SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/834803 |
Subject | Direct Taxation |
Court | Chennai High Court |
Decided On | Sep-05-2002 |
Case Number | T.C. No. 60 of 1997 |
Judge | R. Jayasimha Babu and ;K. Raviraja Pandian, JJ. |
Reported in | (2003)181CTR(Mad)86; [2003]260ITR571(Mad) |
Acts | Finance Act, 1983 - Sections 40(3) |
Appellant | Commissioner of Wealth-tax |
Respondent | Reliance Motor Co. Ltd. |
Appellant Advocate | T.C.A. Ramanujam, Adv. |
Respondent Advocate | R. Meenakshisundaram, Adv. |
Disposition | Reference allowed |
Excerpt:
- t.n. estates (abolition & conversion into ryotwari) act, 1948 [act no. 26/1948]. sections 5(2) & 67; [a.p. shah, cj, mrs. prabha sridevan & p. jyothimani, jj] suo motu revisional powers held, on a bare reading of the provisions of section 5(2) of the act, it is clear that the power conferred on the director by section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the settlement officer is very wide. in the first place, the director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. for example, if the director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the act, then to set right that mistake, the director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the act and to implement the purpose behind the act. the fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under section 67 for making an application to the director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in section 5(2) of the act is in any way curtailed or taken away. therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under section 5(2) of the act is not tenable. -- t.n. estates (abolition &
conversion into ryotwari) act, 1948.
sections 5(2) & 67; suo motu revisional powers held, on a bare reading of the provisions of section 5(2) of the act, it is clear that the power conferred on the director by section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the settlement officer is very wide. in the first place, the director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. for example, if the director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the act, then to set right that mistake, the director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the act and to implement the purpose behind the act. the fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under section 67 for making an application to the director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in section 5(2) of the act is in any way curtailed or taken away. therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under section 5(2) of the act is not tenable. r. jayasimha babu, j. 1. the question referred to us for our consideration, at the instance of the revenue, is as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellate tribunal was right in law in holding that the value of motor cars is not includible in the net wealth as they have been held as stock-in-trade by the assessee the assessment year is 1984-85.2. the provisions of the wealth-tax act as amended by section 40 of the finance act, 1983, as they stood in that assessment year, specifically provided for inclusion of the value of the motor cars in the assets of an assessee for the purpose of the assessment under the wealth-tax act, that was provided for in section 40(3)(vii) of the finance act, 1983. there was no provision made therein for excluding the value of the stock-in-trade.3. the assessee, which is a dealer in motor cars, claimed that the value of the cars, which were its stock-in-trade could not be included in the wealth-tax assessment. the commissioner as also the tribunal held that the stock-in-trade cannot be subjected to wealth-tax even when the asset, viz., the motor car had been specifically enumerated in section 43 of the finance act, 1983.4. the language used in the provision must be given its plain meaning though the section was amended subsequently late in the year 1989, to exclude the value of stock-in-trade. that amendment was not given retrospective effect so as to benefit the assessees in this assessment year. a benefit subsequently given by way of an amendment cannot on that score alone be regarded as having been already given, unless de hors that amendment, the provision is capable of being read and understood as taking within its fold what was subsequently brought in by way of an amendment.5. the words used in section 40(3) of the finance act, 1983, as they stood in this assessment year, do not permit the exclusion of stock-in-trade from the list of assets to be valued for the purpose of wealth-tax. though the assessee is a dealer in motor cars and held some of the cars as stock-in-trade, in view of the specific provision for valuing motor cars as part of the taxable wealth, the valuation of those cars for the purpose of levying tax was rightly done by the assessing officer. the tribunal was in error in holding that the cars could not have been assessed at all.6. the question referred to us is, therefore, answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.7. learned counsel for the assessee brings to our notice that the commissioner as also the tribunal had not gone into the claim made by the assessee that some cars were sold during the assessment year and, therefore, the value of those cars should have been excluded. we find substance in that submission, having perused the order of the tribunal and of the commissioner. we, therefore, remit the matter to the tribunal to determine the number of cars which were held by the assessee for the purpose of sale and work out the value thereof, after taking note of the sales actually effected during the assessment year and also the cars for which the assessee had received the full value in that year.
Judgment:R. Jayasimha Babu, J.
1. The question referred to us for our consideration, at the instance of the Revenue, is as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the value of motor cars is not includible in the net wealth as they have been held as stock-in-trade by the assessee The assessment year is 1984-85.
2. The provisions of the Wealth-tax Act as amended by Section 40 of the Finance Act, 1983, as they stood in that assessment year, specifically provided for inclusion of the value of the motor cars in the assets of an assessee for the purpose of the assessment under the Wealth-tax Act, That was provided for in Section 40(3)(vii) of the Finance Act, 1983. There was no provision made therein for excluding the value of the stock-in-trade.
3. The assessee, which is a dealer in motor cars, claimed that the value of the cars, which were its stock-in-trade could not be included in the wealth-tax assessment. The Commissioner as also the Tribunal held that the stock-in-trade cannot be subjected to wealth-tax even when the asset, viz., the motor car had been specifically enumerated in Section 43 of the Finance Act, 1983.
4. The language used in the provision must be given its plain meaning though the section was amended subsequently late in the year 1989, to exclude the value of stock-in-trade. That amendment was not given retrospective effect so as to benefit the assessees in this assessment year. A benefit subsequently given by way of an amendment cannot on that score alone be regarded as having been already given, unless de hors that amendment, the provision is capable of being read and understood as taking within its fold what was subsequently brought in by way of an amendment.
5. The words used in Section 40(3) of the Finance Act, 1983, as they stood in this assessment year, do not permit the exclusion of stock-in-trade from the list of assets to be valued for the purpose of wealth-tax. Though the assessee is a dealer in motor cars and held some of the cars as stock-in-trade, in view of the specific provision for valuing motor cars as part of the taxable wealth, the valuation of those cars for the purpose of levying tax was rightly done by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal was in error in holding that the cars could not have been assessed at all.
6. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
7. Learned counsel for the assessee brings to our notice that the Commissioner as also the Tribunal had not gone into the claim made by the assessee that some cars were sold during the assessment year and, therefore, the value of those cars should have been excluded. We find substance in that submission, having perused the order of the Tribunal and of the Commissioner. We, therefore, remit the matter to the Tribunal to determine the number of cars which were held by the assessee for the purpose of sale and work out the value thereof, after taking note of the sales actually effected during the assessment year and also the cars for which the assessee had received the full value in that year.