National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. - Court Judgment

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			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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			'respondent' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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[g.rajasuria, j.] tamil nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act. - section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- the respondents/landlords filed initially the rcop invoking section 10(2)(i) of the act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. if the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the rent controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of section 8 of the act. the tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
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			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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civil revision petition filed under section 25 of the tamil nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in rca no.1 of 2011 on the file of the principal subordinate court, rent control appellate authority, erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in rcop no.7 of 2007 on the file of rent controller, principal district munsif, erode.order1. animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in rca no.1 of 2011, by the learned principal subordinate judge, rent control appellate authority, erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in rcop no.7 of 2007 by the rent controller, principal district munsif, erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.2. a summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the.....

Judgment:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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			'respondent' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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8. The points for consideration are as to:

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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POINT NO.1:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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 8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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			'respondent' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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 21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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'Wilful'   deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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'Wilful default'   Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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 - done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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p.296   'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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 4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal & Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.

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			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
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			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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POINT NO.2:

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
		'findings' => '',
		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152   RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.

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			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

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			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
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			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
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		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
	(int) 67 => ''
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19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '928072',
			'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
			'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
			'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
			'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
			'court' => 'Chennai',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
			'findings' => '',
			'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">ORDER</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.1:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">POINT NO.2:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'National Insurance Co Ltd Vs National Insurance Co Ltd - Citation 928072 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '928072',
		'acts' => 'Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5), ',
		'appealno' => 'C.R.P.(NPD).No.2045 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012',
		'appellant' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'casenote' => '
[G.RAJASURIA, J.] Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - Section 10(2)(i), 10(3)(iii), 25, 8(5) -- The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants.',
		'caseanalysis' => '',
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Adv',
		'counseldef' => 'Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy, Adv',
		'court' => 'Chennai',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2012-07-25',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'G.RAJASURIA, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.</p><p>ORDER</p><p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.</p><p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:</p><p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.</p><p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.</p><p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.</p><p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.</p><p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.</p><p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:</p><p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.</p><p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.</p><p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.</p><p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.</p><p>8. The points for consideration are as to:</p><p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?</p><p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?</p><p>POINT NO.1:</p><p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:</p><p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.</p><p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.</p><p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)</p><p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.</p><p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.</p><p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:</p><p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;</p><p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;</p><p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.</p><p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.</p><p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.</p><p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:</p><p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.</p><p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:</p><p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.</p><p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'</p><p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.</p><p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:</p><p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.</p><p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.</p><p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.</p><p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.</p><p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.</p><p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.</p><p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.</p><p>POINT NO.2:</p><p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:</p><p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:</p><p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."</p><p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.</p><p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.</p><p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.</p><p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."</p><p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:</p><p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:</p><p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."</p><p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."</p><p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.</p><p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.</p><p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.</p><p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</p><p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, against the orders dated 04.04.2012 made in RCA No.1 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the orders dated 03.12.2010 made in RCOP No.7 of 2007 on the file of Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>ORDER',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Animadverting upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in RCA No.1 of 2011, by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Rent Control Appellate Authority, Erode confirming the order dated 03.12.2010 passed in RCOP No.7 of 2007 by the Rent Controller, Principal District Munsif, Erode, this civil revision petition is focussed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revision would run thus:',
	(int) 4 => '<p>The respondents/landlords filed initially the RCOP invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the revision petitioner/tenant. Pendente lite the RCOP was got amended, so as to include one other ground, namely personal occupation by invoking Section 10(3) (iii). The matter was contested.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords/respondents, Balasubramaniam examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant/petitioner, one Venkatasubramaniam examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.R1 to R8 were marked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. Ultimately the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which the tenant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate Court, confirming the judgment of the trial Court.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order and judgment of both the Courts below, this revision has been filed on various grounds.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision, would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 9 => '<p>(a) Both the Courts below fell into error in not taking note of the fact that before the Lok Adalat the matter relating to arrears of rent was settled and the amount also was paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlords, which had the effect of obliterating the cause of action on their part to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent by the tenant.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>(b) Already out of the two portions of the demised premises referred to originally in the RCOP, the rear portion had already been handed over to the landlords. However, the front portion alone is under the occupation of the tenant and therefore there are no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of that premises. The rear portion which had been surrendered by the tenant in favour of the landlords would be sufficient for running their Advocate office.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for dismissing the RCOP.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>7. In a bid to extirpate and torpedo the arguments and pleas as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlords would pilot his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(a) The landlords are husband and wife and they are practising law in the locality where the demised premises is situated. In fact, the father of the first petitioner is also a lawyer and as such, they belong to a family of lawyers having number of juniors to be looked after. While so, their demand for the front portion also for setting up their Advocate office could never be described or labelled as one actuated by malice or mala fide intention. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the landlords should restrict their requirements.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(b) Simply because before the Lok Adalat the tenants paid the arrears, it would not obliterate the cause of action which existed as on the date of the filing of the RCOP. There is nothing to indicate that there was such commitment by the landlords in favour of the tenants before the Lok Adalat.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(c) In fact, the parties approached the Lok Adalat purely for the purpose of getting the Court fee refunded as even before approaching the Lok Adalat they got the matter settled and the tenants agreed to pay the arrears also.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords, would pray that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the both Courts below.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>8. The points for consideration are as to:',
	(int) 18 => '<p>(1) Whether the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat, between the landlords and the tenants in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent, could be taken as one capable of obliterating the cause of action which was available as on the date of the filing of the RCOP, which was filed on the ground of wilful default in paying the rent?',
	(int) 19 => '<p>(2) Whether the requirement of the demised premises by the landlords for their personal occupation so as to accommodate their office is a bona fide one and whether there is any illegality in the findings given by the Courts below?',
	(int) 20 => '<p>POINT NO.1:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions:',
	(int) 22 => '<p>(i) (2000)3 SUPREME COURT CASES 282- CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES V. S.MOOSA AND OTHERS.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>&nbsp;8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2). The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>9. In S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.r.Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word 'wilful default' under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below:(SCC pp.605-06, paras 21-26)',
	(int) 25 => '<p>&nbsp;21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary of Law by L.B.Curzon, at p.361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus:',
	(int) 26 => '<p>'Wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>'Wilful default'&nbsp;&nbsp; Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>22. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Vol 11-A (Permanent Edition) at p.268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol.45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>'wilful'&nbsp;&nbsp; intentional; not incidental or involuntary;',
	(int) 30 => '<p>&nbsp;- done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently;',
	(int) 31 => '<p>- in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>p.296&nbsp;&nbsp; 'Wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>23. In Vol.III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 34 => '<p>governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>24.The word 'default' has been defined in Vol.I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p.590 thus:',
	(int) 36 => '<p>to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth edn.) at p.1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus:',
	(int) 38 => '<p>'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.',
	(int) 39 => '<p>The word 'reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'',
	(int) 40 => '<p>26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.',
	(int) 41 => '<p>(ii) 2002(4) CTC 572-E.PALANISAMY V. PALANISAMY (D) BY Lrs.AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:',
	(int) 42 => '<p>&nbsp;4.It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.',
	(int) 43 => '<p>5. Mr.Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal &amp; Another, 1996(1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J.Venkatarama Naidu, 1996(6) SCC 228.',
	(int) 44 => '<p>10. Trite, the proposition of law is that in order to constitute wilful default in paying rent, the element of wilfulness should be proved by the landlords. In this case, with reference to the records, the learned counsel for the landlords would pyramid his arguments to the effect that as per the consensus ad idem which found displayed in the lease deed between the landlords and the tenant, periodically there should be escalation in rent, so to say for the front portion of the demised premises, the escalation should be up to 15% every three years and for the rear portion it should be up to 20% every five years. So far the rear portion is concerned, the dispute is no more subsisting as it was surrendered by the tenant to the landlords. Hence I need not ponder over that issue. However, in respect of the front portion, wherein still the tenant is continuing to occupy, the arrears as per the landlords accrued for the period between 10.07.1998 and 09.09.2001. The rent actually paid as per the old rate was Rs.3,53,970/- and the escalation as contemplated supra came to Rs.30,210/- which was not paid and that constituted default. Precisely there is no clinching answer forthcoming from the tenant's side that there was no such default.',
	(int) 45 => '<p>11. When this Court raised a specific querry to the learned counsel for the tenant as to whether the escalation in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was disputed, there was no direct answer on that. In fact, there was a supine admission on the part of the tenant and that was why before the Lok Adalat he accepted the same and paid the amount. One significant point should be taken note of. It is not that the RCOP was filed after the settlement before the Lok Adalat, but during the pendency of the RCOP such settlement was arrived at before Lok Adalat in respect of the suit filed by the landlords for recovery of the said arrears almost simultaneously with the filing of RCOP.',
	(int) 46 => '<p>12. Now the core question arises as to whether such settlement before the Lok Adalat in respect of recovery of the arrears would have the effect of obliterating the cause of action. The actual award passed by the Lok Adalat, based on the settlement arrived at before it was not produced before this Court. It is only orally submitted before this Court. Unless the terms and conditions contained in that settlement are looked into, the Court cannot give any finding that the Lok Adalat settlement had the effect of obliterating the cause of action which already accrued in favour of the landlords. Had the tenant intended that the said settlement should obliterate the cause of action relating to wilful default in paying rent, then he should have got incorporated in the terms of the settlement itself before the Lok Adalat that based on such settlement the RCOP relating to wilful default should be withdrawn, but that was not done so. In such a case, in the absence of actual Lok Adalat Award having been placed before me and in the absence of any clause in favour of the tenant, this Court cannot at this stage of revision simply reject the contention on the side of the landlords that there was wilful default in paying such arrears of rent referred to supra on the part of the tenant till the filing of the RCOP.',
	(int) 47 => '<p>13. As per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also arrears were not voluntarily paid. In fact, the RCOP for eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying rent and the suit for recovery of money, were both filed simultaneously by the landlords. Had the tenant as per Section 11 of the Act paid the amount during the pendency of RCOP, then the matter would have been different. As such, in the absence of any clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be held that the settlement arrived at before the Lok Adalat would have the effect of getting obliterated the plea of the landlords relating to wilful default in paying rent by the tenant. In fact, the said plea was not put forth before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court; and even in the grounds of revision such a plea is absent.',
	(int) 48 => '<p>Hence, this point is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenants.',
	(int) 49 => '<p>POINT NO.2:',
	(int) 50 => '<p>14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:',
	(int) 51 => '<p>(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110&nbsp;&nbsp; S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 52 => '<p>"10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus:',
	(int) 53 => '<p>"11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."',
	(int) 54 => '<p>11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.',
	(int) 55 => '<p>12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation.',
	(int) 56 => '<p>13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.',
	(int) 57 => '<p>14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."',
	(int) 58 => '<p>(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152&nbsp;&nbsp; RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:',
	(int) 59 => '<p>"12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256, it was held thus:',
	(int) 60 => '<p>"It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."',
	(int) 61 => '<p>21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."',
	(int) 62 => '<p>15. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenants are occupying the demised premises, so to say, at present the front portion for its office purpose, so to say, non residential purpose. The landlords seek eviction only for non residential purpose, so to say to run their Advocate - office. As such their prayer ex facie and prima facie satisfies the requirement of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has to be seen as to whether there is any bona fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking such eviction. The plea of the tenant that for the two lawyers, namely husband and wife, to have their office, the rear portion which was already surrendered by the tenant would be sufficient, in my opinion is neither here nor there. The front portion measuring an extent of 3000 sq.ft. and the rear portion measuring 792 sq.ft., constitute a total extent of 3792 sq.ft. It is in evidence that the petitioners are having as many as eight Junior Advocates.',
	(int) 63 => '<p>16. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to portray and project a picture in my mind that some lawyers are having their offices in a small area of 200 sq.ft. I would like to remark that such an argument cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. The landlords/lawyers who are owning a large area, cannot be mandated to get themselves satisfied with a small portion. The landlords who want to have a befitting and specious office of their own cannot be made to curtail their requirement to suit the expectation of the tenant and they cannot be compelled to sacrifice their requirement over the front portion for the welfare of the tenant. No law, much less the tenancy law in India, is that much draconian and harsh, heartless and inhuman.',
	(int) 64 => '<p>17. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the landlords have not invoked Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, so to say, the ground of personal occupation, at the first instance itself and pending the RCOP, they got it amended and incorporated the said additional grounds. Simply because such a ground was got incorporated belatedly that it does not mean that mala fide intention should be presumed.',
	(int) 65 => '<p>18. Both the Courts below taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in the revision. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.',
	(int) 66 => '<p>19. Taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a Government of India undertaking, I am of the view that six months' time could be granted to vacate and handover the possession to the landlords, subject to payment of past arrears of rent, if any, as well as future rent; however, in order to make use of this benefit, they should file an affidavit to that effect within a period of fifteen days from this date.',
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