ourselves agree to the opinion rendered by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, moreso having regard to the fact that the Full Bench had ruled and classified as to what are the amounts, which are deductible and the amounts which are not deductible.

20. Indeed an injured person cannot claim benefit out of his own misfortune. He cannot claim medical expenses under the Mediclaim policy and also claim damages in the nature of amount expended for medical treatment under the claim petition, which is filed under the Motor Vehicles Act. In similar, if not identical circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation V/s. Anantharam Singh reported in ILR 1996 KAR 1088 has observed that once a claim is satisfied with respect to the damages caused to the car by the insurer, the question of the owner of the car claiming damages as against the tort-feasor before the Claims Tribunal does not arise inasmuch as the cost of repair having been already recovered through the insurer, the claimant or the owner of the car cannot claim compensation under the claim petition filed under the Act. It is useful to extract the observations made by the Division Bench, which would read as under:

“In the above state of evidence, we find no justification for the Tribunal to award a compensation of Rs.50,754,50 to the respondent herein. It is not the case of the respondent that he had incurred any expenses towards the repair charges of the damaged car, nor it is his case that he had suffered any loss an account of the sale of the damaged car to any person. On the other hand, it appears to be a case where the Insurance Company, with whom the car had been insured at the time of the accident, had settled the entire claim of the deceased owner of the car as well as the liability of the Bank, with whom the car had been hypothecated for the loan borrowed by the deceased. There is also a positive admission by P.W.1 himself that the case was taken over by the Insurer itself and that he had never become the R.C. Holder of the car. That being so, we are unable to sustain the Award made by the Tribunal in favour of the present respondent.”

21. In fact an identical question fell for consideration before another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Harkhu Bhat and others V/s. Jiyaram and others reported in 2005 ACJ 1332 wherein two trucks were involved in an accident causing damage to the property. A claim petition was lodged under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Division Bench observed that when the owner of the Truck received compensation in full and final settlement of his claim from the Insurance Company, the question of he claiming compensations for an identical relief under the Act in a claim petition does not arise. It is useful to extract the observations made by this Court:

It is not in dispute that the vehicle owned by the claimant in M.V.C. No.3 of 1990 had suffered extensive damage on account of the collision but it is also admitted that the vehicle being insured with one of (sic.) the other insurance companies, the damage was assessed and paid. The order passed by the Tribunal further shows that the payment was received by the claimant in full and final settlement of his claim without any reservation or demur. In the obsence of any material to show that the claim paid by the other insurance company represented a part only of the total damage, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim for any further payment.

22. In the case on hand, the facts are almost similar. It is not in dispute that in all the claim petitions, the claimants had taken the Mediclaim Policies and they have claimed the amount under the policy. We are of the view that the question of the claimants claiming compensation in the claim petitions, which is filed under the Act for the amount expended by them for the treatment, certainly cannot be granted. The medical expenses as observed, is classified as a pecuniary loss. Pecuniary loss in its context means that the actual amount, which is expended by the claimant for treatment. If the said amount has been paid by the insurer under the Mediclaim plicy, the question of the claimant claiming the very same amount for the very same purpose, which is inclusive of the expenses, which are incurred by him for hospitalization and for his treatment does not arise. Undoubtedly, if the amount, which is received by the claimant under the Mediclaim policy falls short of the actual expenses expended by him, it is always open for him to claim the difference of amount spent from the Tribunal. But however, he cannot claim compensation under both the Mediclaim policy as well as the claim petition filed under the Act. The decision of the Apex Court in Hellen C. Rebello’s case was in respect of the Life Insurance Policy and not in respect of a Mediclaim policy and therefore the said decision is distinguishable.

23. Having said so, we are of the view that the amount received by the claimant under the Mediclaim policy is required to be deducted from the total compensation awardable to the claimants under the head medical expenses. Indeed we hasten to add, if the claimant has not received any amount under the Mediclaim policy, the Tribunal is required to assess the amount expended by the claimant for the medical expenses and suitably award with reference to the bills produced by them. We also observe that if the amount awarded under the Mediclaim policy is much less than the actual amount expended by the claimant towards medical expenses, the shortfall or the balance is also required to be made good by the tort-feasor. Therefore the determination of compensation on the head of medical expenses would in any case have to be made by the Tribunal. In other words, if the amount received under a Mediclaim policy is less than what has been determined by the Tribunal, the former would have to be deducted from the latter. On the other hand, if the amount received under the Mediclaim policy is higher than what is determined by the Tribunal, then no compensations under the head of medical expenses can be awarded by the Tribunal. We hasten to add that any compensation received by the injured claimant on account of an accident policy cannot be deducted from the compensation determined by the Tribunal. Also the determination of compensation on incidental charges is independent of the determination towards medical expenses and has to be paid by the tortfeasor without any reference to a Mediclaim policy that may be obtained by the claimant.

24. In M.F.A. No. 15422/2007, which refers to MVC No. 7156/2004 is concerned, we notice that the question which is posed to us never fell for consideration. Having regard to the injuries sustained by the claimant, which is evidenced by Ex.P2 that she had suffered Type 1 compound fracture of right humerus and Simth’s fracture right distal radius, Ex.P1 discloses that the claimant had taken treatment in Apollo Hospital from 21.06.2004 to 28.06.2004 and also from 01.07.2004 to 18.07.2004. The claimant has undergone open reduction and internal fixation and closed reduction and external fixation for the fractures on 22.06.2004.

25. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances and also the nature of injuries, we find that the total compensation of Rs.2,04,000/-, which is awarded is just and proper in the circumstances of the case and it does not warrant interference.

26. Insofar as M.F.A.6952/2007 which refers to MVC 7157/2004 is concerned, we are of the view that the compensation, which is determined at Rs. 1,96,600/- is just and proper in the circumstances of the case.

27. In M.V.C. 7157/2004, we notice that the claimant had suffered grievious injuries. Ex.P12 is the Wound Certificate issued from Sagar Apollo Hospital, which discloses that the petitioner had sustained facture of surgical neck of humerus left and fracture and dislocation of right hip. The Tribunal has taken into consideration the nature of the injuries, the amount spent towards medical expenses, pain and suffering, the loss of amenities and has awarded a total sum of Rs. 1,96,600/- which we are of the view is not on the higher side and it does not call for interference.

28. Insofar as M.F.A. No.6950/2007 which refers to M.V.C. No.7158/2004 is concerned, the medical expenses incurred by the claimant is Rs.91,000/- and the compensation awarded is Rs. 97,000/-. It is not in dispute that a sum of Rs.83,845.91 spent towards medical treatment of the claimant has been reimbursed under the Mediclaim policy. Hence, we propose to deduct the said amount from the total compensation awarded under the Heading of medical expenses. If Rs.83,845.91 is deducted from Rs.97,000-83,845 the amount would work out to Rs.13,155/-. The question, which is posed before us would arise only in MVC 7158/2004.

29. Hence, the following order:

(a) M.F.A. Nos. 15422/2007 and 6952/2007 stand dismissed.

(b) M.F.A. 6950/2007 stands allowed in part and the amount, which is reimbursed under the Mediclaim is liable to deducted from the total compensation awardable under the heading of medical expenses as determined by the Tribunal and as indicated above. The reference is accordingly answered.

All the appeals stand disposed of accordingly.