T. Subramanyam and Others Vs. G.Bhaskar Hussainaiah and Another - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/950432
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided OnApr-16-2012
Case NumberMACMA NO. 149 OF 2005
Judge R. KANTHA RAO
AppellantT. Subramanyam and Others
RespondentG.Bhaskar Hussainaiah and Another
Excerpt:
this appeal arises out of the order dated 13.10.2004 passed by the motor accidents claims tribunal-cum-iii additional district judge, kurnool in m.v.o.p.no.201 of 2003. 2. the claimants are the appellants. originally the first appellant filed the claim petition under section 166 of the motor vehicles act seeking compensation of rs.2,00,000/- for amputation of his left leg as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident. after the amputation, the injury was not healed up and ultimately it resulted in the death of the first appellant. subsequent to his death, his wife and children got themselves impleaded in the claim petition as his legal representatives and they prayed for granting compensation on account of the death of the first appellant. they also filed an amendment petition seeking enhancement of claim to rs.5 lakhs which was allowed by the learned tribunal. 3. the learned tribunal made an enquiry into the claim, during the course of which, the wife of the deceased was examined as pw.1, a private medical practitioner was examined as pw.2 and exs.a1 to a15 were marked. on behalf of the respondents, senior assistant in the insurance company was examined as rw1. 4. it was the case of the claimants that on 07.06.2001 at 4.00 pm while the first appellant, (the deceased) the fourth appellant, wife of the deceased and two others viz b.venkata lakshmi devi and mohan were proceeding to the bus stand and when they reached near andhra bank, nandyal at about 04.00 pm, an auto bearing no.ap 21 t 6376 driven in a rash and negligent manner came from behind and dashed the deceased, due to which the left leg of the deceased was fractured and he also received some other injuries. in the first instance, he was shifted to the hospital of pw2, who is a private medical practitioner. from there, he was taken to the government hospital, nandyal, and then to the government general hospital, kurnool 2/3rd of his left leg was amputated, but the injury was not healed up and ultimately as a result of infection of the injury he died. the accident occurred on 07.06.2001 and pw.1, the wife of the deceased lodged first information report on 22.07.2001 i.e. nearly 45 days after the accident. the learned tribunal upheld the contention of the second respondent/insurance company that the auto bearing no.ap 21 t 6376 was not at all involved in the accident and a false claim had been laid against the insurance company in collusion with the owner and driver of the auto and also traffic police, nandyal. 5. having arrived at the said conclusion, the learned tribunal dismissed the entire claim made by the appellants without answering the other issues as to the quantum of compensation. 6. challenging the said order passed by the tribunal below, the claimants preferred the present appeal. 7. heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/insurance company. 8. in a case where there is a delay in lodging the first information report in respect of the accident, the court has to examine the facts and circumstances of the case carefully to arrive at a decision taking a broad and comprehensive view of the matter. there may be cases where being under the grief caused by the consequences of the accident, the victims may not be in a position to lodge the first information report promptly. there may also be cases where, being unable to find out the actual vehicle involved in the accident, the claimants resorting to implicate some vehicle or the other which had been insured validly with an insurance company to make a claim. in cases of this nature, the court has to be extremely cautious in evaluating the facts and circumstances and a view has to be ultimately taken having regard to the human’s conduct, objective analysis of facts and evidence and the probability factor. 9. pw.1, the wife of the deceased explained the delay in the claim petition as well as in her evidence stating that soon after the accident her husband (first appellant) was shifted to private hospital of pw.2 where he underwent treatment from 27.06.2001 to 05.07.2001, thereafter on the advice of pw.2, he was shifted to the government hospital, nandyal where he was treated as inpatient from 13.06.2001 to16.06.2001 and on the advise of the doctors there he was shifted to government general hospital, kurnool for better treatment where he had undergone treatment as inpatient from 16.06.2001 to 27.06.2001. according to pw.1, while the first appellant was undergoing treatment in government hospital, kurnool, 2/3rd of his left leg was amputated and he was discharged on 27.06.2001. she further stated before the tribunal that once again he was admitted in the government general hospital, kurnool where he took treatment as inpatient from 27.06.2001 to 05.07.2001 as the injury was not healed up. thereafter, he was treated by pw.2 from 02.08.2001 to 08.08.2001 for the infection. again he was admitted as inpatient of pw.2 and was treated there from 05.09.2001 to 14.09.2001. ultimately, as the infection was not cured, his health was deteriorated and he died on 17.02.2002 i.e. eight months 10 days after the accident. thus, according to pw1, on account of the prolonged treatment, the first appellant had undergone, there occurred delay of 45 days in lodging the first information report. 10. the learned tribunal did not accept the explanation offered by the wife of the deceased on the ground that her version in the first information report and the chief examination is at variance with the version in the cross examination. the discrepancy pointed out by the learned tribunal is that in ex.a.1 report and her evidence in the chief examination, she stated that she and her husband and others were proceeding to apsrtc bus stand, but in the cross examination, she stated that they were all travelling in an auto and at the place of accident, her husband got down from the auto and in the meanwhile, the auto belonging to the first respondent bearing no. ap 21 t 6376 came from behind and hit her husband. i do not think that the discrepancy pointed out is a material one going to the root of the case. the entire version of pw.1 if considered would appear that initially they were travelling in the auto, got down and were proceeding by walk, the offending auto came from behind and hit the deceased. after long lapse of time, pw1 could not have been in a position to give minute details, which resulted in the accident. therefore, the learned tribunal in my view had unnecessarily indulged in microscopic examination of evidence of pw.1 as to the explanation regarding the delay in lodging the first information report which approach is totally erroneous and uncalled for in an enquiry in claim case under section 166 of the motor vehicles act for which a summary procedure is contemplated. 11. the learned tribunal further expressed the view that as the report was lodged 45 days after the accident, pw.1 could not have remembered the number of the auto and the name of the driver and furnished the same in the fir itself. according to the learned tribunal if really pw.1 knew the number of the auto and the name of the driver of the auto, she would have stated the same before the medical officers. i do not accede to the view expressed by the learned tribunal. when the accident takes place, normally the victims of the accident would make enquiries of the offending vehicle and then only would be able to ascertain either the number of the auto or the name of the driver or owner of the auto. since the strict rules of evidence have no application for the proceedings before the tribunal under the motor vehicles act, the evidence of pw.1 given basing on the version of eye witnesses to the accident as to the number of the auto and the identity of the driver of the auto can be relied on and taken into consideration. the approach of the learned tribunal that it was not possible for pw.1 to observe the number of the vehicle at the time of accident is unrealistic and prompted by misconceived notions. the victims might have furnished particulars of the offending vehicle after ascertaining them from the persons, who witnessed the accident. in the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that the first appellant received fracture to his left leg in an auto accident. the appellants/claimants produced the entire record relating to the prolonged medical treatment of the first appellant before the tribunal. further, against the first respondent, who was the driver of the offending vehicle, the police filed charge sheet, after making thorough investigation in to the offence. the first respondent/driver admitted the offence before the magistrate and paid the fine imposed by the magistrate. this important fact has been overlooked by the learned tribunal below on the ground that findings of the criminal court are not binding on the civil court or tribunal. the learned tribunal mentioned in its order that it could not place any reliance on ex.a.3 certified copy of the calendar and judgment, according to which, the first respondent/driver of the offending vehicle was convicted by the magistrate and was imposed fine, since the findings of the criminal court are not binding on the civil court or the tribunal. the learned tribunal also expressed the view that pw.1 in her evidence stated that there were number of eyewitnesses to the accident, but she failed to examine any independent witness to the accident and her solitary testimony cannot be relied upon in view of the delay in lodging the first information report. 12. the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/insurance company relied on a decision in gurappa v goudappagonda and another (2009(acj)293)wherein the learned single judge of high court of karnataka held having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before him that non lodging of first information report before the police at the earliest point of time about the accident justified the tribunal in dismissing the claim petition on the ground that the claimant failed to establish negligence of the motorcyclist. 13. but, in the case before the learned single judge, the crucial aspect was that there is a mention made by the doctor in the letter written by the doctor to the police vide ex.p.15 stating that the deceased sustained head injury as he slipped from the steps. this crucial aspect might have prompted the learned single judge to take the view that the claimant failed to establish the negligence of the motorcyclist. 14. the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case since the facts under the appeal are entirely different to the facts before the learned single judge. 15. on the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/claimants in support of his contention that the delay in lodging the first information report cannot be a ground to reject the claim made by the claimants relied on the following judgments. (1) manoj v samundar singh and others (2005 acj 520)wherein the injured lodged first information report one year after the accident and a criminal case was filed against the driver after investigation, eyewitnesses proved the accident and the driver admitted that there was accident while he was driving the jeep and the injured sustained injuries. the division bench of the madhya pradesh high court, indore bench held that the jeep driver was rash and negligent and caused the accident, the order passed by the tribunal dismissing the claim as the accident had not been reported to the police immediately held not proper. 16. (2) jaimal singh and another v state of rajasthan and others (1994 acj 447)wherein the learned single judge of high court of punjab and haryana at chandigarh held that non registration of case by the police against the driver of offending vehicle and non recording the statements of eyewitnesses after some enquiry is no ground to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle or that the said vehicle was not involved in the accident. 17. (3) ravi v badrinarayan and others (2011) 4 scc 693)wherein the supreme court held as follows: “it is well settled that delay in lodging the fir cannot be a ground to doubt the claimant’s case. knowing the indian conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to first rush to the police station immediately after an accident. human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance to get the victim treated rather than to rush to the police station. under such circumstances, they are not expected to act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the fir with the police. delay in lodging the fir thus, cannot be the ground to deny justice to the victim.” 18. thus, the courts while dealing with the cases wherein either there is inordinate delay in lodging the first information report or where there is no first information report registered, to record a finding about the involvement of the vehicle in the accident have to assess the evidence objectively and on broad probabilities of the case. in claim cases under motor vehicles act, summary procedure is contemplated to prove the respective versions of the parties. therefore, the victims, who are under a duty to prove the accident, need not prove the same beyond reasonable doubt just like the prosecution in a criminal trial. the court has to make a decision basing on the evidence forthcoming before it as to whether the version put-forth by the victims in proof of the accident is probable and has to see whether there is any reliable and dependable evidence to record a finding as to whether a particular vehicle was involved in the accident. 19. in the instant case, pw.1, who was proceeding with the first appellant/husband is an eyewitness to the accident and she is a natural witness. she stated in her evidence that apart from her, several persons witnessed the accident, therefore, it is not difficult for her to gather information about the vehicle involved in the accident. she being a natural witness is the proper person to speak about the involvement of the vehicle in the accident. the learned tribunal is totally unjustified in disbelieving her evidence on the ground that she is a solitary and interested witness. further, because of the prolonged treatment for which the deceased was subjected to, certainly pw.1 might not be in a position to lodge the first information report promptly. for that reason, her version before the tribunal need not be doubted. this apart, the police after thorough investigation filed a charge sheet against the first respondent/driver of the auto bearing no.ap 21 t 6376 for causing grievous hurt to the first appellant by his rash and negligent driving. furthermore, the firs respondent admitted in his evidence that he was convicted by the magistrate under section 338 ipc on his pleading guilty to the offence. though the judgment of the criminal court is not binding on the civil court or tribunal to record a finding, it is a valuable piece of evidence in proof of the accident, which shall not be completely overlooked by the leaned tribunal below without assigning any cogent reasons. in the absence of any satisfactory evidence adduced by the second respondent/insurance company which enables the court to draw an inference that the driver, owner of the vehicle and also the police colluded with the claimants, it is not possible to simply accept the contention of the second respondent/insurance company that the offending vehicle was in fact not involved in the accident. the learned tribunal brushed aside the material evidence with misconceived notions and totally ignored the nature of proof contemplated regarding the involvement of the vehicle in the accident in claim cases under section 166 of the motor vehicles act. the finding recorded by the tribunal is contrary to the evidence on record and the appreciation of evidence by the learned tribunal is contrary to the established norms. the finding of the learned tribunal is therefore, set aside and in this appeal it is held that the auto bearing no. ap 21 t 6376 was involved in the accident and the claimants by highly reliable and convincing evidence could be able to establish that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the auto bearing no. ap 21 t 6376 by the first respondent. consequently, the first respondent/owner of the offending vehicle and the second respondent/insurance company are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the claimants. 20. the next question to be determined is the quantum of compensation. 21. the deceased was aged 42 years. according to the claimants, he was caterer of food items for the functions and he was earning rs.4,500/- per month. but in proof of the said fact, they did not adduce any evidence. they claimed compensation of rs.5,00,000/- on account of his death. for the purpose of computing the compensation, in the absence of independent evidence adduced by the claimants about his income, i consider the income of the deceased at rs.3,000/- per month. his annual income comes to rs.3,000/- x 12 = rs.36,000/-. from this 1/3rd has to be deducted towards his personal and living expenses, which comes to rs.12,000/- and contribution to the family comes to rs.24,000/-. as per the judgment insarala varma and others v delhi transport corporation and another (2009 acj 1298), the multiplier relevant to the age of the deceased is ‘14’. to arrive at the loss of dependency, the above amount has to be capitalized with ‘14’ ie. rs.24,000/- x 14 = rs.3,36,000/-. since the deceased was subjected to prolonged treatment and was treated in various hospitals as mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, an amount of rs.50,000/- can be granted to the claimants for the medical expenses incurred by them for the treatment of the deceased before his death. this apart, the 4th claimant, who is the widow of the deceased is entitled for an amount of rs.10,000/- towards loss of consortium and the claimants are entitled for an amount of rs.5,000/- towards funeral expenses and a further sum of rs.5,000/- towards loss of estate. in all, the claimants are entitled for an amount of rs.3,36,000/- + rs. 50,000/- + rs.10,000/- + rs.5,000/- + rs.5,000/- = rs.4,06,000/- as compensation. the said compensation amount shall carry interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realistion. 22. the 4th claimant, who is the widow of the deceased is entitled to receive an amount of rs.2,06,000/- and the claimants 2 and 3 are entitled for an amount of rs.1,00,000/- each from out of the total compensation. 23. in the result, the appeal is partly allowed. there shall be no order as to costs.
Judgment:

This appeal arises out of the order dated 13.10.2004 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge, Kurnool in M.V.O.P.No.201 of 2003.

2. The claimants are the appellants. Originally the first appellant filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- for amputation of his left leg as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident. After the amputation, the injury was not healed up and ultimately it resulted in the death of the first appellant. Subsequent to his death, his wife and children got themselves impleaded in the claim petition as his legal representatives and they prayed for granting compensation on account of the death of the first appellant. They also filed an amendment petition seeking enhancement of claim to Rs.5 lakhs which was allowed by the learned Tribunal.

3. The learned Tribunal made an enquiry into the claim, during the course of which, the wife of the deceased was examined as PW.1, a private medical practitioner was examined as PW.2 and Exs.A1 to A15 were marked. On behalf of the respondents, Senior Assistant in the Insurance company was examined as RW1.

4. It was the case of the claimants that on 07.06.2001 at 4.00 PM while the first appellant, (the deceased) the fourth appellant, wife of the deceased and two others viz B.Venkata Lakshmi Devi and Mohan were proceeding to the bus stand and when they reached Near Andhra Bank, Nandyal at about 04.00 PM, an auto bearing No.AP 21 T 6376 driven in a rash and negligent manner came from behind and dashed the deceased, due to which the left leg of the deceased was fractured and he also received some other injuries. In the first instance, he was shifted to the hospital of PW2, who is a private medical practitioner. From there, he was taken to the Government Hospital, Nandyal, and then to the Government General Hospital, Kurnool 2/3rd of his left leg was amputated, but the injury was not healed up and ultimately as a result of infection of the injury he died. The accident occurred on 07.06.2001 and PW.1, the wife of the deceased lodged first information report on 22.07.2001 i.e. nearly 45 days after the accident. The learned Tribunal upheld the contention of the second respondent/Insurance company that the auto bearing No.AP 21 T 6376 was not at all involved in the accident and a false claim had been laid against the insurance company in collusion with the owner and driver of the auto and also traffic police, Nandyal.

5. Having arrived at the said conclusion, the learned Tribunal dismissed the entire claim made by the appellants without answering the other issues as to the quantum of compensation.

6. Challenging the said order passed by the Tribunal below, the claimants preferred the present appeal.

7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/insurance company.

8. In a case where there is a delay in lodging the first information report in respect of the accident, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances of the case carefully to arrive at a decision taking a broad and comprehensive view of the matter. There may be cases where being under the grief caused by the consequences of the accident, the victims may not be in a position to lodge the first information report promptly. There may also be cases where, being unable to find out the actual vehicle involved in the accident, the claimants resorting to implicate some vehicle or the other which had been insured validly with an insurance company to make a claim. In cases of this nature, the Court has to be extremely cautious in evaluating the facts and circumstances and a view has to be ultimately taken having regard to the human’s conduct, objective analysis of facts and evidence and the probability factor.

9. PW.1, the wife of the deceased explained the delay in the claim petition as well as in her evidence stating that soon after the accident her husband (first appellant) was shifted to private hospital of PW.2 where he underwent treatment from 27.06.2001 to 05.07.2001, thereafter on the advice of PW.2, he was shifted to the Government Hospital, Nandyal where he was treated as inpatient from 13.06.2001 to16.06.2001 and on the advise of the doctors there he was shifted to Government General Hospital, Kurnool for better treatment where he had undergone treatment as inpatient from 16.06.2001 to 27.06.2001. According to PW.1, while the first appellant was undergoing treatment in Government Hospital, Kurnool, 2/3rd of his left leg was amputated and he was discharged on 27.06.2001. She further stated before the Tribunal that once again he was admitted in the Government General Hospital, Kurnool where he took treatment as inpatient from 27.06.2001 to 05.07.2001 as the injury was not healed up. Thereafter, he was treated by PW.2 from 02.08.2001 to 08.08.2001 for the infection. Again he was admitted as inpatient of PW.2 and was treated there from 05.09.2001 to 14.09.2001. Ultimately, as the infection was not cured, his health was deteriorated and he died on 17.02.2002 i.e. eight months 10 days after the accident. Thus, according to PW1, on account of the prolonged treatment, the first appellant had undergone, there occurred delay of 45 days in lodging the first information report.

10. The learned Tribunal did not accept the explanation offered by the wife of the deceased on the ground that her version in the first information report and the chief examination is at variance with the version in the cross examination. The discrepancy pointed out by the learned Tribunal is that in Ex.A.1 report and her evidence in the chief examination, she stated that she and her husband and others were proceeding to APSRTC bus stand, but in the cross examination, she stated that they were all travelling in an auto and at the place of accident, her husband got down from the auto and in the meanwhile, the auto belonging to the first respondent bearing No. AP 21 T 6376 came from behind and hit her husband. I do not think that the discrepancy pointed out is a material one going to the root of the case. The entire version of PW.1 if considered would appear that initially they were travelling in the auto, got down and were proceeding by walk, the offending auto came from behind and hit the deceased. After long lapse of time, PW1 could not have been in a position to give minute details, which resulted in the accident. Therefore, the learned Tribunal in my view had unnecessarily indulged in microscopic examination of evidence of PW.1 as to the explanation regarding the delay in lodging the first information report which approach is totally erroneous and uncalled for in an enquiry in claim case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for which a summary procedure is contemplated.

11. The learned Tribunal further expressed the view that as the report was lodged 45 days after the accident, PW.1 could not have remembered the number of the auto and the name of the driver and furnished the same in the FIR itself. According to the learned Tribunal if really PW.1 knew the number of the auto and the name of the driver of the auto, she would have stated the same before the medical officers. I do not accede to the view expressed by the learned Tribunal. When the accident takes place, normally the victims of the accident would make enquiries of the offending vehicle and then only would be able to ascertain either the number of the auto or the name of the driver or owner of the auto. Since the strict rules of evidence have no application for the proceedings before the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, the evidence of PW.1 given basing on the version of eye witnesses to the accident as to the number of the auto and the identity of the driver of the auto can be relied on and taken into consideration. The approach of the learned Tribunal that it was not possible for PW.1 to observe the number of the vehicle at the time of accident is unrealistic and prompted by misconceived notions. The victims might have furnished particulars of the offending vehicle after ascertaining them from the persons, who witnessed the accident. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that the first appellant received fracture to his left leg in an auto accident. The appellants/claimants produced the entire record relating to the prolonged medical treatment of the first appellant before the Tribunal. Further, against the first respondent, who was the driver of the offending vehicle, the police filed charge sheet, after making thorough investigation in to the offence. The first respondent/driver admitted the offence before the Magistrate and paid the fine imposed by the Magistrate. This important fact has been overlooked by the learned Tribunal below on the ground that findings of the criminal court are not binding on the civil court or Tribunal. The learned Tribunal mentioned in its order that it could not place any reliance on Ex.A.3 certified copy of the calendar and judgment, according to which, the first respondent/driver of the offending vehicle was convicted by the Magistrate and was imposed fine, since the findings of the criminal Court are not binding on the civil Court or the Tribunal. The learned Tribunal also expressed the view that PW.1 in her evidence stated that there were number of eyewitnesses to the accident, but she failed to examine any independent witness to the accident and her solitary testimony cannot be relied upon in view of the delay in lodging the first information report.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/insurance company relied on a decision in GURAPPA v GOUDAPPAGONDA AND ANOTHER (2009(ACJ)293)wherein the learned Single Judge of High Court of Karnataka held having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before him that non lodging of first information report before the police at the earliest point of time about the accident justified the Tribunal in dismissing the claim petition on the ground that the claimant failed to establish negligence of the motorcyclist.

13. But, in the case before the learned single Judge, the crucial aspect was that there is a mention made by the doctor in the letter written by the doctor to the police vide Ex.P.15 stating that the deceased sustained head injury as he slipped from the steps. This crucial aspect might have prompted the learned single Judge to take the view that the claimant failed to establish the negligence of the motorcyclist.

14. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case since the facts under the appeal are entirely different to the facts before the learned single Judge.

15. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/claimants in support of his contention that the delay in lodging the first information report cannot be a ground to reject the claim made by the claimants relied on the following judgments. (1) MANOJ v SAMUNDAR SINGH AND OTHERS (2005 ACJ 520)wherein the injured lodged first information report one year after the accident and a criminal case was filed against the driver after investigation, eyewitnesses proved the accident and the driver admitted that there was accident while he was driving the jeep and the injured sustained injuries. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench held that the jeep driver was rash and negligent and caused the accident, the order passed by the Tribunal dismissing the claim as the accident had not been reported to the police immediately held not proper.

16. (2) JAIMAL SINGH AND ANOTHER v STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS (1994 ACJ 447)wherein the learned single Judge of High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh held that non registration of case by the police against the driver of offending vehicle and non recording the statements of eyewitnesses after some enquiry is no ground to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle or that the said vehicle was not involved in the accident.

17. (3) RAVI v BADRINARAYAN AND OTHERS (2011) 4 SCC 693)wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:

“It is well settled that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground to doubt the claimant’s case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to first rush to the police station immediately after an accident. Human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance to get the victim treated rather than to rush to the police station. Under such circumstances, they are not expected to act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR with the police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the ground to deny justice to the victim.”

18. Thus, the Courts while dealing with the cases wherein either there is inordinate delay in lodging the first information report or where there is no first information report registered, to record a finding about the involvement of the vehicle in the accident have to assess the evidence objectively and on broad probabilities of the case. In claim cases under Motor Vehicles Act, summary procedure is contemplated to prove the respective versions of the parties. Therefore, the victims, who are under a duty to prove the accident, need not prove the same beyond reasonable doubt just like the prosecution in a criminal trial. The Court has to make a decision basing on the evidence forthcoming before it as to whether the version put-forth by the victims in proof of the accident is probable and has to see whether there is any reliable and dependable evidence to record a finding as to whether a particular vehicle was involved in the accident.

19. In the instant case, PW.1, who was proceeding with the first appellant/husband is an eyewitness to the accident and she is a natural witness. She stated in her evidence that apart from her, several persons witnessed the accident, therefore, it is not difficult for her to gather information about the vehicle involved in the accident. She being a natural witness is the proper person to speak about the involvement of the vehicle in the accident. The learned Tribunal is totally unjustified in disbelieving her evidence on the ground that she is a solitary and interested witness. Further, because of the prolonged treatment for which the deceased was subjected to, certainly PW.1 might not be in a position to lodge the first information report promptly. For that reason, her version before the Tribunal need not be doubted. This apart, the police after thorough investigation filed a charge sheet against the first respondent/driver of the auto bearing No.AP 21 T 6376 for causing grievous hurt to the first appellant by his rash and negligent driving. Furthermore, the firs respondent admitted in his evidence that he was convicted by the Magistrate under Section 338 IPC on his pleading guilty to the offence. Though the judgment of the criminal Court is not binding on the civil Court or Tribunal to record a finding, it is a valuable piece of evidence in proof of the accident, which shall not be completely overlooked by the leaned Tribunal below without assigning any cogent reasons. In the absence of any satisfactory evidence adduced by the second respondent/insurance company which enables the Court to draw an inference that the driver, owner of the vehicle and also the police colluded with the claimants, it is not possible to simply accept the contention of the second respondent/insurance company that the offending vehicle was in fact not involved in the accident. The learned Tribunal brushed aside the material evidence with misconceived notions and totally ignored the nature of proof contemplated regarding the involvement of the vehicle in the accident in claim cases under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The finding recorded by the Tribunal is contrary to the evidence on record and the appreciation of evidence by the learned Tribunal is contrary to the established norms. The finding of the learned Tribunal is therefore, set aside and in this appeal it is held that the auto bearing No. AP 21 T 6376 was involved in the accident and the claimants by highly reliable and convincing evidence could be able to establish that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the auto bearing No. AP 21 T 6376 by the first respondent. Consequently, the first respondent/owner of the offending vehicle and the second respondent/insurance company are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the claimants.

20. The next question to be determined is the quantum of compensation.

21. The deceased was aged 42 years. According to the claimants, he was caterer of food items for the functions and he was earning Rs.4,500/- per month. But in proof of the said fact, they did not adduce any evidence. They claimed compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- on account of his death. For the purpose of computing the compensation, in the absence of independent evidence adduced by the claimants about his income, I consider the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- per month. His annual income comes to Rs.3,000/- x 12 = Rs.36,000/-. From this 1/3rd has to be deducted towards his personal and living expenses, which comes to Rs.12,000/- and contribution to the family comes to Rs.24,000/-. As per the judgment inSARALA VARMA AND OTHERS v DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER (2009 ACJ 1298), the multiplier relevant to the age of the deceased is ‘14’. To arrive at the loss of dependency, the above amount has to be capitalized with ‘14’ ie. Rs.24,000/- x 14 = Rs.3,36,000/-. Since the deceased was subjected to prolonged treatment and was treated in various hospitals as mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, an amount of Rs.50,000/- can be granted to the claimants for the medical expenses incurred by them for the treatment of the deceased before his death. This apart, the 4th claimant, who is the widow of the deceased is entitled for an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards loss of consortium and the claimants are entitled for an amount of Rs.5,000/- towards funeral expenses and a further sum of Rs.5,000/- towards loss of estate. In all, the claimants are entitled for an amount of Rs.3,36,000/- + Rs. 50,000/- + Rs.10,000/- + Rs.5,000/- + Rs.5,000/- = Rs.4,06,000/- as compensation. The said compensation amount shall carry interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realistion.

22. The 4th claimant, who is the widow of the deceased is entitled to receive an amount of Rs.2,06,000/- and the claimants 2 and 3 are entitled for an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- each from out of the total compensation.

23. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.