| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/903097 |
| Subject | Tenancy |
| Court | Kerala High Court |
| Decided On | Jan-07-2010 |
| Case Number | R.C.R. No. 147 of 2009 |
| Judge | Pius C. Kuriakose and; C.K. Abdul Rehim, JJ. |
| Reported in | 2010(1)KLT512 |
| Acts | Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 - Sections 11(2), 11(4) and 20 |
| Appellant | Mohanan |
| Respondent | Muhiyudheen |
| Appellant Advocate | S.V. Balakrishna Iyer, Sr. Adv.,; K. Jayakumar,; P.B. Kr |
| Respondent Advocate | P.N. Ramakrishnan Nair,; P. Viswanathan and; K. Bharatha |
| Cases Referred | Reghunathan v. Varghese |
C.K. Abdul Rehim, J.
1. The Revision Petition is filed against concurrent findings of the courts below, ordering eviction under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short). The revision petitioners herein, were respondents (Cr: petitioners) 1 to 5 before the Rent Control Court who along with respondents 4 to 7 herein, who are legal representatives of late Sri. Krishnan, the original tenant of the schedule premises. Respondents 1 to 3 herein are the petitioners before the Rent Control Court, who are the legal representatives of late Sri Kunjimoosa, the original landlord. The lease came into existence in the year 1964 by virtue of Ext.A1 registered lease deed, executed between late Sri. Kunjimoosa and late Sri. Krishnan. Subsequent to death of Sri. Kunjimoosa the property devolved upon respondents 1 and 2 herein, who were represented before the Trial Court by the 3rd respondent-their mother, by virtue of power of attorney executed by respondents 1 and 2. The revision petitioners herein are referred as tenants and the respondents 1 to 3 herein are referred as landlords in the remaining part of the judgment for the sake of brevity.
2. Even though eviction was ordered both under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(ii), Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Revision petitioners conceded that the order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) is not seriously assailed, because the revision petitioners are willing to pay off arrears of rent with interest due thereon and they are intending to file petition to set aside the order, under Section 11(2)(c). Hence we proceeded to consider sustainability of the order of eviction issued under Section 11(4)(ii), which stands confirmed through the order of the Appellate Authority.
3. The allegations of the landlords inter alia are that, inspite of the specific terms in Ext.A1 agreement to the effect of restraining the tenants from causing any damage to the building, compound wall and gate, the tenants have demolished the compound wall which existed in between the tenanted premises and the property subsequently acquired by the tenants, which is situated on the western side of the petition schedule property. They have also removed the iron gate erected at the entrance of the petition schedule premises which is abutting to Aluva-Perumbavoor public road, on its north, and re-fixed the same on the property acquired by them, situated on the western side. Consequently it is alleged that the petition schedule premises as well as the property acquired by the tenants are lying as contiguous holdings without any physical boundary as not separately identifiable. Consequent to shifting of the gate the entrance to the petition schedule premises was closed and as a result access to the petition schedule premises can be possible only through the gate erected in the holdings of the tenants. It is alleged that, by virtue of the aforesaid material and permanent alterations carried out by the tenants there occurred considerable reduction in the value and utility of the petition schedule premises.
4. In the counter statement filed by the tenants, it is contended that after death of Sri. Krishnan, respondents 1 to 5 are jointly conducting automobile workshop at the petition schedule premises and the property on its western side was purchased by late Sri. Krishnan in the year 1971, in order to expand activities of Motor Engineering Workshop (Automobile Workshop), since the workshop was granted with permission for repair of vehicles owned by the State Government. It is contended that the iron gate was shifted and re-located as entrance to the newly purchased property, with the consent obtained from the original landlord, late Sri. Kunjimoosa @ Moosa Vaidyar. It is also stated that after purchase of the property on the western side, a portion of the compound wall of the schedule premises on the western side was demolished in order to join the two properties. It is contended that the aforesaid works were carried out in the year 1974-1975, with consent of the then landlord. It is also contended that pursuant to the aforesaid alterations effected, rent of the scheduled premises was enhanced from Rs. 101/- to Rs. 400/-. The allegation of the landlords that the demised premises as well as the holding of the tenants are lying inseparable in an unidentifiable manner, was denied by the tenants. It is further contended that there is independent access available to the demised premises from the road, through an opening in the compound wall, situated on its northern corner, apart from the access which is closed on shifting of the gate. Therefore the contention is that by virtue of the above said alterations value or utility of the demised premises has not been materially affected in any manner.
5. The respondents 6, 7 and 9 have filed separate joint counter statement contending that they are not necessary parties and they have been arrayed only to harass them, because they have no rights with respect to the business conducted at the schedule premises.
6. Documentary evidence before the Rent Control Court consisted of Ext.A1 to A6 documents marked on the side of landlords and Ext.B1 to B4 on the side of tenants, along with Ext.C1 commission report and Ext.C1 (a) rough sketch. The 3rd petitioner, who is the mother of petitioners 1 and 2 was examined as PW1. RW1 is the 1st respondent. RW2 is a witness examined on behalf of respondents.
7. On the basis of evidence adduced the trial court had found that the tenants are not disputing the fact that they have carried out the alterations as alleged by the landlords. At the same time it is found that the tenants were not successful in proving through any cogent evidence that such alterations are made with consent of the landlord, as contended. Contentions of the tenants that, the landlords have no right to question such alterations at a highly belated stage of about 30 years, was also negatived by the Rent Control Court, observing that there is no time limit prescribed under the Act to seek eviction. The Trial court further found that obliteration of the boundary and other alterations carried out in the premises are in gross violation of the stipulations contained in Ext.A1, and it will definitely lower value or utility of the premises, from the point of view of the landlords. Therefore it is held that the tenants are liable to be evicted on the ground under Section 11(4)(ii). The appellate authority after re-appraisal of the entire evidence on record, had concurred with the findings of the Rent Control Court.
8. Heard, Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer, senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioners/tenants and Sri. P. Viswanathan, learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 3/landlords. Findings of the courts below is assailed mainly on the ground that the alterations effected are not material and permanent and further that such alterations have not reduced value or utility of the scheduled premises. In the factual matrix of the case there is a clear admission from the side of the tenants that the gate put on the boundary which was the access to the schedule premises from the public road, was removed and the access was closed. So also the compound wall on the western boundary was removed to a considerable extent, thereby joining both the properties for providing free access in between.
9. The first question to be decided is as to whether the alterations, effected are material which will diminish either the value or the utility of the schedule premises. It is contended that the alterations are made only for convenient usage of the schedule premises as contiguous holdings with the other property for the business activities carried thereon. It is also contended that by demolition of the compound wall the boundary is not fully obliterated and identity of the property is not lost. The questions as to whether the alterations effected are material in nature or not and as to whether it will reduce value or utility, are all matters which need be evaluated on the point of view of the landlords. This Court in Francis v. Davis reported in : 2005 (3) KLT 815 held that the value or utility of the building is to be considered in the point of view of the landlords and stipulations in the lease deed restraining the tenants from making additional constructions, is binding on the tenants. In the case at hand there is a clear stipulation in Ext.A1 lease deed restraining the tenants from causing damage to the building, compound wall, and the gate. Considered through the perspective of the landlords there is flagrant violation of the conditions stipulated in the lease. Further we notice that as far as an immovable property is concerned, compound wall demarcating its boundary as well as gate put on for access to that land from the public road, are material structures, destruction of which will definitely affect value and utility of the land. Demolition of compound wall on any of its boundaries will affect security of the property as well as its identity, no matter whether demarcation of the boundary is fully obliterated or not. These alterations in the perspective of the tenants may be termed as advantageous and not material. Contention of the tenants is that in practical usage of the premises for the purpose for which the lease is created, it is not affecting convenience or utility adversely. But for considering as to what will be the perspective of the landlords, we need to take note of the stipulations in the lease, which contains an express restrain from causing such damage. Therefore viewed in the perspective of the landlords, such alterations which are having direct impact on the value and utility of the demised property which were specifically restrained by terms of the lease, definitely it is to be held as a material alterations affecting value and utility of the property.
10. As relied on by the appellate authority, this Court in the decision in Ayishabeevi and Anr. v. Aboobacker : AIR 1971 Ker. 231 held that an act resulting in obliteration of boundary line of the demised property tagging on the same with adjoining property through medium of a corridor, will amount to an act materially and permanently reducing utility and value of the demised properties. So also in Gopalakrishnan v. Lakshmi Bai : 2005 (1) KLT 256 this Court held that user of the garden, grounds, wells, tanks, and structures if any appurtenant to the building in such a manner so as to reduce or destroy its value and utility will amount to material and permanent alterations, which will attract Section 11(4)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, in the case at hand we find no reason to differ in any manner with findings of the courts below in holding that the alterations in question are material alterations affecting value or utility of the demised premises.
11. Sri. S.V. Balakrishna Iyer had raised a plea that even assuming that the alterations are material in nature reducing value or utility of the schedule premises, such alterations are not permanent, so as to attract grounds under Section 11(4)(ii). In this regard a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Reghunathan v. Varghese 2005 4 KLT 147 (SC) is brought to our attention. The words 'materially' and 'permanently' are not disjunctive and the question depends on facts of each case, the nature of building, purpose of letting, terms of contract, and nature of interference with the structure by the tenant, are all relevant, is the dictum laid down therein. It is contended that the compound wall as well as the removed gate can easily be restored. In this regard it is noticed that a specific averment is made in the memorandum of revision to the effect that the alterations are easily reversible and the revision petitioners have undertaken to restore status quo ante, as and when there is valid termination of tenancy, at any time in the future. Further it is submitted during the course of arguments that the revision petitioners are undertaking to re-construct foundation of the compound wall at the portion where it was destroyed, in order to prevent obliteration of the boundary and to have specific demarcation. Further it is promised that the gate in question will be restored by reinstating the access therein.
12. In view of the fact that the landlords are not amenable to the above suggestions we are obliged to examine the question as to whether the alterations are 'permanent' in nature as contemplated under Section 11(4)(ii). The mandate of the provision is that the alterations should be of 'material' and 'permanent' so as to reduce Value' or 'utility' of the tenanted premises. We have already found that the alterations effected are material in nature causing diminution of value or utility. The further question as to whether it is permanent in nature also need be evaluated on the point of view of the landlords. As already observed, as far as an immovable property is concerned destruction of its compound wall and removal of its gate thereby closing its access, is a permanent alteration. Merely because the structures removed from the property can be restored in an easy manner, it cannot be said that the alterations are not permanent. As distinguished from temporary alterations destruction of any structure can be viewed only as permanent in nature for the purpose of considering a ground for eviction under Section 11(4)(ii). The question to be considered in this context is as to whether the destruction is permanent and not whether the structure can be restored. If the latter view is taken as the criteria, it will have to be found that anything which is destroyed can be re-constructed. Therefore it is clear that while evaluating the nature of permanency of the alterations the question to be considered is not as to whether it can be restored, but as to whether it is a permanent destruction. We hold that demolition of the compound wall, uprooting and removal of gate, closing of access provided to the public road, etc. are permanent alterations, no matter whether it can be restored or re-constructed. Hence we hold that the alterations effected in this case are permanent in nature coming within the purview of Section 11(4)(ii).
13. Yet another contention raised on behalf of revision petitioners/tenants is that the alterations are effected with consent of the landlords. The final fact finding authority had found that there is absolutely no evidence forthcoming to substantiate such contentions. Sitting in revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act we do not find any material irregularity or impropriety in arriving at such a conclusion, based on the evidence on record. The tenants could not point out any material non-appreciation or misappreciation of evidence.
14. Further contention is in the nature of plea of acquiescence. Based on deposition of RW1 it is contended that there is an indirect admission from the side of landlords that the alterations in question were effected long back. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such alterations are effected long back, as observed by the Trial Court, the landlords are not prevented from seeking eviction based on such alterations under Section 11(4)(ii), merely because they have failed in raising such objection at any point of time earlier. A plea of acquiescence nor a plea of limitation can be raised against an order seeking eviction under the Act within the purview of Section 11(4)(ii). Hence we do not find any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the orders of the courts below impugned in this revision.
15. Lastly, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners tenants sought indulgence of this Court to permit one year period for the tenants to vacate the premises, on the ground that a full-fledged automobile engineering workshop is being functioned in the premises and that the vehicles belonging to the State Government also are repaired therein. Sri. P. Viswanathan, learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 3 had vehemently opposed the above request. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to grant time upto 31.12.2010.
16. Under the above circumstances the revision petition is disposed of with the following directions:
The order of eviction issued under Section 11(4)(ii) by the Rent Control Court which stands confirmed in appeal, shall not be executed till 1.1.2011, on condition of the revision petitioners filing an affidavit before the executing court (or before the Rent Control Court if there is no execution proceedings pending) to the effect that they will handover peaceful and vacant possession of the schedule premises to the landlord, before 31.12.2010 and also undertaking to pay arrears of rent if any and shall continue to pay occupational charges at the rate of the agreed rent, till surrender of the leased premises. The affidavit as directed above shall be filed within a period of 3 weeks and arrears of rent if any shall be paid within one month, from today.