Pralay Karmakar and ors. Vs. Uttara Co-operative Housing Society Limited and anr. - Court Judgment

Rudrendra Nath Banerjee, J.

1. This revisional application under Article 227 challenges the impugned order dated May 10, 2007 passed by West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal in Appeal No. 30 of 2006.

2. The Uttara Housing Co-operative Society Ltd., the O.P. No. 1 was constituted and registered under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, in the year 1971. The said Housing Co-operative Society purchased plot No. 13, Broad Street, Calcutta - 700 019 measuring 61 cottahas 6 chittaks from Manmatha Nath Mukherjee and others along with 'thika' tenancy of Manik Lal Karmakar who was running a garage thereof occupying a substantial portion of the land, by a registered deed of purchase dated 30.11.74. Ultimately, upon the vesting of interest of superior landlord with the State the said Manik Lal Karmakar began to deposit the rent before the Thika Controller'. In the year 1976 the said housing society asked Manik Lal Karmakar to vacate the suit land over which a title suit was filed by Manik Lal Karmakar and ultimately it was agreed between Manik Lal Karmakar and the housing society, on 22.8.79, that the said society would execute a sale deed in respect of 13 cottahs 14 chittaks of land in Picnic Garden Road, Calcutta - 39 out of 18 chittaks and 8 chittaks with condition that the balance 4 cottahas and 8 chittaks of land would also be sold to Manik Lal Karmakar after the registration of the said deed of sale and the matter was confirmed by the letter of the Chief Executive of the society.

3. Thereafter, the housing society moved to the land ceiling authority for permission for sale of such land to Manik Lal Karmakar, since deceased. Due to non-fulfilment of the conditions in the petition under the said Act, the permission sought for was refused. Then the Housing Society had to move this High Court with a writ application.

4. On 22.2.84 Mr. R.K. Roychowdhury, learned advocate on behalf of the said Manik Lal Karmakar wrote to the society for supply of the copy of the writ petition which the society filed challenging the land ceiling authority's decision for refusing permission to sale. In such writ application the said Manik Lal Karmakar was not a party. This Court ultimately set aside the impugned order of the competent authority but the result was not intimated to said Manik Lal Karmakar. In the meantime, the managing committee of the housing society has changed and the society began to make attempt to sell out such land to outsider violating the earlier agreement dated 22.08.1979 with said Manik Lal Karmakar.

5. It is the further case of Manik Lal Karmakar that he had to spend Rs. 93,527/- for development of the land as per contract with the Housing Society during 1979-1982.

6. In the meantime, the respondent housing society filed the eviction suit namely, the title suit No. 39 of 1985 before learned 2nd Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division at Alipore and ultimately the said suit was dismissed with cost. The said Manik Lal Karmakar through his advocate Mr. Sukumar Roy sent reminder to the housing society on 21.1.85 requesting further to sell out the land in terms of the land agreement dated 22.8.79 but the society did not reply to such letter.

7. On 22.1.85 the said Manik Lal Karmakar filed the dispute case before the Registrar of Co-operative Society, West Bengal under Section 86 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (now governed by Section 95 of the WBCS Act, 1983). According to provisions of the statute the dispute was required to be filed within 30 days from the date of cause of action and the same was actually filed within 30 days from the date of knowledge. However learned Arbitrator as per agreement between the parties passed the award on 24.4.91 directing the housing society to sale the land at the Picnic Garden in terms of the agreement dated 22.8.79.

8. On June 23, 1999 learned Members of the Tribunal set aside the said award only on technical ground that the award was not passed within the stipulated period. But the learned Tribunal did not give any observation about the award itself and remanded the same to the learned Arbitrator for readjudication after appointment of a fresh Arbitrator.

9. In the meantime, on 16.4.2000 Manik Lal Karmakar died living behind the present petitioner and others as his legal heirs. Since the legal heirs were not aware of the dispute case the same was pending in the office of Registrar of Co-operative Societies, West Bengal without any approval of the Arbitrator for a long time. Such legal heirs came to know of the dispute case when they received the summons issued by Registrar, Co-operative Societies for allotment of the fresh Arbitrator. On 21.3.2001 the legal heirs of late Manik Lal Karmakar filed application for substitution along with petition for condonation of delay by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the order of substitution was confirmed by this High Court in CO. 1707/2001.

10. On January 20, 2005 Mr. T.K. Sengupta, Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Headquarter) was appointed as an Arbitrator in the said dispute case and on 18.7.05 after hearing both sides in length, the said Arbitrator directed the respondent housing society to execute and register the deed of conveyance to the petitioners i.e. the heirs of Manik Lal Karmakar.

11. Such order was challenged before the Co-operative Tribunal which by the impugned order dated May 10, 2007 held that the dispute case was barred by limitation and was outside the scope of dispute cases under Section 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 and as such not maintainable.

12. As against such case of the plaintiff the defendant society's case is that it is not a dispute within the scope of Section 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973. It is the further case of the defendant that Suresh Bhowmick was acting as Chief Executive of the Uttara Housing Co-operative Societies but was removed from the post, as Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies was of the opinion that the society could not appoint a paid Chief Executive and a society must act through its secretary. Since 1981 the said Suresh Bhowmick is in litigation with the society. It is the further case of the defendant society that, the plaintiff has actually surrendered the thika tenancy in favour of the defendant Housing Society on receipt of Rs. 50,000/- from the society and thereafter the plaintiff was simply a licensee in respect of a small portion of the land at Broad Street as accommodated by the society. The defendant has also raised contention that after 1982 the plaintiff is not a thika tenant under the defendant but the superior right of landlord has been vested with the state. It is the further case of the defendant society that in the year 1976 the plaintiff entered into two separate agreements agreeing to vacate the two thika tenancies on receipt of consideration of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation but the plaintiff continued to occupy 4 1/3 cattahs (Four and One third cattahs) the land at 13, Broad Street. The disputed land at Picnic Garden was purchased by the defendant at the request of plaintiff. Now the plaintiff is trying to keep the land in his possession and also to purchase the disputed land.

13. Mr. T.K. Sengupta, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society by his award dated 18.7.05 held that the deed of agreement dated August 22, 1979 executed by Manik Lal Karmakar and Suresh Bhowmick for the society is valid and enforceable. It was further held in the said award that despite quaries from the end of plaintiff the defendant Housing Society did not reply as to the fate of the writ application before the High Court. It has been further held by the said award that although the case comes under the Specific Relief Act and covered under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is also well-covered as a dispute case when Section 9 is read with Section 132 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973. Accordingly, the Deputy Registrar (Co-operative Societies) directed the defendant Housing Society to execute and register the sale deed as agreed upon in terms of the said 'Bainapatra' dated August 22, 1979 within 45 days from the date of the award. Of course, the plaintiff was directed to pay Rs. 72943.75 - Rs. 51501.00 i.e. Rs. 21042.75 as the balance consideration.

14. Such award passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies was challenged before the Co-operative Tribunal which by its order dated May 10, 2007 hold that although the memo of appeal had not spoken of any ground of limitation the defendant appellant contested the dispute case as it was barred by limitation. It has been further held by learned Tribunal that the record shows that the plaintiff had the knowledge of rejection of the writ application by the High Court. Learned Tribunal has also held that such prior knowledge would appear from the letter dated 10.11.84 from the end of the plaintiff clearly speaking that the plaintiff had knowledge from the reliable source that such application of writ was dismissed. It has been further held by learned Tribunal that the dispute was barred by limitation as not filed within one month from the date of the rejection of the writ application. It has been further held that the agreement must be an independent and conclusive one to bring the dispute case under the provisions of Section 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 learned Tribunal took the view that the said agreement has quite a bearing with the other two agreements dated 7.8.76 and as such such agreement dated 22.08.1979 is not enforceable. Accordingly, learned Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the award of the Arbitrator.

15. Being aggrieved by such Judgment of the appellate Tribunal the plaintiff petitioner has preferred this instant revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution.

16. Mr. De, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order has contended that the question of limitation has been raised for the first time by the Tribunal in the impugned order. It has been further contended that such period of limitation of 30 days should be counted from the date of the knowledge of the petitioner particularly when the housing society was duty bound to intimate the petitioner about the decision of the High Court in the writ petition challenging the refusal of the land ceiling authority to grant permission for sale. Secondly, it has been further contended by Mr. Dey that the dispute though for a specific performance of contract is well within the scope of affairs or business or transaction of the Housing Co-operative Society within the provisions of Section 86 of the Act of 1973 and learned Tribunal ought to have held the dispute case maintainable.

17. Mr. Milan Chandra Bhattacharya, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent while supporting the Judgment of the learned Tribunal has contended that the agreement being dated 22.8.79 and the dispute case being filed on 28.1.85, it is hopelessly barred by limitation. It has been further contended by Mr. Bhattacharya that the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 being special Act prescribing its own limitation and procedures to be followed at the proceeding of such dispute case there is no scope for any extention of limitation or condonatian of delay.

18. Undisputedly, the transaction involved took place in the year 1979 and the provisions of West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (to be mentioned hereinafter as the Act) would be applicable and not the said Act of 1983. Section 86 of the said Act deals with the dispute to be referred to the Registrar. It runs as follows:

86. Disputes to be referred to Registrar.--(1) Any dispute relating to the affairs of a co-operative society or of the liquidator of a society shall be referred to the Registrar if the parties thereto are among the following, namely:

(a) ...

(b) ...

(c) ...

(d) any other co-operative society or any person including a financing bank having transaction with the concerned co-operative society or the liquidator of such society:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any dispute-

(a) ...

(b) ...

(2) Any dispute mentioned in Sub-section (1) other than a dispute relating to the recovery of money shall be referred to the Registrar within one month from the date of the cause of action.

19. From the aforesaid provisions it transpires that Section 86(1)(d) of the said Act clearly provides that when the dispute is between Co-operative Society and any person including a financing bank the same may be settled under the said provisions. In the present case, the question is relating to specific performance of contract of sale on the basis of agreement dated 22.8.79 between the said Co-operative Society and the predecessor of the petitioners viz. Manik Lal Karmakar. Mr. Bhattaeharya has contended that the dispute does not come out of the affairs of the Co-operative Society. But, if we look at the provisions of Section 86(1)(d) we find that it clearly speaks of a dispute between the society and any non-member person having transaction with the society. Furthermore, Section 86(1) starts with the clause 'any dispute relating to the affairs of the Co-operative Society'. Such clause is wide enough to include the present transaction of specific performance of agreement of sale.

20. Learned Tribunal while interpreting the words 'affairs' of the Co-operative Society has in one hand held that the said term connotes 'Every sphere of activity of the society whether the activity relates to business of the society in its narrow sense of trade and property, the management of the society, the administration of the society and the running of the society.' Learned tribunal has also entered into the bye-laws of the society and has observed that in such bye-laws the object of the society 'shall be primarily to establish a co-operative basis settlement or housing schemes'. It has been further observed by learned Tribunal that with such object, the society shall have the power to raise fund to procure land on purchase, hire or lease. Learned Tribunal is of the view that from the object it does not transpire that the society was required to purchase land for the benefit of other persons and/or to transfer the same to the later and learned Tribunal has finally observed that the agreement dated 22.8.79 does not come within the object of the society as depicted in the bye-laws.

21. Learned Tribunal has also observed that 'Had it been the case of the plaintiff that there was an agreement that society would transfer the land at 206A, Picnic Garden Road to the plaintiff in exchange and/or in lieu of the two plots occupied by plaintiffs as thika tenant we would have come to the conclusion safely that the dispute was within the meaning of Section 86 of the Act of 1973. A few lines later at page 10, learned Tribunal has observed to the contrary that the agreement is not an independent one and has got intimacy with two other deeds dated 7.8.76 and accordingly the dispute for enforcement of the agreement dated 22.8.79 is not maintainable.

22. Such observations appear to be contradictory to each other and it is not understood as to how learned Tribunal below in the same Judgment took two separate contradictory views over the self-same transaction.

23. However, learned Tribunal also held that the transaction of the instant case is not a transaction falling under the object of the society and accordingly the instant dispute is not maintainable under the West Bengal Co-operative Society Act 1973.

24. The agreement between the opposite party/Housing Co-operative Society and Manik Lal Karmakar dated 02.08.1979 does not speak of any prior agreement or resolution of the society as to the condition that the said Manik Lal Karmakar would vacate the land in Broad Street and in lieu of that he shall take possession of the landed property in Picnic Garden in respect of which the society agreed to make a sale deed in his favour. But the resolution of the society dated 5th May, 1978 goes to indicate that the society decided to purchase such land at Picnic Garden in order to shift him there and amount required for such purchase of land more than Rs. 50,000/- would be borne by Sri Manik Lal Karmakar. It is also not disputed that the plaintiffs/ petitioners since the time of their predecessor are still in occupation of a substantial portion of land at Broad Street as a thika tenant and the society required such land for raising building thereon.

25. Thus it cannot be said that the requirement of the society was for the benefit of Manik Lal Karmakar rather it was for the benefit of the members of the society. Learned Tribunal has committed an error in interpreting such purpose of the agreement as for the benefit of the said Manik Lal Karmakar.

26. Learned Tribunal has over looked the very fact that the said earlier agreement dated 07.08.1976 under which the said Manik Lal Karmakar agreed to vacate such land on getting title and possession of some other land in lieu thereof at Picnic Garden might not be enforced as barred by limitation. But the factual background of the case goes to indicate that the instant agreement dated 22.08.1979 was although made out independently in form, but in essence has got every bearing with vacating the land at Broad Street. But such vacating of land at Broad Street by the original plaintiff is not the subject matter of the present dispute. Whatever may that case be, the dispute that has come to surface is about the obligation of the housing society to execute such sale deed as already mentioned. Such dispute comes within the meaning of transaction or affairs of the society and obviously under Section 86(1)(d) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act 1973.

27. A question has been raised as to the role and power of Suresh Bhowmick as the Chief Executive Officer of the society to enter into such agreement with Manik Lal Karmakar. It is the case of the defendant society that the said Suresh Bhowmick was acting as Chief Executive of the society but on the observation or objection by the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Society such appointment was virtually cancelled. But no paper is forth-coming in order to show that the acts done by the said Suresh Bhowmick as Chief Executive of the society was illegal or beyond jurisdiction and that the society was not bound by such acts done by him in much capacity. Rather the documents show that the said Suresh Bhowmick has been writing letters in the letter head of the society and there was no protest from the end of the society to the effect that the said Suresh Bhowmick had no power or capacity to enter into such agreement or to issue such letter. It might be that as his appointment was cancelled subsequently and there might be stained relation between him and the society. With such allegation the society cannot get rid of its obligation to comply with the terms of the agreement. Even when the said Manik Lal Karmakar through his lawyer issued notices dated 21.01.1985 and 10.11.1994 it was not replied from the end of the society raising objection as to the power and capacity of the said Suresh Bhowmick to enter into such agreement. Such objection is raised only in the dispute case before the arbitrator when the society has already earned some obligation to execute the sale deed. Furthermore, even upon such agreement the defendant society approached the land ceiling authority for permission to sell such land to Manik Lal Karmakar, which goes to indicate the society's acceptance of the said agreement of sale.

28. On the question of limitation Mr. Bhattacharya has contended that Section 86(2) of the Act of 1973 gives out a limitation of 30 days from the date of the award of the arbitrator for filing a dispute case. The said Act is a special law prescribing a special period of limitation and there is no provision for extension of such period of limitation as is provided under Section 5 of the limitation Act 1963. Rather the Section 134(2) of the said Act of 1973 speaks of no application of said Limitation Act 1963 in case of appeal from dispute case under Section 86(1) of the said Act. In support of such contention Mr. Bhattacharya has cited a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2003(2) CHN page 460 (E.T. Co-op. A.M. Soty. Ltd. v. Co-op. Soty). The principles laid down in such decision that the Limitation Act 1963 is not applicable to the dispute case under the said act may be relied upon. Under the said decision the contrary view taken by a single judge of this Court in the case reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta 318 (Nowda Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society v. West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal and Ors.) has been held to be not a good law.

29. It will not be irrelevant to say that learned single Judge of this Court while dealing with the validity of substitution beyond the prescribed period in C.O. 1707 of 2001, observed that the Limitation Act had no application in such proceedings.

30. However, such view is not disputed by Mr. Dey appearing for the petitioners. According to him the question in this case is not the extension of the period of limitation but the application of the provisions of the limitation, whether from the date of the award or from the date of knowledge of the predecessor of the petitioners as to the decision of the writ application filed by the housing society against the refusal to give permission of sale by the Urban Land Ceiling authority, wherein the present petitioners or their predecessor Manik Lal Karmakar was not made a party. It is gathered from the record that the said Judgment quashing the order of refusal by the land ceiling authority was passed by the Court on 31.05.1984 and the defendant society remained silent despite the subsequent letters through lawyer of the said Manik Lal Karmakar and ignored to let him know as to the decision of the High Court over the said writ petition. According to Mr. Dey such cause of action arose only from the date of knowledge of the attempt of transaction to other person by the defendant society that is on 18.01.1985 and the case has been filed on 28.01.1985, which goes to mean that the case has been filed within one month from the date of the knowledge.

31. It cannot be ignored that the defendant Society had the liability to comply with the terms of agreement of sale dated 22.08.1979. For such compliance the Urban Land Ceiling authority was duly approached for permission of sale, which was refused by the competent authority. It is not disputed that the defendant Society filed the writ application challenging the order of refusal by the Urban Land Ceiling authority without making the plaintiff Mank Lal Karmakar or his heirs party to such case, which was ultimately allowed quashing the order of refusal by the competent authority. It cannot also be ignored that this original plaintiff at least sent two letters dated 22.02.1984 and 10.11.1984 through his lawyer making positive and specific enquiry as to the fate of the writ application. The defendant Society did not care to answer the same. This being the position it can be safely inferred that the original plaintiff was kept in complete darkness by the defendant Society as to the result of the writ application. The defendant Society had the duty to inform the plaintiff as to the result of the writ case quashing the decision of the land ceiling authority. The defendant society having not performed such duty the plaintiff could not proceed further to get the sale deed executed or to file the dispute case within time. The plaintiff ultimately getting information on 18.01.1985 that the defendant society was trying to sell the land to third party depriving the plaintiff of his right, filed the dispute case on 28.01.1985. Now if the plaintiffs' such claim is thrown aside as barred by limitation for no fault on their part, it will definitely be a violation of natural justice. After all, the defendant society cannot take the benefit of its own fault of not letting the plaintiff know the result of the writ application.

32. Learned Tribunal observed that from the letter of the plaintiff dated 10.11.1984, it transpired that the plaintiff had the knowledge of the result of the writ application at the latest on 10.11.1984. When such view of the matter learned Tribunal held that the dispute case was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation.

33. But on careful scrutiny of the letter dated 10.11.1984, specially from paragraphs 9 and 11 of the said letter it will be clear that by the said letter on behalf of the original plaintiff it was stated that although he had knowledge from source about the disposal of the said writ application, he wanted to get a copy of the Judgment to verify the authenticity of such knowledge. The said letter clearly indicates that the plaintiff wanted a reply from defendant society. But no reply was received by him and ultimately on 18.1.85 when he got the information that the defendant society had been trying to sell out the property to third party in stead of the plaintiff he filed the suit on 28.01.1985.

34. Upon such backdrop, it is not left unnoticed that Section 86(2) of the Act requires filing of the dispute case within 30 days from the date of 'cause of action' and not the date of the award by the Arbitrator. The use of the term 'cause of action', avoiding the term 'date of award' by the legislation has got some wide significance. Under the present factual background it suggests the date of original plaintiffs knowledge of defendant society's evil attempt to sell the land to others after the order of refusal by the competent authority was quashed.

35. Upon such set of facts the observation of learned Tribunal that the dispute case was time barred is obviously erroneous and based on perverse finding.

36. Mr. Bhattacharya appearing for respondent has urged that every points of facts where there is scope of revision or appeal the superintending power of the High Court cannot be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Bhattacharya cited the decision reported in : [2003]1SCR567 (Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr.). In the cited decision it was a case under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. Needless to mention that interlocutory order passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1999. Obviously there is scope of appeal in such case. In the present case under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act 1973 there is no scope of appeal against the Judgment of the Co-operative Tribunal. In paragraph 6 of the said decision the Supreme Court held 'The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal.' In the said decision the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was declared wholly misconceived. As an illustration the Supreme Court has further held 'where a trial Court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a state enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 CPC, in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie....'

37. Accordingly such decision does not come to much help of the respondent. Mr. Bhattacharya has also cited decision reported in : AIR2003SC3044 (Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors.) and contended that in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction the High Court cannot correct the mere errors of fact or of law. Under paragraph 38/4 it has been held by the Supreme Court 'Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.' In the self-same Judgment under paragraph 38/5 it has been held by the Supreme Court 'Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.'

38. In paragraph 38/6 the Supreme Court as also held 'A patent error is an error which is a self evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning.'

39. Mr. Dey appearing for the petitioners contended that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is very wide. According to him, broadly speaking the petitioner under supervisory jurisdiction when contends in appropriate cases and seeks for High Court's interference there may not be any bar simply because the points of facts are involved, rather the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is very wide enabling the High Court to ensure that the Courts and Tribunals inferior to it discharge their duties and obligations. Such contention is supported by the ratio expressed in paragraph 25 of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2007(4) Supreme Court Cases page - 94 (Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Mahak Singh and Ors.)

40. Thus it is now well settled that the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may be exercised by the High Court even on point of facts if it is found that such finding of the subordinate Court or the Tribunal caused grave injustice to the parties, provided there is no scope of any appeal therefrom. In the instant case learned Tribunal has observed that the very dispute case filed by Manik Lal Karmakar was barred by limitation as prescribed under Article 86(2) of the Act of 1973. There is no provision for appeal against such finding of the learned Tribunal. By the amended Civil Procedure Code the scope of interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made limited. Now such a finding of learned Tribunal which appears to be wrong under law and facts caused irreparable and grave injustice to the petitioners, snatching away their right to agitate their grievance before the Tribunal or any legal authority. Such finding of learned Tribunal is obviously a perverse one inviting interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

41. The respondent Society apprehends that the petitioners may not give up their possession in the portion of their land at Broad Street inspite of execution and registration of sale deed in their favour in respect of the land at Picnic Garden. But there is no scope to ask the petitioners to deliver possession of such land at Broad Street in favour of respondent Society. The society shall have to find its remedy in respect thereof in appropriate forum according to law.

42. Accordingly justice demands interference by the High Court over the matter under Article 227 of the Constitution. Hence this revision is allowed.

The impugned Judgment dated May 10, 2007 of the learned tribunal in Appeal No. 30 of 2006 is set aside and the award of the Deputy Registrar under West Bengal Co-operative Societies dated July 18, 2005 is confirmed. The period of execution and registration of the deed of sale by the respondent society is extended till 31.03.2008. The petitioners shall pay the balance consideration money to the opposite party/societies by February 29, 2008 as directed by the Deputy Registrar/Arbitrator. If after payment of such balance consideration by the date fixed, the respondent Society fails to execute and register the necessary sale deed in favour of the petitioners by the aforesaid date, the petitioner shall have the liberty to get such sale deed executed and registered through the Registrar West Bengal Co-operative Society according to law.

Considering the circumstance there shall be no order as to cost.

Urgent xerox copy be given to the parties expeditiously, if applied for.