Sri Ram Ratan Ram Vs. Union of India (Uoi) Through Its Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Desk Officer T. No. 23001148, Ministry of Labour, Government of India - Court Judgment

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- what remains to be seen is as to whether pinki died an un-natural death within seven years of her marriage and whether her death was attributable to the demand of dowry and further whether she was dealt with cruelty soon before her death. if these ingredients are proved by the prosecution then the conviction of the accused under section 304b, ipc will be complete.[para 9] the question is, in the absence of corpus delicti, could it be presumed that the accused persons alone were responsible for the death of pinki. we must hasten to add here that the accused persons have already been acquitted of the murder charge. [para 9] it is clear that pinki's death was caused because of the burns and not in the normal circumstances. the finding of the trial court and the appellate court in that behalf is correct. for this reason we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that in the absence of corpus delicti, the conviction could not stand. [para10] it is clear that the prosecution has not only proved the offence under section 304b, ipc with the aid of section 113b, indian evidence act but also the offence under section 201, ipc. [para 15] held: we have gone through the judgments of the trial court as well as the appellate court carefully and we find that both the courts have fully considered all the aspects of this matter. we, therefore, find nothing wrong with the judgments and confirm the same. the appeal is, therefore, dismissed.[para 16]d.n. patel, j.1. learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present petition has been preferred mainly against an order, passed by respondent no. 2, who has not made reference to the central government industrial tribunal, dhanbad under section 10 of the industrial disputes act, 1948 and, therefore, the present petition has been preferred. the reference is denied by a letter dated 29th september, 2008, at annexure-3 to the memo of the petition. against this order, this petition has been preferred.2. having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, i hereby, quash and set aside the order, passed by respondent no. 2 dated 29th september, 2008, at annexure-3 to the memo of the petition, on the following facts and reasons:(i) the petitioner was working as a miner loader with respondent no. 1 since, 1980, as per the allegations levelled by the present petitioner.(ii) it appears that the petitioner was working with the respondents sincerity, honestly, diligently and to the satisfaction of the respondents and without any justifiable reasons, his services have been terminated in the year, 1999 and therefore, industrial disputes has been raised after the petitioner felt that now respondent no. 1 is not giving any response to the several requests made by the petitioner, despite several assurances were given by respondent no. 1 and therefore, the petitioner has to wait for few years and therefore, delay cannot be a reason for denial of making a reference by respondent no. 2 and therefore, order at annexure-3 to the memo of the petition, deserves to be quashed and set aside,(iii) it further appears from the facts of the case that respondent no. 2 should not have been refused the reference to the petitioner, under the industrial disputes act, only on the ground of a delay. delay may be because of some assurances given by respondent no. 1. all that depends upon the evidences.(vi) it has been held by the hon'ble supreme court in the case of telco convoy drivers mazdoor sangh and anr. v. state of bihar and ors. as reported in : (1989) 3 scc 271 in paragraph nos. 11, 13 and 14, which read as under:11. it is true that in considering the question of making a reference under section 10(1), the government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute 'exists or is apprehended', as urged by mr. shanti bhushan. the formation of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute 'exists or is apprehended' is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits. in the instant case, as already stated, the dispute is as to whether the convoy drivers are employees or workmen of telco, that is to say, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between telco and the convoy drivers. in considering the question whether a reference should be made or not, the deputy labour commissioner and/or the government have held that the convoy drivers are not workmen and, accordingly, no reference can be made. thus, the dispute has been decided by the government which is, undoubtedly, not permissible.13. attractive though the contention is, we regret, we are unable to accept the same. it is now well settled that, while exercising power under section 10(1) of the act, the function of the appropriate government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by section 10 of the act....14. applying the principle laid down by this court in the above decisions, there can be no doubt that the government was not justified in deciding the dispute. where, as in the instant case, the dispute is whether the person raising the dispute are workmen or not, the same cannot be decided by the government in exercise of its administrative function under section 10(1) of the act. as has been held in m.p. irrigation karamchari sangh case, there may be exceptional cases in which the state government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. further, the government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to declining reference and courts will always be vigilant whenever the government attempts to usurp the powers of the tribunal for adjudication of valid disputes, and that to allow the government to do so would be to rentier section 10 and section 12(5) of the act nugatory.(emphasis supplied)in view of these facts, once the industrial disputes is in existence or is apprehended normally, a reference ought to have been made and the officers of the respondents cannot wear the robe of the industrial tribunal. for delayed reference, there may be several reasons which officers should be presumed against workman, sometime, a downtrodden class will be slow in going to the court due to poverty, due to dependency upon others, sometimes they are more dependent upon the assurances given by the authorities of the respondents. all the facts and factors should not have been prejudged by respondent no. 2.(v) it has been held by hon'ble supreme court in the case of dhanbad colliery karamchari sangh v. union of india and ors. as reported in : 1991 supp. (2) scc 10 in paragraph nos. 2 and 3. which read as under:2. the appellant union raised a dispute that the workmen employed in the mines run and maintained by m/s bharat coking coal ltd., lodhna area, dhanbad were engaged by a contractor without obtaining a licence and in fact the workmen were under the direct employment of the management of m/s bharat coking coal ltd. they claimed relief for a declaration to that effect. the workmen approached the central government for referring the dispute to industrial court under section 10 of the industrial disputes act, 1947. the central government by its order dated may. 5, 1989 refused to refer the dispute on the ground that union had failed to establish that the disputed workmen were engaged in prohibited categories of work under thes contract labour (regulation and abolition) act, 1970 and further that they were engaged by contractor and not by the management of the respondent company. the government further held that there appeared to be no employer-employee relationship between the management of the respondent-company and the workmen involved in the dispute. the appellant challenged the governments order before the high court by means of writ petition but the same was dismissed in limine. hence this appeal.3. after hearing learned counsel for the parties and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that this appeal must succeed. the central government instead of referring the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate industrial court under section 10 of the industrial disputes act. 1947, it itself decided the dispute which is not permissible under the law. we, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the high court and of the central government and direct the central government to refer the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate industrial court under section 10 of the industrial disputes act, 1947. we further direct the central government to make the reference within three months.(emphasis supplied)in view of this decision, government cannot itself decide the disputes and reference ought to be made when industrial dispute tribunal, is already in existence.3. looking to the order, passed by respondent no. 2 at annexure-3, a reference ought to be made for adjudication before appropriate court and therefore, delay cannot be a reason for not making a reference. delay affects the quantum of back wages, if at all, reference is allowed.4. in view of these facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, i hereby, quash and set aside the order, passed by respondent no. 2 dated 29th september, 2008 at annexure-3 to the memo of the petition and i hereby, also direct respondent no. 2 to make reference. within a period of three months, from the date of receipt of a copy of an order of this court. this writ petition is allowed.