The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited Vs. the Commissioner of Customs - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/836882
SubjectCustoms
CourtChennai High Court
Decided OnNov-06-2006
Case NumberC.M.A. (NPD) No. 2663 of 2004
JudgeP.D. Dinakaran and ;P.P.S. Janarthana, JJ.
Reported in2007[6]STR216
ActsIncome Tax Act - Sections 131 and 132A; Customs Act - Sections 111, 112, 124, 125, 128, 129A, 129DD and 130E; Indian Penal Code; Constitution of India - Articles 32 and 226
AppellantThe Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited
RespondentThe Commissioner of Customs
Appellant AdvocateT.K. Seshadri, S.C. for T.K.Bhaskar, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateV.T. Gopalan, Additional Solicitor General assisted by P. Bhuvaneswari, SCGSC
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredIndian Overseas Bank v. Collector Of Customs
Excerpt:
- land acquisition act, 1894 [c.a. no. 1/1894]. sections 5a & 4; [p. sathasivam, m.e.n. patrudu & s. manikumar, jj] land acquisition (tamil nadu) rules, rule 4 time limit for filing objections held, time limit prescribed under section 5-a for filing objections cannot be further enlarged by form b notice issued under rule 4. authorities were directed to modify form b. sections 5a (2); [ hearing of objectors - held, it is mandatory and making a further enquiry by the collector is discretionary. if the objectors have not filed any objection with8in 30 days but come forward with oral objection, even then, the collector must hear. the hearing is mandatoryp.d. dinakaran, j.1. the above appeal is directed against the final order no. 397 of 2004 dated 22.4.2004 passed by the customs, excise and service tax appellate tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as 'the cestat'), confirming the order of the commissioner of customs, chennai, dated 6.3.98 holding that the appellant herein is not a person aggrieved to prefer an appeal under section 129a of the customs act (for short 'the act'), in a matter that arises against the confiscation proceedings initiated under section 124 of the act, raising the following substantial questions of law, under the facts and circumstances of the case stated below:(i) whether the applicant bank is a 'person aggrieved' under section 129a of the customs act?(ii) whether the applicant bank has locus standi to prefer an appeal before the appellate tribunal in view of the condition provided in the hand book of import - export and procedure of government of india, 1985-88, that the exchange bank of authorised dealer whom the letter of credit is opened is considered as a joint holder of license to the extent of goods covered by the credit before the appellate tribunal? 2.1. the detailed facts that are relevant for the disposal of this appeal are:249.4. metric tonnes of what was declared as 'stainless steel defective circles' were imported from korea in may - june 1982 in the name of m/s.indian steel corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the corporation') claiming that the same were covered by ten import licenses issued during the period 1981-82. the declared value of the goods was rs. 18,19,102/-. the import licenses relied on by the importer are:1. p/l/2899510/31.3.812. p/l/2902451/1.1.823. p/l/2902519/14.1.824. p/l/2902163/28.12.815. p/l/2902509/12.1.826. p/l/2902510/12.1.827. p/l/2902454/1.1.828. p/l/2902453/1.1.829. p/l/2902180/30.12.8110. p/l/0456336/11.9.812.2. on inspection by the customs authorities (hereinafter referred to as 'the department'), the goods were found to be non-magnetic stainless steel circles and that they were not defective stainless steel circles. the metallurgical expert opined that the goods were of prime quality. samples of the consignment were also tested in salem steel plant and the test report confirmed that the goods were of prime quality. on the basis of the expert's opinion and the test report as well as the invoice issued by the korean supplier of the goods, the department inferred that the prime quality stainless steel circles had been mis-declared as defective circles and heavily undervalued. the value of the said prime quality goods imported was assessed at rs. 59,96,414/- as against the declared value of rs. 18,19,102/-, which obviously indicated undervaluation to the extent of over and above rs. 41 lakhs.2.3. it was also noticed that the import licenses produced before the department pertain only with respect to the defective circles whereas the imported one were stainless steel circles of prime quality. hence, the department issued a show cause notice dated 15.10.1982 to the importer as well as to its proprietor one by name mr.a.kumar invoking section 124 of the act to confiscate the said goods on the ground of mis-declaration of the description of the property as well as for undervaluation of the goods attracting section 111 of the act and also proposed to impose penalty under section 112 of the act.2.4. when the income-tax authorities proposed to seize the goods lying with the customs authorities at madras invoking section 132-a of the income tax act by order dated 19th june, 1982, the same was challenged by the proprietor, a.kumar by way of writ petition (c) no. 2689 of 1982 before the delhi high court and he also filed another writ petition (c) no. 1812 of 1982 questioning the rate of customs duty and valuation of goods imported. since both the writ petitions were dismissed by the delhi high court, the proprietor, a.kumar, preferred civil appeal nos.1693 and 1694 of 1982 before the apex court.2.5. in the meanwhile, the proprietor of the corporation, a. kumar, also approached the apex court in writ petition (c) no. 8168 of 1982 for a declaration that the 'scale of rates' prescribed by the madras port trust are unconstitutional and to restrain the port trust from collecting the charges in accordance with the said scale of rates and also for issuance of detention certificate. after the receipt of the show cause notice dated 15.10.1982 issued under section 124 of the act, he filed another writ petition (c) no. 2 of 1983 invoking article 32 of the constitution of india questioning the validity of the show cause notice.2.6. all the above mentioned writ petitions, viz., writ petition (c) no. 8168 of 1982 and writ petition (c) no. 2 of 1983 as well as the civil appeals nos.1693 and 1694 of 1984 were heard together by the apex court and were disposed of by a common order dated 11.10.1996.2.7. the apex court while disposing of the above writ petitions and the civil appeals, observed that the department had a huge claim of arrears of income tax and the madras port trust also claimed for demurrage charges, as well as the appellant herein, viz., the lakshmi vilas bank limited, also put forward a claim contending that inasmuch as it had financed the said importer, the appellant bank is entitled to be repaid. in the face of these rival claims, the apex court, by an order dated 21.6.1983 directed the sale of the imported goods by appointing three joint receivers, viz., sri.jayaraman, additional collector of customs, madras, sri.sridharan, deputy general manager, lakshmi vilas bank, madras and sri.rajsekharan, deputy traffic manager (commercial), madras port trust.2.8. the joint receivers sold the goods by auction on 27.7.1983 and deposited the sale proceeds, viz., rs. 1 crore and 27 lakhs, in the state bank of india, main branch, madras, in a fixed deposit and the said amount is still lying with the state bank of india. unfortunately, when the matters were taken up for final hearing before the apex court, the learned counsel appearing for the said a.kumar, the proprietor of the corporation, reported no instructions, as there was no response from the said a.kumar in spite of several reminders by his counsel. hence, the apex court heard the department, viz., the custom authorities, the appellant herein, viz., lakshmi vilas bank limited, and also the purchaser of the goods in the public auction and disposed of the matters finally by an order dated 11.10.1996.2.9.1. in this connection, it is relevant to refer the three statements of a.kumar, which were brought to the notice of the apex court while disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeals, referred to above, by an order dated 11.10.1996. the first one is the statement recorded under section 131 of the income-tax act on 10.6.1983, in which the said kumar had stated that he was only an employee of vinod kumar didwania on a salary of rs. 1,000/- and that he was a man of humble origins and practically of no means. it was further stated that he was the national of sri lanka and that he had no connection with indian steel corporation. he also denied that he is the proprietor of the indian steel corporation and his knowledge of certain accounts maintained in his name in the lakshmi vilas bank. more interestingly, he also denied signing of any documents in connection with the imported goods and that he has nothing to do with the said import at all. according to the said statement of a.kumar, everything was done by vinod kumar didwania and deen dayal didwania using his name.2.9.2. in the second statement dated 2.12.1983 recorded by the income-tax authorities, the said kumar denied being the proprietor of the said concern and disowned any connection with the import of the said goods and further stated that he had no claim to the said goods.2.9.3. in the third statement, which is an affidavit dated 24.2.1984, the same stand denying his connection with the corporation as well as the import of the goods in question and added that, whatever the affidavits he had signed and filed in the impugned proceedings therein were made at the instance of his employers, didwanias.2.10. in the light of the averments stated in the above statements, the department came up with a petition in c.m.p. no. 27299 of 1983 in special leave petition (c) no. 8780 of 1982, which was subsequently re-numbered as civil appeal no. 1693 of 1984 for prosecuting the members of didwania group together with certain officials of lakhsmi vilas bank for various offences under the indian penal code.2.11. on the other hand, the appellant herein represented by his counsel mr.a.t.m.sampath, stated that the bank had already filed a suit against the said kumar, didwanias and the department for recovery of the amount due to them. the madras agencies, who is the purchaser of the imported goods, contended before the apex court that since there was an inordinate delay in confirming the sale and the delivery of the goods, the purchaser is entitled to the interest on the earnest money paid and also sought to reimburse the demurrage charges to the tune of rs. 52,582/- and to reimburse the sales tax he was made to pay after the purchase of the goods to the tune of rs. 5,47,719/-.2.12. the apex court, in the said order dated 11.10.1996, clearly rendered a decision on the claim of the appellant herein that the bank has to work out its right in the suit, which they had already filed. since there was also a claim by the madras port trust for demurrage charges, the apex court also made it clear that after passing the final order in the confiscation proceedings, the balance amount lying in the fixed deposit with the state bank of india, main branch, madras, after settling the claim of the madras port trust for demurrage charges, shall be paid over to the department.2.13. the apex court, in the said order dated 11.10.1996, also observed that it was rather strange that the lakshmi vilas bank, the appellant herein, chose to issue letters of credit on behalf of a.kumar, a mere low paid employee and a person of no means and that there are also allegations of collusion and fraud against certain officials of the appellant/bank in this matter levelled by the income-tax department. not satisfied with the records produced by the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellant bank before the apex court with regard to the circumstances under which the letters of credit were issued by the appellant bank in favour of a.kumar (ashok kumar), the apex court further observed that the matter appeared to be strange and unusual. however, the apex court left the matter for the reserve bank of india to look into it since it involves loss of depositors money with a further direction that in case if the reserve bank of india finds any officials of the appellant bank had acted outside their authority or adverse to the interest of the bank, the reserve bank of india shall direct the management of the appellant bank to take necessary disciplinary proceedings against them. the apex court, accordingly disposed of the above writ petitions and the civil appeals by order dated 11.10.1996, as referred to above.3.1. pursuant to the above order of the apex court dated 11.10.1996, the department proceeded with the final adjudication proceedings and issued notice to the corporation as well as to its proprietor, viz., a. kumar, requiring the said kumar to appear for personal hearing on 27.2.1998. but on that date, the appellant herein representing through its manager and the consultant sought a hearing as an intervenor. the notice issued to the corporation and its proprietor, was returned undelivered and the appellant was permitted to be heard as an intervenor on 27.2.1998. after the full-fledged adjudication, the commissioner passed an order dated 6.3.1998 confirming the demand of customs duty to the tune of rs. 1,38,72,807/- on the imported goods and also imposed a redemption fine of equal amount in lieu of confiscation of the goods, apart from a penalty imposed to the tune of rs. 25 lakhs and rs. 25,000/- on a. kumar and the corporation respectively under section 112 of the act.3.2. aggrieved by the said order of the commissioner, the lakshmi vilas bank preferred an appeal before the cestat, who by an order dated 30.4.2004 held that the appeal preferred by the appellant is not maintainable in law as they are not the person aggrieved within the meaning of section 129a of the act. hence, the present appeal.4.1. mr.t.k.seshadri, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant bank contends that the appellant bank, having been heard as an intervenor by the commissioner of customs in the confiscation proceedings, by an order dated 27.2.98, is deemed to be the person aggrieved within the meaning of section 129a to prefer an appeal against the said order passed by the commissioner in the confiscation proceedings.4.2. the learned senior counsel also contends that the appellant bank is a joint owner of the imported goods, as the very import is based on the letters of credit furnished by the appellant bank. in any event, placing reliance on the hand book of import-export procedures issued in the year 1985-88 by the government of india, ministry of commerce, where under it is stated that the banker who furnished the letter of credit or making remittance of foreign exchange for the purpose of importing the goods is deemed to be the joint holder of the licence, it is contended that the appellant bank is the person aggrieved to maintain the appeal under section 129a of the act. the relevant portion in which the learned senior counsel placed his reliance in the said hand book of import export procedures, reads as follows:bank as joint holders of licences(1) when an importer opens an irrevocable letter of credit through a bank and later fails to honour his bills, the bank concerned, which is committed for the payment of the exchange to the foreign suppliers, finds itself in difficulty to import as it is not the licence holder. as a safeguard against this contingency, the exchange bank or authorised dealer through whom the letter of credit is opened is considered as a joint holder of the licence to the extent of the goods covered by the credit which would thus enable the bank to honour its commitments with foreign supplier.4.4. the learned senior counsel also placed reliance on a decision of the supreme court reported in northern plastics ltd. v. hindustan photo films mfg.co.ltd. and a decision of this court in .indian overseas bank v. collector of customs 1984 t.l.r. 2427 to buttress his submissions.5.1. per contra, mr. v.t. gopalan, learned additional solicitor general appearing on behalf of the department, submits that the claim of the appellant bank already got concluded before the apex court in the common order dated 11.10.1996 while disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeals, referred to above.5.2. the learned additional solicitor general invited our attention to the finding rendered by the apex court on the claim of the appellant bank that the bank had already filed a suit against the corporation and its proprietor and the appellant bank has to work out its right only in that suit. therefore, the appellant has no locus standi to be heard in the confiscation proceedings initiated under section 124 of the act, much less, to agitate against the order passed by the commissioner of customs dated 6.3.1998 by preferring an appeal before the cestat under section 129a of the act.6. we have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions of both sides.7. since both the substantial questions of law referred to above are inter-related, viz., on the point whether the appellant bank is a person aggrieved by the order of the commissioner of customs dated 6.3.1998 to prefer an appeal under section 129a of the act before the cestat, they are considered and disposed of jointly as hereunder.8. in this regard, it is apt to refer sections 124 and 129a of the act, which read as follows:section 124. issue of show cause notice before confiscation of goods, etc. -no order confiscating any goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made under this chapter unless the owner of the goods or such person -(a)is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty;(b)is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein; and(c)is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter;provided that the notice referred to in clause (a) and the representation referred to in clause (b) may, at the request of the person concerned be oral.section 129a. appeals to the appellate tribunal.(1) any person aggrieved by any of the following orders may appeal to the appellate tribunal against such order -(a) a decision or order passed by the commissioner of customs as an adjudicating authority;(b) an order passed by the commissioner (appeals) under section 128a;(c) an order passed by the board or the appellate commissioner of customs under section 128, as it stood immediately before the appointed day;(d) an order passed by the board or the commissioner of customs either before or after the appointed day, under section 130, as it stood immediately before that day:provided that no appeal shall lie to the appellate tribunal and the appellate tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to decide any appeal in respect of any order referred to in clause (b) if such order relates to, -(a) any goods imported or exported as baggage;(b) any goods loaded in a conveyance for importation into india, but which are not unloaded at their place of destination in india, or so much of the quantity of such goods as has not been unloaded at any such destination if goods unloaded at such destination are short of the quantity required to be unloaded at that destination;(c) payment of drawback as provided in chapter x, and the rules made thereunder:provided further that the appellate tribunal may, in its discretion, refuse to admit an appeal in respect of an order referred to in clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) where -(i) the value of the goods confiscated without option having been given to the owner of the goods to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation under section 125; or(ii) in any disputed case, other than a case where the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment is in issue or is one of the points in issue, the difference in duty involved or the duty involved; or(iii) the amount of fine or penalty determined by such order, does not exceed fifty thousand rupees..9.1. for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved', we are obliged to refer the dictionary meaning of the same in this connection.9.2. in collin's english dictionary, the word 'aggrieved' has been defined to mean 'to ensure unjustly especially by infringing a person's legal rights'. in webster's comprehensive dictionary, international edition at page 28, aggrieved person is defined to mean 'subjected to ill-treatment, feeling an injury or injustice. injured, as by legal decision adversely infringing upon one's rights'. in stroud's judicial dictionary, 5th edn., vol.1, pages 83-84, person aggrieved means 'person injured or damaged in a legal sense'. in black law's dictionary, 6th edn. at page 65, aggrieved has been defined to mean 'having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured' and aggrieved person has been defined to mean: 'one whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment. one whose right of property may be established or divested. the word 'aggrieved' refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation'.10.1. the words 'person aggrieved' had been considered and interpreted by the apex court in several decisions, which in our considered opinion, may be useful for the disposal of the present appeal.10.2. lord denning, in the notable case of attorney general of gambia v. pierra sarr n'jie 1961 ac 617, had spoken that even though the words 'person aggrieved' are of wider import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation, of course, they do not include a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him'.10.3. in a decision of the constitution bench (seven judges) of the apex court rendered in council of maharashtra v. m.v.dabholkar , a.n.ray, c.j. on behalf of h.r.khanna, k.k.mathew, a.c.gupta and s.murtaza fazal ali, jj., held as follows:the words 'person aggrieved' are found in several statutes. the meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. sometimes, it is said that the words 'person aggrieved' correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative of judicial decision is created by a statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. the meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute. one of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one 'a person aggrieved'. again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. the meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. the restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights.in the above said decision of the apex court, justice.beg, concurring with the majority view, held that to claim locus standi and as the person affected by the results of a proceeding, there should necessarily be a lis or a dispute. lis implies the conception of an issue joined between two parties.10.4. in thammanna v. k.veera reddy , the apex court, while defining the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved', held as follows:although the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless, normally, a 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.10.5. further, in krapa rangiah v. special dy. collector, land acquisition , the apex court held that the person aggrieved would mean a person who had suffered legal injury or one who has been unjustly deprived or denied of something, which he would be interested to obtain in the usual course or similar benefits or advantage or results in wrongful affectation of his title to compensation.10.6. the interpretation of the expression 'any person aggrieved', as employed in section 129a of the customs act, which itself is the subject matter in the above appeal, came up for consideration before the apex court in northern plastics ltd. v. hindustan photo films mfg. co. ltd. .the apex court in the said judgment held that the appeal as provided under sections 128 and 129a of the act is a creature of statute. the right to appeal has to be exercised only by persons permitted by the statute to prefer an appeal subject to the conditions regarding the filing of such an appeal. therefore, the wider concept of locus standi for filing a writ petition both under article 32 and 226 of the constitution of india, is not importable for deciding the right of appeal under the statutory provisions, viz., sections 128, 129a and 130e of the act. it is further held that the expression 'person aggrieved' employed in section 129a of the act, even though has got a wider connotation than the expression 'party aggrieved', the expression 'person aggrieved' has to be construed only in the context of the statutory scheme, viz., the scheme of the customs act, particularly in the context of section 129a of the act, wherein the right of appeal is confined to the parties to the proceedings before the adjudicating authority and that a third party could earn a locus standi to file an appeal as a person aggrieved only if it is able to show that it has a direct legal interest in the goods belonged to it and not to the purported importer. it is also held that the phrase 'person aggrieved' used in sections 128 and 129a of the act, do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made and it must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. the apex court thus held as follows:.a statutory remedy is provided to the collector of customs in connection with orders of the appellate collector of customs passed immediately before the appointed day and also in connection with the orders passed by collector of customs under section 128a, to direct proper officer to appeal on his behalf as central board of excise and customs against the orders of collectors of customs as provided by section 129da(1) as well as on the central government under contingencies contemplated by section 129dd(1). these are the only statutory modes contemplated by the act by resort to which the orders of collector (customs) could be brought in challenge before higher statutory authorities including the cegat. in the light of this statutory scheme, therefore, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the contesting respondents that sub-section (1) of section 129a entitles any and every person feeling aggrieved by the decision or order of the collector of customs as an adjudicating authority, to prefer statutory appeal to the appellate tribunal. neither the central government, through industries department, nor the rival company or industry operating in the same field as the importer can as a matter or right prefer an appeal as 'person aggrieved'. it is true that the phrase 'person aggrieved' is wider than the phrase 'party aggrieved'. but in the entire context of the statutory scheme especially sub-section (3) of 129a it has to be held that only the parties to the proceedings before the adjudicating authority collector of customs could prefer such an appeal to the cegat and the adjudicating authority under section 122(a) can prefer such an appeal only when directed by the board under section 129d(1) and not otherwise. it is easy to visualise that even a third party may get legitimately aggrieved by the order of the collector of customs being the adjudicating authority if it is contended by such a third party that the goods imported really belonged to it and not to the purported imported or that he had financed the same and, therefore, in substance he was interested in the goods and consequently the release order in favour of the purported imported was prone to create a legal injury to such a third party which is not actually arraigned as a party before the adjudicating authority and was not heard by it. under such circumstances, such a third party might perhaps be treated to be legally aggrieved by the order of the collector of customs as an adjudicating authority and may legitimately prefer an appeal to the cegat as a 'person aggrieved'. that is the reason why the legislature in its wisdom has used the phrase 'any person aggrieved' by the order of the collector of customs as adjudicating authority in section 129a(1). but in order to earn a locus standi as 'person aggrieved' other than the aggrieved party before the collector of customs as an adjudicating authority it must be shown that such a person aggrieved being third party has a direct legal interest in the goods involved in the adjudication process. it cannot be a general public interest or interest of a business rival as is being projected by the contesting respondents before us.10.7. it is true that a learned single judge of this court, justice.mohan, as he then was, in indian overseas bank v. collector of customs, cited supra, which also arises under the customs act in a matter relating to the confiscation proceedings of the imported goods, held that the bank is deemed to be the owner within the meaning of sections 124 and 125 of the act. even, in the said decision, justice. mohan, as he then was, has observed that the object of the customs act is only to see that there is no illegal importation of goods and the various policies under the import trade control are enunciated with reference to the economic conditions of the country and one cannot claim an inviolable right with regard to importation. in the said decision, it was not in dispute that the documents were drawn to the order of the shipper and endorsed in favour of the bank for collection after presentation to the importer and as the importer refused to honour the documents on presentation and informed the customs authorities that he had no intention to clear the goods, the customs authorities initiated adjudication proceedings against the importer and ultimately the imported goods were seized and the importer was given option to redeem under section 125 of the act. thus, while dealing with a case where the goods were imported according to law, it was held by justice.mohan, as he then was, that bank could be given a notice of adjudication under section 124 of the act.10.8. again, unlike in the matter of land acquisition cases, where a tenant of the land acquired has got some interest to be protected in the usual course is entitled for similar benefits or advantages against the wrongful acquisition or in the matter affecting his title to claim compensation, because ultimately such tenant would suffer a legal injury, in the present case, the banker, merely because he has issued letters of credit and having financed to the importer cannot claim that he is the person aggrieved when the import itself is not only invalid but also conceded to be a bogus and illegal event according to the import statutes, even though he has got the business interest in the matter, which itself cannot be a consideration to treat the appellant bank as the person aggrieved, more particularly, when the apex court in the detailed order dated 11.10.1996 did not satisfy with the records produced by the bank with regard to the circumstances under which the letters of credit were issued in favour of the importer, kumar, who himself disowned his claim over the goods imported, and left the matter for the reserve bank of india to look into the same and to take necessary action in the matter.10.9. taking into consideration the object of sections 124 and 129a of the act, merely because the appellant bank happened to be the financier to the corporation, whose proprietor himself has denied his right on the imported goods, it cannot claim to be the person aggrieved against the order of confiscation passed by the commissioner of customs for filing an appeal under section 129a of the act, because they do not have any legal grievance against the confiscation proceedings even though they may have a lawful claim against the importer-corporation. even the extract from the hand book of import-export procedures would only protects the right of the banker to honour its commitments with the foreign supplier and not in the confiscation proceedings initiated under section 124 of the act in the case of mis-declaration of description of goods and under valuation of the imported goods attracting section 111 of the act, based on which the department is entitled to initiate penal action under section 112 of the act for the commission and omission of the importer.10.10. in the instant case, the appellant cannot claim any right against the confiscation claiming that he is legally entitled to import the goods because he is not the importer and therefore, the words 'any person aggrieved' employed in section 129a of the act should be given a wider meaning in a statute like customs act, which provides remedies for protection of the importer alone against the proposed confiscation proceedings with regard to the deprivation of his legal right of importing the goods legally.in view of the above well settled propositions, we find no question of law much less a substantial question of law that would arise for our consideration in this appeal. the appeal is accordingly dismissed. no costs.
Judgment:

P.D. Dinakaran, J.

1. The above appeal is directed against the Final order No. 397 of 2004 dated 22.4.2004 passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as 'the CESTAT'), confirming the order of the Commissioner of Customs, Chennai, dated 6.3.98 holding that the appellant herein is not a person aggrieved to prefer an appeal under Section 129A of the Customs Act (for short 'the Act'), in a matter that arises against the confiscation proceedings initiated under Section 124 of the Act, raising the following substantial questions of law, under the facts and circumstances of the case stated below:

(i) Whether the Applicant Bank is a 'person aggrieved' under Section 129A of the Customs Act?

(ii) Whether the Applicant Bank has locus standi to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in view of the condition provided in the Hand Book of Import - Export and Procedure of Government of India, 1985-88, that the exchange bank of authorised dealer whom the letter of credit is opened is considered as a joint holder of license to the extent of goods covered by the credit before the Appellate Tribunal?

2.1. The detailed facts that are relevant for the disposal of this appeal are:

249.4. Metric Tonnes of what was declared as 'Stainless Steel Defective Circles' were imported from Korea in May - June 1982 in the name of M/s.Indian Steel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') claiming that the same were covered by ten import licenses issued during the period 1981-82. The declared value of the goods was Rs. 18,19,102/-. The import licenses relied on by the importer are:

1. P/L/2899510/31.3.81

2. P/L/2902451/1.1.82

3. P/L/2902519/14.1.82

4. P/L/2902163/28.12.81

5. P/L/2902509/12.1.82

6. P/L/2902510/12.1.82

7. P/L/2902454/1.1.82

8. P/L/2902453/1.1.82

9. P/L/2902180/30.12.81

10. P/L/0456336/11.9.81

2.2. On inspection by the Customs Authorities (hereinafter referred to as 'the Department'), the goods were found to be non-magnetic stainless steel circles and that they were not defective stainless steel circles. The Metallurgical expert opined that the goods were of prime quality. Samples of the consignment were also tested in Salem Steel Plant and the test report confirmed that the goods were of prime quality. On the basis of the expert's opinion and the test report as well as the invoice issued by the Korean supplier of the goods, the Department inferred that the prime quality stainless steel circles had been mis-declared as defective circles and heavily undervalued. The value of the said prime quality goods imported was assessed at Rs. 59,96,414/- as against the declared value of Rs. 18,19,102/-, which obviously indicated undervaluation to the extent of over and above Rs. 41 lakhs.

2.3. It was also noticed that the import licenses produced before the Department pertain only with respect to the defective circles whereas the imported one were stainless steel circles of prime quality. Hence, the Department issued a show cause notice dated 15.10.1982 to the importer as well as to its proprietor one by name Mr.A.Kumar invoking Section 124 of the Act to confiscate the said goods on the ground of mis-declaration of the description of the property as well as for undervaluation of the goods attracting Section 111 of the Act and also proposed to impose penalty under Section 112 of the Act.

2.4. When the Income-tax authorities proposed to seize the goods lying with the customs authorities at Madras invoking Section 132-A of the Income Tax Act by order dated 19th June, 1982, the same was challenged by the proprietor, A.Kumar by way of Writ Petition (C) NO. 2689 of 1982 before the Delhi High Court and he also filed another Writ Petition (C) No. 1812 of 1982 questioning the rate of customs duty and valuation of goods imported. Since both the writ petitions were dismissed by the Delhi High Court, the proprietor, A.Kumar, preferred Civil Appeal Nos.1693 and 1694 of 1982 before the Apex Court.

2.5. In the meanwhile, the proprietor of the Corporation, A. Kumar, also approached the Apex Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 8168 of 1982 for a declaration that the 'scale of rates' prescribed by the Madras Port Trust are unconstitutional and to restrain the Port Trust from collecting the charges in accordance with the said scale of rates and also for issuance of detention certificate. After the receipt of the show cause notice dated 15.10.1982 issued under Section 124 of the Act, he filed another Writ Petition (C) NO. 2 of 1983 invoking Article 32 of the Constitution of India questioning the validity of the show cause notice.

2.6. All the above mentioned writ petitions, viz., Writ Petition (C) No. 8168 of 1982 and Writ Petition (C) No. 2 of 1983 as well as the Civil Appeals Nos.1693 and 1694 of 1984 were heard together by the Apex Court and were disposed of by a common order dated 11.10.1996.

2.7. The Apex Court while disposing of the above writ petitions and the civil appeals, observed that the department had a huge claim of arrears of income tax and the Madras Port Trust also claimed for demurrage charges, as well as the appellant herein, viz., the Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited, also put forward a claim contending that inasmuch as it had financed the said importer, the appellant Bank is entitled to be repaid. In the face of these rival claims, the Apex Court, by an order dated 21.6.1983 directed the sale of the imported goods by appointing three joint receivers, viz., Sri.Jayaraman, Additional Collector of Customs, Madras, Sri.Sridharan, Deputy General Manager, Lakshmi Vilas Bank, Madras and Sri.Rajsekharan, Deputy Traffic Manager (Commercial), Madras Port Trust.

2.8. The Joint Receivers sold the goods by auction on 27.7.1983 and deposited the sale proceeds, viz., Rs. 1 crore and 27 lakhs, in the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Madras, in a Fixed Deposit and the said amount is still lying with the State Bank of India. Unfortunately, when the matters were taken up for final hearing before the Apex Court, the learned Counsel appearing for the said A.Kumar, the proprietor of the Corporation, reported no instructions, as there was no response from the said A.Kumar in spite of several reminders by his counsel. Hence, the Apex Court heard the Department, viz., the custom authorities, the appellant herein, viz., Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited, and also the purchaser of the goods in the public auction and disposed of the matters finally by an order dated 11.10.1996.

2.9.1. In this connection, it is relevant to refer the three statements of A.Kumar, which were brought to the notice of the Apex Court while disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeals, referred to above, by an order dated 11.10.1996. The first one is the statement recorded under Section 131 of the Income-tax Act on 10.6.1983, in which the said Kumar had stated that he was only an employee of Vinod Kumar Didwania on a salary of Rs. 1,000/- and that he was a man of humble origins and practically of no means. It was further stated that he was the national of Sri Lanka and that he had no connection with Indian Steel Corporation. He also denied that he is the proprietor of the Indian Steel Corporation and his knowledge of certain accounts maintained in his name in the Lakshmi Vilas Bank. More interestingly, he also denied signing of any documents in connection with the imported goods and that he has nothing to do with the said import at all. According to the said statement of A.Kumar, everything was done by Vinod Kumar Didwania and Deen Dayal Didwania using his name.

2.9.2. In the second statement dated 2.12.1983 recorded by the Income-tax authorities, the said Kumar denied being the proprietor of the said concern and disowned any connection with the import of the said goods and further stated that he had no claim to the said goods.

2.9.3. In the third statement, which is an affidavit dated 24.2.1984, the same stand denying his connection with the Corporation as well as the import of the goods in question and added that, whatever the affidavits he had signed and filed in the impugned proceedings therein were made at the instance of his employers, Didwanias.

2.10. In the light of the averments stated in the above statements, the Department came up with a petition in C.M.P. No. 27299 of 1983 in Special Leave Petition (C) NO. 8780 of 1982, which was subsequently re-numbered as Civil Appeal No. 1693 of 1984 for prosecuting the members of Didwania group together with certain officials of Lakhsmi Vilas Bank for various offences under the Indian Penal Code.

2.11. On the other hand, the appellant herein represented by his counsel Mr.A.T.M.Sampath, stated that the bank had already filed a suit against the said Kumar, Didwanias and the Department for recovery of the amount due to them. The Madras Agencies, who is the purchaser of the imported goods, contended before the Apex Court that since there was an inordinate delay in confirming the sale and the delivery of the goods, the purchaser is entitled to the interest on the earnest money paid and also sought to reimburse the demurrage charges to the tune of Rs. 52,582/- and to reimburse the sales tax he was made to pay after the purchase of the goods to the tune of Rs. 5,47,719/-.

2.12. The Apex Court, in the said order dated 11.10.1996, clearly rendered a decision on the claim of the appellant herein that the bank has to work out its right in the suit, which they had already filed. Since there was also a claim by the Madras Port Trust for demurrage charges, the Apex Court also made it clear that after passing the final order in the confiscation proceedings, the balance amount lying in the fixed deposit with the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Madras, after settling the claim of the Madras Port Trust for demurrage charges, shall be paid over to the department.

2.13. The Apex Court, in the said order dated 11.10.1996, also observed that it was rather strange that the Lakshmi Vilas Bank, the appellant herein, chose to issue letters of credit on behalf of A.Kumar, a mere low paid employee and a person of no means and that there are also allegations of collusion and fraud against certain officials of the appellant/Bank in this matter levelled by the Income-tax Department. Not satisfied with the records produced by the learned Counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellant Bank before the Apex Court with regard to the circumstances under which the letters of credit were issued by the appellant Bank in favour of A.Kumar (Ashok Kumar), the Apex Court further observed that the matter appeared to be strange and unusual. However, the Apex Court left the matter for the Reserve Bank of India to look into it since it involves loss of depositors money with a further direction that in case if the Reserve Bank of India finds any officials of the appellant Bank had acted outside their authority or adverse to the interest of the Bank, the Reserve Bank of India shall direct the management of the appellant Bank to take necessary disciplinary proceedings against them. The Apex Court, accordingly disposed of the above writ petitions and the civil appeals by order dated 11.10.1996, as referred to above.

3.1. Pursuant to the above order of the Apex Court dated 11.10.1996, the department proceeded with the final adjudication proceedings and issued notice to the Corporation as well as to its proprietor, viz., A. Kumar, requiring the said Kumar to appear for personal hearing on 27.2.1998. But on that date, the appellant herein representing through its Manager and the consultant sought a hearing as an intervenor. The notice issued to the Corporation and its proprietor, was returned undelivered and the appellant was permitted to be heard as an intervenor on 27.2.1998. After the full-fledged adjudication, the Commissioner passed an order dated 6.3.1998 confirming the demand of customs duty to the tune of Rs. 1,38,72,807/- on the imported goods and also imposed a redemption fine of equal amount in lieu of confiscation of the goods, apart from a penalty imposed to the tune of Rs. 25 lakhs and Rs. 25,000/- on A. Kumar and the corporation respectively under Section 112 of the Act.

3.2. Aggrieved by the said order of the Commissioner, the Lakshmi Vilas Bank preferred an appeal before the CESTAT, who by an order dated 30.4.2004 held that the appeal preferred by the appellant is not maintainable in law as they are not the person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 129A of the Act. Hence, the present appeal.

4.1. Mr.T.K.Seshadri, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Bank contends that the appellant Bank, having been heard as an intervenor by the Commissioner of Customs in the confiscation proceedings, by an order dated 27.2.98, is deemed to be the person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 129A to prefer an appeal against the said order passed by the Commissioner in the confiscation proceedings.

4.2. The learned senior counsel also contends that the appellant Bank is a joint owner of the imported goods, as the very import is based on the letters of credit furnished by the appellant Bank. In any event, placing reliance on the Hand Book of Import-Export procedures issued in the year 1985-88 by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, where under it is stated that the banker who furnished the letter of credit or making remittance of foreign exchange for the purpose of importing the goods is deemed to be the joint holder of the licence, it is contended that the appellant Bank is the person aggrieved to maintain the appeal under Section 129A of the Act. The relevant portion in which the learned senior counsel placed his reliance in the said Hand Book of Import Export procedures, reads as follows:

Bank as Joint holders of Licences

(1) When an importer opens an irrevocable letter of credit through a bank and later fails to honour his bills, the bank concerned, which is committed for the payment of the exchange to the foreign suppliers, finds itself in difficulty to import as it is not the licence holder. As a safeguard against this contingency, the exchange bank or authorised dealer through whom the letter of credit is opened is considered as a joint holder of the licence to the extent of the goods covered by the credit which would thus enable the bank to honour its commitments with foreign supplier.

4.4. The learned senior counsel also placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg.Co.Ltd. and a decision of this Court in .Indian Overseas Bank v. Collector Of Customs 1984 T.L.R. 2427 to buttress his submissions.

5.1. Per contra, Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Department, submits that the claim of the appellant Bank already got concluded before the Apex Court in the common order dated 11.10.1996 while disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeals, referred to above.

5.2. The learned Additional Solicitor General invited our attention to the finding rendered by the Apex Court on the claim of the appellant Bank that the bank had already filed a suit against the Corporation and its proprietor and the appellant Bank has to work out its right only in that suit. Therefore, the appellant has no locus standi to be heard in the confiscation proceedings initiated under Section 124 of the Act, much less, to agitate against the order passed by the Commissioner of Customs dated 6.3.1998 by preferring an appeal before the CESTAT under Section 129A of the Act.

6. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions of both sides.

7. Since both the substantial questions of law referred to above are inter-related, viz., on the point whether the appellant Bank is a person aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Customs dated 6.3.1998 to prefer an appeal under Section 129A of the Act before the CESTAT, they are considered and disposed of jointly as hereunder.

8. In this regard, it is apt to refer Sections 124 and 129A of the Act, which read as follows:

Section 124. Issue of show cause notice before confiscation of goods, etc. -

No order confiscating any goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made under this Chapter unless the owner of the goods or such person -

(a)is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty;

(b)is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein; and

(c)is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter;

Provided that the notice referred to in Clause (a) and the representation referred to in Clause (b) may, at the request of the person concerned be oral.

Section 129A. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal.

(1) Any person aggrieved by any of the following orders may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order -

(a) a decision or order passed by the Commissioner of Customs as an adjudicating authority;

(b) an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 128A;

(c) an order passed by the Board or the Appellate Commissioner of Customs under Section 128, as it stood immediately before the appointed day;

(d) an order passed by the Board or the Commissioner of Customs either before or after the appointed day, under Section 130, as it stood immediately before that day:

Provided that no appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to decide any appeal in respect of any order referred to in Clause (b) if such order relates to, -

(a) any goods imported or exported as baggage;

(b) any goods loaded in a conveyance for importation into India, but which are not unloaded at their place of destination in India, or so much of the quantity of such goods as has not been unloaded at any such destination if goods unloaded at such destination are short of the quantity required to be unloaded at that destination;

(c) payment of drawback as provided in Chapter X, and the rules made thereunder:

Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may, in its discretion, refuse to admit an appeal in respect of an order referred to in Clause (b) or Clause (c) or Clause (d) where -

(i) the value of the goods confiscated without option having been given to the owner of the goods to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation under Section 125; or

(ii) in any disputed case, other than a case where the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment is in issue or is one of the points in issue, the difference in duty involved or the duty involved; or

(iii) the amount of fine or penalty determined by such order, does not exceed fifty thousand rupees..

9.1. For the purpose of understanding the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved', we are obliged to refer the dictionary meaning of the same in this connection.

9.2. In Collin's English Dictionary, the word 'aggrieved' has been defined to mean 'to ensure unjustly especially by infringing a person's legal rights'. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition at page 28, aggrieved person is defined to mean 'subjected to ill-treatment, feeling an injury or injustice. Injured, as by legal decision adversely infringing upon one's rights'. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Vol.1, pages 83-84, person aggrieved means 'person injured or damaged in a legal sense'. In Black Law's Dictionary, 6th Edn. at page 65, aggrieved has been defined to mean 'having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured' and aggrieved person has been defined to mean: 'one whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment. One whose right of property may be established or divested. The word 'aggrieved' refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation'.

10.1. The words 'person aggrieved' had been considered and interpreted by the Apex Court in several decisions, which in our considered opinion, may be useful for the disposal of the present appeal.

10.2. Lord Denning, in the notable case of Attorney General of Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N'Jie 1961 AC 617, had spoken that even though the words 'person aggrieved' are of wider import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation, of course, they do not include a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him'.

10.3. In a decision of the Constitution Bench (seven judges) of the Apex Court rendered in Council Of Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar , A.N.Ray, C.J. on behalf of H.R.Khanna, K.K.Mathew, A.C.Gupta and S.Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ., held as follows:

The words 'person aggrieved' are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes, it is said that the words 'person aggrieved' correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative of judicial decision is created by a statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one 'a person aggrieved'. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights.

In the above said decision of the Apex Court, Justice.Beg, concurring with the majority view, held that to claim locus standi and as the person affected by the results of a proceeding, there should necessarily be a lis or a dispute. Lis implies the conception of an issue joined between two parties.

10.4. In Thammanna v. K.Veera Reddy , the Apex Court, while defining the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved', held as follows:

Although the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless, normally, a 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.

10.5. Further, in Krapa Rangiah v. Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition , the Apex Court held that the person aggrieved would mean a person who had suffered legal injury or one who has been unjustly deprived or denied of something, which he would be interested to obtain in the usual course or similar benefits or advantage or results in wrongful affectation of his title to compensation.

10.6. The interpretation of the expression 'any person aggrieved', as employed in Section 129A of the Customs Act, which itself is the subject matter in the above appeal, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. .

The Apex Court in the said judgment held that the appeal as provided under Sections 128 and 129A of the Act is a creature of statute. The right to appeal has to be exercised only by persons permitted by the statute to prefer an appeal subject to the conditions regarding the filing of such an appeal. Therefore, the wider concept of locus standi for filing a writ petition both under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, is not importable for deciding the right of appeal under the statutory provisions, viz., Sections 128, 129A and 130E of the Act. It is further held that the expression 'person aggrieved' employed in Section 129A of the Act, even though has got a wider connotation than the expression 'party aggrieved', the expression 'person aggrieved' has to be construed only in the context of the statutory scheme, viz., the scheme of the Customs Act, particularly in the context of Section 129A of the Act, wherein the right of appeal is confined to the parties to the proceedings before the adjudicating authority and that a third party could earn a locus standi to file an appeal as a person aggrieved only if it is able to show that it has a direct legal interest in the goods belonged to it and not to the purported importer. It is also held that the phrase 'person aggrieved' used in Sections 128 and 129A of the Act, do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made and it must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. The Apex Court thus held as follows:.a statutory remedy is provided to the Collector of Customs in connection with orders of the Appellate Collector of Customs passed immediately before the appointed day and also in connection with the orders passed by Collector of Customs under Section 128A, to direct proper officer to appeal on his behalf as Central Board of Excise and Customs against the orders of Collectors of Customs as provided by Section 129DA(1) as well as on the Central Government under contingencies contemplated by Section 129DD(1). These are the only statutory modes contemplated by the Act by resort to which the orders of Collector (Customs) could be brought in challenge before higher statutory authorities including the CEGAT. In the light of this statutory scheme, therefore, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the contesting respondents that Sub-section (1) of Section 129A entitles any and every person feeling aggrieved by the decision or order of the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority, to prefer statutory appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Neither the Central Government, through Industries Department, nor the rival company or industry operating in the same field as the importer can as a matter or right prefer an appeal as 'person aggrieved'. It is true that the phrase 'person aggrieved' is wider than the phrase 'party aggrieved'. But in the entire context of the statutory scheme especially Sub-section (3) of 129A it has to be held that only the parties to the proceedings before the adjudicating authority Collector of Customs could prefer such an appeal to the CEGAT and the adjudicating authority under Section 122(A) can prefer such an appeal only when directed by the Board under Section 129D(1) and not otherwise. It is easy to visualise that even a third party may get legitimately aggrieved by the order of the Collector of Customs being the adjudicating authority if it is contended by such a third party that the goods imported really belonged to it and not to the purported imported or that he had financed the same and, therefore, in substance he was interested in the goods and consequently the release order in favour of the purported imported was prone to create a legal injury to such a third party which is not actually arraigned as a party before the adjudicating authority and was not heard by it. Under such circumstances, such a third party might perhaps be treated to be legally aggrieved by the order of the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority and may legitimately prefer an appeal to the CEGAT as a 'person aggrieved'. That is the reason why the Legislature in its wisdom has used the phrase 'any person aggrieved' by the order of the Collector of Customs as adjudicating authority in Section 129A(1). But in order to earn a locus standi as 'person aggrieved' other than the aggrieved party before the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority it must be shown that such a person aggrieved being third party has a direct legal interest in the goods involved in the adjudication process. It cannot be a general public interest or interest of a business rival as is being projected by the contesting respondents before us.

10.7. It is true that a learned single Judge of this Court, Justice.Mohan, as he then was, in Indian Overseas Bank v. Collector Of Customs, cited supra, which also arises under the Customs Act in a matter relating to the confiscation proceedings of the imported goods, held that the bank is deemed to be the owner within the meaning of Sections 124 and 125 of the Act. Even, in the said decision, Justice. Mohan, as he then was, has observed that the object of the Customs Act is only to see that there is no illegal importation of goods and the various policies under the Import Trade control are enunciated with reference to the economic conditions of the country and one cannot claim an inviolable right with regard to importation. In the said decision, it was not in dispute that the documents were drawn to the order of the Shipper and endorsed in favour of the Bank for collection after presentation to the importer and as the importer refused to honour the documents on presentation and informed the Customs Authorities that he had no intention to clear the goods, the Customs Authorities initiated adjudication proceedings against the importer and ultimately the imported goods were seized and the importer was given option to redeem under Section 125 of the Act. Thus, while dealing with a case where the goods were imported according to law, it was held by Justice.Mohan, as he then was, that bank could be given a notice of adjudication under Section 124 of the Act.

10.8. Again, unlike in the matter of land acquisition cases, where a tenant of the land acquired has got some interest to be protected in the usual course is entitled for similar benefits or advantages against the wrongful acquisition or in the matter affecting his title to claim compensation, because ultimately such tenant would suffer a legal injury, in the present case, the banker, merely because he has issued letters of credit and having financed to the importer cannot claim that he is the person aggrieved when the import itself is not only invalid but also conceded to be a bogus and illegal event according to the import statutes, even though he has got the business interest in the matter, which itself cannot be a consideration to treat the appellant bank as the person aggrieved, more particularly, when the Apex Court in the detailed order dated 11.10.1996 did not satisfy with the records produced by the bank with regard to the circumstances under which the letters of credit were issued in favour of the importer, Kumar, who himself disowned his claim over the goods imported, and left the matter for the Reserve Bank of India to look into the same and to take necessary action in the matter.

10.9. Taking into consideration the object of Sections 124 and 129A of the Act, merely because the appellant Bank happened to be the financier to the Corporation, whose proprietor himself has denied his right on the imported goods, it cannot claim to be the person aggrieved against the order of confiscation passed by the Commissioner of Customs for filing an appeal under Section 129A of the Act, because they do not have any legal grievance against the confiscation proceedings even though they may have a lawful claim against the importer-Corporation. Even the extract from the Hand Book of Import-Export procedures would only protects the right of the banker to honour its commitments with the foreign supplier and not in the confiscation proceedings initiated under Section 124 of the Act in the case of mis-declaration of description of goods and under valuation of the imported goods attracting Section 111 of the Act, based on which the Department is entitled to initiate penal action under Section 112 of the Act for the commission and omission of the importer.

10.10. In the instant case, the appellant cannot claim any right against the confiscation claiming that he is legally entitled to import the goods because he is not the importer and therefore, the words 'any person aggrieved' employed in Section 129A of the Act should be given a wider meaning in a statute like Customs Act, which provides remedies for protection of the importer alone against the proposed confiscation proceedings with regard to the deprivation of his legal right of importing the goods legally.

In view of the above well settled propositions, we find no question of law much less a substantial question of law that would arise for our consideration in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.