Smt. Gouri Phani Chakraborty Vs. Governing Body of Krishnanagar Women's College and Ors. (18.12.2003 - CALHC) - Court Judgment

Amitava Lala, J.

1. This is an application for contempt. This contempt application is arising out of an order passed by this Court in disposing of the writ petition on 20th May, 2002. In the original order Court held: a long period of suspension till the retirement of the incumbent is as good as major penalty like compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal. Such order was set aside. However, it was observed that this order will not prevent the authority concerned to proceed in accordance with law, if necessary. In drawing inference Court has also held that the petitioner will be entitled to service benefits including arrears deducting the amount, if any, paid during the period of suspension. From such order an appeal was preferred when on 26th August, 2002 an interim order was passed by the Division Bench giving directions for preparation of the Paper Book and fixing a period of hearing. Meanwhile, operation of the order of the learned single Judge impugned in this appeal was stayed. This contempt application was made on 31st January, 2003, taking a plea that the Division Bench was pleased to pass a limited order of stay. No application was made for extension of interim order by the Division Bench. Therefore, the incumbent is entitled to get relief pursuant to the original order in the form of joining in the service and recovery of service benefits. Initially a contempt rule was issued by this Court upon the alleged contemners making the same returnable to get the full fact and/or defence of the contemners.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the contemners contended before this Court that the respondents in the original writ petition are protected by the order passed by the Division Bench. The order of the Division Bench is still subsisting. To that, arguments were advanced by both the parties on the strength of a judgment reported in 1993(2) CHN 444 (Calcutta Corporation Teachers' Association and Anr. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors.) whereunder it was held by a Division Bench that 'in the mean time' must be given its normal meaning i.e. 'during or within the time which intervenes'. However, from such judgment I find, in effect, Division Bench was made such interim order 'in the mean time' limited for a particular period.

3. Mr. Ashok Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the alleged contemners cited a judgment reported in 2001(3) SCC 739 (Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Ors.) in its paragraph 14 to establish that 'standard of proof be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt.

4. Mr. Sarkar further contended that when an order is capable of two interpretations then the order of contempt cannot be passed because alleged contemners are not in a position what text or meaning should be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out the same. Therefore, assuming for a moment, the word 'meanwhile' can be construed the interregnum period but it is not for the lay clients to understand such import. By citing paragraph 15 of another Supreme Court judgment reported in : 2002CriLJ1814 (Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh and Ors.) he contended that mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to a civil contempt. The element of willingness is an Indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act and lastly, in the event two interpretations are possible and the action of alleged contemner pertains to one such interpretation--the act or acts cannot be ascribed to be otherwise contumacious in nature. A doubt in the matter as regards the wilful nature of conduct if raised, question of success in a contempt petition would not arise.

5. Mr. Bikas Ranjan Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also relied upon the head note and paragraphs 21 and 22 of the self-same judgment and contended feeling of confidence and proper administration of justice cannot but be the hallmark of Indian jurisprudence and contra-action by Courts will lose its efficacy. Tolerance of Law Courts there is, but not without limits and only up to a certain point and not beyond the same.

6. According to me, ignorance of law is no ground of defence. 'Question of meanwhile' has, as interpreted by Mr. Sarkar, gone against his own contention. The Division Bench judgment of this Court 1993(2) CHN 444 (supra) goes totally against Mr. Sarkar's case to the extent that the word 'meanwhile' in the order is made for a definite period unless and until the matter is heard. Be that as it may anxiety in the mind of the petitioner arose in respect of getting his pensionary benefit treating her service continued or not in nature. To that extent the parties are already protected by allowing the petitioner to render her service. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be debarred from getting any retiral benefit as per the original order subject to result of the appeal. Even to that extent the interest of the petitioner is protected. Allowing the petitioner in joining service is reflected from the affidavit or affidavits filed by the contemners before this Court. Mr. Sarkar contended that all the contemners have prayed for unconditional apology before this Court if any order is violated by them. Under such circumstances I do not find any other reason but to dispose of the contempt application as against the Rule upon accepting their unconditional apology. Personal presence of the contemners are permanently dispensed with. No order is passed as to costs.

Let an urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties within two weeks from the date of putting the requisites.