Rajan Behl Vs State - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
contempt of court - civil and criminal contempt - willful disobedience - the substantial question of law therefore which emerges for determination in this appeal is whether the learned single judge of the high court was justified in initiating suo moto contempt proceeding against the appellant judicial officer in absence of even prima facie material to the effect that there was at all a case of disobedience to the order of the high court - much less wilful disobedience and whether issuance of notice to initiate contempt proceeding would be justified merely on assumption, speculation and inference drawn from facts without existence of a clear case of wilful disobedience to the order of the high court so as to treat it as a case of contempt of court of civil nature.[para 5] on a scrutiny of the sequence of events narrated hereinbefore, we are clearly of the view in the first place that the contempt alleged against the appellant would not amount to a criminal contempt because the alleged contempt even if made out would clearly at the best be of a civil nature, which is evident from section 2 of the contempt of courts act 1971[para 12] that contempt of a civil nature can be held to have been made out only if there has been a wilful disobedience of the order and even though there may be disobedience, yet if the same does not reflect that it has been a conscious and wilful disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have been made out. [para 13] thus, initiation of the contempt proceeding against the petitioner by the learned single judge is based on a wholly wrong premise based on unsustainable and unfounded facts which cannot be treated sufficient material so as to initiate contempt proceeding in spite of absence of any degree of fault or misconduct or even unintentional disobedience to the order for the reasons assigned hereinbefore.[para 20] hence, we set aside the impugned order dated 08.12.2006 passed by the learned single judge by which the proceeding for contempt has been ordered to be initiated by registering a regular contempt proceeding against the appellant and the same shall be treated as dropped. consequently, the appeal is allowed directing the parties to bear their cost.[para 21]1. whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?2. to be referred to the reporter or not?3. whether judgment should be reported in digest?1. by present revision petition, the petitioner has assailed judgment dated 18th may, 2010 and order on sentence dated 21st may, 2010 passed by the appellate court. the petitioner was convicted by the court of learned metropolitan magistrate under section 63 of copyright act and under sections 78 and 79 of trademarks and merchandise act and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment under section 63 of copy right act and 78 and 79 of trademarks act apart from fine of rs.50,000/- under section 63 of copyright act and rs.1,000/- each under section 78 and 79 of trademarks act.2. on an appeal preferred by the petitioner, the learned sessions judge maintained the conviction of both the accused persons, however, while sentencing, the learned sessions judge reduced the sentence of imprisonment from six months' rigorous imprisonment to 45 days simple imprisonment both under section 63 of copyright act as well as under section 78 and 79 of trademarks act with the fine as awarded by the trial court. the petitioner in this revision petition has assailed the order of learned sessions judge on the ground that findings of court below were against the weight of evidence. there was nothing on record to show that the goods allegedly recovered from front of the shop of the petitioner bearing fake and spurious mark were stocked by the petitioner. there was no evidence on record to show that marks on the goods were fake or spurious. the other grounds raised by the petitioner in the petition show that the petitioner had assailed the order of learned sessions judge on merits.3. section 393 cr.p.c. specifically provides that the judgment and order passed by the appellate court in an appeal shall be final except in cases provided under sections 377, 378 and 384 (4) or chapter xxx. section 377 cr.p.c. provides for appeal by state government against sentence, section 378 provides for appeal in case of acquittal and section 384 (4) is in respect of the jail appeals dismissed summarily. the case of the petitioner does not fall under these three cases. thus, the judgment of appellate court has attained finality and the high court can interfere under section 397 cr.p.c. only if there was an issue of correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed by the sessions court or there was any irregularity of the proceedings of the sessions court. the high court in its power under section 397 cannot act as a court of second appeal and cannot re-appreciate the entire evidence to substitute its own opinion against the opinion of the appellate court. the scope of revision against the concurrent finding of fact is very limited and ordinarily the concurrent finding of fact cannot be challenged unless and until there is gross misreading of evidence or there is manifest error of law or miscarriage of justice. the revisional jurisdiction does not confer power on the revisional court to re-appreciate the evidence on record. the revisional court can examine the record only to satisfy itself that the court below had conducted the proceedings in an appropriate manner and had taken into account entire evidence before passing the judgment. the judgment is not to be resorted to as a second appeal.4. during arguments, counsel for the petitioner had only been agitating that the conclusion arrived at by the trial court as well as by the appellate court was not correct conclusion and he wanted this court to re-appreciate the entire evidence. i consider that this court in view of section 393 cr.p.c. cannot re-appreciate the entire evidence to arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the appellate court. i, therefore, find no force in this revision. the revision petition is hereby dismissed. the bail bond of the revisionist/petitioner is cancelled. the revisionist/petitioner shall surrender and undergo the remaining sentence as awarded.

Judgment:
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the reporter or not?

3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?

1. By present revision petition, the petitioner has assailed judgment dated 18th May, 2010 and order on sentence dated 21st May, 2010 passed by the appellate court. The petitioner was convicted by the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 63 of Copyright Act and under Sections 78 and 79 of Trademarks and Merchandise Act and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment under Section 63 of Copy Right Act and 78 and 79 of Trademarks Act apart from fine of Rs.50,000/- under Section 63 of Copyright Act and Rs.1,000/- each under Section 78 and 79 of Trademarks Act.

2. On an appeal preferred by the petitioner, the learned Sessions Judge maintained the conviction of both the accused persons, however, while sentencing, the learned Sessions Judge reduced the sentence of imprisonment from six months' rigorous imprisonment to 45 days simple imprisonment both under Section 63 of Copyright Act as well as under Section 78 and 79 of Trademarks Act with the fine as awarded by the trial court. The petitioner in this revision petition has assailed the order of learned Sessions Judge on the ground that findings of court below were against the weight of evidence. There was nothing on record to show that the goods allegedly recovered from front of the shop of the petitioner bearing fake and spurious mark were stocked by the petitioner. There was no evidence on record to show that marks on the goods were fake or spurious. The other grounds raised by the petitioner in the petition show that the petitioner had assailed the order of learned Sessions Judge on merits.

3. Section 393 Cr.P.C. specifically provides that the judgment and order passed by the appellate court in an appeal shall be final except in cases provided under Sections 377, 378 and 384 (4) or Chapter XXX. Section 377 Cr.P.C. provides for appeal by State Government against sentence, Section 378 provides for appeal in case of acquittal and Section 384 (4) is in respect of the jail appeals dismissed summarily. The case of the petitioner does not fall under these three cases. Thus, the judgment of appellate court has attained finality and the High Court can interfere under Section 397 Cr.P.C. only if there was an issue of correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed by the Sessions Court or there was any irregularity of the proceedings of the Sessions Court. The High Court in its power under Section 397 cannot act as a court of second appeal and cannot re-appreciate the entire evidence to substitute its own opinion against the opinion of the appellate court. The scope of revision against the concurrent finding of fact is very limited and ordinarily the concurrent finding of fact cannot be challenged unless and until there is gross misreading of evidence or there is manifest error of law or miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction does not confer power on the revisional court to re-appreciate the evidence on record. The revisional court can examine the record only to satisfy itself that the court below had conducted the proceedings in an appropriate manner and had taken into account entire evidence before passing the judgment. The judgment is not to be resorted to as a second appeal.

4. During arguments, counsel for the petitioner had only been agitating that the conclusion arrived at by the trial court as well as by the appellate court was not correct conclusion and he wanted this court to re-appreciate the entire evidence. I consider that this court in view of Section 393 Cr.P.C. cannot re-appreciate the entire evidence to arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the appellate court. I, therefore, find no force in this revision. The revision petition is hereby dismissed. The bail bond of the revisionist/petitioner is cancelled. The revisionist/petitioner shall surrender and undergo the remaining sentence as awarded.