Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others - Court Judgment

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			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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[r.v. raveendran; a. k. patnaik] indian penal code section 452 - house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- after investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the judicial magistrate, first class, ludhiana. after further investigation, the superintendent of police, city-ii, ludhiana, submitted his report to the deputy inspector general of police, ludhiana range. the relevant portion of the report of the superintendent of police, city-ii, ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below: "i found during my investigation that mohan singh, son of shri sher singh , dharmatma singh, harpal singh, jagdev singh and bhupinder singh, sons of mohan singh, residents of pullanwal, sold one plot.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
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			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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1. heard sri g.s. chaturvedi, senior advocate for the petitioners and thelearned a.g.a.2. this petition has been filed for quashing of an fir dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime no. 106 of 2011, under section 306/34 i.p.c., p.s. gurgaonsadar, district gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.3. the fir lodged by sri shahrukh khan son of the deceased iqbal asif khanalleges that the deceased was working as taxation manager in xeroxcompany. on 23.3.2011 at 3.30 pm, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.4. thereafter, he went to gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (mama.)in themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his.....

Judgment:

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			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.

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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
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3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.

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			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.

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			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
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6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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			'court' => 'Allahabad',
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
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8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case.

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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
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		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.

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			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
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15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
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		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. 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	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
)
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16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction.

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'prhistory' => null,
			'pubs' => null,
			'ratiodecidendi' => null,
			'respondent' => 'State of U.P. and Others',
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => null,
		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
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			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
)
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18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '917464',
			'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
			'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
			'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
			'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
			'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
			'court' => 'Allahabad',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs State of U P and Others - Citation 917464 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '917464',
		'acts' => 'Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Cr.P.C.) - Section 156(3); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 306; ',
		'appealno' => 'CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 5850 of 2011',
		'appellant' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Nishant Mishra and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others',
		'casenote' => '[R.V. Raveendran; A. K. Patnaik]  Indian Penal Code  Section 452 - House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- After investigation, the police filed two challans on 02.02.2006 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana. After further investigation, the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range. The relevant portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II, Ludhiana, which contains his conclusions after further investigation, is extracted herein below:

"I found during my investigation that Mohan Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh, Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh, sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold one plot of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh, Jagjit Singh, son of Amarjit Singh, Gurcharan Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of Harpal Singh, resident of Phulanawal through registered sale deed vasikha No.23895 and the mutation No.10940 duly entered in the name of purchasing party. For deciding the issue, we must first refer to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. under which the police submits reports after investigation and after further investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a police report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High Court exercises its powers to quash the criminal proceedings. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. Cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall also forward to the Magistrate a further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after the initial investigation as well as the further report under sub-section (8) of Section 173 after further investigation constitute "police report" and have to be forwarded to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. R.P. Kapur moved the Punjab High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the First Information Report. 
',
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		'counselplain' => 'Samit Gopal; G.S. Chaturvedi, Advs',
		'counseldef' => 'Govt. Advocate',
		'court' => 'Allahabad',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2011-04-06',
		'deposition' => null,
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Amar Saran; Arvind Kumar Tripathi, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.</p><p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.</p><p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.</p><p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.</p><p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.</p><p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.</p><p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. </p><p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.</p><p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. </p><p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. </p><p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.</p><p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. </p><p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.</p><p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.</p><p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. </p><p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. </p><p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). </p><p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.</p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '1. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate for the petitioners and thelearned A.G.A.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. This petition has been filed for quashing of an FIR dated 23.3.2011 registeredat case crime No. 106 of 2011, under Section 306/34 I.P.C., P.S. GurgaonSadar, district Gurgaon and the consequential proceedings thereto.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The FIR lodged by Sri Shahrukh Khan son of the deceased Iqbal Asif Khanalleges that the deceased was working as Taxation Manager in XeroxCompany. On 23.3.2011 at 3.30 PM, the deceased had telephoned theinformant and told him that he was very disturbed by his officials. Then theinformant himself tried to contact his father but his phone was not picked up.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Thereafter, he went to Gurgaon along with his maternal uncle (Mama.)In themeantime there was a phone call to the mobile of his 'Mama' from the mobileof his father that a corpse was lying in an under-construction building nearSouthend Opal in Gurgaon. The FIR named five persons including the fourpetitioners as having troubled his father causing him to commit suicide.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned AGA raised a preliminary objection that as the FIR of this casewas registered in Gurgaon, where the matter was being investigated, the HighCourt at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. Sri G.S.Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that after 15th(1963) amendment of the Constitution, the powers to issue directions, order orwrits to any Government authority or person could also be exercised by anyHigh Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within whichthe cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, even if the seat of suchGovernment or authority was not within the said territories.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. It was further argued by Sri Chaturvedi that there was also a suicide note( Annexure-7) which mentioned that the deceased was compelled to commitsuicide because of the role played by the four petitioners, Inder Singh Bishtand Ganesh Sati. The background was that the deceased had to file a writpetition in the High Court. He was given a power of attorney by Inder SinghBist and Ganesh Sati. The deceased was apprehensive that the petitioners hadtrapped him into filing the writ petition. The Advocate petitioner fromAllahabad, Sri Nishant Mishra asked him to keep the authorization with him.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. The deceased felt that he had wrongly signed the writ petition. He furtherstated that his family or sasural members were not responsible for his suicidebut the petitioners and the other accused named above were the only personsresponsible. By his mistake a great loss had been caused to the company forwhich the petitioners were responsible and they had involved him in this case because of his ignorance. It was also submitted that part of the cause of actionrelated to Allahabad as Nishant Mishra, Advocate Allahabad High Court hadassisted in the filing of the writ petition, which the deceased felt he hadwrongly filed and because of the guilt of filing which writ petition, he hadeventually committed suicide on the fateful day at Gurgaon. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi relied on Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat andanother, 2010 (70) ACC 907 (Supreme Court) for the proposition that when aperson gets depressed and commits suicide because he had been wronglyrebuked and harassed by his superior officer against whom he nurses a grude,even if he honestly feels he has been wronged, it would not disclose anyoffence under section 306 IPC.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision ofNavinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 forthe proposition that a writ petition could be entertained in the High Court evenwhere part of the cause of action relating to the matter arises especially afterthe fifteenth (1963) amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. Learned A.G.A on the other hand contended that for deciding the territorieswhere any cause or part of the cause of action arises, only the FIR could belooked into and there was no reference to the suicide note in the FIR in thepresent case. ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>11. Further more in our view, the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra is distinguishable on facts, because it was a case in which thecourt recorded a finding that the major part of the cause of action arose inMumbai and the mere fact that the FIR was registered in a particular State (inthat case Shillong), it could not provide the sole criteria for reaching aninference that no part of the cause of action could arise in another State. It wasobserved in the said case that the major part of the cause of action had arisenin Mumbai as the company was registered in Mumbai, in which the petitionerand his family members were principal share holders of one company M/sIndian Farmers Pvt. Ltd (IFPL for short), and they were entitled to enter into acontract to receive rupees 58 crores from Chinar Exports for sale of shares.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>12. Chinar Exports did not complete its contract by paying the balance amountwithin the time allowed, hence the petitioner had had terminated theagreement. Another company M/s J.D. Holding, Shillong was carved out ofChinar Exports Ltd Thereafter in a mala fide manner the complaint waslodged in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya to exert pressure on theCompany. All the transactions had taken place at Mumbai and not at anyother place outside Mumbai, much less at Shillong or in any other place in theState of Meghalaya. The investigation by the Police of Shilong was said to beoppressive and malicious. ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>13. As the High Court had refused to interfere, the Apex Court had set aside thejudgement of the High Court observing that the main cause of action arose atMumbai and the FIR had been lodged in a malafide manner in Shilong, hencethe High Court in Mumbai clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Inthe present case, we find that the main cause of action has taken place inGurgaun( Haryana) where the deceased committed suicide because he feltharassed because the petitioners and other accused persons had forced him tofile the petition which in his view he had wrongly signed. This in our opinionwould not give jurisdiction to the Allahabad High Court to quash theimpugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>14. We may add that if the investigation is being carried out at a particular placein another State and if the High Court in another State can interfere with theinvestigation because part of the cause of action is connected with that State,it could give rise to an anomalous position because different High Court mayexercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter in different ways. Also asthe investigation had commenced in Haryana where the report etc wereregistered, obtaining of police remand and bail etc would ordinarily beconsidered by the High Court in Haryana and therefore, the said High Courtwould have jurisdiction because it was the superior Court before which thesaid subordinate courts would submit the reports of investigation or remandsetc. The High Court at Allahabad could ordinarily have no jurisdiction in sucha case.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>15. In Asit Bhattacharje v Hanuman Prasad and Ors., 2007 Cri.L.J. 3181 (SC)the Allahabad High Court which had entertained a writ petition because partof the cause of action which arose in a matter related to U.P., where theapplication under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was filed in West Bengal, has comein for criticism by the Apex Court. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>16. In AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1288 "Musaraf Hossain Khan v.Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd." it has been held that simply because the chequeswere issued or the company had its registered office in Kerala, it would notconfer jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court to entertain a writ from an ordertaking cognizance passed in West Bengal for which the Calcutta High Courtwould have jurisdiction, as the Calcutta High Court exercises superintendenceunder Article 227 over Courts falling in its jurisdiction. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>17. Therefore, without commenting on the merits of the matter, only on the pointof jurisdiction, we are not inclined to interfere with the investigation or toquash the impugned FIR which was registered at P.S. Gurgaon (Haryana). ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded that this Court maygrant two months time to the petitioners to approach the concerned HighCourt. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 in AjeetSingh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cri.L.J. 170, which has in turn relied onthe Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 and other decisions that when theHigh Court refuses to entertain the petition and to grant the main relief, butrelegates him to seek another remedy, it would be outside the scope of Article226 to grant the ancillary relief in the interregnum. In this case as we havechosen not to entertain this writ petition it would be an abuse of the process oflaw to stay the arrest for any period to enable the petitioners to approachanother High Court which may have jurisdiction in the matter. For all thesereasons we find the writ petition devoid of force and it is dismissed.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>'
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