Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation . Vs. Bhimabhai Nagbhai ValA. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
[markandey katju ; gyan sudha misra, jj.] - code of civil procedure (c.p.c.) 1908 - section 151 - saving of inherent powers of court -- this appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 21.5.2004 passed by learned single judge of the patna high court in civil revision no. 945 of 2002. while the aforesaid partition suit was pending, the defendants smt. pushpa biswas and apurva kumar biswas executed a general power of attorney on 31.7.1992 in favour of umesh chandra and dr. sanjeev kumar mishra and the same was registered. pushpa biswas and apurva kumar biswas cannot be allowed to say that their own act of signing the compromise petition was collusive and fraudulent. the high court has observed that defendants nos. 2 and 2a viz., pushpa biswas and apurva kumar biswas.....1. present second appeal has been filed by the appellant-original defendant- gujarat state road transport corporation under section 100 of the code of civil procedure, 1908 posing following substantial questions of law:"1. whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the civil court has jurisdiction under section 9 of the code of civil procedure to try the suit?2. whether in the facts and circumstances of the case plaintiff is a workman within the meaning of industrial disputes act, 1947 and remedy available to the plaintiff workman is only under the industrial disputes act and not under civil forum?3. whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the legality and validity of the findings given by the departmental authority, under code.....

Judgment:
1. Present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant-original defendant- Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 posing following substantial questions of law:

"1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Civil Court has jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to try the suit?

2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case plaintiff is a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and remedy available to the plaintiff workman is only under the Industrial Disputes Act and not under civil forum?

3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the legality and validity of the findings given by the departmental authority, under Code of Civil Procedure?

2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the civil court has jurisdiction to set aside the penalty imposed by the defendant-Corporation?

3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the civil court has jurisdiction to reduce the penalty imposed by defendant Corporation against plaintiff?"

4. The facts of the case briefly stated are that Regular Civil Suit No.678 of 1982 has been filed by the plaintiff along with others challenging the order passed by the defendant Corporation regarding the dismissal after the departmental inquiry for irregularities.

5. The suit came to be dismissed by learned Civil Judge (SD) Junagadh vide judgment and order dated 27.5.1988, against which a Regular Civil Appeal No.35 of 1990 was preferred by the respondent herein-original plaintiff which came to be allowed by the learned Joint District Judge Junagadh vide order dated 09.03.1992 setting aside the dismissal order passed by the trial Court on 27.5.1988 in Regular Civil Suit No.678 of 1982. Therefore, corporation has preferred present Second Appeal posing substantial questions of law as stated above.

6. However, as transpires from the papers, the substantial questions of law which have been posed with regard to jurisdiction of the Civil Court as well as quantum of punishment would be only an academic question as it has also been noted by this Court earlier vide order dated 25.11.2010 that the reinstatement was granted with 30% back wages and learned advocates for the parties were directed to take further instructions.

7. As it transpires that after the said order, as no stay was granted, the respondent No.1 would have been in service and would have retired at the age of superannuation and, therefore, without going into further details, considering the subsequent development, present Second Appeal deserves to be disposed of as having become infructuous and accordingly stands disposed of.