| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/848944 |
| Subject | Criminal |
| Court | Jharkhand High Court |
| Decided On | Feb-23-2010 |
| Judge | M.Y. Eqbal, J. |
| Appellant | Surendra Kumar Thakur @ Surendra Kumar @ Suraj |
| Respondent | The State of Jharkhand |
| Disposition | Application dismissed |
| Cases Referred | Smt. Rukhsana Khatoon v. Sakhawal Hnssain and Ors.
|
Excerpt:
- what remains to be seen is as to whether pinki died an un-natural death within seven years of her marriage and whether her death was attributable to the demand of dowry and further whether she was dealt with cruelty soon before her death. if these ingredients are proved by the prosecution then the conviction of the accused under section 304b, ipc will be complete.[para 9]
the question is, in the absence of corpus delicti, could it be presumed that the accused persons alone were responsible for the death of pinki. we must hasten to add here that the accused persons have already been acquitted of the murder charge. [para 9]
it is clear that pinki's death was caused because of the burns and not in the normal circumstances. the finding of the trial court and the appellate court in that behalf is correct. for this reason we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that in the absence of corpus delicti, the conviction could not stand. [para10]
it is clear that the prosecution has not only proved the offence under section 304b, ipc with the aid of section 113b, indian evidence act but also the offence under section 201, ipc. [para 15]
held: we have gone through the judgments of the trial court as well as the appellate court carefully and we find that both the courts have fully considered all the aspects of this matter. we, therefore, find nothing wrong with the judgments and confirm the same. the appeal is, therefore, dismissed.[para 16]m.y. eqbal, j.1. by this application under section 482 cr.p.c. the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 5.10.2005 passed by addl. sessions judge, fast track court-ii, bokaro in sessions trial no. 82 of 2003 whereby he has allowed the application filed by the prosecution under section 319 cr.p.c. and summoned the petitioner and others to face trial under section 302 i.p.c. and section 3/4 of the dowry prohibition act.2. the informant, who is father of the deceased, lodged a first information report on 13.2.2002 alleging murder of his daughter by the accused persons. on the basis of f.i.r., a case was instituted and the investigating officer arrested the husband of the deceased and after investigation, submitted charge-sheet under section 304-b/34 i.p.c. against the husband rajesh kumar thakur only. so far other accused persons including petitioner are concerned, final form was submitted. the sessions court proceeded with the trial against one of the accused persons, namely, husband of the deceased and after the conclusion of the trial, learned addl. sessions judge passed judgment convicting the accused-husband for the offence under section 302 i.p.c. while convicting the accused-husband, the addl. sessions judge also allowed the application filed by the prosecution under section 319 cr.p.c. and ordered for issuance of summons against ether accursed persons including the petitioner.3. i have heard mr. k.k. singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned a.p.p.4. the only question that falls for consideration is as to whether the sessions judge in exercise of power under section 319 cr.p.c. has committed any error of law in issuing summons against other accused persons who were earlier not charge-sheeted. so far this question is concerned, it is no longer res integra. the supreme court in the decision rendered in the case of joginder singh and anr. v. state of punjab and anr. air 1979 s.c. 339, has held that the expression 'any person not being the accused' occurring in section 319 clearly covers any person who is not being tried already by the court. the provision clearly shows that even persons who have been dropped by the police during the investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the court are included in the said expression. it is, therefore, clear that even a person who has been discharged earlier can also be summoned to face trial if evidence recorded during the trial shows his complicity in the crime. recently in the case of smt. rukhsana khatoon v. sakhawal hnssain and ors. 2002 air scw 2493, the supreme court observed that any of those persons named in the f.i.r. but not charge-sheeted can be summoned and arraigned as accused under section 319 cr.p.c. when evidence of prosecution witness corroborates the role of these persons in the crime of the offence.5. in the instant case, from perusal of the impugned order, it appears that during the trial of the husband, altogether 17 witnesses were examined including son and daughter of the accused. they are eyewitnesses of the occurrence. pws. 5, 6, 12 and 13 and the informant pw.16 all have supported the case of the prosecution and the court found that there were sufficient materials against all the accused persons for summoning them to face the trial. in my considered opinion, therefore, the order passed by the sessions judge under section 319 cr.p.c. summoning the other accused persons including the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction.6. for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order needs no interference by this court this application is, accordingly, dismissed.
Judgment:M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. By this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 5.10.2005 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Bokaro in Sessions Trial No. 82 of 2003 whereby he has allowed the application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and summoned the petitioner and others to face trial under Section 302 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. The informant, who is father of the deceased, lodged a first information report on 13.2.2002 alleging murder of his daughter by the accused persons. On the basis of F.I.R., a case was instituted and the Investigating Officer arrested the husband of the deceased and after investigation, submitted charge-sheet under Section 304-B/34 I.P.C. against the husband Rajesh Kumar Thakur only. So far other accused persons including petitioner are concerned, final form was submitted. The Sessions Court proceeded with the trial against one of the accused persons, namely, husband of the deceased and after the conclusion of the trial, learned Addl. Sessions Judge passed judgment convicting the accused-husband for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. While convicting the accused-husband, the Addl. Sessions Judge also allowed the application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and ordered for issuance of summons against ether accursed persons including the petitioner.
3. I have heard Mr. K.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned A.P.P.
4. The only question that falls for consideration is as to whether the Sessions Judge in exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has committed any error of law in issuing summons against other accused persons who were earlier not charge-sheeted. So far this question is concerned, it is no longer res Integra. The Supreme Court in the decision rendered in the case of Joginder Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. AIR 1979 S.C. 339, has held that the expression 'any person not being the accused' occurring in Section 319 clearly covers any person who is not being tried already by the Court. The provision clearly shows that even persons who have been dropped by the police during the investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the Court are included in the said expression. It is, therefore, clear that even a person who has been discharged earlier can also be summoned to face trial if evidence recorded during the trial shows his complicity in the crime. Recently in the case of Smt. Rukhsana Khatoon v. Sakhawal Hnssain and Ors. 2002 AIR SCW 2493, the Supreme Court observed that any of those persons named in the F.I.R. but not charge-sheeted can be summoned and arraigned as accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. when evidence of prosecution witness corroborates the role of these persons in the crime of the offence.
5. In the instant case, from perusal of the impugned order, it appears that during the trial of the husband, altogether 17 witnesses were examined including son and daughter of the accused. They are eyewitnesses of the occurrence. PWs. 5, 6, 12 and 13 and the informant PW.16 all have supported the case of the prosecution and the Court found that there were sufficient materials against all the accused persons for summoning them to face the trial. In my considered opinion, therefore, the order passed by the Sessions Judge under Section 319 Cr.P.C. summoning the other accused persons including the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction.
6. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order needs no interference by this Court This application is, accordingly, dismissed.