Goverdhan Lal Vs. State of H.P. and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- orderkamlesh sharma, j. 1. the petitioner is a deed-writer. he has filed the present petition under article 227 of the constitution of india praying for expunction of adverse remarks made against him in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 2nd february, 1978 passed by, the district judge, hamirpur, in civil appeal no. 64 of 1975 titled khushal chand and fithu v. smt. hakam devi. 2. the appeal was against the judgment dated 2nd may, 1978 of senior sub-judge, hamirpur whereby the suit filed by smt. hakam devi was decreed in her favour for possession of the property in dispute -- land measuring 30 kanals 14 marias and a house. the allegations of smt. hakam devi which were found correct by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court were that she was owner in possession of the property in dispute and defendant fithu in connivance with defendant khushal chand obtained her general power of attorney by fraud and misrepresentation and thereafter sold her property in dispute to defendant khushal chand by registered sale-deed. receipt of sale consideration was also got thumb marked from her by playing fraud and misrepresentation. all the three documents, the general power of attorney, the sale deed and the receipt were scribed by the petitioner. 3. against the adverse remarks made in the judgment dated 2nd february, 1978, the petitioner had earlier filed c.m.p. (m) no. 4 of 1978 seeking similar relief but it was dismissed on 9th august, 1985 as not maintainable on the ground that the parties to the appeal were not impleaded in the petition. feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the high court, the petitioner filed s.l.p. (c) no. 16164/1985 in the supreme court which was also dismissed on 10th march, 1986 by the following order :-- 'it is open to the petitioner to file a fresh application before the high court impleading all the necessary parties and praying for condonation of delay in making that application. if such an application is made within 4 weeks from today the high court will entertain and dispose it of on merits. special leave petition is dismissed.' 4. thereafter, the present petition was filed on 8th april, 1986. this court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. sh. bhupender gupta, appearing for the petitioner, has urged that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 2nd february, 1978 were not justified on the facts of the case nor were necessary for the disposal of the appeal. according to him, the petitioner had written the documents as he was instructed to and had made entries in his register impartially and truthfully. the district judge, as such, was not right to hold that the petitioner was also party to the conspiracy hatched by khushal chand and fithu besides ram nath. this conclusion had been arrived at by the district judge when he found that the dates written against serial nos. 596 and 597, where receipt and sale-deed were entered in the register of the petitioner, and also in the sale-deed and the receipt were interpolated from 5th october, 1968 to 8th october, 1968, on the other hand, sh. p. m. bisht, learned law officer, appearing for respondent no. 2, has submitted that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner were necessary for the decision of the case and were borne out from the evidence on record. 5. in order to appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the tests laid down by the hon'ble supreme court, in respect of expunction of adverse remarks are noted. these tests are summed up by the supreme court in para 10 of its judgment in the state of uttar pradesh v. mohammad naim, air 1964 sc 703 : (1964(1) cri lj 549) and are (at page 707 of air sc) :-- '....it has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. it has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.' 6. these tests have been reiterated and followed by the supreme court in r.k. lakshmanan v. a. k. srinivasan, air 1975 sc 1741 : (1975 cri lj 1545), niranjan patnaik v. sashibhusan kar, air 1986 sc 819 : (1986 cri lj 911) and a. m. mathur v. framed kumar gupta, air 1990 sc 1737. in the case of a. m. mathur (supra) k. jagan-natha shetty, j. speaking for the court further observed (at page 1741) :-- '(13) judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. the duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a constant theme of our judges. this quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect; that is, respect by the judiciary. respect to those who come before the court as well to other coordinate branches of the state, the executive and legislature. there must be mutual respect. when these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe, that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process. (14) the judges bench is a seat of power. not only do judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. the judges' have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the court domain. but they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses. we concede that the court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice , that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct....' 7. before these tests are applied to the present case, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 2nd february, 1978 are reproduced hereinbelow :-- '8. the respondent's case is that she was brought by the appellants to hamirpur on 5-10-1968, with intention of making sale of some of her land in favour of fithu. writing ex.d-3 was procured from her such day and her several thumb impressions were also obtained on several papers. it is contended that such thumb impressions were obtained on the document ex.d-3 and at two places in the deed writer's register against s.nos. 595, 596. such day she was also produced before the sub-registrar towards registration of deed ex.d-3 by which she meant to be sell her land towards sale consideration of rs. 1200/-and she was made to thumb mark the deed there. it is contended that a mere glance of entries nos. 595, 596, 597 at page 191 of goverdhan lal deed-writer (d.w. 3's register) would support the contention so made. it is said that all these three entries appear to have been made on 5-10-1968 but dates in the latter two have been changed to read 8-10-1968. the contention has force in it. the digit 8 in the year 1968 in the three entries in dates has different style of writing than the digit 8 in date against s. nos. 596, 597 and digit 5 appears to have been changed to read as 8 in these. in any case, this a big suspicious circumstance to shake the credibility of the three documents. similar tampering appears in the dates appearing in receipt ex.d-2 where date 8-10-1968 appear at two places. similar tampering appears in date 8-10-1968 of deed, ex.d-1 but not in the mukhtiarnama ex.d-3. 9. it is further the contention of the respondent that though the three entries in the deed-writer's register appear to have been made on 5-10-1968 and the whole scheme of defrauding the respondent was to be completed the same day. the appellant appears to have run into trouble as on 5-10-1968 they could not procure the requisite stamp paper for sale deed to be made by fithu in favour of khushal chand. this was, however, made available on 7-10-1968 and thus, it was to be given a date 8-10-1968. but since the original entry in the deed-writer's register was made on 5-10-1968, originally, the date was written in the sale deed as 5-10-1968, but later changed to 8-10-1968. 10. yet another suspicious circumstance is patent on a reference to the original register of the deed-writer, fithu. claims that first he completed the sale deed, went to the registrar and having received the sale consideration of rs. 10,000/- from khushal chand came out and passed on such money to smt. hakam devi vide receipt ex.d-2 on 8-10-1968. if events happened like that then it was natural that the entry of receipt in the deed-writer's register should have appeared next to the entry of the sale deed. but this is not found to be the case. the receipt is entered against section no. 596 while the deed of sale is shown against section no. 597. in the deed-writer's seal appearing on ex.d-2 and ex. d-1 too the dates stand tampered with. if the theory propounded by the appellant that on 8-10-1968 also smt. hakam devi was present when she received rs. 10,000/- from fithu against receipt ex.d-2 is correct, then the question arises why the sale deed was not produced by khushal chand from hakam devi the principal and why did he insist to secure the sale deed from her so-called mukhtiar, fithu. fithu claims in his testimony that smt. hakam devi made him mukhtiar as she as an old lady and could not move about. but per his own showing, if is to be believed, hakam devi was present on 8-10-1968 also but her presence was not utilized to secure sale-deed from her. the explanation of fithu, thus, appears unconvincing and that of the respondent appears convincing that it was on 5-10-1968 that writing ex.d-2 was obtained from her besides procuring her thumb impression at, several papers, one being the receipt, ex.d-2, in ex.d-2 date 8-10-1968 appears in the body in reference on sale deed, at the end of the writing and with the s. no. in the seal of the deed-writer. at all these three places, the date has been tampered with and it appears that earlier the digit in the date was 5 which was changed to read as '8' to suit the appellant theory.' 8. though the petitioner has not-referred to para 15, where further adverse remarks have been made, yet, these are also considered for deciding the present petition. para 15 is :-- '15. all the above factors go to lead to only one irresistible conclusion that khushal chand wanted to deprive sant ram of his share in the property in dispute after the death of hakara devi and thought of procuring sale deed of the entire estate from her. he put up fithu as prospective buyer to apart of her property which she wanted to sell to raise necessary funds for 'yaciya'. he entered a conspiracy with fithu in which the deed-writer was also joined besides his own kala ram rath and on 5-10-1968, mukhtiarnama ex.d-3 was procured and also receipt ex.d-2 and the old unsuspecting lady was made to thumb mark the relevant document and the deed-writer's register. peculiarly enough the entry of mukhtiarnama ex.d-3 is noted in the deed-writer's register at section no. 595 as mukhtiarnama khas.' 9. applying the tests laid down by the supreme court in its various judgments to the facts of the present case, this court does not find it a fit case to expunge the adverse remarks made against the petitioner. in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner were not necessary for the decision of the case and were not borne out from the evidence on record. a perusal of paras 8, 9, 10 and 15 of the judgment dated 2nd february, 1978 makes it clear that in order to examine the genuineness of the documents which were scribed by the petitioner, the district judge was justified in taking into account the interpolations of dates written against serial nos. 596 and 597 in the register of the petitioner where receipt and sale deed were entered and also in the sale deed and the receipt, ex.d-1 and ex.d-2. on the basis of change of dates from 5th october, 1968 to 8th october, 1968, found in the register and the documents and other evidence on record, the district judge has held that the whole scheme of defrauding smt. hakami devi was completed on 5th october, 1968 when the documents were written and entered in the register of the petitioner but as the requisite stamp papers for sale deed were made available on 7th october, 1968, the dates were changed to 8th october, 1968. naturally, the change in the dates in the register as well as in the sale deed and the receipt written by the petitioner could not be made by anyone else except the petitioner. therefore, the district judge, while holding that khushal chand defendant had entered into a conspiracy with fithu defendant for defrauding smt. hakami devi of her property in dispute, has rightly commented on the conduct of the petitioner that he was also joined in the conspiracy. 10. further, while disbelieving the statement of fithu defendant that first he completed the sale deed, got it registered and thereafter received the sale consideration of rs. 10,000/- from khushal chand defendant and passed on the money to smt. hakami devi who thumb marked the receipt ex.d-2 on 8th october, 1968, the district judge has relied upon the register of the petitioner wherein the receipt is entered against sr. no. 596 whereas the sale deed is shown against sr. no. 597 and held that had the events happened as alleged by fithu defendant and smt. hakami devi been present in the office of the registrar to sign the receipt on 8th october, 1968, the sale deed would have been executed by her. therefore, the district judge concluded that all the three documents were written on 5th october, 1968 and entered in the register of the petitioner at one point of time but later on the dates against sr. nos.596 and 597 of the register of the petitioner and the sale deed and the receipt were changed as the sale deed could be registered only on 8th october, 1968, after the non-judicial stamp papers were made available on 7th october, 1968. 11. so far another test of giving opportunity to the petitioner to explain his conduct is concerned he did have it when he appeared as a witness in civil suit titled hakami devi v. khushal chand and fithu and produced his register. it is not a case in which it can be held that the district judge has not exercised judicial restraint and has made uncalled for remarks against the petitioner. 12. in the result, the petition is dismissed but there is no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

Kamlesh Sharma, J.

1. The petitioner is a deed-writer. He has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for expunction of adverse remarks made against him in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 2nd February, 1978 passed by, the District Judge, Hamirpur, in Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1975 titled Khushal Chand and Fithu v. Smt. Hakam Devi.

2. The appeal was against the judgment dated 2nd May, 1978 of Senior Sub-Judge, Hamirpur whereby the suit filed by Smt. hakam Devi was decreed in her favour for possession of the property in dispute -- land measuring 30 kanals 14 Marias and a house. The allegations of Smt. Hakam Devi which were found correct by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court were that she was owner in possession of the property in dispute and defendant Fithu in connivance with defendant Khushal Chand obtained her general power of attorney by fraud and misrepresentation and thereafter sold her property in dispute to defendant Khushal Chand by registered sale-deed. Receipt of sale consideration was also got thumb marked from her by playing fraud and misrepresentation. All the three documents, the general power of attorney, the sale deed and the receipt were scribed by the petitioner.

3. Against the adverse remarks made in the judgment dated 2nd February, 1978, the petitioner had earlier filed C.M.P. (M) No. 4 of 1978 seeking similar relief but it was dismissed on 9th August, 1985 as not maintainable on the ground that the parties to the appeal were not impleaded in the petition. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the petitioner filed S.L.P. (C) No. 16164/1985 in the Supreme Court which was also dismissed on 10th March, 1986 by the following order :--

'It is open to the petitioner to file a fresh application before the High Court impleading all the necessary parties and praying for condonation of delay in making that application. If such an application is made Within 4 weeks from today the High Court will entertain and dispose it of on merits. Special Leave Petition is dismissed.'

4. Thereafter, the present petition was filed on 8th April, 1986. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Sh. Bhupender Gupta, appearing for the petitioner, has urged that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 2nd February, 1978 were not justified on the facts of the case nor were necessary for the disposal of the appeal. According to him, the petitioner had written the documents as he was instructed to and had made entries in his register impartially and truthfully. The District Judge, as such, was not right to hold that the petitioner was also party to the conspiracy hatched by Khushal Chand and Fithu besides Ram Nath. This conclusion had been arrived at by the District Judge when he found that the dates written against serial Nos. 596 and 597, where receipt and sale-deed were entered in the register of the petitioner, and also in the sale-deed and the receipt were interpolated from 5th October, 1968 to 8th October, 1968, On the other hand, Sh. P. M. Bisht, learned Law Officer, appearing for respondent No. 2, has submitted that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner were necessary for the decision of the case and were borne out from the evidence on record.

5. In order to appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the tests laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in respect of expunction of adverse remarks are noted. These tests are summed up by the Supreme Court in para 10 of its judgment in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964(1) Cri LJ 549) and are (at page 707 of AIR SC) :--

'....It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.'

6. These tests have been reiterated and followed by the Supreme Court in R.K. Lakshmanan v. A. K. Srinivasan, AIR 1975 SC 1741 : (1975 Cri LJ 1545), Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar, AIR 1986 SC 819 : (1986 Cri LJ 911) and A. M. Mathur v. Framed Kumar Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1737. In the case of A. M. Mathur (supra) K. Jagan-natha Shetty, J. speaking for the Court further observed (at page 1741) :--

'(13) Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a constant theme of our judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect; that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as well to other coordinate branches of the State, the Executive and Legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe, that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.

(14) The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The Judges' have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses. We concede that the Court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice , that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct....'

7. Before these tests are applied to the present case, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 2nd February, 1978 are reproduced hereinbelow :--

'8. The respondent's case is that she was brought by the appellants to Hamirpur on 5-10-1968, with intention of making sale of some of her land in favour of Fithu. Writing Ex.D-3 was procured from her such day and her several thumb impressions were also obtained on several papers. It is contended that such thumb impressions were obtained on the document Ex.D-3 and at two places in the deed writer's register against S.Nos. 595, 596. Such day she was also produced before the Sub-Registrar towards registration of deed Ex.D-3 by which she meant to be sell her land towards sale consideration of Rs. 1200/-and she was made to thumb mark the deed there. It is contended that a mere glance of entries Nos. 595, 596, 597 at page 191 of Goverdhan Lal Deed-Writer (D.W. 3's register) would support the contention so made. It is said that all these three entries appear to have been made on 5-10-1968 but dates in the latter two have been changed to read 8-10-1968. The contention has force in it. The digit 8 in the year 1968 in the three entries in dates has different style of writing than the digit 8 in date against S. Nos. 596, 597 and digit 5 appears to have been changed to read as 8 in these. In any case, this a big suspicious circumstance to shake the credibility of the three documents. Similar tampering appears in the dates appearing in receipt Ex.D-2 where date 8-10-1968 appear at two places. Similar tampering appears in date 8-10-1968 of deed, Ex.D-1 but not in the Mukhtiarnama Ex.D-3.

9. It is further the contention of the respondent that though the three entries in the deed-writer's register appear to have been made on 5-10-1968 and the whole scheme of defrauding the respondent was to be completed the same day. The appellant appears to have run into trouble as on 5-10-1968 they could not procure the requisite stamp paper for sale deed to be made by Fithu in favour of Khushal Chand. This was, however, made available on 7-10-1968 and thus, it was to be given a date 8-10-1968. But since the original entry in the deed-writer's register was made on 5-10-1968, originally, the date was written in the sale deed as 5-10-1968, but later changed to 8-10-1968.

10. Yet another suspicious circumstance is patent on a reference to the original register of the deed-writer, Fithu. claims that first he completed the sale deed, went to the Registrar and having received the sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/- from Khushal Chand came out and passed on such money to Smt. Hakam Devi vide receipt Ex.D-2 on 8-10-1968. If events happened like that then it was natural that the entry of receipt in the deed-writer's register should have appeared next to the entry of the sale deed. But this is not found to be the case. The receipt is entered against Section No. 596 while the deed of sale is shown against Section No. 597. In the deed-writer's seal appearing on Ex.D-2 and Ex. D-1 too the dates stand tampered with. If the theory propounded by the appellant that on 8-10-1968 also Smt. Hakam Devi was present when she received Rs. 10,000/- from Fithu against receipt Ex.D-2 is correct, then the question arises why the sale deed was not produced by Khushal Chand from Hakam Devi the principal and why did he insist to secure the sale deed from her so-called Mukhtiar, Fithu. Fithu claims in his testimony that Smt. Hakam Devi made him Mukhtiar as she as an old lady and could not move about. But per his own showing, if is to be believed, Hakam Devi was present on 8-10-1968 also but her presence was not utilized to secure sale-deed from her. The explanation of Fithu, thus, appears unconvincing and that of the respondent appears convincing that it was on 5-10-1968 that writing Ex.D-2 was obtained from her besides procuring her thumb impression at, several papers, one being the receipt, Ex.D-2, In Ex.D-2 date 8-10-1968 appears in the body in reference on sale deed, at the end of the writing and with the S. No. in the seal of the deed-writer. At all these three places, the date has been tampered with and it appears that earlier the digit in the date was 5 which was changed to read as '8' to suit the appellant theory.'

8. Though the petitioner has not-referred to para 15, where further adverse remarks have been made, yet, these are also considered for deciding the present petition. Para 15 is :--

'15. All the above factors go to lead to only one irresistible conclusion that Khushal Chand wanted to deprive Sant Ram of his share in the property in dispute after the death of Hakara Devi and thought of procuring sale deed of the entire estate from her. He put up Fithu as prospective buyer to apart of her property which she wanted to sell to raise necessary funds for 'Yaciya'. He entered a conspiracy with Fithu in which the deed-writer was also joined besides his own Kala Ram Rath and on 5-10-1968, Mukhtiarnama Ex.D-3 was procured and also receipt Ex.D-2 and the old unsuspecting lady was made to thumb mark the relevant document and the deed-writer's register. Peculiarly enough the entry of Mukhtiarnama Ex.D-3 is noted in the deed-writer's register at Section No. 595 as Mukhtiarnama Khas.'

9. Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in its various judgments to the facts of the present case, this Court does not find it a fit case to expunge the adverse remarks made against the petitioner. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner were not necessary for the decision of the case and were not borne out from the evidence on record. A perusal of paras 8, 9, 10 and 15 of the judgment dated 2nd February, 1978 makes it clear that in order to examine the genuineness of the documents which were scribed by the petitioner, the District Judge was justified in taking into account the interpolations of dates written against Serial Nos. 596 and 597 in the register of the petitioner where receipt and sale deed were entered and also in the sale deed and the receipt, Ex.D-1 and Ex.D-2. On the basis of change of dates from 5th October, 1968 to 8th October, 1968, found in the Register and the documents and other evidence on record, the District Judge has held that the whole scheme of defrauding Smt. Hakami Devi was completed on 5th October, 1968 when the documents were written and entered in the Register of the petitioner but as the requisite stamp papers for sale deed were made available on 7th October, 1968, the dates were changed to 8th October, 1968. Naturally, the change in the dates in the register as well as in the sale deed and the receipt written by the petitioner could not be made by anyone else except the petitioner. Therefore, the District Judge, while holding that Khushal Chand defendant had entered into a conspiracy with Fithu defendant for defrauding Smt. Hakami Devi of her property in dispute, has rightly commented on the conduct of the petitioner that he was also joined in the conspiracy.

10. Further, while disbelieving the statement of Fithu defendant that first he completed the sale deed, got it registered and thereafter received the sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/- from Khushal Chand defendant and passed on the money to Smt. Hakami Devi who thumb marked the receipt Ex.D-2 on 8th October, 1968, the District Judge has relied upon the register of the petitioner wherein the receipt is entered against Sr. No. 596 whereas the sale deed is shown against Sr. No. 597 and held that had the events happened as alleged by Fithu defendant and Smt. Hakami Devi been present in the office of the Registrar to sign the receipt on 8th October, 1968, the sale deed would have been executed by her. Therefore, the District Judge concluded that all the three documents were written on 5th October, 1968 and entered in the Register of the petitioner at one point of time but later on the dates against Sr. Nos.596 and 597 of the register of the petitioner and the sale deed and the receipt were changed as the sale deed could be registered only on 8th October, 1968, after the non-judicial stamp papers were made available on 7th October, 1968.

11. So far another test of giving opportunity to the petitioner to explain his conduct is concerned he did have it when he appeared as a witness in Civil Suit titled Hakami Devi v. Khushal Chand and Fithu and produced his register. It is not a case in which it can be held that the District Judge has not exercised judicial restraint and has made uncalled for remarks against the petitioner.

12. In the result, the petition is dismissed but there is no order as to costs.