Subrata Sundar Das and ors. Vs. Tripura Central University and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- orderi.a. ansari, j.1. all these three writ petitions, which involve identical facts and common questions of law, are being disposed of by this judgment and order.2. the petitioners are the students of first year b. a. (law ll.b. course in tripura government law college. in the internal test, conducted by the said college, the petitioners failed to qualify. acting upon the result of the internal test, so conducted by the said college, respondent no. 3, namely, principal of the said college, declined the petitioners' request to allow them to appear in part ii final examination to be conducted by tripura university, which the said college is affiliated to. as the part-i final examination was to commence on 17th june, 2009, the petitioners, with the help of these writ applications, made.....

Judgment:
ORDER

I.A. Ansari, J.

1. All these three writ petitions, which involve identical facts and common questions of law, are being disposed of by this judgment and Order.

2. The petitioners are the students of first year B. A. (Law LL.B. course in Tripura Government Law College. In the internal test, conducted by the said College, the petitioners failed to qualify. Acting upon the result of the internal test, so conducted by the said College, respondent No. 3, namely, Principal of the said College, declined the petitioners' request to allow them to appear in Part II final examination to be conducted by Tripura University, which the said College is affiliated to. As the Part-I final examination was to commence on 17th June, 2009, the petitioners, with the help of these writ applications, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, sought for, inter alia, issuance of writ, in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondents, particularly, respondent No. 3, to allow the petitioners to appear in the said final examination of Part-I.

3. The case of the petitioners is, briefly stated, as under:

The relevant Regulations of Tripura University do not empower respondent No. 3 to restrain or disallow a student, who has, otherwise, completed the course of Part-I, from appearing the final examination, which may be conducted by the Tripura University, except when the student, as a candidate, has failed to secure 66% of classes in each of the subjects and also the moot Courts and practical training courses. Passing of an internal examination, which a college may, on their own, conduct, is not a condition precedent for eligibility of a candidate to appear in the Part-II final examination and, hence, the result of such internal examination cannot create a legal bar for such a candidate and disentitle him from appearing in the Part-I final examination to be conducted by the University.

4. The respondents have resisted the writ petitions, the case of the respondent No. 3 being, in brief, thus: The petitioners had appeared, without any reservation, in the internal test, conducted by the College w.e.f. 16-3-2009, and the result-sheets would indicate that the petitioners had not passed in several papers, which had been set by the College for testing the preparedness and ability of the candidates. As the petitioners had not objected to the holding of the test, they are, now, estopped from challenging the decision of the College not to let them appear in the final examination, in question. The holding of the internal test by the College was in exercise of the authority, which every academic institution has, and, hence, the holding of such test is not violative of the relevant Regulations of the University. The educational institutions are duty bound to consider the eligibility and viability of the students to pass the official examination, which a University may conduct. The practice of conducting internal tests have been in vogue for a long time and the petitioners too had appeared in the said test examination, but having been unsuccessful in the said test, they have, now, challenged the result of the test. This is impermissible in law. No provision of the relevant Regulations prohibits or can be said to have taken away the authority of the College to adopt its own methodology for evaluating the eligibility of a student to appear in the final examination to be conducted by the University. Since the internal test was held in the interest of the students at large, such an action of the College authorities is not subject to judicial review under Article 226. The decision of the College authorities, disallowing the petitioners from appearing in the Part-I final examination, is not arbitrary or discriminatory and may not, therefore, be interfered with.

5. As far as the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 (i.e., the University, authorities are concerned), their case is that the internal test are conducted by the Colleges to adjudge the preparedness of the students and such tests are conducted in the overall interest of the students inasmuch as holding of such tests enables the College authorities to determine the preparedness of their students for the examinations, which are to be held by the University. As the legality and validity of the holding of internal test was not objected to by the petitioners, when the test was conducted, the petitioners cannot, now, challenge the decision of the college authorities to disallow the petitioners from appearing in the final examination, in question.

6. While issuing notice of motion, this Court passed an interim order, on 10-6-2009, directing the respondents to allow the petitioners to appear provisionally in the Part-I final examination, which was to commence on 17-6-2009, subject to the condition that, the results of the examination of the petitioners shall not be announced without the approval of the Court. In terms of the interim directions so issued, the petitioners have been allowed to appear in the examination aforementioned, they have accordingly appeared and though the results of the said examination have been announced, the result of the said examination of the petitioners have been kept withheld. In the backdrop of these facts, these writ petitions, as had been sought for, and agreed to, by the learned Counsel for the parties concerned, were heard for the purpose of final disposal.

7. I have heard Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3, and Mr. P. K. Biswas, learned Senior Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 &2.

8. Having made the Court traverse through various provisions of the relevant Regulations of the University; Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, has tried to impress upon this Court that the relevant Regulations do not prohibit any college from conducting its own internal examination for determining the preparedness of its students for the final examination to be conducted by the University and to make improvements in the quality of the performance of the students, but no College can, according to Mr. Bhowmik, impose any conditions, which the relevant Regulations do not envisage, as a condition precedent, for eligibility of such candidates to appear in the final examination, which has to be conducted by the University. In support of these submissions, Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, points out that the relevant Regulations prescribe a minimum qualifying number of attendance of classes, in each of the subjects, as the only condition precedent for eligibility of a candidate of Part-I to appear in the Part-I final examination to be conducted by the University, and hence, in such circumstances, the result of the internal examination, which a College may hold, cannot be treated by the College, as a condition of eligibility of its students to appear in the final examination to be conducted by the University, for, doing so, according to Mr. Bhowmik, would amount to imposing an additional condition on the sole eligibility criteria, which the relevant Regulations prescribe, and such a condition, if imposed, would, contends Mr. Bhowmik, militate against the Regulations inasmuch as such a condition would encroach upon the field, which the Regulations occupy.

9. Appearing on behalf of the college authorities, Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that the College, in question, is an autonomous body and it has the power to adopt its own policy to regulate its function and this freedom empowers the College to impose any condition, which it deems necessary, for the purpose of testing the ability of its students to appear in the examination, which may be conducted by the University, and, the power of judicial review, under Article 226, cannot be invoked in such cases, Mr. Deb also submits that the policy, which the College has, does not, in any way, militate against the relevant Regulations, which the University has, and, hence, the policy of the College not to let those of its students, who have not qualified in its internal test, to sit in the final examination, to be held by the University, cannot be said to be violative of the relevant Regulations and/or violative of the law contained in that behalf. In support of his submissions, Mr. Deb placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath reported in : (1971) 1 SCC 607 : AIR 1971 SC 2560, K. H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala reported in : (2006) 6 SCC 395 : AIR 2006 SC 2339 and All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan reported in : 2009 AIR SCW 3124 : AIR 2009 SC 2322.

10. As far as Mr. P. K. Biswas, learned Senior Government is concerned, he has adopted the submissions made, on behalf of the College, by Mr. S. Deb.

11. In the light of the rival submissions made, on behalf of the parties, when I turn to the Regulations, which the petitioners have relied upon. I find that these Regulations have been framed by Tripura University in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 51 read with Section 52 of the Tripura University Act, 1987, which has been amended, in the year 1998, pursuant to the recommendations of the Bar Council of India and the UGC Curriculum Development Committee (CDC) Report, 2000. The Regulations, which have been referred to, and relied upon, in these writ petitions, are called Revised Regulations for B.A. LL.B. and B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Degree Courses of Tripura University. The validity of these Regulations are not under challenge in these writ petitions. These Regulations have, admittedly, come into force w.e.f. 2006-07 academic session of the University.

12. There is no dispute that the law course, in question, comprises of five parts, namely, Part-I, Part-II, Part-III, Part-IV and Part-V. In terms of the Regulations, the law course is a five year integrated programme, having one year course in each part, from Part I to Part V. In terms of Regulation 4(d), admissions, into the 1st year of the law course, is based on the entrance examination, which is held as per rules framed, and guidelines issued, by the State Government.

13. Regulations 5(a) and 5(b), if read together, make it clear that final examination of each part shall be taken by the University after completion of each academic year and there will be a gap of forty-five days between the completion of classes and the commencement of the University examination. Under Regulation 5(e), a candidate is required to attend 66% of classes in each of the subjects and also moot courts and practical training courses provided that, in exceptional cases and, for reason to be recorded, Principal of a law college may condone attendance of its student. The Regulation 5(f) makes it clear that a student, having less than stipulated attendance, has to be declared as discollegiate. The Regulation 5(g) provides that a student has to complete his/her course of study of law and all examinations, within a period of eight years from his/her admission in the 1st year class, in a law college, under,' Tripura University. Regulation 5(h) provides that non-appearance, in any year, in the University examination or special examination, or if the scheduled examination is cancelled due to adopting unfair means/unfair act by a candidate in the course of examination, as the case may be, at any stage, such non-appearance 'shall be counted as chance or chance availed by those candidate(s) in computing the number of chances to appear at the examination'.

14. From a combined reading of the various provisions contained in the Regulations referred to above, what becomes clear is that the only condition, imposed by the Regulations, in order to enable a student of law course to appear, in Part-I final examination of the University, is that he/she must have attended 66% of classes in each of the subjects and also at the moot courts and practical training courses. However, in exceptional cases, and for reasons to be recorded, Principal of a law college may condone shortage of the requisite attendance if the student had attended 66% of the lectures in aggregate. The Regulations make it also clear that a student, having less than stipulated attendance of 66%, shall be declared as discollegiate unless his lack of attendance is condoned by the Principal of the college as indicated hereinbefore. The Regulations further make it clear that a candidate of LLB course, other than Part-IV and Part-V, is required to obtain 40% of marks in order to pass the examination of the University. Other than attendance of 66% as stipulated in Regulation 5(e), no other condition is required to be fulfilled, under the Regulations, to enable a candidate to appear in Part-I final examination.

15. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that the entire course of study has to be completed, in eight years, by a student from his/her admission in the 1st year class, in a law college, under the University. Non-appearance of a student, in any of the University examinations, shall be counted, as a chance, in counting the total number of chances, which a candidate will receive, under the Regulation, to appear in the examination of each part of the five-year course. Thus, non-appearance, in any of the examinations, conducted by the University,; would amount to availing of the chance, which a candidate would have received under the Regulations'.

16. In the light of what have been pointed out above, it is apparent that if a student is not allowed to appear in the final examination of Part-I or in the final examination of any other part, Weld by the University, it would be treated as if the student has already availed a 'chance', though he might not have appeared due to the fact that he was not allowed by his college to appear in the examination. Consequently, if the present petitioners are not allowed by their College to appear in the Part-I examination held by the University, the effect would be as if the petitioners have availed and exhausted one of their chances, which they would have, otherwise, received in respect of Part-I examination. Thus, non-appearance in the examination, in question, would have serious legal consequences affecting the future prospects of the petitioners as students of law course. It may be noted that it is only the principal of a law college, who can condone the attendance of a student of law course to appear in Part-I examination. Otherwise, the necessity of attendance of 66% of classes, as indicated above, is the only condition, which the University has imposed, on the petitioners, as students of law course, to become eligible to appear in the examination, which the University conducts. To pass the internal examination of a college is an additional condition, which the Regulations do not conceive of.

17. If the scheme of the Regulations is carefully analysed, it becomes abundantly clear that the Regulations do not permit any of the colleges to impose any condition, other than attendance, on a student, to enable him/her to become eligible to appear in Part-I examination of the University. Thus, the condition precedent, which the respondent College, has imposed on the petitioners, as students, to pass the internal examination, conducted by the College, is not only wholly alien to the scheme of the Regulations, but also militates the scheme of the course contemplated by Regulations. When the Regulations are silent and lay down no condition, other than requisite percentage of attendance for a student to become eligible to appear in Part-I examination of the University, no college authority can, with the help of their own adopted policy or system, impose such a condition, which would render an eligible student, under the Regulations, ineligible. If the internal test has the effect of rendering ineligible a student, who is, otherwise, eligible, under the Regulation, to appear in the University's examination, such a test cannot but be regarded as going ;against the scheme of the Regulations. The college authority may make any rule or adopt 'any policy to effectively enforce the Regulations, but they cannot make any such rules 'or adopt any such policy, which would defeat the Regulations.

18. The Regulations, in question, make it crystal clear that no test, internal or external, is required to be passed by a student of law course before he/she becomes eligible to appear in the University examination. The scheme of the Regulations is precise and clear that if a student has requisite attendance, he/she shall be allowed to appear in the final examination of each Part to be conducted by the University. Within the field, which the Regulations occupy, no encroachment by a law college is permissible. When the Regulations do not conceive of any additional test to be passed by a student to enable him to appear in Part-I final examination of the University, the College authorities cannot make the passing of the internal test, as a condition precedent, for a student to become eligible to appear in the final examination. The policy, adopted by the College authorities, in the present case, militates against the Regulations and disables a student, who is, otherwise, eligible, under the Regulations, from appearing in the University examination. This is impermissible in law.

19. As an autonomous body, a college may adopt such a policy, which helps them in maintaining discipline in the college and if any student is not allowed to appear for breach of discipline, the matter would be different inasmuch as the Regulations do not prescribe any procedure or action as far as discipline of a student of law course is concerned and, hence, the field of discipline is open and can be occupied by adopting appropriate policy by the college authorities concerned. But as far as the eligibility criterion for appearance in Part-I examination of the University is concerned, no condition, other than attendance, can be insisted as a condition of eligibility. Consequently, no condition, such as, the condition of passing of the internal test, conducted by the respondent College, could have been imposed by the respondent College on its students. The authority of the University to make the Regulations in exercise of its statutory powers is not questioned by the respondent College. Hence, these Regulations must be enforced and no college can put impediments in the way of enforcement of these Regulations. The policy, which the College, in question, has adopted, in the present case, puts clear impediments in the way of enforcing the Regulations inasmuch as the Regulations require a candidate to attend his classes, as the Regulations conceive of, and his ability and knowledge to pass or not to pass an examination would be tested, in the light of the Regulations of the University, by conducting such examination as the Regulations contemplate and permit.

20. In their counter, the respondents have attempted to show that the policy of internal examination is adopted with the aim of testing the preparedness of the students. If the policy has been adopted to alert the students and to make them aware of their deficiencies and/or lack of preparedness, there can be no objection. In fact, such a policy would, undoubtedly, be regarded as a laudable policy, for, such a policy would subserve the interest of the University and such a policy does not dilute or set at naught the effectiveness of the Regulations. But when the policy goes beyond helping the Regulations from being enforced and/or creates conditions, which are not envisaged by the Regulations, affecting thereby the enforcement of the Regulations themselves, such a policy should not be allowed to survive.

21. It has been contended, on behalf of the respondent No. 3, by Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior counsel, that in matters of educational institutions, a writ Court should adopt the policy of detachment. It is, undoubtedly, not very desirable that the High Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review, interferes with the functioning of an educational institution. This policy of no-interference in the functioning of the academic institutions cannot, however, go to the extent of permitting an academic institution flout the law and thereby destroy the rule of law itself. Such an attitude, as rightly contended by Mr. Bhowmick, would be nothing, but autocratic and tyrannical and if this policy is allowed to survive, it would amount to the High Court abdicating its authority of ensuring that even an academic institution functions and remains within the bounds of law. The respondent College functions under the Regulations aforementioned and cannot, therefore, act in a manner, which defeats or destroys the very scheme of the Regulations. Educational institutions, particularly, the institutions of law, have to be ideal for those, who wish to learn how to respect law and abide by law. When an educational institution adopts a policy, which collides against, or is violative of. the Regulations, whereunder the college has to function, and if in a such serious matter, the High Court refuses to look into and pass such order(s) as may be necessary, the causality would be none but the rule of law. Invoking of its jurisdiction, under Article 226, by a High Court, in such a situation, would not only be desirable, but imperative.

22. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Lavu Narendranath and Ors. etc. reported in : (1971) 1 SCC 607 : AIR 1971 SC 2560, which Mr. Deb relied upon, the Government of Andhra Pradesh had been conducting entrance test for admission to medical colleges. By a notification issued by the State Government, when the State Government published the notification inviting applications for entrance test, several writ petitions were filed challenging the validity of the entrance test including the methodology of selection for admission to the medical colleges. The writ petitioners, in substance, contended, relying upon Andhra University Act, that it was the said University, which was the competent authority to prescribe qualifications for admission into all degree courses run under the University and the Government could not have substituted itself in place of the academic council of the University and prescribe the criteria for admission to the medical Colleges. In effect, the petitioners contended, in Lavu Narendranath and Ors. (supra), that holding of the entrance test and making selection on the basis of such test, in disregard of marks obtained by the candidates at the examinations held by the University, was an encroachment upon the Central Subject listed in Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, A learned single Judge of Andhra High Court had dismissed the writ petition; but the Division Bench, in appeal, allowed the writ petition. The State Government, then, carried the matter to the Apex Court.

23. In Lavu Narendranath and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court was required to examine as to whether the State Government had the power to prescribe a test for making selection front a number of candidates out of the large body of applicants, who had been seeking admission in the 1st Year MBBS course, and whether such action of, the Government contravened any provisions already made by the legislature in that, respect. The Apex Court pointed out that under Article 162, State's executing power is co-extensive with its legislative power and when the State Government runs the medical colleges, it has the right and also the duty to make a selection from the number of applications, whereby admission to the MBBS course were being sought for. The Apex Court observed that if there was no legislation providing the method and manner of selection for admission to the MBBS course, the State Government was free to lay down appropriate scheme or policy for selection. The Apex Court held that since the University had merely prescribed the eligibility criterion for admission to a course of study and had not laid down the method of selection, the State Government was free to devise its own policy of selection so far as the selection, out of a number of candidates, who had satisfied the prescribed eligibility criterion of the University, were concerned. On the basis of the conclusions, so reached, the Apex Court allowed the appeal and maintained the impugned notifications. The relevant observations made by the Apex Court, which appear at para 15, read as under:

In our view there is no substance in any of the contentions as will be apparent from our conclusions noted above and the decisions of this Court bearing on this point. The University Act, as pointed out, merely prescribed a minimum qualification for entry into the higher courses of study. There was no regulation to the effect that admission to higher course of study was guaranteed by securing of eligibility. The Executive have a power to make any regulation which would have the effect of a law so long as it does not contravene any legislation already covering the field and the Government order in this case in no way affected the rights of candidates with regard to eligibility for admission; the test prescribed was a further hurdle by way of competition when mere eligibility could not be made the determining factor.

24. It transpires from the decision, in Lavu Narendranath and Ors. : AIR 1971 SC 2560 (supra), that when a University prescribes the minimum qualifying marks for admission to a course of study, but does not prescribe as to how selection, out of a number of applicants, who satisfy the eligibility criterion, are to be made, the authorities, who have to allow admission to such a course of study, will remain free to adopt their own methodology, for, in such cases, the policy, adopted by the authorities concerned, cannot be said to militate against the relevant law governing the field. Conversely, what Lavu Nareridranath and others (supra) lays down is that when a University, in exercise of its competent jurisdiction, prescribes the eligibility criteria in respect of a course of study, the academic institutions, which conduct the course of study, cannot adopt any policy, which would militate against, or encroach upon, the area, which the University, in exercise of its lawful jurisdiction, has covered by prescribing the eligibility criteria. In the present case too, when the University has prescribed a specified percentage of attendance as the only pre-condition for making a student eligible to appear in the Part-I final examination, the authorities, running the course, in question, cannot put such a condition, which the University has not imposed, and which, if allowed to continue, would defeat the University's Regulations. In the present case, the University has prescribed, as indicated hereinbefore, only one eligibility criterion, namely, percentage of attendance and when the University has not put any other condition, no such condition can be prescribed or imposed by the respondent College, conducting the course, which would militate against the University's sole prescribed criterion.

25. In the case at hand, if the contention of the respondent College is permitted to prevail, the consequence would be that a student, who is, otherwise, eligible, in terms of the Regulations, to appear, in Part-I final examination, would become disqualified from appearing in such examination. The logical extension of such a consequence would be that a student, who is eligible in terms of the prescribed criterion of the University, would be disabled from appearing in the examination by the act of the respondent College. This is not permissible in law. In a given case, if a student is not allowed, on disciplinary ground, to appear in University examination by a college, it would be a case, which would not warrant interference by the High Court under Section 226, for, the Regulations do not dis-empower a College from enforcing discipline and from taking such consequential action(s) as may be warranted including expelling a student from College on disciplinary ground. When the University's Regulations have left the colleges free to evolve their own respective policies with regard to discipline, it logically follows that a student may not be allowed by a College to appear in the University's examination if the reason for not allowing is breach of discipline; but when a student is not allowed to appear in the College's examination on the ground that he lacks merit as he has not passed the internal test, such a condition would amount to putting, apart from requisite attendance, merit as an additional condition for making a student eligible to appear in the examination to be conducted by the University, which the Regulations do not contemplate and permit. Thus, so far as eligibility criterion for appearance in the examination, in question, is concerned, no college authority, including the respondent College, can put any condition in addition to what the Regulations have put, for, doing so would amount to encroaching upon the field, which the University, with the help of its Regulations, has covered. Thus, the case of Lavu Narendranath and Ors. : AIR 1971 SC 2560 (supra) does not help the case of the respondents. Far from this, the decision, in Lavu Narendranath and Ors. (supra), advances the case of the present writ petitioners.

26. Turning to the case of All India Council for Technical Education : AIR 2009 SC 2322 (supra), it needs to be noted that in the said case, the All India Council for Technical Education (in short, the AICTE) had declined to grant permission for bridge course, for diploma holders, which the State Government had recommended so as to enable the diploma holders acquire degree in engineering. Feeling aggrieved, some students of the Institute, which holds the bridge course, approached Delhi High Court and the High Court, while allowing the writ petitions, quashed the letters, whereby AICTE had declined to permit the bridge course. The High Court, then, directed the AICTE to accord approval to the Institute to have a bridge course for its students, who had studied or who have been studying the advance diploma course. Though the AICTE had, as a one time measure, acted upon the directions issued by the High Court, an objection was raised, when similar directions were issued by the Delhi High Court.

27. It was in the backdrop of such factual scenario that in All India Council for Technical Education : AIR 2009 SC 2322 (supra), the Supreme Court, having noted that it had already held, in its earlier decision, in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. J.B. Educational Society reported in : 2005 (3) SCC 212 : AIR 2005 SC 2014, 'the AICTE Act was enacted with the object of regulating and co-ordinating the development of technical education throughout the country and also for establishment of proper and uniform norms and standard of technical education in India', pointed out, referring to the bridge course, which was being run on the basis of the orders of the High Court, that an educational course had been created and continued on the basis of the judicial fiat without any statutory or academic evaluation or assessment or acceptance. Hence, the direction, which had been issued, was interfered with. The relevant observations, made in All India Council for Technical Education (supra), appearing at para-18, read as under:

18. This is a classic case where an educational course has been created and continued merely by the fiat of the Court, without any prior statutory or academic evaluation or assessment or acceptance. Granting approval for a new course or programme requires examination of various academic/technical facets which can only be done by an expert body like AICTE. this function cannot obviously be taken over or discharged by Courts. In this case, for example, by a mandamus of the Court, a bridge course was permitted for four year Advance Diploma holders, who had passed the entry level examination of 10 + 2 with PCM subjects. Thereafter, by another mandamus in another case, what was a one time measure was extended for several years and was also extended to Post Diploma holders. Again by another mandamus, it was extended to those who had passed only 10+1 examination instead of the required minimum of 10 + 2 examination. Each direction was obviously intended to give relief to students who wanted to better their career prospects, purely as an ad hoc measure. But together they lead to an unintended dilution of educational standards, adversely affecting the standards and quality of engineering degree courses. Courts should guard against such forays in the field of education.

28. Even the case of All India Council for Technical Education : AIR 2009 SC 2322 (supra), which Mr. S. Deb, learned Sr. Counsel, relies upon, advances the case of the writ petitioners inasmuch as it clearly lays down that when the competent authority, which has the power to co-ordinate development of technical education, has adopted a policy, the Court cannot force such an authority to act contrary to its decision. In the case at hand too, when the University has chosen to prescribe the eligibility criteria, the college authorities cannot make ineligible a student, who is, otherwise, eligible under the Regulations of the University concerned, for, this would amount to intruding into the field, which the Regulations cover.

29. On turning to the case of K.H. Siraj : AIR 2006 SC 2339 (supra) too, I do not find that this case helps the respondents. In the case of K. H. Siraj (supra) are clear and the implications are, amongst others, that an authority, which is entrusted with the power to make selection, may adopt, within the statutory limits, its own policy to conduct the selection. The present one is a case, wherein the college authorities have not been given the power to make ineligible a student, who is, under the Regulations, eligible to appear in Part-I final examination. Viewed from this angle, even the case of K. H. Siraj (supra) does not, in any way, support the contention of the respondents.

30. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court finds that the impugned action of the respondents, in refusing to allow the petitioners to appear in their Part-I final examination, was wholly illegal and cannot, therefore, be maintained. These writ petitions are, therefore, allowed. The appearance of the petitioners, as examinees in Part-I examination, in question, shall be, and shall always be treated to have been, valid appearance in the said examination. The respondent University shall publish the petitioners' results, which have been kept withheld in the light of the interim directions passed in these writ petitions. The interim directions, passed in these writ petitions, shall accordingly stand modified.

31. With the above observations and directions, these writ petitions shall stand disposed of.

32. No order as to costs.