Hari Singh Thr. Lrs. and Another Vs. Gugan Thr. Lrs. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/948575
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided OnMay-16-2012
Case NumberRFA No.173 OF 1994
Judge SUNIL GAUR
AppellantHari Singh Thr. Lrs. and Another
RespondentGugan Thr. Lrs.
Excerpt:
order 1. impugned judgment of 9th december, 1993 apportions the compensation granted vide award no.20/85-86, in respect of acquisition of 4 bighas and 8 biswas of land in khasra no.12/1 and 13/5 of village pooth kalan, delhi (hereinafter referred to as the subject land) in equal share between the first party i.e. the appellants and the second party, i.e. the respondents, in proceedings under sections 30 and 31 of the land acquisition act, 1894. 2. appellants are the legal heirs of interested party no.1- sube singh son of khema (henceforth referred to as i.p. no.1), who claim to be the recorded owner of the subject land whereas, interested party no. 2- gugan son of duliya had claimed that he was in settled possession of the subject land since long and had thus become bhumidhar therein. respondents are the legal heirs of interested party no.2 – gugan (hereinafter referred to as ‘i.p.no.2’). 3. undisputedly, i.p.no.1 as well as i.p.no.2 were embroiled in proceedings under section 85 of delhi land reforms act, 1954 prior to the commencement of the acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land, but the proceedings under section 85 of the delhi land reforms act, 1954 could not reach to its logical end due to acquisition of the subject land. the finding returned in the impugned judgment is that though i.p.no.1 continued to be the bhumidhar of the subject land but i.p.no.2 was in its cultivating possession from the year 1978 till the year 1984 and for the prior period, i.e., in the years 1973 to 1975, i.p.no.1 has been also shown to be in possession of the subject land. 4. as regards the actual possession of the subject land at the time of its acquisition in the year 1984-85 is concerned, in view of the revenue record – khasra girdawari of 1984-85 (ex.ip1/3-c) being in favour of i.p.no.1, the finding returned by the reference court in the impugned judgment while relying upon the cross-examination of the concerned patwari (ipw1/4), is that it could not be conclusively said that actual possession of the subject land had passed on from i.p.no.2 to i.p.no.1. 5. learned counsel for the appellant assails the aforesaid findings in the impugned judgment by urging that the revenue entries (ex.ip-2/1 to ex.ip-2/3) and also revenue entries (ex.ip-2/6 to ex.ip-2/8) in favour of i.p.no.2 were not entered after complying with the delhi land revenue rules, and so these revenue entries are rendered invalid. to contend so, reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellants upon rule 56, rule 63(3) and rule 67 of delhi land reforms rules, 1954, as i.p.no.1 was not put to notice prior to the recording of the aforesaid revenue entries. 6. reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the appellants upon decisions in ‘ramchandra keshav adke (dead) by lrs. vs. govind joti chavare and others’, air 1975 sc 915; ‘sudhir engineering company vs. nitco roadways ltd.’, 1995 (34) drj 86; ‘shri raja durga singh of solon vs. tholu and others’, 1962 (lxiv) plr 837; ‘jai pal singh and others vs. smt. kapur kaur’, 1967 (lxix) plr 852; ‘newal vs. the financial commissioner punjab and others’, 1969 plj 169; ‘gurcharan singh and others vs. prithi singh and others’, air 1974 sc 223; ‘dr.mahesh chand sharma vs. smt.raj kumari sharma and others’, air 1996 sc 869; ‘hemaji waghaji jat vs. bhikhabhai khengarbhai harijan and ors.’, air 2009 sc 103; ‘tulsiram tukaram vs. k.l.pande and others’, air 1956 nagpur 11 to contend that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with the necessity of its proof and where the power is given to do a certain thing in a particular way, then it must be done in that way. it was also contended that there is no presumption of truth attached to the revenue entries and in case of conflict, the later revenue entry must prevail. the submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellants on the strength of the afore-cited decisions, is that the possession of a tress-passer even if adverse, cannot ripen into title to claim compensation under the land acquisition act, 1894 and there is no equity against the true owner and so, the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law and the entire compensation amount deserves to be granted to the appellants. 7. there was no representation on behalf of the respondents when this appeal was heard and with the assistance learned counsel for the appellants, the impugned judgment and the evidence on record was perused. 8. in the light of the legal position, as culled out from the decisions cited and upon scrutiny of the evidence on record, it emerges that there is presumptive value attached to the revenue entries and the presumption of correctness attached thereto, is rebuttable one. no doubt a later revenue entry prevails but it can be ignored if it is shown to be wrong. 9. reference court in the impugned judgment has relied upon the cross-examination of appellant’s witness - puran singh, the patwari who he has admitted that in the year 1984-85, as per directions of the higher authorities, he had no power to enter the possession of any other person other than the owner in the column of possession in the revenue entry. this explains the later revenue entry of the year 1984-85 being in favour of i.p. no.1 i.e. the appellants. 10. in the face of the afore-referred evidence, the reference court was justified in not relying upon later revenue entry (ex. i.p.1/3-c) showing appellants/ i.p. no.1 in possession of the subject land. the justification to do so is the fact that at the time of recording of the aforesaid revenue entry, proceedings under section 85 of the delhi land reforms act, 1954 were still pending and in view thereof, the possibility of respondents/ i.p. no.2 being dispossessed from the subject land is ruled out. this is being so said as the revenue entries prior to the initiation of the acquisition proceedings were in the name of the respondents/ i.p. no.2. 11. upon scrutiny of the evidence on record, it becomes evident that there is no basis to accept the contention of appellants’ counsel that the revenue entries in favour of the respondents/ i.p.no.2 were invalid. there is nothing on record to explain as to why the revenue entries in favour of the respondents/ i.p. no.2 were not challenged by the appellants/ i.p.no.1. 12. in this view of the matter, the revenue entries relied upon by the respondents/ i.p.no.2 cannot be ignored. since the presumption of correctness attached to the later revenue entry in favour of appellants/ i.p.no.1 stands rebutted, therefore, the reference court has committed no illegality in apportioning the compensation awarded equally between the appellants and the respondents in this appeal. thus, finding no merit in this appeal, it is dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Judgment:

ORDER

1. Impugned judgment of 9th December, 1993 apportions the compensation granted vide Award No.20/85-86, in respect of acquisition of 4 Bighas and 8 Biswas of land in Khasra No.12/1 and 13/5 of Village Pooth Kalan, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the subject land) in equal share between the first party i.e. the appellants and the second party, i.e. the respondents, in proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. Appellants are the legal heirs of Interested Party No.1- Sube Singh son of Khema (henceforth referred to as I.P. No.1), who claim to be the recorded owner of the subject land whereas, Interested Party No. 2- Gugan son of Duliya had claimed that he was in settled possession of the subject land since long and had thus become Bhumidhar therein. Respondents are the legal heirs of Interested Party No.2 – Gugan (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.No.2’).

3. Undisputedly, I.P.No.1 as well as I.P.No.2 were embroiled in proceedings under Section 85 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 prior to the commencement of the acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land, but the proceedings under Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 could not reach to its logical end due to acquisition of the subject land. The finding returned in the impugned judgment is that though I.P.No.1 continued to be the Bhumidhar of the subject land but I.P.No.2 was in its cultivating possession from the year 1978 till the year 1984 and for the prior period, i.e., in the years 1973 to 1975, I.P.No.1 has been also shown to be in possession of the subject land.

4. As regards the actual possession of the subject land at the time of its acquisition in the year 1984-85 is concerned, in view of the revenue record – Khasra Girdawari of 1984-85 (Ex.IP1/3-C) being in favour of I.P.No.1, the finding returned by the Reference Court in the impugned judgment while relying upon the cross-examination of the concerned Patwari (IPW1/4), is that it could not be conclusively said that actual possession of the subject land had passed on from I.P.No.2 to I.P.No.1.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant assails the aforesaid findings in the impugned judgment by urging that the revenue entries (Ex.IP-2/1 to Ex.IP-2/3) and also revenue entries (Ex.IP-2/6 to Ex.IP-2/8) in favour of I.P.No.2 were not entered after complying with the Delhi Land Revenue Rules, and so these revenue entries are rendered invalid. To contend so, reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellants upon Rule 56, Rule 63(3) and Rule 67 of Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954, as I.P.No.1 was not put to notice prior to the recording of the aforesaid revenue entries.

6. Reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the appellants upon decisions in ‘Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Govind Joti Chavare and others’, AIR 1975 SC 915; ‘Sudhir Engineering Company vs. Nitco Roadways Ltd.’, 1995 (34) DRJ 86; ‘Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon vs. Tholu and others’, 1962 (LXIV) PLR 837; ‘Jai Pal Singh and others vs. Smt. Kapur Kaur’, 1967 (LXIX) PLR 852; ‘Newal vs. The Financial Commissioner Punjab and others’, 1969 PLJ 169; ‘Gurcharan Singh and others vs. Prithi Singh and others’, AIR 1974 SC 223; ‘Dr.Mahesh Chand Sharma vs. Smt.Raj Kumari Sharma and others’, AIR 1996 SC 869; ‘Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and Ors.’, AIR 2009 SC 103; ‘Tulsiram Tukaram vs. K.L.Pande and others’, AIR 1956 Nagpur 11 to contend that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with the necessity of its proof and where the power is given to do a certain thing in a particular way, then it must be done in that way. It was also contended that there is no presumption of truth attached to the revenue entries and in case of conflict, the later revenue entry must prevail. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellants on the strength of the afore-cited decisions, is that the possession of a tress-passer even if adverse, cannot ripen into title to claim compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and there is no equity against the true owner and so, the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law and the entire compensation amount deserves to be granted to the appellants.

7. There was no representation on behalf of the respondents when this appeal was heard and with the assistance learned counsel for the appellants, the impugned judgment and the evidence on record was perused.

8. In the light of the legal position, as culled out from the decisions cited and upon scrutiny of the evidence on record, it emerges that there is presumptive value attached to the revenue entries and the presumption of correctness attached thereto, is rebuttable one. No doubt a later revenue entry prevails but it can be ignored if it is shown to be wrong.

9. Reference Court in the impugned judgment has relied upon the cross-examination of appellant’s witness - Puran Singh, the Patwari who he has admitted that in the year 1984-85, as per directions of the higher authorities, he had no power to enter the possession of any other person other than the owner in the column of possession in the revenue entry. This explains the later revenue entry of the year 1984-85 being in favour of I.P. No.1 i.e. the appellants.

10. In the face of the afore-referred evidence, the Reference Court was justified in not relying upon later revenue entry (Ex. I.P.1/3-C) showing appellants/ I.P. No.1 in possession of the subject land. The justification to do so is the fact that at the time of recording of the aforesaid revenue entry, proceedings under Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 were still pending and in view thereof, the possibility of respondents/ I.P. No.2 being dispossessed from the subject land is ruled out. This is being so said as the revenue entries prior to the initiation of the acquisition proceedings were in the name of the respondents/ I.P. No.2.

11. Upon scrutiny of the evidence on record, it becomes evident that there is no basis to accept the contention of appellants’ counsel that the revenue entries in favour of the respondents/ I.P.No.2 were invalid. There is nothing on record to explain as to why the revenue entries in favour of the respondents/ I.P. No.2 were not challenged by the appellants/ I.P.No.1.

12. In this view of the matter, the revenue entries relied upon by the respondents/ I.P.No.2 cannot be ignored. Since the presumption of correctness attached to the later revenue entry in favour of appellants/ I.P.No.1 stands rebutted, therefore, the Reference Court has committed no illegality in apportioning the compensation awarded equally between the appellants and the respondents in this appeal. Thus, finding no merit in this appeal, it is dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.