Advocates' Association Vs. the District Registrar and Registrar of Societies and Ors. (17.04.2006 - KARHC) - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
civil - power to initiate proceedings - section 25 of the karnataka societies registration act, 1960 - maintainability - section 15 of the karnataka societies registration act, 1960 - petitioners a registered society, represented by their general secretary contended irregularities in enrolling members to the association - hence the petition - held, section 15 of the act would disclose that every society which is registered under the act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman or principal secretary or the trustees as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and in default in the name of such person who shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion - petition rejectedcivil - power - registrar - respondent 4 averred registrar cannot.....orderajit j. gunjal, j.1. even though the matters are listed for preliminary hearing, with consent, they are taken up for final disposal as service is complete.2. w.p. no. 2721 of 2006 is filed by the advocates association represented by its general secretary. w.p. no. 2955 of 2006 is filed by two members of the governing council. mr. ravivarma kumar, learned senior counsel is appearing for respondent 4 in w.p. no. 2721 of 2006 and mr. d.l.n. rao, learned senior counsel has entered appearance for respondent 2. in w.p. no. 2955 of 2006 mr. b.n. prasad, learned government pleader is directed to take notice for respondent 1. respondents 2 and 3 are represented by mr. ravivarma kumar and mr. d.l.n. rao, learned senior counsel and respondent 4 is represented by mr. jayakumar patil, learned.....

Judgment:
ORDER

Ajit J. Gunjal, J.

1. Even though the matters are listed for preliminary hearing, with consent, they are taken up for final disposal as service is complete.

2. W.P. No. 2721 of 2006 is filed by the Advocates Association represented by its General Secretary. W.P. No. 2955 of 2006 is filed by two members of the Governing Council. Mr. Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel is appearing for respondent 4 in W.P. No. 2721 of 2006 and Mr. D.L.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel has entered appearance for respondent 2. In W.P. No. 2955 of 2006 Mr. B.N. Prasad, learned Government Pleader is directed to take notice for respondent 1. Respondents 2 and 3 are represented by Mr. Ravivarma Kumar and Mr. D.L.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel and respondent 4 is represented by Mr. Jayakumar Patil, learned Senior Counsel.

3. A situation has arisen in the present context where the Advocates Association represented by the General Secretary is before this Court questioning the order passed by the first respondent wherein he has suspended the election process which has commenced on 13-2-2006.

4. Facts, shorn off unnecessary details, can be summarised as follows.--

The petitioners case in both the petitions is that it is a registered association registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. It has approved bye-laws which govern the management of the association through elected Council which is called the Governing Council, The term of the office of the existing Governing Council of the petitioner has expired and a new Governing Council is to be elected and constituted. It appears the outgoing Governing Council has passed a resolution appointing the Chief Returning Officer to conduct the election for the year 2006-07. In furtherance thereof, the Chief Returning Officer and the team of Returning Officers have issued a calendar of events on 13-2-2006 which has been published. A copy of which is produced at Annexure-A. It appears, respondents 2 and 3 have submitted a representation to the first respondent on 30-1-2006 alleging certain illegal admission of membership and in violation of the bye-laws of the Advocate Association. The said representation was not taken up for consideration by the first respondent. In these circumstances, a public interest litigation was filed by respondents 2 and 3 in W.P. No. 169 of 2006. The reliefs sought for in the said writ petition are:

(a) to set aside the resolution of the respondent 2 dated 6-1-2006 whereby the Secretary has been conferred the power to approve the membership in violation of the bye-laws and to annual all membership made by the Secretary;

(b) to appoint an independent committee of Senior Advocates to go into the membership rolls of all newly inducted members of the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 and remove from the rolls all members who are not practising in the Metropolitan Courts of Bangalore;

(c) to set aside the appointment of the Returning Officer by the Secretary and to appoint a Senior Member of the Bar as Returning Officer;

(d) to direct the Returning Officer so appointed to proceed with the election only after correcting the membership rolls and after eliminating the ineligible members;

(e) to direct respondent 1 to appoint an officer to supervise the election and to go into the illegalities;

(f) to direct the compliance of Bye-laws 35 and 45 of the respondent 2 and to permit payment of arrears upto 15 days prior to election.

5. This Court disposed of the said writ petition on 14-2-2006. A copy of the same is to be found at Annexure-C. The Division Bench was of the opinion that considering the nature of the dispute arid the controversy raised in the writ petition, the same cannot be properly and effectively adjudicated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court further observed that an effective and proper adjudication of the dispute and the controversy will require inspection, verification and scrutiny of the records of the petitioner and also enquiry into the qualifications and eligibility etc. In view of the factual dispute which has arisen the Division Bench was of the opinion that the said exercise cannot be undertaken by this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and has declined to entertain the writ petition. But however, a direction was issued to the first respondent to consider the said representation i.e., Annexure-B, dated 30-1-2006. The Division Bench also further directed that the Registrar may take appropriate action in the matter in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. The Division Bench however made it clear that it has not considered or decided the question of maintainability of the representation given or the jurisdiction to grant the request made in the said representation. With this observation, the said writ petition was disposed of.

6. Thereafter, the third respondent herein gave another representation to the first respondent, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-D. The said representation was given on 16-2-2006 which would once again reiterate what has been stated in the earlier representation. In the said representation another prayer was made i.e., pending adjudication the representation given on 30-1-2006 and also the present representation dated 16-2-2006 the elections which are scheduled to take place on 11th March be stayed. The first respondent pursuant to Annexure-E which is impugned in this writ petition has withheld/stayed the notification dated 13-2-2006 holding election on 11-3-2006. The first respondent has also observed that the said representation shall be treated as the one under Section 25 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 (for short, 'the Act') and the proceedings adjourned to 25-2-2006 for adjudication.

7. Mr. Jayakumar Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the proceedings which are stated to have been initiated under Section 25 of the Act are not at all maintainable. He would stress that Section 25 of the Act would contemplate an enquiry by the Registrar which would give powers to the Registrar of Societies to initiate proceedings suo motu or in the alternate one-third members of the Society by resolution make an application to the Registrar to hold an enquiry. He would submit that in the case on hand no such resolution of one-third members of the Society has been passed. Consequently the question of the first respondent embarking upon an enquiry as contemplated under Section 25 of the Act would not arise at all. He would alternatively submit that assuming that suo motu powers could be exercised, but however that by itself will not empower the first respondent in injuncting or grant an interim order withholding elections. He would submit that an interim order shall be in aid of the final relief. According to him, under Section 26 of the Act where surcharge proceedings are initiated the only option left with the first respondent is to proceed under Section 27A of the Act which would relate to appointment of an Administrator. In the circumstances, he submits that the question of the first respondent exercising powers under Section 25 of the Act and grant of an interim order withholding the elections will not certainly be in aid of the final decision as contemplated under Section 27A of the Act. He would also further submit that the first respondent has proceeded on the footing that this Court while disposing of the public interest litigation has directed the first respondent to hold an enquiry. According to him a reading of the order in PIL would clearly disclose it is not so. He also pointed out that this Court while disposing of the said public interest litigation has not observed that it is open for the first respondent to suspend the election which is scheduled to take place on 11-3-2006. He would also rely on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of the Bangalore Grain Merchants Association v. The District Registrar for Societies and Anr. 2001(7) Kar. L.J. 1 (FB) : ILR 2001 Kar. 766 (FB) wherein this Court while dealing with scope of Section 25 of the Act has dealt extensively under what circumstances the first respondent or the Registrar of Societies could exercise his powers under Section 25(1) of the Act.

8. Mr. Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the third respondent would raise a preliminary objection in respect of maintainability of the writ petition itself. According to him the petition is filed by the Advocate Association represented by its General Secretary. He would also refer to the affidavit filed verifying the writ petition. He relied on the provisions of Section 15 of the Act which would deal with the institution of the proceedings. He submits that a perusal of the memorandum of articles of association and the bye-laws does not give any indication it empowers the General Secretary to initiate the proceedings. In the absence of such powers under the bye-laws, the Governing Council in the present context will have to empower the Secretary to initiate the proceedings. In these circumstances, he submits that the very writ petition which is filed without there being any resolution passed in the Governing Council authorising the Secretary to initiate proceedings, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. To buttress his contention he has relied on two decisions of this Court in the case of Muddappa v. Panchaksharaiah and Anr. : ILR1985KAR1230 decision in the case of B.H. Inamdar v. B.F. Swamy : ILR1991KAR1654 , wherein according to him, this Court has ruled that in the absence of any bye-laws empowering the Secretary to initiate the proceedings, the Governing Council having not authorised the General Secretary to initiate the proceedings the writ petition is not maintainable. He would also further submit that the proceedings which are initiated under Section 25 of the Act will have to be treated as suo motu proceedings initiated by the first respondent. He submits that pursuant to the representations on 30-1-2006 and 16-2-2006 it was brought to the notice of the first respondent that large scale irregularities have taken place while enrolling the members to the association. He also drew the attention of the Court to the applications filed by the members to get themselves admitted to the association. According to him a perusal of the said application forms would clearly disclose that all the columns are left blank and there is large scale impersonation and fraud committed by the association while enrolling the said members. According to him, some of the members are not at all practising Advocate but come from different class of society, inasmuch as, they are businessmen and some of them are law students who have not as yet enrolled as Advocates. He would also further submit that the first respondent was justified in initiating the said proceedings in view of large scale irregularities which has been committed by the petitioner-association. He would further submit that to prevent the large scale irregularities committed by the association the injunctive order is granted suspending the election. He would submit that notwithstanding the fact that the election process has already commenced that by itself will not disentitle the first respondent from exercising his powers if he prima facie finds that the entire election process pursuant to the notification at Annexure-A is the result of fraud and illegality. He would also further submit that the parties cannot be relegated to fight out the proceedings at a latter point of time by filing election petition when prima facie the first respondent has found the irregularities committed by the association. In these circumstances, he submits that the petition is required to be dismissed in limine as not maintainable and also on merits the petitioners are not entitled for any of the reliefs sought.

9. Mr. D.L.N. Rao, learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents submits that admission of members is in violation of Clauses 5 and 8 of the Memorandum of Association. He submits that to weed out the non-member from the Association the proceedings are initiated. He refers to the General Body resolutions dated 11-10-2003 under which certain members were sought to be appointed as Returning Officers who have declined. Accordingly the appointment of Chief Returning Officer is not backed by any Resolution of the Governing Committee or the General Body. He wanted to rely on the representation given by the respondents to initiate proceedings under Section 25 of the Act,

10. Insofar as maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, it is to be noticed that the powers of the President, Secretary, Treasurer and the Governing Council are regulated by the memorandum of association. A copy of which is produced at Annexure-R2A of the Statement of Objections of the third respondent. Bye-law 5 would deal with membership of the association which would mean that is shall be open to all persons ordinarily practising before the Court, Tribunals, Authorities etc., which are situate within the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. Bye-law 8 would deal with admission to membership. Bye-law 24 would deal with term of office and Bye-law 26 would deal with management and control of the affairs of the association which would vest with the Governing Council.

11. Bye-law 19 would deal with the composition of the Council, which is inclusive of President, General Secretary, Treasurer, Seven Councillors elected by the High Court unit; twelve Councillors elected by the City Civil Court unit; five Councillors elected by the Mayo Hall Court unit; five Councillors elected by the Magistrate Court unit; Advocate General of Karnataka as ex officio; Chairman of the Bar Council of Karnataka as ex officio and immediate past President and General Secretary as ex officio. This is the composition of the Governing Council. Bye-law 48 would deal with power of the Governing Council which would relate to admission of members; taking disciplinary action; appointment of an auditor and fix his remuneration; to scrutinise from time to time the accounts of the association; to appoint Committee/Sub-Committees for any specific purpose; to grant licence or permission to any activity and to do all such acts, deeds or things incidental or consequential to properly implement the objects of the association. Bye-law 50 would deal with the general powers of the Secretary which would once again subject to the supervision and control of the President and the Governing Council; the General Secretary shall be in the overall charge of all affairs of the association. These are the only relevant bye-laws which would relate to the powers of the Secretary and also the powers of the Governing Council authorising the General Secretary or the President to do certain acts.

12. The primary objection raised by Mr. Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel will have to be dealt with in the first instance which is regarding maintainability of the writ petition.

13. Section 15 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act read with Section 10 which would deal with the powers of the society to institute a suit or be sued. It is appropriate to extract the provisions of Section 15 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, which reads as follows.--

15. Suits by and against Society.--Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal Secretary or the trustees as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default, of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion:

Provided that, it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the President or Chairman or Principal Secretary or the trustees thereof, if, on application to the governing body, some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.

14. A reading of Section 15 of the Act would disclose that every society which is registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal Secretary or the Trustees as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the Society and in default in the name of such person who shall be appointed by the Governing body for the occasion. The interpretation of Section 15 is no longer res Integra, inasmuch as, a series of decisions of this Court would clearly disclose that the proceedings cannot be maintained unless authorised by the Governing Council. The Secretary on his own cannot institute a. proceeding. The relevant bye-laws have been referred in the preceding paragraph, A compendious reading of the said bye-laws do not disclose nor any resolution is produced in this proceeding to show that the Secretary of the Association was authorised to file the present writ petition. The first of the case in respect of maintainability of the proceedings without there being any resolution to institute proceedings was dealt with by this Court in the case of Muddappa. It is useful to extract the relevant para which deals with the scope of Section 15:

31. It would be seen from the above provisions that the society could sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal Secretary or the Trustees as determined by the Rules and Regulations of the Society and in the absence of any such determination in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the Governing body for the occasion and the suit or the proceeding in any Civil Court shall not abate or discontinue by reason of the person by or against whom such suit or proceeding shall have been brought or continued dying or ceasing to fill the character in the name whereof, he shall have sue or been sued but the same suit or proceeding shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person. This would go to show that the society being a legal entity could sue or be sued in its own name through one of the persons as determined under Section 15 read with the relevant provisions of the rules and regulations governing the society. However, it is obligatory for the society either to file or defend a suit by or against the society through one of the authorised persons under Section 15 of the Act read with the relevant provisions of the rules and regulations of the society and none else. If a society sues or be sued through a person not empowered under Section 15 read with the relevant provisions of the rules and regulations of the society, such an action will not be competent.

The next of the decision is in the case of B.H. Inamdar. The said decision is also to the same effect.

15. Section 15 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act provides that every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary or the trustee as shall be determined by the Rules and Regulations of the society. It clearly enables a registered society to determine by rules and regulations in whose name the society may sue or be sued. The Rules and Regulations may determine whether the society may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustee. Where the Rules and Regulations do not so determines, it enables the Governing Council of the society/association to appoint a person for the said purpose. In the absence of any such resolution by the association enabling the Secretary to initiate proceeding, I am of the considered view that the present writ petition filed by the Secretary representing the association is not maintainable.

16. But, however, insofar as the companion writ petition i.e., W.P. No. 2955 of 2006 is concerned, the said writ petition will have to be taken note, inasmuch as, the said writ petition is filed by two members of the Governing Council who have also questioned the order passed by the first respondent deferring the elections which were to be held on 11-3-2006. The contentions urged by three Senior Counsel would also hold good in respect of the said writ petition.

17. The next question which would fall for consideration is whether the first respondent was justified in initiating suo motu proceedings. The question would be whether the proceedings are to be treated as suo motu proceedings or the proceedings initiated on the application made by the respondents in the companion writ petition.

18. The other question which requires to be considered in the present proceeding is whether the first respondent had power to injunct or to suspend the elections scheduled to take place on 11-3-2006.

19. Insofar as initiation of proceedings suo motu or on an application has also been set at rest by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bangalore Grain Merchants Association. Two questions were referred to the Full Bench for decision. What are the pre-conditions for the exercise of power of holding an enquiry by the Registrar and the other was whether the Registrar has exercised the power on his own motion on the basis of the complaint made by less than 1/3rd members of the society. In the said decision the law laid down in that it is always open for the Registrar to initiate suo motu proceedings and also on the basis of complaint made by 1/3rd members of the society. Apparently in the case on hand, it is to be noticed that, initially a public interest petition was filed which was disposed of. In the said writ petition it was observed by this Court that it is always open for the petitioner to make a necessary application before the Competent Authority. It is no doubt true that this Court while disposing of the writ petition has made an observation that it has not pronounced any opinion regarding maintainability of the application or whether the Registrar has got power to go into the said question. But however what is required to be considered is whether the proceedings initiated by the Registrar are to be treated as suo motu proceedings or on the basis of a complaint made by 1/3rd members of the society. It is not in dispute that 1/3rd members of the association have nut made a complaint to the Registrar regarding functioning of the association. When that is the case, then the next question would be whether the first respondent was compelled to initiate suo motu proceedings. A perusal of Section 25 of the Act discloses that there are three different situations under which a Registrar can initiate and hold an enquiry: (1) on his own motion; (2) acting at the instance of majority of the members of the governing body; and (3) acting on the request of 1/3rd members of the society. Apparently, in the case on hand, as stated earlier, the last of the two conditions do not apply, inasmuch as, the members of the governing body or 1/3rd members of the association have not made a representation calling upon the Registrar to examine functioning of the association. It has to fall under the category of initiation of the proceedings on his own motion which is suo motu. Suo motu proceedings will have to be considered on its own motion. The dictionary meaning would be 'on one's own initiative'. Own motion obviously implies application of mind and formation of one's opinion. It does not matter how and from what source he gets the information. Apparently in the case on hand it is to be noticed that certain irregularities are stated to have been committed by the association while admitting the members to the association. On the basis of this information the proceedings were initiated which would fall under the category of suo motu proceedings. It is no doubt true that he cannot mechanically act at the behest of some persons or form an opinion that it is expedient for holding an enquiry. Apparently, in the case on hand the Registrar of societies was of the opinion that it is expedient to hold an enquiry into the functioning of the association, inasmuch as, according to him, he was prima fade of the opinion that certain alleged irregularities have been committed by the association while admitting the members to the society. Of course this Court is not called upon to pronounce on the fact whether admission of the members to the association is in violation of the bye-laws and the memorandum of association. Apparently this factor will have to be considered by the Registrar himself. What was required by the Registrar is a prima facie satisfaction before initiation of an enquiry. The Registrar was of the opinion that it is brought to his notice about the functioning of the association, which would necessarily entail an enquiry. This Court also is not called upon to pronounce as to whether any admission of the members of the society is in violation of the bye-laws as that falls in the realm of the enquiry to be conducted by the Registrar.

20. Insofar as initiation of enquiry is concerned, I am of the considered view that it would fall in the realm of suo motu. The respondents are only instrumental in bringing to the notice of the Registrar regarding irregularities committed by the association while admitting the members. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the proceedings are to be treated as suo motu proceedings. Of course, another contention raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the Registrar is labouring under the impression that this Court had directed the Registrar to hold an enquiry. Apparently, a reading of the order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition does not give an indication that such a direction is issued. But however this Court had directed that a representation could be given to the Registrar and he shall consider it in accordance with law. When that is the case, it cannot be said that the Registrar was swayed or influenced by any of the observations made during the course of the order passed in the earlier writ petition. Certain irregularities were brought to the notice of the Registrar and he had initiated suo motu proceedings. Consequently, this contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Registrar could not have initiated proceedings without a complaint being lodged by 1/3rd members of the association cannot be accepted.

21. The next question which requires to be considered is whether the Registrar had the power to suspend, postpone or stay the elections which were supposed to have been held on 11-3-2006.

22. In this regard, Mr, Jayakumar Patil, has relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Diwakar R.R. v. M.S. Patil and Ors. 1975 (2) Kar. L.J. 147, to buttress his contention that unless there is a power conferred under the Act regarding grant of order of injunction or stay the election, the question of Registrar postponing the election was not justified. Apparently it is to be noticed that the proceedings were initiated under Section 25 of the Act. Section 25 would deal with an enquiry by the Registrar on his own motion or on the application of the majority of the members or on the complaint given by 1/3rd members of the society. Sub-section (2)(a) to Section 25 deals with the powers of the Registrar regarding the free access to the books, accounts, documents, securities, cash etc., at a reasonable time. Sub-section (2)(b) would relate to the power of the Registrar to summon any person who, he has reason to believe has knowledge of any of the affairs of the society to appear before him and examine him. Sub-section (2)(c) would deal with the powers of the Registrar to issue a notice for general body meeting of the society, require the governing body of the society to call a general meeting at such time and headquarter of the society or any branch and to determine such matters as may be directed by him. These are the ancillary powers of the Registrar while holding an enquiry. It was contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent that power to grant an interim order which is ancillary relief is in aid of the main relief. It is no doubt true that under Section 25 of the Act while holding an enquiry there is no specific provision which enables the Registrar to suspend the activities of the association. But however it is to be noticed that some power regarding calling for general body meeting during the pendency of the enquiry is to be found under Sub-section 2(c)(i) of the Act. Of course a reading of the other provisions do not give an indication that a special power is conferred under the said provision. But however what is more important and relevant is that if certain material irregularities are brought to the notice of the Registrar and if he is of the opinion that granting of an interim order pending disposal of the enquiry is in furtherance of final order to be passed, I am of the considered view that the power can be traced under Section 25 itself regarding enquiry. It is trite to say that the authority who is supposed to hold an enquiry does not have the power to grant an interim order, even though it cannot be traced to any of the provisions of the Act would be a mockery of the situation. Apparently the Registrar in the case on hand prima facie was of the opinion that certain facts which are brought to his notice would require an enquiry and such an enquiry requires that any action which is likely to take place will have to be suspended. Consequently, I am of the view that the Registrar has got power to grant an interim order in aid of the final relief.

23. Insofar as decision relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, it is to be noticed that that was a case which arose under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. What fell for consideration is the scope of Section 69 of the Act under which a Charity Commissioner has the power to issue an order of injunction against a trustee restraining alienation. This Court was of the opinion that there is no provision conferring power on the Charity Commissioner to issue an injunction against the trustee. But however that is not the case here. It is not a case where injunction is issued against the petitioner. It is a case where an interim order of stay is granted suspending the elections until the controversy is resolved by holding an enquiry. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Registrar did not have power to grant an interim order.

24. It is also to be noticed that an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society which would include an enquiry into the propriety of constitution. It is useful to extract the observation made in Kodava Samaj, Bangalore v. District Registrar of Registration of Societies, Bangalore : ILR1993KAR2715 wherein it is held thus:. Though Mr. Karanth, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that Registrar has no power to direct the society to hold an election, it is not possible to accept this contention because an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society would include the enquiry into the propriety of continuation by a Working Committee and the need to elect a new Committee if the existing working committee functions contrary to the bye-laws of the society. Section 25(2)(c) should be read so as to include a power in the Registrar to direct the holding of the election to the genera] body if the occasion demands.

25. The next question which would fall for consideration is that when once a calendar of events are set in motion, whether the Registrar has power to stay the elections. Apparently much water has flown under the bridge after the impugned order is passed. Apparently the election date which was scheduled on 11-3-2006 has already over. The parties have been relegated to the position of status quo ante.

26. It is no doubt true that as a matter of rule once the election process has been set in motion, the Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not stay the said proceedings and leave the parties to get their rights adjudicated in a properly constituted suit which are to be filed under the Act. This is not a case where this Court is exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution to stay the election process. Apparently that exercise has already been done by the Registrar, It is to be noticed that the Association is registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, which would necessarily mean that it is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Registrar. The Registrar has prima facie found that holding of an election pursuant to calendar of events would be unjustifiable. He is prima, facie of opinion that admission of certain members to the society is not in conformity with the bye-laws of the association. When it is so, I am of the considered view that it is within the powers of the Registrar to postpone the eventuality, Of course this power will have to be exercised sparingly and only in an exceptional circumstances and not as a matter of course.

27. Consequently, I do not find any merit in both the petitions. Petitions stand rejected. But, however, the Registrar shall conclude the enquiry as contemplated under Section 25 of the Act within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order.

28. It is made clear that this Court has not pronounced on the merits of the case, though extensive arguments were advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides on the merits of the case. So far as these contentions are concerned, they are to be determined by the Registrar and not by this Court. This Court was required to examine only two questions - one regarding the suo motu powers of the Registrar to initiate proceedings and the other regarding the power of the Registrar to issue an interim order and defer the elections. All other questions are left open to be decided by the Registrar.

Petitions stand disposed of accordingly.