Renadevan Vs. Ezhupunna Grama Panchayat - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- antony dominic, j.1. since 1985, petitioner has been conducting a piggery in his property with licence from the panchayat, noc of the district medical officer and consent issued by the pollution control board. according to the petitioner, in 2007, when the licence became due for renewal, for reasons which are only political, at the instance of respondents 6 to 8, it was renewed by ext.p1 order with a condition that the consent of the pollution control board for the period subsequent to 1.7.2009 should be produced. the period of the licence thus renewed was upto 31.3.2010.2. according to the petitioner, again at the instance of respondents 6 to 8, by ext.p2, the environmental engineer of the pollution control board refused to grant consent to operate the farm on the allegation that the petitioner had not provided satisfactory facilities for treatment of polluted effluents and was causing nuisance to the public by way of sound pollution.3. aggrieved by ext.p2 order of the environmental engineer, petitioner filed ext.p3 appeal before the appellate authority and the appeal is still pending consideration. while so, ext.p4 notice dated 26.8.2009 was issued by the panchayat, calling upon the petitioner to show cause why in the light of ext.p2 order, ext.p1 licence shall not be cancelled. he was required to submit his explanation within 14 days of receipt of the notice. petitioner submits that ext.p4 notice was served on him by registered post with acknowledgment due. ext.p10 is the cover enclosing ext.p4 which shows that it was delivered to the petitioner on 31.10.2009.4. it is stated that before the 14 days period for submitting reply expired, the panchayat passed ext.r1(b) resolution on 12.11.2009, resolving to cancel ext.p1 licence, vide agenda item no. 10. petitioner submits that the said resolution was passed by the panchayat at about 3.00 p.m. on 12.11.2009 and that on the same day, the president and the secretary of the panchayat came to his piggery when he was absent and removed five pigs without giving any notice or other intimation to the petitioner or his family members. it is also stated that the remaining 44 pigs were removed by the aforesaid respondents on 13.11.2009, in the forenoon and were transported to the meat products of india and that the pigs were sold realising rs. 1,73,520/-, as evidenced by ext.r1 (g) receipt produced by the 1st respondent.5. it is stated that long thereafter, copies of ext.r1 (b) order cancelling the licence and exts.r1(c) and r1(d) order requiring him to close down the piggery, both dated 12.11.2009, were served on the petitioner on 21.11.2009. these orders were sent to the petitioner in exts.p11 and p12 covers which were despatched from the office of the panchayat only on 13.11.2009 and 16.11.2009 respectively. petitioner submits that in the meanwhile, he filed an appeal against ext.r1 (b), which is also pending consideration of the tribunal for local self government institutions. it is also stated that within 14 days from 31.10.2009, he has filed ext.p5 reply to ext.p4 notice as well. the petitioner submits that the aforesaid high handed action of the panchayat, its president and secretary was mala fide and illegal and that as a consequence thereof, damages to the tune of rs. 10 lakhs was caused to him and that he is entitled to be compensated. in this background the writ petition has been filed with the following main prayers.(i). to call for the records leading upto the decision said to have been passed on 12.11.2009, by the members of 1st respondent and to quash the same by the issuance of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction.(ii). to issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents 2 and 3 to effect restitution/restoration of the pig farm as it stood on 12.11.2009 and also direct them to pay a sum of rs. 10,00,000/- as compensation to the petitioner for the atrocities committed by them against the petitioner and the members of his family.(iii) to direct respondents 4 and 5 to launch criminal prosecution against respondents 2 and 3 and all the persons named in ext.p7 for the offences committed by them which are punishable under the indian penal code.6. on behalf of the 1st respondent panchayat, the secretary, who is also the 2nd respondent, has filed a detailed counter affidavit. in the counter affidavit it is stated that when by ext.p2, the pollution control board refused to grant consent to the piggery, ext.r1 (a) (ext.p4) notice was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to show cause within 14 days, why the licence shall not be cancelled. it is stated that this notice was attempted to be served on the petitioner through his peon on 26.10.2009 and that since it was refused, the notice was served by affixture in the presence of witnesses. the second page of ext.r1(a) contains the endorsement of affixture stating that the notice was affixed in the piggery. it is stated that on receipt of the notice, petitioner did not submit any explanation and therefore, the panchayat committee convened a meeting on 12.11.2009 and took ext.r1(b) decision, to cancel the licence. according to respondents 1 and 2, it was further resolved to close down the pig farm on 12.11.2009 itself, and authorized the secretary to implement the resolution, if necessary, with police protection.7. in compliance with ext.r1(b), exts.r1(c) and r1(d) were issued to the petitioner on 12.11.2009, directing him to closed own the pig farm before 4.30 p.m. on 12.11.2009 itself. it is stated that though both the orders were attempted to be served on the petitioner through the peon of the panchayat, it was not accepted and therefore, were served by affixture in the piggery. endorsement on ext.r1 (c) shows that it was affixed at the piggery at 11.30 a.m. on 12.11.2009. ext.r1(d) also contains an endorsement to the same effect.8. it is contended that in spite of exts.r1 (c) and r1(d), petitioner did not close down the piggery. therefore, on 13.11.2009, ext.r1(e) order was issued, directing a lower division clerk of the panchayat to close down the piggery after 4.30. p.m. on 13.11.2009 with police protection and to entrust the pigs to the meat products of india at koothattukulam, and that in pursuance to ext.r1(c) order, on 13.11.2009 after 4.30 p.m., the panchayat clerk entered the farm, prepared a seizure mahazar and entrusted the pigs to the representatives of the meat products of india.9. according to the 2nd respondent, there were 17 male and 27 female pigs and the pigs were transported in lorries to the meat products of india and that all these operations were done 'smoothly' by the experts of meat products of india. meat products of india weighed the pigs and paid rs. 1,73,520/- to the 1st respondent. ext.r1(g) is the goods receipt.10. insofar as the allegation of the petitioner that five pigs were removed on 12.11.2009, it is stated in para. 7 of the counter affidavit that respondents 2 and 3 visited the piggery and talked to the petitioner's wife and that she agreed to shift the pigs to another piggery. according to respondents 1 and 2, petitioner's wife shifted few pigs to another piggery on that day and that they have not removed any pigs on 12.11.2009. it is contended that they were only implementing the directions of the panchayat committee and have not done anything illegal.11. 3rd respondent, the president of the panchayat, has filed a counter affidavit. according to the 3rd respondent, consent was not issued by the pollution control board and that due to unbearable pollution problem the panchayat had to cancel the licence. according to him, there were widespread complaints from the local residents which the panchayat could not ignore and he, as the representative of people, was bound to protect the rights of the residents of the area. the president has also averred in his counter affidavit that in the circumstances explained by the secretary, 44 pigs had to be removed on 13.11.2009. a reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner denying the averments in the counter affidavits.12. i have considered the submissions made.13. as far as the order of the pollution control board refusing to grant consent to the petitioner's farm and the decision of the panchayat cancelling the licence are concerned, these issues are pending in appeal before the concerned appellate authority and the tribunal for local self government institutions respectively. in view of this, it is for those authorities to decide on the legality of the decisions impugned in the appeals and at this stage, this court is not required to examine those issues. therefore, these issues are left open to be adjudicated by the respective appellate authorities. in this case, the question to be considered is whether even if the orders passed are within their authority, can respondents 1 to 3 be said to have acted mala fide or oppressive or capricious, rendering them liable to personally compensate the petitioner.14. before proceeding to evaluate the facts, a brief reference to a few precedents may be fruitful. lucknow development authority v. m.k. gupta : (1994) 1 scc 243, was a case arising out of consumer protection act, 1986, the apex court examined the question whether, should the society or the tax payer be burdened for the oppressive act of public officers or it be paid by those responsible for it. dealing with this question it was held that under the constitution, sovereignty vests in the people and that every hints of the constitutional machinery is obliged to be people oriented and that public authorities acting in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions oppressively are accountable for their behaviour before courts entrusted with responsibility of maintaining the rule of law and that when sufferance is due to mala fide or oppressive or capricious acts of a public servant the injured is entitled to be compensated. proceeding further, it has been held that;the jurisdiction and power of the courts to indemnify a citizen for injury suffered due to abuse of power by public authorities is founded as observed by lord hailsham in cassell & co. ltd v. broome on the principle that 'an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of law'. an ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the state or its instrumentalities. that is provided by the rule of law. it acts as a check on arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. in rookes v. barnard, it was observed by lord devlin, 'the servants of the government are also the servants of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service.' a public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. no law provides protection against it. he who is responsible for it must suffer it. compensation or damage as explained earlier may arise even when the officer discharges his duty honestly and bona fide. but when it arises due to arbitrary or capricious behaviour then it loses its individual character, and assumes social significance. harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. it may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous. crime and corruption thrive and prosper in the society due to lack of public resistance. nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. an ordinary citizen instead of complaining and fighting succumbs to the pressure of undesirable functioning in offices instead of standing against it. therefore the award of compensation for harassment by public authorities not only compensates the individual, satisfies him personally but helps in curing social evil. it may result in improving the work culture and help in changing the outlook. wade in his book administrative law has observed that it is the credit of public authorities that there are simply few reported english decisions on this form of malpractice, namely misfeasance in public offices which includes malicious use of power, deliberate maladministration and perhaps also other unlawful acts causing injury. one of the reasons for this appears to be development of law which, apart, from other factors succeeded in keeping a salutary check on the functioning in the government or semi-government offices by holding the officers personally responsible for their capricious or even ultra vires action resulting in injury or loss to a citizen by awarding damages against them. various decisions rendered from time to time have been referred to by wade on misfeasance by public authorities. we shall refer to some of them to demonstrate how necessary it is for our society. in ashby v. white the house of lords invoked the principle of 'ubi jus ibi remedium' in favour of an elector who was wrongfully prevented from voting and decreed the claim of damages. the ratio of this decision has been applied and extended by english courts in various situations. in roncarelli v. duplessis the supreme court of canada awarded damages against the prime minister of quebec personally for directing the cancellation of a restaurant-owner's liquor licence solely because the licensee provided bail on many occasions for fellow members of the sect of jehovah's witnesses, which was then unpopular with the authorities. it was observed that, 'what could be more malicious than to punish this licensee for having done what he had an absolute right to do in a matter utterly irrelevant to the alcoholic liquor act malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here the element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation outlawry'. in smith v. east elloe rural district council the house of lords held that an action for damages might proceed against the clerk of a local authority personally on the ground that he had procured the compulsory purchase of the plaintiff's property wrongfully and in bad faith. in farrington v. thomson, the supreme court of victoria awarded damages for exercising a power the authorities knew they did not possess. a licensing inspector and a police officer ordered the plaintiff to close his hotel and cease supplying liquor. he obeyed and filed a suit for the resultant loss. in wood v. blair, a dairy farmer's manageress contracted typhoid fever and the local authority served notices forbidding him to sell milk, except under certain conditions. these notices were void, and the farmer was awarded damages on the ground that the notices were invalid and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for misfeasance. this was done even though the finding was that the officers had acted from the best motives.today the issue thus is not only of award of compensation but who should bear the brunt. the concept of authority and power exercised by public functionaries has many dimensions. it has undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change in socio-economic outlook. the authority empowered to function under a statute while exercising power discharges public duty. it has to act to sub serve general welfare and common good. in discharging this duty honestly and bona fide, loss may accrue to any person. and he may claim compensation which may in circumstances be payable. but where the duty is performed capriciously or the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the responsibility to pay the loss determined should be whose in a modern society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. it is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is made to run from one end to other with no result. the culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. public administration, no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields the action of administrative authority. but where it is found that exercise of discretion was mala fide and the complainant is entitled to compensation for mental and physical harassment then the officer can no more claim to be under protective cover. when a citizen seeks to recover compensation from a public authority in respect of injuries suffered by him for capricious exercise of power and the national commission finds it duly proved then it has a statutory obligation to award the same. it was never more necessary than today when even social obligations are regulated by grant of statutory powers. the test of permissive form of grant is over. it is now imperative and implicit in the exercise of power that it should be for the sake of society. when the court directs payment of damages or compensation against the state the ultimate sufferer is the common man. it is the tax payers' money which is paid for inaction of those who are entrusted under the act to discharge their duties in accordance with law. it is, therefore, necessary that the commission when it is satisfied that a complainant is entitled to compensation for harassment or mental agony or oppression, which finding of course should be recorded carefully on material and convincing circumstances and not lightly, then it should further direct the department concerned to pay the amount to the complainant from the public fund immediately but to recover the same from those who are found responsible for such unpardonable behaviour by dividing it proportionately where there are more than one functionaries.15. again, after surveying several precedents, the apex court in n. nagendra rao and co. v. state of a.p. : (1994) 6 scc 205 held in paras.25 and 27 as follows:no civilized system can permit an executive to play with the people of its country and claim that it is entitled to act in any manner as it is sovereign. the concept of public interest has changed with structural change in the society. no legal or political system today can place the state above law as it is unjust and unfair for a citizen to be deprived of his property illegally by negligent act of officers of the state without a remedy. from sincerity, efficiency and dignity of state as a juristic person, propounded in nineteenth century as sound sociological basis for state immunity the circle has gone round and the emphasis now is more on liberty, equality and the rule of law. the modern social thinking of progressive societies and the judicial approach is to do away with archaic state protection and place the state or the government on a par with any other juristic legal entity. any watertight compartmentalization of the functions of the state as 'sovereign and non-sovereign' or 'governmental and non-governmental' is not sound. it is contrary to modern jurisprudential thinking. the need of the state to have extraordinary powers cannot be doubted. but with the conceptual change of statutory power being statutory duty for sake of society and the people the claim of a common man or ordinary citizen cannot be thrown out merely because it was done by an officer of the state even though it was against law and negligent. needs of the state, duty of its officials and right of the citizens are required to be reconciled so that the rule of law in a welfare state is not shaken. even in the 'financial instability of the infant american states rather than to the stability of the doctrine's theoretical foundation', or because of 'logical and practical ground', or that 'there could be no legal right as against the state which made the law' gradually gave way to the movement from, 'state irresponsibility to state responsibility'. in welfare state, functions of the state are not only defence of the country or administration of justice or maintaining law and order but it extends to regulating and controlling the activities of people in almost every sphere, educational, commercial, social, economic, political and even marital. the demarcating line between sovereign and non-sovereign powers for which no rational basis survives has largely disappeared. therefore, barring functions such as administration of justice, maintenance of law and order and repression of crime etc. which are among the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government, the state cannot claim any immunity. the determination of vicarious liability of the state being linked with negligence of its officers, if they can be sued personally for which there is no dearth of authority and the law of misfeasance in discharge of public duty having marched ahead, there is no rationale for the proposition that even if the officer is liable the state cannot be sued. the liability of the officer personally was not doubted even in viscount canterbury. but the crown was held immune on doctrine of sovereign immunity. since the doctrine has become outdated and sovereignty now vests in the people, the state cannot claim any immunity and if a suit is maintainable against the officer personally, then there is no reason to hold that it would not be maintainable against the state.a law may be made to carry out the primary or inalienable functions of the state. criminal procedure code is one such law. a search or seizure effected under such law could be taken to be an exercise of power which may be in domain of inalienable function. whether the authority to whom this power is delegated is liable for negligence in discharge of duties while performing such functions is a different matter. but when similar powers are conferred under other statute as incidental or ancillary power to carry out the purpose and objective of the act, then it being an exercise of such state function which is not primary or inalienable, an officer acting negligently is liable personally and the state vicariously. maintenance of law and order or repression of crime may be inalienable function, for proper exercise of which the state may enact a law and may delegate its functions, the violation of which may not be sueable in torts, unless it trenches into and encroaches on the fundamental rights of life and liberty guaranteed by the constitution. but that principle would not be attracted where similar powers are conferred on officers who exercise statutory powers which are otherwise than sovereign powers as understood in the modern sense. the act deals with persons indulging in hoarding and black marketing. any power for regulating and controlling the essential commodities and the delegation of power to authorised officers to inspect, search and seize the property for carrying out the object of the state cannot be a power for negligent exercise of which the state can claim immunity. no constitutional system can, either on state necessity or public policy, condone negligent functioning of the state or its officers.16. from the above precedents it is clear that law is settled that where power is conferred to achieve a purpose, it should be exercised reasonably and in good faith to achieve the purpose for which power is conferred and in this context 'good faith' means 'for legitimate reasons' and where power is exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations or reasons, it is a colourful exercise of power, a fraud on power. by such oppressive, capricious or negligent exercise of power, if loss or damage is caused to a citizen, he is entitled to be compensated by the officer who has misconducted himself.17. on appreciation of the rival contentions, i am convinced that respondents 1 to 3 were only implementing certain decisions that were already taken by them. their conduct show that they were enacting a drama, the script of which was already written. the petitioner's establishment was functioning since 1985. even if such an establishment was to be closed down for any reason, one would expect the panchayat to have exercised the power of cancellation and consequential closure of the piggery in a reasonable manner. the requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of statutory power is inbuilt in the provisions of the kerala panchayat raj act (act for short). this precisely is what is provided in sections 236(5) and 240 of the act. section 236(5) of the act provides that if an act is done without licence or permission or in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the licence, secretary may require the offender to rectify the defect within the time to be specified in the notice. section 240(1) of the act provides that all notices to be given under the provisions of the act, shall be in writing and signed by the secretary. section 240(2) provides that whenever by any notice under the act, any person is required to execute any work or do anything, a reasonable time shall be fixed in such notice, within which the work shall be executed, measures taken and the things done. sub-section (3) provides that if the requirement of such notice or order is not complied with within the time fixed, secretary may, with the approval of the panchayat concerned, cause such work to be executed or may take any measures or do anything which may, in his opinion, be necessary for giving effect to the notice or order. this section further provides that the loss incurred by the panchayat in this behalf may be recovered from the owner of the premises.18. as already seen, the first notice issued by the panchayat is ext.p4 dated 26.10.2009, by which the petitioner was called upon to show cause why the licence shall not be cancelled for the reasons stated therein. the panchayat and the secretary contended that the notice was attempted to be served on the petitioner personally, that it was refused to be accepted and therefore it was served by affixture. in spite of the alleged refusal and service by affixture, this notice was sent to the petitioner under ext.p10 cover and was served on 31.10.2009. in my view, the theory of affixture by ext.r1(c) is totally unbelievable and improbable. if as stated by the panchayat, notice was tendered to the petitioner and he refused to accept the same, it may have been open to the panchayat to serve the notice by affixture. however once the notice was tendered, refused to be accepted and was affixed, nobody would expect the panchayat to sent the notice again by registered post. further, if affixture was necessitated due to the petitioner's refusal to accept ext.p4, there would have been such an endorsement on ext.p4, which is also absent and there is no explanation for this omission. admittedly, the notice sent by post was served on the petitioner only on 31.10.2009 and this is evident from ext.p10. the panchayat having chosen to serve notice on the petitioner by post, ought not have initiated further action till the expiry of the period specified for reply. on the other hand, if it was not intended to await for his response, the panchayat need not have sent notice by post.19. on the other hand, on 12.11.2009, panchayat proceeded to convene a meeting. cancellation of the petitioner's licence was included as agenda item no. 10. petitioner has a case that the meeting commenced only at 11.00 a.m. and that ext.r1(b) resolution to cancel ext.pl licence was passed by the panchayat only at 3.00 p.m. of course, there is no material to substantiate this contention. but fact remains that the issue was item no. 10 of the agenda and this is obvious from ext.r1(b) resolution of the panchayat itself and therefore this resolution could not have been passed at the commencement of the meeting. if so, the resolution could not have been affixed at 11.30 a.m., after it was allegedly tendered to the petitioner and refused by him. on the basis of the premature decision so taken, panchayat issued ext.r1(c) order.20. here again, yet another attempt to mislead this court is evident from the proceedings of the panchayat. while in ext.r1(b) agenda, this item is shown as no. 10, there is a correction in ext.r1(c) where the agenda item is attempted to be shown as item no. 1. this correction is obviously to substantiate the theory of respondents 1 to 3, that the decision was taken at the commencement of the meeting in which event only ext.r1(c) could have been affixed at the piggery at 11.30 a.m. as recorded in ext.r1(c). along with ext.r1(c), on 12.11.2009 itself, ext.r1(d) order was also issued. by this order the petitioner was called upon to close down the piggery removing the pigs before 4.30 p.m. on the same day. exts.r1(c) and r1(d) carry the endorsements that these were affixed at the piggery at 11.30 a.m.. although it is averred in the counter affidavit that these orders were also refused to be accepted by the petitioner, there is no endorsement to that effect on exts.r1(c) or r1(d). if refusal to accept the order necessitated affixture, the refusal would certainly have been recorded in exts.r1(c) and r1(d). therefore, the story of refusal to accept and the affixture, is not the one inspiring confidence of a reasonable mind.21. at the same time, despite all the above, exts.r1(c) and r1(d) were also sent to the petitioner by registered post on 13.11.2009 and 16.11.2009 respectively and this is evident from exts.p11 and p12. from the materials that are available in this case, i am inclined to take the view that exts.r1(c) and r1(d) were served on the petitioner only on 21.11.2009, whereas, admittedly the secretary and the president of the panchayat removed 44 pigs from the farm of the petitioner on 13.11.2009 and the pigs were delivered to the butchers of meat products of india, which is even before these orders were despatched to the petitioner. affidavit of respondents 1 and 2 shows that representatives of meat products of india were brought to the piggery on 13.11.2009. if as stated by them, petitioner was given time till 4.30 p.m. on 13.11.2009 to remove the pigs, what made respondents 1 to 3 to secure the presence of the representatives of meat products of india, at the farm at 4.30 p.m. on 13.11.2009 is unknown. the unexplained presence of representatives of meat products of india reinforces my impression that all this was a premeditated plan to close down the farm.22. it may be true that respondents 1 to 3 have the power to cancel a licence, close down the farm itself and even to remove the pigs. however, power conferred is to be exercised in a reasonable manner and is not to be abused in the manner it is done. in this case, the facts speak themselves and i am satisfied that the whole action of the panchayat, its secretary and president was mala fide, capricious and oppressive and was calculated to harm and cause damages to the petitioner. the cruelty against the animals, which could not protest or defend themselves, cannot be condoned.23. there is also violation of the statutory provisions. petitioner was not given time to rectify the defects are required under section 236(5) of the act. under section 240, the time so given has to be reasonable, the duration of which will vary in the facts of each case. admittedly there were 44 pigs in the farm. not only that reasonable time was not given for rectifying the defects, but also, reasonable time was not given for removing the pigs. again, under section 240(3) only with the approval of the panchayat can the secretary take action, if the directions in the notice are not complied with. there is no case for respondents 1 to 3, that such approval of the panchayat was obtained, before 44 pigs were forcibly removed from the petitioner's farm. in the facts as above, i am convinced that the petitioner is entitled to be compensated applying the theory of restitution which is applicable to proceedings under article 226 of the constitution of india.24. in a writ petition, this court has its own limitations. if the damages is to be assessed and awarded, evidence is essential. when disputes are decided on the facts pleaded in the affidavits filed by the respective parties appreciation of evidence and adjudication of factual disputes is impossible. in the circumstances, i dispose of this writ petition with the following directions.(i) that the 1st respondent panchayat shall forthwith refund rs. 1,73,520/- received from the meat products of india by sale of 44 pigs removed from the piggery of the petitioner without making any deduction whatsoever.(ii) in view of the high handed and deliberate actions of the panchayat, the secretary and the president, i direct the panchayat to pay the amount of rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation to the petitioner, within four weeks of production of a copy of this judgment. once payment is made it will be open to the panchayat to fix liability on those who are responsible and recover the amount, in accordance with law.(iii) since the panchayat, its president and secretary are responsible for the decisions taken and the manner in which the decisions have been implemented, panchayat, its president and secretary are directed to pay rs. 25,000/- each to the petitioner as costs. the costs payable by the president and secretary shall be paid by them personally. payment shall be made within four weeks of production of a copy of this judgment.25. if the petitioner has a case that the damages he has suffered is more than what is ordered to be paid by the panchayat, viz., rs. 1,73,520/- the amount realised from the meat products of india and rs. 1,00,000/-, it will be open to the petitioner to approach the civil curt by filing a suit and recover the balance amount, if any, due to him.26. in the absence of any satisfactory material against respondents 6 to 8, i refrain from passing any order as against them, but however, it will be open to the petitioner to proceed against them also, before the civil court.writ petition is disposed of as above.